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ART. I.—SOUTH-CAROLINA: HER PRESENT ATTITUDE AND FUTURE ACTION.

*Proceedings of the meeting of Delegates from the Southern Rights Associations of South-Carolina; held at Charleston, May, 1851.*

THE most appropriate introduction to the remarks we propose to offer in regard to the present attitude of South-Carolina, and her future action, will be found in the noble exordium of General Hammond's late oration on the life and character of Mr. Calhoun. We shall quote this exordium, satisfied that it cannot too frequently invite the attention of our readers:

"Faith is an instinct of the human heart. Its strongest, its purest and its noblest instinct—the parent of love and of hope. In all ages and every where, mankind have acknowledged, adored and put their trust in the great Creator and Ruler of the Universe. And, descending from the invisible and infinite, to the visible and finite, they have entertained the same sentiments, differing only in degree, for those of their own species, who have received from heaven an extraordinary endowment of intellect and virtue. The ancient heathen deified them. By the early Christians they were enrolled among the saints. It is a shallow and a base philosophy which can see superstition only, in such customs, and fails to recognize the workings of a profound veneration for the attributes of God, as manifested through his favourite creations. A better knowledge of the bounds which separate the natural from the supernatural, has taught us in our day to limit our homage, but still it is a

deep and pure wisdom which counsels us to submit ourselves, in no grudging spirit, to the guidance of those great minds, that have been appointed to shed light and truth upon the world.

"To the honour and praise of South-Carolina it may be said, that she has always recognized her prophets, and believed their inspiration. She has aided and sustained them in the performance of their missions, with a warm and steady confidence, and she has been faithful to their memory. Her loyal reverence for real greatness has ever been a deep,—I might say, a religious sentiment,—untinted with superstition, but as profound as it is magnanimous and just."

These passages speak for themselves. We shall not stop to criticise them. To praise them would be superfluous. South-Carolina still "recognizes her prophets, believes in their inspiration, and aids and sustains them in the performance of their missions." Let her continue thus to honour merit, and reward service, and she will never be left without a prophet. The country of Rutledge and Pinckney, of Lowndes and Calhoun, of Hayne, McDuffie, Turnbull and Harper, still boasts her Cheves, her Barnwell, her Preston, her Rhett, and her Hammond, and, when these have fulfilled their appointed mission, others will not be wanting to supply their place. *Uno avulso, non deficit alter*. What other State has so long had cause to rejoice in the glory of her sons? Alas for Virginia! We look back twenty years, and we say, "there were giants in those days." In her convention of 1829, we see Madison, Monroe, Marshall, Randolph, Upshur, Leigh, Johnson, Stanard, Doddridge! They are gone. Of all that Titan generation, Tazewell alone remains—*neglected and forgotten*. Not even enough of the old leaven remains to do honour to the memory of the mighty dead. "They belonged to a past age. Great though they were in their day and generation, they had not the benefit of the lights that have since dawned upon the world. Locke, Sydney and Montesquieu, were the best instructors they had. Let them give place to Ledru Rollin, Lamartine, O'Connell and Abby Folsom." And so the wren now chatters from the eagle's perch. The obscure hyæna defiles the lion's lair. The monarch's roar no longer shakes the forest, and the black night of moral and intellectual darkness is only disturbed by the sharp petulant yelp of the fox and the wolf's long howl. "From out the palace of the Cæsars comes the owl's wild cry." In that very hall



where all these glorious names were met, what do we now see? One who boldly asserts, defying contradiction, and, contradicted, asserts it again, that John Locke was the contemporary of Charles I, and the apologist of his usurpations. Another, (a States Right man, par excellence,) who would wrest the sword from the hand of the State Executive, *lest, by possibility*, it might be used to restrain federal aggression. And these are the great ones of their respective parties—the champions in the arena, who, while they differ about all things else, concur to disgrace Virginia by their incompetency, and to dishonour, degrade and destroy her by their measures. How true, that “among the blind, a one-eyed man is a king.” Has Virginia then “lost the breed of noble bloods?” We would hope not. But she does not “recognize her prophets.” Has she not thrown away—cast out to seek their fortunes in other lands—more great men than any other State but South-Carolina can boast? Crawford and Clay, and Crittenden, Barry and Preston, Harrison and Scott, and Bibb and Bates—are not all these her sons? Did she not ostracise Randolph, the bold and valiant champion of her rights? Did she not dishonour Leigh, because he would not dishonour himself and her? Did she ever employ the giant intellect and spotless integrity of Johnson? She knew the virtue, the wisdom, the eloquence of Upshur. From an obscure corner of the State, he stepped forth into the arena, and made himself at once the admiration and wonder of all. Did she avail herself of this discovery of a pearl of great price? Did she not leave him to be drawn from the obscurity into which she suffered him to subside, by *federal* patronage, again to fill the world with amazement, that such a man should have so long lived unknown? Was it to her favour, or to her just appreciation of his greatness, that *even Marshall* owed the opportunity of securing to himself the unrivalled honour everywhere paid to his pure and illustrious name? Truly she has her reward. Her house is left unto her desolate. Her glory is departed. Her name has become a hissing and a by-word. Her arms are reversed.\* The tyrant now tramples on liberty. Her banner trails in the dust. Her fangless rattlesnake† is trodden under the foot of federal usurpation. Her most sacred and fundamental

\* The device is a figure of Liberty trampling on Tyranny.

† The cognizance of Virginia is a Rattlesnake.

institution, the only basis on which the temple of freedom can stand firm and enduring, is uprooted by fanatic abolition. She has renounced all her rights. Her cherished sovereignty is abolished by her own act. SHE HAS BEEN. And great and glorious she *was*. What is she now? Nothing. A political nonentity. A subject province, oppressed, insulted, outraged; not ashamed to complain of wrong: not daring to resent it: chewing her leech, but swearing horribly.

Whence came this? The answer to this question is foreign to our present topic: but we will give it in a few words, and let those who read ponder it for themselves. *She has given five Presidents to the United States.* Joy to South-Carolina, that she has never given one. He who administers power, can never be jealous of that power. He who feeds from the public treasury cannot be expected to care much by what means it is filled. We have been assured that the number of educated young men in Virginia, who grow up, looking to politics as a trade and to federal patronage for a livelihood, is tenfold greater than it was before Mr. Jefferson was President. What wonder, then, that jealousy of federal power fell into disrepute, when that power was wielded for more than thirty years, by the hands of her own most trusted sons; and the redundancy of federal patronage was profusely poured into her own bosom. What wonder, that, while she consecrated the stepping-stone (the Resolutions of '98) from which her Presidents rose to power, she frowned on all who dared to assert the principles of those resolutions against their authors? Alas for Virginia! And yet she takes upon herself to counsel us. We, who stand in the breach in her defence: in defence of principles, to the support of which "her life, and fortune and sacred honour" stand pledged; which, but twelve months ago, she declared she would maintain "at all hazards and to the last extremity," and which she has already basely deserted and surrendered. Is it not as if Judas had followed his betrayed master to the judgment-seat of Pilate, urging him to renounce his mission and live—to take his thirty pieces of silver and deny his father. "Get thee behind me, Satan: thou art an offence to me; for thou savourest not the things that be of God, but those that be of men." Enough of her! Honour to her old renown! Shame to her degeneracy. Once characterized by all that is noble,



disinterested and magnanimous ; what has made her what she is ?

“ Clime of the unforgotten brave,  
Whose land, from shore to mountain cave,  
Was freedom’s home and glory’s grave :  
Shrine of the mighty ! Can it be  
That this is all remains of thee.”

And South-Carolina ? Shall she, too, make her bed in dishonour ? Shall she, too, “ say to corruption ‘ thou art my father,’ and to infamy ‘ thou art my mother and my sister ? ’ ” Let her, then, follow in the footsteps of Virginia ; now advancing, now retreating ; uttering high-sounding words of vanity, and straightway eating them ; threatening and crouching ; showing her teeth and afraid to bite ; until, for her, too,

“ Self-abasement paves the way,  
To villain bonds and despot sway.”

God forbid ! Be it still our boast, that the Palmetto stands though the Oak falls.\* For the prostrate monarch of the forest let us take up the poet’s lament :

“ Thou, who unmoved, hast heard the tempest chide,  
Full many a winter, round thy craggy bed,  
And, like an earth-born giant, hast outspread  
Thy hundred arms, and heaven’s own bolts defied,  
Now liest along thy native mountain side  
Uptorn.”

What shall South-Carolina do, deserted as she is, “ in the imminent deadly breach,” by those who cheered her advance ? Shall she still go on ? Shall she fall back ? Or, shall she stand fast ?

1. Shall she advance ? Shall she go on to accomplish the wish that burns in the hearts of all her people, and throw off, at once, by secession, the yoke which galls her ? This is a question of COMPETENCY, of RIGHT, and of EXPEDIENCY.

Of the COMPETENCY of a State to secede from the Union, we believe that no doubt was ever expressed, until it was first denied in General Jackson’s famous and fatal proclamation of December, 1832. We are well assured that he himself was not aware of the force of the words put

\* The device of South-Carolina is a Palmetto standing by a fallen Oak.

for him by an artful and treacherous Secretary. It will be remembered that he afterwards publicly disavowed them ; and we do not now believe that any well informed man has ever yet, *in truth*, entertained a doubt of the *competency* of any State to resume the powers granted by herself in adopting the constitution. While the history of that instrument was fresh in the minds of all, it had not entered into the imagination of any man that it was possible to doubt it. At this moment, no intelligent man can examine the contemporary documents, without being convinced that, while these were present to the memory and understandings of all, such doubt was impossible. In that day, no man had forgotten that Virginia, in her very act of ratification, had expressly declared the right of her people to resume the powers granted by the constitution. At this day, Virginia herself affects to have forgotten this. Perhaps it may be more candid to admit, that the shallow and ignorant rabble, who have intruded themselves into her legislature and convention, never knew it. A few years ago, we should have deemed it superfluous to offer an argument on the subject. At this day it may be necessary

The inhabitants of the United States constitute as many distinct people as there are States, or they constitute one people. The fundamental principle of our revolution, vindicated by the event, recognized in the treaty of peace, and consecrated by the public act of each State, is, that "whenever any government shall be found inadequate, or contrary to the greatest degree of happiness and safety, a *majority* of the community hath the *inalienable*, indubitable and *indefeasible* right to reform, alter or abolish it in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal."

We quote here from the Bill of Rights of Virginia ; and we choose to do so, because we desire to bring our argument to bear, in all its force, on a State which has made herself not more conspicuous for the soundness of her principles than for her base desertion of them : not more for her boldness in proclaiming them, than for her desertion of those who rally to their support.

The maxim just quoted has never been disputed. It lies at the foundation of all our institutions, and there is not a State which has not recognized it and acted on it. But, if it be true, and if the constitution of the United



States has made one people of all the inhabitants of those States, then is that people a "community," of which this maxim may be predicated, and all the checks and limitations on federal power, with which that instrument abounds, are nugatory. Why were they introduced? Because it was seen that it would never do to put *all* the rights and interests of one part of this vast continent in the power of a numerical majority in another part, which might be united, as one man, to advance an opposing interest. Had they who maintained the oneness of the States believed themselves, they would long ago have resorted to this good old maxim, the *ultima ratio*, and most sacred monument of freedom, to turn it upon her, and seize upon all the power which, for more than half a century, they have been contriving, by trick and chicane, and all sorts of forced and false constructions of the constitution, to filch from the States, and to ascribe to that government, which is *their* government, *because* they are the *majority*. Being a *majority*, why did they not change the constitution at once? Why perjure themselves by continuing to swear to support it, while bent on its violation, when they had the power, and the *right*, to dispense with the oath, and with the constitution itself? On this hypothesis, the power of the free States has, from the first, been absolute over this very subject of slavery, which now fills the land with agitation and alarm. Under the constitution, our slaves are represented to the extent of three-fifths. But, in an extra-constitutional revolutionary movement, such as is contemplated by the Virginia Bill of Rights, they would not be considered at all. They form no part of that "community," to a majority of which our maxim ascribes the indubitable, inalienable and indefeasible right to change the constitution; and there has been no day, for the last thirty years, when that majority was not ready to abolish slavery absolutely, could they have devised the means of accomplishing that object. To have assembled in convention for that purpose would have been to throw off the mask prematurely. The time may be at hand, when, a sufficient number of States having been cajoled, bullied, and bribed to submission, they may march, by that road, directly to their object.

But if it be admitted that, by the adoption of the constitution, all the States were amalgamated into one people, there was nothing to stop them for a moment. Why,

then, did they not at once go on, to accomplish this and other darling projects? They have, at all times, had a majority, who would have given power, under a new constitution, to charter banks, to open roads and canals, to impose tariffs, protective and prohibitory, to levy all the taxes on the South, and expend them on the North. Why has it not been done? And how can we believe the statesmen of the South to have been so blind as to rest secure that these things could not be done, if they were conscious of having done an act, conceding to a fixed local majority, in the North, the power and the right to change the constitution at pleasure? Patrick Henry, in the Virginia convention, laid much stress on this matter, declaring that, in the fullness of time, when the pear should be ripe, a construction would be given to the words, "We, the people of the United States," under which the North would acquire power to set all our slaves free. But what said the advocates of the constitution, in that body? They denied that the words could be made to bear any such construction, and protested against any such disingenuous perversion of their meaning. But Patrick Henry was a prophet. He foresaw this day, and he was perfectly right in saying that, if the words, "We, the people," have the effect attributed to them by politicians of the Webster school, then all limitations on the central power were nugatory. Had the constitution gone on to give, in terms, but a single power, and had it, in terms, prohibited every other, it could have made no difference. The words, so understood, would have amounted to an absolute surrender of all power, by the fixed Southern minority, to the fixed Northern majority. If this were so, the constitution would not be worth the skin of parchment it is written on.

Are we to be told, in answer to all this, that the constitution requires the assent of three-fourths of the States to all changes of that instrument? What of that? Is not this provision itself a part of that constitution of government, which a majority of the community has as much right to change as any other? What if a State were to declare her constitution unchangeable? Would that make it so? We find the answer in the words of our maxim, which declares the right to change to be *inalienable* and *indefeasible*. How, then, can it be barred by any constitutional provision, and how can the question



of change be rightfully decided by any thing but the will of the majority? Let every Southern man rest assured, that, if once we are brought to admit that the whole population of the States constitute one people, twelve months will not pass over before a majority of that people will give us a constitution that will place all our rights at the tender mercy of our enemies, and expose all our property to their rapacity. Are Southern men yet to be told that this thing is already thought of and spoken of at the North? Have they not seen intimations of the sort in Northern papers? We have. It was indeed indiscreet to give us so much insight into their views. But they presume upon our blindness and supineness, upon our cupidity and our cowardice, the anodyne power of Texas scrip and federal patronage, and the benumbing terror of federal power. They may be safe in doing so. We are not sure that Virginia would not go into such a convention, and agree to be bound by its vote. The honour and glory of seats in such a body, and the hope of prætorships, and quæstorships, and vice-royalties in the Southern provinces of the empire, might be as tempting to the demagogues who now direct her councils, as seats in the cabinet and foreign missions. What would South-Carolina do? What *could* she do *then*, against the concentrated force of a consolidated empire? *What, then, should she do now?* It depends on her answer to this question, whether she shall be put to find an answer to the other.

We content ourselves with this concise view of the matter. It is the only one with which the public has not been made familiar, by the tongues and pens of our Hayne, Calhoun, Cheves, McDuffie and others, who, though dead, yet speak. It would be superfluous and impertinent to repeat their arguments. That which we offer is only presented, because it is less trite, though, to our own minds, perfectly conclusive. The *reductio ad absurdum* refutes the idea that the inhabitants of the United States constitute one entire people, and establishes as incontestably, that they constitute as many distinct people as there are States.

The COMPETENCY of each State to separate herself from the Union, and to place herself, by her own act, (whether justly or unjustly, rightfully or wrongfully,) in all the relations of a foreign State, follows as an inevitable consequence. Her right to be recognized and dealt

with, as such, could not be denied by the United States, or by any nation of the civilized world.

We come, then, to the question of RIGHT. Has such been the conduct of the other States of this Union as to justify South-Carolina, in the sight of God and man, in declaring the compact which binds her to them forfeited, by breach of its conditions, and renouncing its obligations? Were it necessary, we might state the question in another way: Has experience shown the constitution of the United States to be conducive to the happiness and safety of the people of South-Carolina, or is it manifest that it must be fatal to both? We will not discuss either of these questions. Our wrongs are not denied by any of the Southern States, and even the perpetrators themselves seek their justification in appeal to a "*higher law*," which cancels all obligations, and absolves from all oaths. As to the effect of this incongruous Union on our prosperity, our happiness, and the safety of our institutions, we believe there is but one opinion among ourselves; and, on *this point*, it is our own judgment that must guide us. On such matters, nations never consult the rest of the world.

Coming, then, to the question of EXPEDIENCY, we are prepared at once to answer, without farther argument, that the day that frees South-Carolina from the yoke of this fatal Union will be a day to be ever celebrated in songs of praise and thanksgiving. But when we inquire of the EXPEDIENCY of attempting to shake it off, we are met by the terrible question: "Can she do it?"

And has it come to this? Are the chains riveted so strong upon us, that all attempts to break them can but bruise our fettered arms? Shall we, then, take up the speech of Belial, counselling "ignoble ease, and peaceful sloth—not peace?"

" Shall we, then, live thus vile—  
Thus trampled—thus expelled to suffer here  
Chains and these torments? Better these than worse,  
By my advice, since fate inevitable  
Subdues us, and omnipotent decree  
The victor's will."

Is it, then, true, that to advance is to rush on destruction? For ourselves, we do not think so. But to act, in a great crisis, with divided counsels, is dangerous, and



rarely wise, though it is sometimes the part of wisdom to defy all danger. Many, among ourselves, think this not a case of that sort. They see danger, which, bold and resolute as they are. (and they are among our truest hearts,) they are unwilling to encounter. But for this, and were we all, with one mind, prepared to encounter the worst that might befall, we believe that the danger would dissipate itself in empty menace. We have great faith in the desperation of determined men, and few are bold enough to encounter it. Despair is fatal, but there is *hope in desperation*. But men are not to be *reasoned* up to this, and the fact that such as we speak of, but will not name, have such misgivings, is entitled to great weight, even with those who do not partake their doubts. In this case, we are constrained to admit it to be decisive, at least of the question, whether South-Carolina should proceed, forthwith, to take the important and final step, of dissolving her connection with the other States, and assuming her separate and independent place among the nations of the earth.

II. But shall she then fall back? Shall she, too, declare herself wronged—insulted—outraged—but submissive? Shall she, too, “swear horribly” about what she will do, *if* ——? Shall she fall back quietly into her old and friendly relations with her implacable enemies, and join in the shout of *esto perpetua* to this Mezentian Union? God forbid! If she cannot advance, let her, at least, stand fast in the position she has assumed, proclaiming her rights and her wrongs; her unshaken determination to maintain the one and resist the other; to bide her time; never to “give rest to her eyes, nor slumber to her eyelids,” until the inglorious and galling yoke is shaken off; to husband her resources; to renounce all commercial intercourse with her oppressors; to take no part in the affairs of the Union; to prepare all things for the last and decisive step, and to seize on all means and opportunities for effecting her deliverance.

III. Should such be the purpose, then let her not give one foot of ground; let her take no step backward, but stand fast, just where she is.

But in what attitude shall she stand? Can she forbear, even for a time, to act out her avowed purpose, without giving back? Is there any medium between advance and retreat? This is the question of questions. If there can

be no such middle ground, then is there nothing left to South-Carolina but to choose between the different modes of inevitable destruction. Will she perish now, sword in hand, or preserve a dishonoured existence, for a season, to die by the hangman's hands, or to rest in chains and rot in a dungeon? These are questions to be decided, not by reason, but by impulse and taste. Whether to leap overboard, or perish in the burning ship, is but a choice between fire and water. Few men know how they themselves would choose in such extremity, and none have a right to advise others. One brave man may cling to the last plank, while another, equally bold, leaps into the waves, crying, "Hell is empty, and all the devils are here." When we think of the Sewards, and Hales, and Giddingses, the Clays, and the Websters, and Scotts, the Footes, and Toombses, and Stephenses, we ourselves should feel inclined to follow him—but by no means advising others to follow us.

But, in our judgment, there is a middle course. There are many things which South-Carolina can do, without making any present issue with federal power—acts which shall mark her determination not to submit, and prepare her for resistance when the time for resistance comes.

We beg leave to introduce what we have to say on these topics by a remark which may seem too speculative for the occasion, and the more so, because it is to be found in the writings of all who have ever speculated on the science of government. It is, that free government lacks the energy necessary to great emergencies. When dangers are all around, and every thing is in peril, there is no time to chaffer with individuals, and to work the complex problem of right and expediency. If vessels of gold and silver are wanted for fire-buckets, they must be used, and the soft handed owners must fall into line, and hand them too. What would have been the fate of New-Orleans, if Jackson had waited for formal authority from the owners of cotton-bales, before he built them into his breastwork? What would have been the event of his Florida campaign, if he had not summarily cashiered incompetent officers, put men of action into their place, and shot such as refused obedience to these, because he did not wait for commissions from the seat of government? Yet we cannot help shuddering at such things, nor can we think of them, as precedents, without dismay.



Had he failed, it would have been remembered that he had done things for which he might be shot or hanged. Let the same thing be done *hereafter*, and, whatever failure may follow, it will only be remembered that General Jackson had done the like. In the rout of Bladensburg, and in his flight from Washington, Mr. Madison forgot all his own irrefragable arguments against a bank, and Mr. Clay, as he declared, found an answer to them all, "in the necessities of the war." Had not the imbecility of the British ministry given us peace, Mr. Monroe, as Secretary of War, was ready for a *conscription* of 40,000 men. The prescient sagacity of John Randolph foresaw all this, and he warned us that "we should come out of the war without the constitution." How true the prophecy, let banks and tariffs, internal improvements and abolition, testify.

It will always be a question with a free people, whether they shall submit to wrong, or repel and avenge it at this hazard. But all people, worthy to be free, have ever decided that question in the same way. That hazard, along with all others, must be incurred. But it is the part of wisdom to endeavour to reduce that hazard to the minimum, and no surer indication of a resolute purpose of desperate resistance can be given, than the adoption of measures to mitigate the strain on the constitution which desperate resistance must cause.

The question being asked, "How is the constitution to be saved from this strain?" we give the answer in a few words: "By setting it aside for the occasion, and laying it up for future use."

Is this idea new? It is as old as the early days of the Roman Republic. It was the talisman of Roman invincibility. It was this which gave to the constitution of Rome a longer duration than Providence has allotted to any other free government. Whatever name political philosophy may assign to the constitution of Rome—whatever was recognized as the source of power—thus much we know certainly. In the normal condition of the government, power was so widely distributed, that nothing requiring concentrated action could be legally done but by the consent of many minds. The executive power, limited as it was, was divided between two. But, without a decree of the Senate, they could do nothing out of the ordinary routine of peace and tranquillity, and even such

decree might be arrested and annulled by a Tribunitian veto. In the field, at the head of his army, the power of the consul was absolute enough, as all military power must be. But he did not exercise it in virtue merely of the consular office. A decree of the Senate was necessary to assign him to the command of the army, and, even when there, he was liable to be recalled and censured by the Senate, and to be summoned, by jealous Tribunes, to answer criminally before the people, for the conduct of the war. How could such a constitution stand the shock of a war, threatening the very existence of the State? How could it be that innumerable lawless acts, excused by necessity and vindicated by success, should not be made precedents for similar acts, until nothing but the name of constitutional freedom should remain? The answer is found in a device, which amazes us not more by its grandeur than its simplicity. Those imperious necessities which might be pleaded in excuse for usurpation, were avoided, by a *free grant* of unlimited power. But it was not on the existing and permanent government that this grant was conferred. The regular constitutional rulers had thus no motive to create necessities, with a view to procure an enlargement of their powers. Just the reverse. So far from receiving any accession of power, they were required to surrender all that they already had. It was the office of the consul himself, standing in his place in the Senate, to give it in charge to some Fabius or Camillus, designated, we presume, by notorious enjoyment of public confidence, "to take care that the republic suffer no damage." The consul could not appoint himself, though he was not incapable of receiving the appointment at the hands of another. The power so conferred was absolute and irresponsible.

It is remarkable, that such power was never abused. But it is equally remarkable, that the men selected for this momentous trust were always men distinguished for moderation, and possessing the sober confidence of the public, rather than the noisy popularity which is the meed of the demagogue. But so it is. Men rarely mistake the marks of true greatness, and though, on ordinary occasions, they may bestow their suffrage to gratify a personal partiality, or to advance the views of a friend, yet, in times of extreme peril, they never prefer a Cleon to a Pericles, a prating Chares to a silent Phocion.

But, let it be remembered too, that the power thus conferred, though absolute for the time, was limited in duration, and that its instant determination reduced its depositary at once to the rank of a private citizen. He was not, indeed, answerable, even then, to inimical prosecution, for any abuse of this unlimited power; but he was still dependent on public esteem for all his future prospects, and this he was the more sure to lose by misconduct, *because* he was not criminally responsible. Had the law allowed the punishment of a successful dictator, for any crime, however flagrant, the prosecution would, perhaps, excite reaction and sympathy on his behalf. But, being safe from punishment, there could be nothing to break the force of public detestation. Had General Scott been arrested and punished for that preposterous conduct of his at Mexico, which might have provoked a mutiny, if those he insulted by his absurd order had been as indiscreet as he, he would have been requited by the presidency. As it is, men speak of his folly with a good-humoured smile, and content themselves with wondering how a man, possessing undoubted military talents of a high order, can make himself so ridiculous and contemptible. General Jackson committed what, in the eye of the law, were capital crimes. He was denounced in the Senate, and threatened; and he, in turn, threatened to cut off the ears of his denouncers. The people sided with him, and made him President. The enemies of General Scott were more discreet. They loaded him with honours, and left the name of Marshal Tureene to stick to him. It will stick to him, and will go down to posterity, in striking contrast to the honour which will forever attach to the rude soubriquet of Old Hickory. In short, the Romans never chose a vain man as Dictator, and it may be doubted whether any man ever selected for that high office would not have stood less in awe of the Tarpeian Rock itself, than of the contempt and detestation of the public, *aggravated by his impunity.*

However this may be, the dictatorial power never was abused, and was never resisted. It always proved equal to the occasion, and determined in the very moment of success and triumph.

Has it never occurred to our politicians, that what we call a convention is a many-headed dictator? It is even so. A convention is, by political fiction, what its name



imports—an assemblage of the whole body of the people. The people are the source of all power, and, therefore, to the power of the people, met in convention, there is no limit. Of the same nature is the political omnipotence of the British Parliament. The king and lords are actually there, and, by fiction of law, the commons are all there too. Who, then, shall set a limit to their power, and why may they not change the constitution itself, as they have done more than once. We get the idea from them; but we do not copy the English model. Our people meet in convention, with power, of course, unlimited; and the use made of it is to constitute a government of limited powers, administered by men who act under a restricted power of attorney, called a constitution. This, like all such powers, may be enlarged or revoked at pleasure, or it may be, for the time, superseded, whenever the principal thinks proper to come forward in person, and act for himself.

This is precisely what the people of South-Carolina should now do. They have already taken steps for meeting in convention, and, when met, they will find themselves in attitude to strike or ward, as occasion may require; to exert every muscle of the body politic; to command all the resources of the State; to adopt measures equal to every emergency, and, in short, to do every act which the necessities of the time and the public good may require, without being embarrassed by questions of constitutional authority. Meantime, the constitution lies quietly upon the shelf. A word from the convention will be enough to continue the powers of the existing government, at discretion. A word will be enough to annul them, and to leave no public authority but that of the people themselves, in convention. But, should it be thought advisable, as it probably would be, to employ the services of the present functionaries, under their present denominations, the convention should still keep itself in place, to enlarge or restrain the powers of these functionaries, *for the time*, so as to adapt them to all emergencies. *For the time!* What time? Until the peaceable recognition of the independence of South-Carolina by the United States. Until that is done, the public peril may be too great to be encountered by a government armed only with such powers as a people jealous of freedom will entrust to their *permanent* rulers. But, in the meantime,

is it to be endured that the liberty of the people may be cloven down, all their rights trampled under foot, their government abolished, and the State a subjugated province, under the dominion of the commissary of a foreign power, and all for want of some constitutional authority, which the people, *if they could be appealed to*, would not hesitate to give? *Let them, then, keep themselves in condition to be appealed to.* Is paper money necessary? Let power be given to issue it. Is it necessary to send the militia out of the State? Let it be authorized. Should it be found that even bills of attainder, terrible as they are, would be a less evil than base men, keeping within the limits of written law, might bring upon the State—what then? Can any man fear that, should they be deliberately and solemnly authorized by the convention, and then deliberately and solemnly enacted by the legislature, the axe would fall on any head not worthy of death? These thoughts are awful, and it is because they are awful that we present them. The struggle in which South-Carolina may be involved, sooner or later, will be no May-game. Should coercion be attempted, every man must go into it, taking his life in his hand. If the people are not prepared for this, let them stop short at once, and fall back; eat all their words; renounce all their principles; relinquish all hope; and let South-Carolina, like Virginia, kissing the hand that smites and the foot that spurns her, submit herself to bondage, and forget that she ever heard the name of honour.

Do we, then, propose that the convention shall keep itself in perpetual session? By no means. Let them determine upon a position of “masterly inactivity,” and adjourn from time to time, devolving their powers, in the interval, on a committee of public safety, consisting of a few men, who possess the confidence of the people and the respect of the world. South-Carolina has such men within her borders. It is a favourable omen, that God has not yet left her without her prophets, and, while she is true to herself, she will never want a man “to go in and out before him!” Alas for Virginia! Has *she* no great minds and noble spirits, that Botts, and Wise, and such as they, are left to speak for the land of Washington, Henry, Jefferson, Madison, Marshall, Mason, Lee, Randolph, Leigh and Johnson? The great and *unterrified*

COLONY !” \* *The abject, crouching, craven STATE !* South-Carolina, is this to be your exemplar ? Marion, Pickens and Sumter, Pinckney and Rutledge, Lowndes, Hayne, Turnbull, Calhoun, McDuffie, Harper, sleep on ! Your fame is consecrated by death, that dies not ! South-Carolina cannot dishonour you. South-Carolina *will* not dishonour you. “Up, Guards, and at them !” were the last words of her great leader. Had these been the last words of Wellington—had a ball, at that moment, crashed through his brain—would it have changed the fate of Waterloo ? The live-long day had that gallant body, curbing their impatient valour, lain secure in the hollow of the road that ran along the brow of that hill, restrained by the authority of a leader, who knew when to forbear and when to strike. Would they not have avenged his fall ? Just so has the impatient spirit of South-Carolina been held in check, by the influence of one equally wise and equally bold. His last words announced that the moment of action was come. “Up, Guards, and at them !” Shall she not avenge him ?

But it is not by one bold and fiery charge that the enemy we must encounter is to be swept from the field. Prudent boldness, masterly inactivity, deliberate promptness, fortitude, self-denial, these are the tactics—these are the weapons of South-Carolina’s warfare.

“Masterly inactivity !” “deliberate promptitude !” Behold these ideas embodied in a *war government*, lying dormant awhile, till the crisis comes, when every energy must be strained, every resource put in requisition, and the concentrated force of the State, hurled like a stone from the hand of a giant ; a *peace government*, with its limited powers, goes on quietly, to perform its peaceful functions, with its accustomed regard to constitutional restraints and vested rights.

The measure of secession, let it be adopted when it may, will be only one of many things that South-Carolina will have to do, and most of which must be first done. It is fortunate that many of these are of such a nature that they may be done without producing, directly or indirectly, any collision with the central power at Washington. They are such as will prepare and dispose the minds of her own people for the last decisive step.

\* These are the words of Lord Cornwallis.



They are such as will open the eyes of other States to their own true position and true interests. They are such as will awaken the slumbering attention of European statesmen, to what is passing here, and provoke them to study and understand the true character of our institutions. If the importance and character of these measures be duly considered, it will be seen than many of them are not within the competency of the regularly constituted and permanent government of the State. Let us look at some of them.

When the legislature assembles, can they dispense with the oath to support the constitution of the United States? When taken, are they to follow the example of that perjured wretch, Seward, and plead the authority of a higher law releasing them from the obligation of that oath? Can they free from that obligation all the functionaries of the State, by whom, alone, they can act, and who have already taken that oath? These questions can only be answered in the negative.

A convention will have no such difficulties. It is a body not known to the constitution. It does not meet *under* the constitution. It is above all constitutions: for of such bodies all our constitutions are the creatures. It may prescribe its own oaths, or dispense with all. It may cancel all existing commissions, and issue new ones, dispensing with the oath to support the constitution, which they are about to renounce and abjure.

Can the present Senators and Representatives of South-Carolina, consistently with that oath, forbear their attendance on the sessions of Congress? Should they resign, can the legislature, consistently with that oath, forbear to fill the vacancies in the Senate? Can the governor withhold new writs of election for members of the Lower House?

Let us not deceive ourselves. We have, heretofore, conscientiously, and acting in strict conformity to that oath, opposed what we deemed infractions of the constitution. We have reasoned justly when we said, that, in opposing, by all means, unconstitutional laws, it was we who were supporting the constitution. But the case is altered, when the very thing proposed is to shake off the constitution, as an intolerable burthen, and to renounce all its obligations. Until we do this, South-Carolina must continue to be dishonoured by the appearance of her

Senators and Representatives in that synagogue of Satan, that Sanhedrim of the powers of darkness, that meets at Washington. It is only by the action of a convention, untrammelled by any such oath, that this degradation can be avoided.

Is there any authority in the regular constitutional government of the State to open negotiations with foreign powers? Is any constitutional functionary authorized to propose and adjust that reciprocation of commercial advantages, which would make the commerce of South-Carolina most beneficial to herself, and of more value to a foreign manufacturing and commercial nation than that of any other State in the existing Union? Is any one authorized to represent to such a nation that her own rights and interests are engaged to forbid those annoyances to her trade with the free, sovereign and independent State of South-Carolina, the dread of which hangs over us, as the only thing to deter us from at once assuming that character among the nations of the earth?

Is there any authority, under the constitution, for prohibiting or crippling the trade of the Northern States with our people? for raising troops? for issuing scrip, for the purposes of effecting loans? for issuing bills of credit, by which the State might avail herself of the confidence of her own sons in her faith and resources, though all others might be distrustful? The necessity for these, and many other powers, which would suggest themselves, may be the consequence, and they should therefore be the antecedents of secession. There is not one of these measures about which the central power at Washington can raise a question, to be brought to the arbitrament of courts or arms. All this may be done, and having done this, South-Carolina might go on, preparing to work out her deliverance, evading all collision, until the danger of collision should have passed away, or until she should be in condition to defy it.

Do the powers of the convention extend to all these objects? If they do not, then it is not a *convention of the people*. The powers of *such a body* are, from the nature of the thing, unlimited. An assemblage of deputies, however called together, invested with powers limited in the slightest degree, is not a *convention of the people*, in fact, and no fiction can make it so. If the body about to assemble is doubtful of the extent of its powers, let it

invite the people to remove that doubt, by a new election, under an act expressly providing that they who shall come together under it shall have full power to take care "*quod nil detrimenti capiat respublica.*"

It is doubted whether the people are enough in earnest to be willing to sustain the convention in the stand we propose that it shall take. A new election may be contrived, to remove that doubt too. Meantime, the convention, *without disbanding*, may adjourn, after having done whatever they may deem clearly right, and in accordance with the public will. But let them not adjourn without having first published a manifesto, declaring that South-Carolina, (in language used by all the States, seventy-five years ago,) "*of right, ought to be a free, sovereign and independent State;*" but that, *in fact*, though sovereign, she is *not free, not independent*, but a *subject province* of a power, which, by innumerable infractions of the only bond which bound her to it, has made itself a *power foreign to her*, with interests antagonist to hers, oppressive, unjust, tyrannical, devoted to a course of policy injurious to her rights and fatal to her very existence. Such is, indeed, the true import, even of the whimpering palinode of Virginia, recently put forth under the absurd name of *resolutions*. But shall South-Carolina, like Virginia, proclaim her determination to submit to these wrongs, and to cherish friendly relations with the perpetrators? Let her, indeed, frankly say to her people, that she has not, at this moment, power to protect them from the axe and the halter which her oppressors are preparing for them; let her advise them, therefore, to pay all taxes, duties, imposts and excises, and to offer no resistance to the federal courts within her limits. But let her, at the same time, declare her fixed determination never again to take part in the affairs of the central government. Let her annul all her laws for the election of federal officers, and call upon all who now hold them to resign them. Let her protest that she will no longer lend an active compliance to her own ruin, and say plainly to her enemies that she regards them only as enemies—that she does not strike, only because her hands are tied; but that she cherishes, and will cherish, as necessary to her salvation, a sentiment of undying hate, and a settled purpose of revenge, whenever the day of vengeance may come. *It will come!* When? However long delayed, what will she lose by assuming the attitude



we propose? Is the federal government anything to her? Is her voice of any weight in the federal councils? She pays, and she can but continue to pay, into the treasury. What does she hope to receive from it? The only appropriations ever spent within her borders are for military fortresses, which, under the pretence of protecting, are really meant to bridle her. These will go on, and she will get the benefit of them, *when they fall into her hands, as an independent State*. Then, and not till then. *And that time will come*. As soon as the people of South-Carolina are brought to know and feel that their deadliest enemies are on this continent, they will learn to see their best friends in the enemies which the restless cupidity and growing insolence of the North will provoke. Let the North again presume so far on the pacific policy of any European nation as to put forth any such bravado as "54° 40', or fight," and they will presently be indulged with a fight. Let them back the schemes of Yankee speculators and adventurers in Nicaragua, and crow defiance to Great Britain. Will she fail to see that her interest, not less than her honour, will require her to echo that defiance, and to push on the controversy, which must surely aid in the dismemberment of that power from which she has more to dread than from all the nations of Europe? What is the foundation of the power of Great Britain? Her foreign possessions. But these are preserved at great charge of men and money. And what are they all, as elements of power, to the central authority, compared with the subject provinces here, in the south of *New England*, which cost her nothing, and from which she can derive, in time of war, not only money, but men. Canada furnishes no men to the British armies; but Virginia will be proud to wear the livery of her Northern masters, and will think herself well repaid for all her sacrifices, by the chance of furnishing a new "military chieftain," another *hero*, to be a candidate for the presidency, and to make himself subservient to the interests of her oppressors. It is but the other day that South-Carolina poured out, like water, the rich blood of her noblest sons, to conquer an *El Dorado* for these Northern harpies. Will she ever do so again? Let her see to it *now*, that she never shall, by assuming an attitude which shall *familiarize* her people with the great truths necessary to their salvation. Be it lightning or

earthquake that throws down the walls of their prison, let them be prepared to hail it as a friend and deliverer.

But the people of South-Carolina have not yet entirely forgotten the angry feelings growing out of the war of the revolution. Well, then, let them read over the declaration of independence, and compare the wrongs recited there to those they now endure. What was the *actual* grievance then? What is it now? Then they "augured misgovernment at a distance." Now the evil is upon them, and tenfold greater evil than the most far-seeing politicians of that day anticipated from British tyranny. One, and but one, of the luxuries of the rich was taxed, not more than five per cent. Now, every necessary of life, which she does not produce at home, is taxed, at an average rate of not less than thirty per cent. Then, *Old* England claimed the right to exact from her a portion of the revenue necessary for the support of the British empire, while the amount expended for the benefit of South-Carolina very far exceeded all that she was called on to contribute. Now, *New* England requires her, together with a few of her uncomplaining and acquiescent sisters, to furnish the whole revenue of the Union, no part of which comes back to them, except in the shape of bribes to such as are willing to sell themselves into the service of their enemies, for Texas scrip and the emoluments of office. And are we to lose all sense of present wrong, insult and intolerable grievance, in the cherished remembrance of a wrong which was but speculative, and not attended, even at the time, by any actual grievance to us? Massachusetts was wronged. Massachusetts was aggrieved. But she forgets, or dissembles the recollection of her wrongs, and enters into league with the fanatics of Exeter Hall, to make war upon an institution entwined with our very vitals. She *was* wronged. She was outlawed, and her port of Boston was shut. *We* took up arms, in *her* quarrel. It was hardly our own. But we made it our own. It was for her that our Moultrie, Marion, Pickens and Sumter fought, in defence of our fire-sides, against an enemy whom our zeal in her behalf brought upon us. From Ninety-Six to Charleston, our country is full of monuments of our efforts in her cause. It was for her the gallant Hayne died a felon's death; and the requital of that sacrifice is to threaten the like doom to his descendants, should they be as bold, in de-

fence of our own rights, as he then was in defence of hers. We separated ourselves from *Old* England, because the port of Boston was shut up. Should we now separate ourselves from *New* England, we hear from Boston, itself, that the port of Charleston is to be shut up. "Oh! fools and slow of heart, to believe all that your prophets have spoken!" What is there, at this day, antagonistic, between the interests of Great Britain and those of South-Carolina? Is not each the consumer of all the others productions, reciprocally? Is not their relation, like that of the sexes, each necessary to the other. And shall South-Carolina, like the Circassian slave, continue shut up in the harem of a brutal and sordid tyrant, when a generous lover is waiting to make her his honoured wife, and to establish her in wealth, and comfort, and freedom, and all the dignity of a Christian matron? How is this delusion kept up? It is from the same source whence all our other evils flow. With all her professions of friendship, Massachusetts hates England, with an inextinguishable, *because interested hatred*. They are rivals in commerce. They are rivals in manufactures. An especial object of rivalry is the commerce of the Southern States, and hence Massachusetts does all that she can to keep alive in the South their old animosities, and to prevent the growth of any sympathy between us and England. Hence she excites the impertinent clamours of English abolitionists. What for? Can they interfere with our institutions? No! they can but make us angry. And so Massachusetts echoes the brayings of long-eared Exeter Hall, and would have us take them for the articulate voice of the people of England. Never was there a grosser mistake. Never did any people more heartily repent a folly and a wrong, than the enlightened of England repent their blundering injustice to her West India possessions. They have become a burthen to her. They continually harass her, with well-founded complaints, and demand some indemnity, in the way of protection to their sugar, in the English market. But this is oppressive to her people at home, and especially to the manufacturing operative, to whom coarse sugars are a necessary of life. To reconcile him to this, nothing so ready as an appeal to his sympathies with his brother slave, on this side of the Atlantic; and he, poor wretch, shut up in the work-house, the factory or the



mine, readily believes that the condition of the negro slave must be a "lower depth, in that lowest deep," with the horrors of which he is so familiar. Little does he understand of the "proud submission, the liberal obedience, the generous loyalty," the heartfelt love, which so often warm the negro's heart, animate his labours, render his light tasks yet more light, and make his duty his delight. But this truth is finding its way to enlightened English minds, and, let but South-Carolina, even alone, set up for herself, and establish such commercial relations with Great Britain as would be best for both parties, how long would it be before Great Britain would see her interest in permitting, and encouraging, and aiding Jamaica, and her other West India Islands, to form one State, and Demarara another, and to enter into confederacy with South-Carolina? Getting slaves from the continent, they would need no more protection, and all the clamour about "slave-grown sugar" would cease forever. Entering the ports of England, under a moderate revenue tariff, the sugar would find its way to the operative at half its present price, and the poor woman, wasted and worn by her twelve hours of unceasing toil, would not be obliged to deny herself the cheering influence of her indispensable cup of tea—her only luxury, and not her least necessary.

We have wandered on, from topic to topic, of this vast subject, and find it still extending before us, in the never-ending variety of all the chances of that new and untried being, on which South-Carolina is about to enter. Gladly would we perform the office of the good fairy, of the Eastern tale, who watches over the birth of the new-born princess, and welcomes her to life with the promise of the choicest gifts. We can only promise Carolina one blessing, in which all others are comprehended, and, should she fail of that, *she*, at least, shall have no cause to reproach us, for the fulfillment of the promise will depend on her. We promise that *she shall be true to herself*. Let her but go to her work with full purpose of accomplishing it, sooner or later, and she will hazard nothing for want of prudence, and lose nothing for want of boldness, and surrender nothing for want of fortitude. Is she not the land of MARION? Let his spirit animate her. Let his example instruct her. Patient, vigilant, indefatigable, enduring, never ashamed to run, never afraid to

strike, let her show, in her own quarrel, the same qualities she displayed in fighting the battles of ungrateful Massachusetts, and she cannot fail.

We find we have omitted a single remark, without which we might be liable to misconstruction. It may be supposed that, because the revolutionary convention ought, as we insist, to be a body unfettered by any constitutional restraint, it should therefore be exempt from the control of public opinion, and not take measures to keep itself in communication with public sentiment. Far from it. On the contrary, it should not fail to take every measure to keep itself fully advised of all the workings of the common mind, and, for that purpose, to provide for new elections, at short intervals, of the whole or portions of its own body. The existence of the convention should be uninterrupted, while opportunity should be given, from time to time, for the people to express any change of purpose, by a change of members. We have already suggested the wisdom of plainly indicating to the people the course of action deemed most advisable, and affording them, in the outset, an opportunity of arresting that course, or pledging themselves to it by new elections. Should their hearts fail them, all experience proves that contest must be unavailing, and that there will be nothing left but submission, however abject. But let them express their approbation of the proposed course of action, by the re-election of its authors, and these will come back to their work, like Antæus, with strength renewed and multiplied by contact with the bosom of his mother, earth.

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#### ART. II.—SEPARATE SECESSION.

*Proceedings of Meeting of Delegates from the Southern Rights Associations of South-Carolina. Held at Charleston. May, 1851.*

SEPARATE SECESSION! Terror thrills us at the thought. Ay, though fiery and rampant valour may hiss disgrace at a word so inconsistent with the fashion and spirit of the day, yet must we confess, terror thrills us at the idea of a course so suited, we solemnly believe, to crush our

dearest hopes for liberty, and plunge into anarchy, ruin, and slavish bondage, all that is nearest and dearest to us. If any step be well calculated to retard the hopes of the South, making us the patient hewers of wood and drawers of water for our Northern aggressors, we believe it to be this well-meant, but mistaken expedient. We have no love for the Union; we have no fear of its dissolution. Welcome as summer shower to the sun-parched earth—welcome as heaven's free air to the heart-sick tenant of a dungeon—would come to us the voice of freedom, the word, the deed, which would tend to burst our bonds, and, in earnest faith, contribute to the disruption of this proud fabric, (once beautiful, but now rotten to the core,) which, under the name of Union, threatens to crush us beneath its unholy power. As *God* is true, we believe that we speak truth when we say, that there is no risk of life or property that we would shrink from, in the accomplishment of so desirable an end;—for, albeit most certainly a non-combatant, in every legal and customary application of the word, we believe that we, too, could be roused, if need were, to give our mite of strength, in a struggle for hearth and home. Our little mock-bird (Carolina's nightingale) will, at the risk and sacrifice of life, fight for its nest, against odds the most fearful! Is there a heart in Carolina less bold than that of our poor fluttering song bird? But, where hearth and home, child and country, are to be heedlessly thrown into the balance, against a vaunting spirit, a headlong rashness, which mocks the counsels of our wisest and our best, methinks the *God* of battles is against us, and terror is not too strong a word, when we contemplate the countless woes, the fathomless abyss of ills, which may ensue.

In all revolutions, impulse is undoubtedly the motive cause, with the masses; but thinking men, who act by reason, and well-weighed, long-considered, deeply-studied motives, must—unless *God* has marked out a people for destruction—sway and direct that impulse to its proper course. If, then, the voice of the convention of delegates held in Charleston, in the beginning of May last, were indeed the voice of the State, it would present a fearful crisis in our history. *Quem Deus vult perdere, prius dementat*. Has *God* made us cast aside all the counsels of wisdom, that he may thus crush us under the weight of our own madness? We trust not; we believe not. The



voice of the convention of May was *not* the voice of the State; its members were *not* the delegates of the State; they were the delegates of certain associations of the State, (useful in their way, no doubt,) but who have gone a step too far—who have assumed too much, in the course which they have pursued. Violent, enthusiastic, (we speak, of course, of the majority, whose voice has alone been heard,) actuated by the best motives, but misled by impulse—impatient and sore under insufferable oppression, but excited by the heat of unripe counsels, they have thought, by this display of passion, to bind the State to a course which *they* believe the safest for her interests, and to thus influence the action of her proposed State convention. This unauthorized step is calculated to do much harm. Efforts to have it accredited, as an act of the State, have, to a considerable extent, been but too successful, both at home and abroad. Our object is, before going farther, to show the fallacy of such an impression.

The intrinsic nature of the elective bodies to this convention ought, perhaps, to be sufficient to convince us of such a fallacy. District associations, got up by individuals, are, necessarily, from their very qualities of being, most regularly attended by their more active and violent members. Sober and orderly men, however patriotic, are apt to tire of such meetings, which, although they may be occasionally useful, in keeping up the flagging spirit of the people, or bringing the doubtful to the mark, will be found too often to degenerate in their tendency, (like the revolutionary clubs of France,) into a factious disposition to mob-rule.

We mean no slur upon the high-spirited people of our gallant and noble State;\* but such is the general tendency of all similar associations. They fall, necessarily, into the hands, and under the management, of the restless and violent, and are thus, even in a good cause, liable to rush into dangerous extremes. Not only, then, were the elections, in each district, made by this portion, alone, of its citizens, but from the very irregular numbers of the delegates, we easily perceive that each district, or rather, each

\* The nature of our article compels us to write, more than is desirable for a *Southern Quarterly*, in the limited view of South-Carolinian, rather than under the wider designation of Southron.

district association, was represented, without regard to the population, property or representative force of such respective districts. Lancaster, with a legislative representation of *two*, and a population of 5,794 free, and 5,014 slave, sent *nineteen* delegates; while Laurens, with a similar legislative representation, and a population of 11,453 free, and 11,953 slave, sent *seven*. Georgetown (comprised in parishes of All Saints and Prince George, Winyah,) and Greenville, with each a legislative representation of *four*, sent, respectively, *eight* and *nine* delegates; while Richland and Barnwell, with each a similar legislative representation, sent, respectively, *twenty-seven* and *thirty-three*. Marion, Orangeburgh and Fairfield have each a legislative representation of *three*. The population of Marion is 9,888 free and 7,720 slave; of Orangeburgh, 8,199 free and 15,425 slave; of Fairfield, 7,164 free and 14,246 slave. The delegates of Marion to the convention of May were *three*, from Orangeburgh, *twenty-one*, and from Fairfield, *thirty-five*!! Pickens had *one* delegate, for a population of 13,228 free and 3,679 slave. Besides sundry of the parishes, as St. James, Goose Creek, St. James, Santee, St. Thomas and St. Denis, St. George, Dorchester, St. Pauls and St. Lukes, we find not only the whole district of Horry, with a population of 5,824 free and 2,082 slave, entirely unrepresented, but the populous district of Spartanburgh, whose inhabitants number 18,358 free and 8,038 slave, entitled to a legislative representation of *five*, (almost double that of Fairfield, which sent *thirty-five* delegates) stands in the same category—not one voice from Spartanburgh. Will any man, who can add two and two together, contend, for one instant, that such an assembly has the shadow of a right to speak for the State, or can, in the smallest degree, bind or compromise her, by the expression of its opinions? On the contrary, ought not its bold action and spirit of dictation to startle us into prudent watchfulness? These men mean well, perhaps. The majority of them, no doubt, do. But so, we are told by veracious historians, did Robespierre. A good man was Robespierre, a kind-hearted man, say these, and *he thought* he was doing the best for his country, when he was bringing upon her a “desolation of desolations,” for there was death, “and hell followed with him.” He was her guide

and protector. *God* shield us from such self-constituted guides and protectors !

But, permit us here to ask, what was the power of a Robespierre or a Danton, other than the gift of such clubs as these very associations, which formed the convention we are discussing. They were but the agents of a similar power, pushed to a further extreme. Let us here, once for all, disclaim any wish to cast the taint or shadow of a doubt upon the sincerity of men, whose zeal, alone, we regard as their stumbling-block. They love their State, but *qui amat non semper amicus est*. Their love is death. Robespierre and Couthon, at the height of their assumed power, *thought themselves right*, and acted for the weal of their country. It is somewhat startling to find that our convention intends not to resign the power, (whatever it may be,) that it swayed in May last. Its members have declared themselves a permanent body, "*preserving its organization, under the same officers.*" We have seen how, and by whom, these officers have been elected. They have appointed a "central committee," to "promote the cause," and thus govern the State; and they have pronounced that all future members shall be elected—not by the people—but by district associations, and by *district associations* ALONE !

Carolínians, are you awake ? Will you sanction the proceedings of such a body, as the *proceedings of the State* ? Will you take the voice of unruly faction for the voice of the people ? Heaven save us from ourselves, if *this* be Southern patriotism ! But it cannot be. When faction speaks, let it speak in its own name, nor pass its dictates for the fiat of a people.

We are glad to believe that the convention, formed and elected as we have above shown, was, even under such circumstances, by no means so unanimous as we are led to suppose from printed accounts. Five and six dissentient voices, even to the most objectionable of its resolutions, is the report we receive ; but, in the triumph expressed, concerning this most astonishing unanimity, we are not told, but are left, from accident, to gather the fact, that many of the more moderate members, who were members elect to the State convention, abstained, upon principle, from a vote, which was calculated to compromise them, and to shackle their action, as servants of the



State.\* Hon. Mr. Butler, in his speech before the convention, remarks, "The measures intimated in the draft of the address, and in some of the resolutions, will not allow many of this convention to vote upon them. All who are members of the constitutional convention of the people cannot give a vote to control their future judgment. They ought not to be required to do so. I have conversed with several of them, and they have come to a common conclusion, to give no vote upon any matter upon which they will have to deliberate, when there shall be a real occasion for their officially responsible judgment."

Here, then, we are brought to a stand. We see the graver men, even of this meeting, not only shrinking from the violence of its course, but advising, imploring headstrong valour, to check itself by prudence, and heed "the pauser, Reason." Alas!

"But older men are monitors too dull  
For passionate youth."

And in

"That season when the fancy is a god,  
Hope a conviction,"

wild work may be made upon unwary faith by the spirit of party, faction and demagoguism. Cassandra-like, rise the warnings of our long-tried counsellors. *Young Carolina* heeds them not. The opinions of men whom the State delighted to honour are trampled upon, as not worth the hearing. The eloquent appeals, the labored reasonings, of a Barnwell or a Butler are cast aside, for the passionate declamations of some new *Camille Desmoulins*. The opinion of the venerable Cheves, in whom

"Old experience doth attain  
To something like prophetic strain;"

whose voice, at Nashville, startled the country, and half roused the South from its lethargy, meets with less respect than that of the noisiest gabbler of "drawn swords and bloody bones" whom the convention could produce.

\* We are informed, upon the best authority, that this meeting refused to allow the yeas and nays to be called.

Scarcely had his last words of warning been spoken, (we will not say listened to,\*) when the chairman "from the select committee of 21" submitted *his* resolutions and address, evidently cut and dried for the occasion. There was little intention to make the meeting a deliberative assembly, for it is scarcely possible to suppose that the committee of twenty-one, whatever the genius and talent of its members, had taken sufficient time, since its nomination, to compose so important an address, and mature such momentous resolutions, when we remember that its nomination had only been on the morning of the same day. The committee, or at least the acting portion of it, had very evidently decided itself a committee, and determined its measures, before the assemblage even of the convention. Such is universally the action of clubs and club-meetings. They are never governed but by caucus and demagoguism. Let, then, the action of this convention be taken for what it is worth, i. e., for the action of certain associations, who have most undoubtedly a right to the expression of their own opinions; but none, whatever, to endeavour to give to those opinions the impression of State action. Few as there are of submissionists and Union men in our State, still there is, even of these Yankeeized Southrons, some small sprinkling to be found. These men might, with equal propriety as the convention to which we refer, gather themselves together, as district delegates, pass their resolutions, write their addresses, and claim to be exponents of the spirit of South-Carolina. Difference of numbers would make no difference in legality of action. Both of these meetings are, or rather, would be, the representatives only of party, and both would be, we regret to say, in our opinion, equally mischievous, could they succeed in giving to their voice the impress of State sovereignty. When the State speaks, let it be through her proper authorities, and with the due solemnity of legalized assemblies, not the party violence of club-meetings. We think it will be a question worth the consideration of our approaching legislature, whether men who have prematurely committed themselves to any decisive mode of action, independently of future events,

\* We know that an after-thought sought to cover the appearance of want of respect, and that the letter, to which a reading was first refused, was afterwards voted to be printed; but the facts are as we state them.

have not thus incapacitated themselves, as members of a grave deliberative body, such as our State convention, should it ever assemble, ought to be; and, whether it might not be the wisest course of such legislature to abstain from calling the meeting of so important a body, under circumstances which would so much shackle, and contribute to prevent its discreet and sober action. Faction and party-spirit have worked hard, and done much, since the elections to the proposed convention have been made. To such a meeting, its members ought to come with clean hands and clear heads.

The present is a crisis of vital importance, not to South-Carolina alone, but to the South generally. Indissolubly are we united, for weal or for woe, with our Southern sisters. As Ruth clave unto Naomi, so we to them. Surely, their people should be our people, and their *God* our *God*. One we are in interests, one in hopes, and one in dangers; and one we *must be*—unless the Almighty has frowned upon us his darkest measure of reprobation—one we must be in effort. Surely, so important a consummation is worth years of patience and of striving. Shall we, then, throw away our last chance, in the violent excitement of party dispute, and to maintain the honour of inconsiderate heroism?

We have talked enough—more than enough—of “Palmetto banners,” “bleaching bones” and “Southern chivalry.” Such boasts have become a bye-word, and a taunt, in the mouths of our opponents. It were well to let them sleep. When a man talks much of his own valour, we are aptest to doubt it, and the truly brave and great need not trumpet their own merits. There is a self-respect to be exercised, as well by communities as individuals; and is there not, in this continual vaunting, an implied disgrace—a doubt, at least, of the spirit of our people, which would thus appear to need such a system, to keep it to the point of action? This “blood and ashes” style of oratory suits only the school-boy, or the vaunting Bobadil. The continual exercise of it has placed us somewhat in the position of the champion in the Eastern tale, who, having it in aim to conquer some magic spell of evil, is suddenly introduced into a capacious and mysterious abode, where are suspended before him a sword and a horn, with an accompanying inscription, importing that victory will fall to him who chooses rightly between



these implements. The rash, nervous, and, if we may so express ourselves, *timorous valour* of the would-be hero, induces him to seize the horn; but, as he blows, troops of armed knights rush upon the unfortunate and defenceless wight, felling him to the ground, and leaving the victory to be gained by the wiser and braver champion, whose cool courage and deliberate reason prompt him to *draw the sword* before he blows the horn.

We have boasted too much—quite too much—already. An act of separate secession would be but a continued boasting—a farther blowing of the horn. Every reasoning man feels that it would be so, and if he, for a moment, sincerely maintains the contrary, it will be found, we think, to be because he has not fairly weighed and sifted his own words. He advocates separate secession, not because he believes in the efficacy of separate secession, *per se*, but only so far (in his own mind, at least) as he regards it as a means of precipitating the course of our sister States, and dragging them into action. The talk about San Marino republics, English alliance, and so forth, is merely a glittering bait, to amuse the crowd—a new way of blowing the horn. We speak of thinking men, for no doubt there are thousands of unfledged lads, whose green reason exudes in boiling wrath and illogical conclusions, who would contend, and believe too, in the sincerity of their enthusiasm, that South-Carolina can live and flourish by the mere chivalry of her sons, a Lilliput empire, with the spirit of the world against her and her institutions. But this can never do. As we love the South, as we love our State, as we cherish her institutions, her honour, her very existence, let us cease this trumpeting, nor again blow the horn before we draw the sword—ay, even before we have the sword to draw! Is it the part of valour, or of prudence, thus weaponless to give the taunt, hoping that others may be roused to redeem our pledge?

And will they thus be roused? This is a fearful throw, and the advocates of separate secession are playing a game of brag, too alarming to contemplate with composure. Desperate gamblers, they cast into the stake not only property and life, but children and country—and for what? "*Because the State cannot recede, without dishonour.*" Ay, say they so, these men of valour? Truly, we love our State as devoutly, and shrink from her shame

with as nice a sense of honour, as they ; but we deny that our honour is engaged, to the breaking of our own necks, by this worse than Curtius-like leap. There has been no oracle, to promise us that this self-devotion shall save our country. On the contrary, the voice of wisdom calls a halt. The State, thank heaven ! is *not* pledged to separate action, and, we trust in *God*, will not be driven to a measure so suicidal. The State has declared that the South ought to act, and holds herself in readiness to act, according to the pledge given by her best and boldest sons, at Nashville and elsewhere, so soon as she sees opportunity for doing so, without breaking her own neck by a desperate plunge, and, at the same time, stabbing to the heart, in her blind struggles, the last hope for liberty of her Southern sisters. The State is ready to redeem every pledge she has ever given, and will only fail to do so if driven on by party, which thus coolly assumes her dictatorship. She would prove false to the cause, by committing herself to a move so treasonable, as is separate State secession, to Southern interests. By pausing with dignity, in an effort to unite, instead of alienating the South, South-Carolina is *not receding* ; she takes no step backward, but, on the contrary, firmly stands, precisely where she did when, at the last session of her legislature, she stood, proud of the counsels of him, her "old man eloquent," who, confident alike in her boldness and her prudence, brought to her legislative halls the pledge which, in *her* name, he had just given at Nashville, and received the only reward suited to his merit, the hearty "well done, thou good and faithful servant," echoed by the true representatives of his native State. Has the State changed, since this period ? and, while South-Carolina holds such a position, resolute and unflinching, has she the traitor-son who will dare accuse her of receding from her pledges ? If such there be, let the mother who bore him shrink from his kiss, for would the Judas who defames his country spare even his mother's blush ?

"Faithful and true," South-Carolina stands to her pledges. We pause, but we do not recede. The South bids us pause, and she has a *right* so to do. Each and every Southern State has a right to deliberate and investigate, before taking a step so momentous in our history as a disruption of this Union, foul and rotten though it be. We are convinced that disunion is the only remedy

for our ills. Gladly would we persuade our Southern sisters to the same belief; but, pending their decision, they have a right to bid us pause. We pause; not to yield, but to maintain our position, while our hosts are gathering. They have never told us that they will desert us; they have never surrendered their arms; and we will win their confidence by admitting that they will not prove recreant to their duty—that they are not slavishly apathetic to their rights. We differ from them in time and expediency of action, but must allow something to their judgment, nor endeavour to gag them with our ideas of right. We will never make a man our friend by calling him a rascal, and giving him a kick, to prove it; nor, we believe, will the plan be likely to prove at all more effectual with States than with individuals. The former, like the latter, may feel that they have a right to the guardianship of their own honour, and be rather revolted than convinced by the dictatorial *ipse dixit* of another.

One of the arguments of the separate secessionists is, that the State is now ready for action, and it is doubtful whether it will bear delay. They think it necessary to keep up an eternal puffing and blowing, for fear the fire will burn out, and the glowing iron cool. Fie upon it! Is it so hard to keep “our courage to the sticking point?” and cannot we be trusted, to keep our honour’s truth, but we must, like some poor coward, dragged up to the lists, be held there at the bayonet’s point, lest we may turn and run? If such were the spirit of our State, then indeed were it time to bow ourselves in the dust—then indeed is “the glory departed from Israel.” Such courage is fear, such fire but cowardice! If our spirit of resistance has not strength to survive prudent delay, it is but a mocking semblance of firmness, and failure becomes certain. But we have a higher opinion of our people. We need not fight to-day, for fear that, ere to-morrow, our bottled up courage will evaporate, and leave the trembling slave to crouch to the yoke. The firm spirit can “bide its time,” and the truly brave among Carolina’s statesmen do not fear to trust Carolina’s sons. They feel that these are ready for duty, when the fitting time shall come, and will not need to be whipped up to the cannon’s mouth, as an alternative to a regular *stampede*.

Let us give up the “Hercules vein,” and confess—for there is no shame in it—that we are not strong enough—



we of South-Carolina alone—to maintain our cause. We can die ! ay, and bury our children beneath the ruins of our hearth-stones, that our enemies may triumph and our names be forgotten. But it would be desperation, not courage, which would prompt us to this. True courage can bear and forbear, can wait and watch, and strive and endure. It is impatience, not courage—it is coward shrinking, not resolution—which casts itself upon the sword point, to terminate its struggles. The ancient Roman was half a barbarian, when he sought death as a cure for life's evils ; a higher civilization—a nobler philosophy—teaches us to *bear* and *conquer* them.

Because we are weak, our enemies have trampled us. Because we are weak, yet a little longer must we endure their insult. But because we are weak, not therefore are we cowards. Rather is the sense of our wrongs keener, from the sense of our weakness, and, if we pause, we pause that our strength may grow with our endurance. The South *must* unite, and our spring will be the more vigorous and resistless, from the gathered might of our temporary crouch. We have much faith in our legislature. We cannot believe that this body, upon the eve of so momentous a step, will move without due consideration. When great events require great minds, to work them out to their conclusions, such minds are generally found to rise, as it were, heaven-inspired, from the chaotic mass which surrounds them. We trust in *God*, that He has not so shut us out from all hope of mercy, that our every beacon-light is to be dashed aside and extinguished, by the roar of passion which environs us. We trust in *God*, that the legislature, upon the prudence of whose action so much depends, will, (although a majority of its members may be young in years,) act like grave men, upon whose decision the destinies of a nation hang, and not like some rabble-rout of school-boys, impatient to rid themselves of the supervision of their preceptors, and who fancy that noisy bragging can be mistaken for heroism. The members of such a body have assumed to themselves, on entering it, heavy duties and responsibilities, well calculated to make men pause in the acting. All their boldness they will need ; but should it not be purged from the very shadow of rashness ? Men upon whom a nation's fate depends, have no longer the right to be young. Deep thought, which sits like dew upon the brow,

"For thought is brain-sweat,"

should

"From the table of their memory  
All trivial records wipe,  
Leaving the book and volume of the brain  
Unmixed with baser matter."

There is, in the question which we discuss, and the decision of which must virtually fall upon our legislature, matter

"To make the brow to ache, the eye turn dim,  
And resolution search itself for rashness,  
Or ere it dares to plunge."

We have faith in our legislature, and *God* grant that we be not deceived.

The *right* of secession we are not inclined to discuss—we consider it too well established to need argument. The *risk* of it, to life, limb and property, not one who deserves the name of man will shrink from. The *mischievous folly* of separate secession, acting as an alienating medium between ourselves and our true and natural allies, is alone what we fear. If the step be taken, our life for it, you have no truer soldiers than those who now warn you from action. "Our country, right or wrong," will be the watchword of our State.—Alas! alas! that our own blind precipitancy should oblige us to limit this certainty to *our State*, rather than extend it to *our country*, our *Southern Union*, our home of hope!—If there is to be any "bleaching of bones" upon our battle-fields, the names and families of such men as Cheves, Barnwell and Butler will have as full a share in the anticipated sacrifice, as those of any other more fiery heroes of all the State rights associations in the country. "These men are cautious, fearful; we will not listen to their arguments; this is a time to act, and not to reason," say our hot-headed and unripe counsellors. These men, we answer, *are* cautious, fearful; but of what? Cautious of *self*! Fearful of *personal* risk? If there be tongue of slander vile enough to utter, if there be ear of folly senseless enough to listen to so vapid a charge, we will not disgrace our pen by referring to it. They are cautious for their country; fearful of *her* perils; and, while their blood boils

beneath oppression, they have the courage and self-possession to plead with us—patience, prudence, even for the sake of that cherished country. They have the courage to raise their voices against the stormy cry of faction, to warn that faction against its own rashness. They have the courage of that Æmilius, who, at Cannæ, after vainly striving to check the hot zeal of an imprudent colleague, when that colleague had, in spite of all remonstrances, made such a disposition of his troops as completely to place himself in the power of the enemy, was yet ready to die nobly, in the desperate struggle, brought on by the headlong rashness of another. While the boastful Varro fled from the slaughter, consequent upon his own obstinate folly, Æmilius died upon the field. “My part is chosen,” exclaimed the expiring hero, when urged to flight, “My part is chosen. Go and tell the Senate, from me, to fortify Rome against the approach of the conqueror.” If the State needs victims, she will find, perchance, the firmest, not among her noisiest politicians.

We were at first inclined to believe that the expression of opinions made by the “meeting of delegates of Southern Rights Associations,” of May last, was calculated not only to do much, but unmitigated evil. The rashness and dogmatic assumption of its course (we begin, however, to hope) is bringing its own antidote. Men are startled at the idea of being thus over-ridden; and the warning, we hope, will prove salutary. Leaders of clubs are seldom the best leaders for nations; and a revolution, effected by mere animal excitement, is inevitably a failure. Revolutions ought not to be made too easily: they are fierce remedies, for fiercer ills, and, when rashly applied, they become, like the knife of the surgeon, in the hands of the quack, instruments, not of healing, but of death. Revolutions, to be efficient, must be the work of intense thought, grave effort, systematized action, and, consequently, of time. They ought not, we repeat, to be made too easily. Witness France, where revolutions have become the bloody toy of the multitude; who fight for they know not what; spurning to-day the idol of yesterday, and calling for revolution as they would for a parade, or “*un spectacle*,” Hasty revolution (and it were folly to deny that we are on the eve of revolution, for, however legalized, still it is revolution at which we aim) must always be inefficient, if not mischievous. Give us time:

time to arrange our forces ; time to bring our people to the point of action—by people, we mean our Southern people, not simply Carolinians ;—time to show them the necessity and the right of that action ; time to accustom themselves to the idea of severing old ties—for, even when such ties are chains, the habit of wearing them is to be conquered. No people, roused by a fit of momentary passion, (and years are but moments, in the history of nations,) has ever accomplished great deeds. Oh ! you, our too hasty brethren, to whom, in our heart of hearts, we cling—for one aim, one thought is ours—pause yet, ere the Rubicon be passed, which is to sever us not only from foes but from friends ; pause, ere we throw down the gauntlet of defiance, not to our oppressors alone, but to those, our sisters in endurance, who (give them but the time) must yet be with us in our struggle. Pause, were it but for unanimity in our own State, at a crisis when division were death. Give us time !—time !

“Time, (you answer) we have had time enough ! This storm has been brewing for a quarter of a century.” Most truly, and in very deed, it hath ! The seeds of it were planted, even with the forming of that constitution to which we have vainly clung, and looked for aid, and fain would have called sacred, while our opponents have sneered at our credulity, and trampled it in the dust. This storm has, of a truth, been brewing long ; but who among us have been fully awake to the muttering wrath of its insidious approach ? awake to the consciousness of danger ? awake to the point of resistance ? It is but of very recent date that the word “disunion” has ceased to be (even in South-Carolina) a word almost of treason. Has there been, until within the last three or four years, more than one voice in the country which dared to boldly predict, and warn us of the possible necessity of such a measure. Mr. Cheves, we know, as far back as the year 1830, publicly expressed the opinion, that joint resistance of the Southern States was the only hope for the preservation of the Union in its integrity, and, that hope failing, disunion, if not our choice, might be “our necessity.” But did not Mr. Cheves stand alone ? Did not even the nullifiers, of that date, against whose expedient he argued, as a partial and inefficient measure, shrink from the word “disunion ?” We have ourselves heard a Hayne and a Hamilton, then among the most active resisters to go-



vernmental oppression, and personal intimates of Mr. Cheves, answer the arguments of the latter by the avowal that they were not prepared to go so far. They believed his remedy to be more severe than was needful. Time, alas! has proved but too fully the correctness of Mr. Cheves's position; and the same voice which, in 1830, exclaimed, "Submit! Why, the question is whether we shall bear oppression or not!"—the same voice which counselled us then, that "any measure, by one of the suffering States alone, will be a measure of feebleness, subject to many hazards; any union, among the same States, will be a measure of strength, almost of certain success," twenty years after echoed itself at Nashville, "Submit! submit! The very sound curdles the blood in my veins! But oh! great God! unite us, and a tale of submission shall never be told!"

Mr. Cheves, then, foresaw the necessity which has fallen upon our times, but stood alone in so doing. How long is it (three or four years, we think) since Mr. Calhoun, decidedly the most popular man in the State of South-Carolina, declared that, if there were any man in the Union sincerely attached to it, that man *was himself*. We cannot doubt the perfect sincerity of Mr. Calhoun, in this declaration, and certainly there was, at that time, no single voice in the State so potential, or so well calculated to speak the spirit of the majority, as his. Progress is never found in rapid change, and the sudden and fierce desire of a large portion, (we will not believe it the majority of the State,) to throw itself "'o the other side," speaks impulse rather than reason. We must not attempt (time and space—our editor being stringent against long articles—forbid it) to sum up our authorities in favour of waiting upon a Southern Union, as opposed to hurried separate State action; neither have we space to dwell upon the inevitable evils, the bitter feuds, the heart-burnings and jealousies, which the opposite measure entails upon us, terminating in long, if not permanent estrangement, among States whose prosperity, whose very existence, depends upon union among themselves; neither can we dwell upon the crushed hopes, the bitter remorse, the angry revilings which must ensue, even among the now united advocates of this hasty measure, to make our State a very hell of discord, and passion, violence and rancour the rulers of its fate. Such thoughts would swell

our article into a volume. They have been profoundly discussed, and, we hope, will be as profoundly studied. But, having mentioned the popular name of Calhoun, and as our violent party have made large use of it, delighting in rhetorical flourishes about his "guardian spirit," which they suppose to be looking down sympathizingly upon their course, we must be allowed to quote the authority of this distinguished statesman himself, against these worshippers and desecrators of his name. In a letter, addressed to Mr. Foote, in August, 1849, and recently published in the New-Orleans Delta, Mr. Calhoun, after stating his desire, which he presumes to be that "of every true-hearted Southern man, to save, if possible, the Union as well as ourselves; but, if both cannot be, then to save ourselves, at all events," remarks, "*Without concert of action, on the part of the South, neither can be saved; by it, if it be not too long delayed, it is possible both yet may be.* Without it, we cannot satisfy the North that the South is in earnest, and will, if forced, choose resistance; and, until she is satisfied of this, the causes which have brought the question between the two sections to its present dangerous stage, from a small beginning, will continue to operate, until it will be too late to save the Union, and nothing will be left us but *to dissolve the connection. To do that, concert of action would be necessary, not to save the Union, for it would be too late; but to save ourselves.* Thus, in my view, *concert is the one thing needful.*"

From the above extract, we may draw two conclusions, most important to our argument. First, that Mr. Calhoun had, at this period, become entirely concurrent in the opinions of Mr. Cheves, expressed nearly twenty years before, concerning the necessity of a *concert of action* among the Southern States, which, as we see, he here pronounces to be "*the one thing needful;*" and, secondly, that, at so late a period as August, 1849, but a few months before his death, he had by no means abandoned the hope of seeing the Union preserved in its integrity. In favour of this hope we are not inclined to argue. The measure of our sufferings has long been full, and new injuries have heaped it to overflowing. We feel, with Mr. Cheves, that "the Union is already dissolved," and the constitution a "*caput mortuum*"—a "shape of dead formalities," wherein we have no farther interest than had "free Rome" in that

constitution by which "Caligula made his horse a Roman consul." We argue not for the Union—"the glorious Union"—at whose chariot-wheels we have long been dragged, the victims of its triumphal progress; but we notice the above-quoted opinion of Mr. Calhoun, as showing how rapid a change has come over the spirit of our State—for, we presume there is no man to dispute that Mr. Calhoun was, from his extreme popularity, as much as any one man could be, the exponent of that spirit. Certainly South-Carolina was not, at the date of this letter, prepared for disunion—still less for separate secession. Two short years have since passed over us. And are two years enough to so entirely change the sentiments of her people as to authorize not only the great and momentous revolution which we contemplate, (and which may heaven speed!) but such an eagerness for forcing on that revolution, that we, in our hot haste, must throw overboard all hope of uniting our sister States, and calling them traitor and recreant, because they think as we did two years ago, rush headlong upon separate secession? True, we have suffered new injuries since that time; but does the tumultuous and unregulated action, by which it is proposed to right these injuries, not better suit a school-boy rebellion, and barring out, (in which the actors, as a matter of course, are not only destined, but expect to be, punished and whipped back into submission,) than the grave action of grave men, legislating for the most important crisis which the history of their country could present?

It cannot be that this disgrace has come upon our time.

Our *true leaders*, resolute in resistance, are opposed to violent and separate action. Among the party in favour of such action, there is scarcely a single man to whom the State has hitherto been accustomed to look for advice. All whom South-Carolina has hitherto held dear and venerable, in authority, are opposed to this movement. She will, she must, be guided by the kindly, calm and rational counsels of her long-tried advisers. We will not believe otherwise of the State we love so well!

The question is not, with us, one between resistance and submission. We are unanimous for resistance—resistance to the death—and the wariest of our counsellors, when the struggle comes, will be found shoulder to shoulder with the warmest. The doubt is not *whether*, but *how* shall we

resist? and our leading men plead with us, even as a father pleadeth with his children, to use wisely those means which God and nature have given us, rather than throw them away in weak, futile and misguided effort. If there is, as we have suggested, a hope in the spirit of re-action, caused by the dictatorial tone of the May convention, and its evident desire to force the State into premature action, there is also, we cannot deny to ourselves, the fear of a result much to be dreaded, and, should it occur, never too deeply to be deplored. This re-action may become too extreme. There is, in every country, and amidst the most enlightened population, a large proportion whose natural instinct leads them, in difficult political questions, to submit the guidance of their judgments to stronger minds, whose power and truth experience has taught them to venerate. There is danger that such men, misled by the opprobrium which the violent party endeavours to cast upon the more prudent, may become, to a certain extent, embarrassed, between the submissionist and the *bona fide* resistance party. The principles, the faith, and the men of these parties are, indeed, wide as the poles asunder; but an error or a slander, constantly and emphatically repeated, obtains finally, in the ears of unthinking men, a familiarity, which stamps it with a semblance of truth. There are many men, who will have sufficient diffidence of their own judgments, and sufficient respect for such names and opinions as we have cited, to induce them, very much, to regulate their course by these opinions. If, then, the vituperation of party violence can succeed in convincing such individuals that the almost dying words of a Calhoun, that the earnest and prophet-like appeals of a Cheves, that the advice of a Barnwell, a Butler, besides a host of true and noble men, fire-trying in our political struggles, are in favour of submission, is there not danger that such vituperation is doing much to the manufacture of submissionists?

As we believe that there are many, very many, true and earnest hearts among those against whom we argue, those our only too zealous brethren, we would beg them, in God's name, to beware of such a result. Then, indeed, might South-Carolina be in danger of receding from her pledges; then, indeed, might there be fear that she would hold out her hands to the shackles; and then, when trampled under the heel of the oppressor, would the sin and



the shame be upon those who have deceived her people into believing that this was the voice, this the advice, of her wise men, her seers and her prophets! Hush the voice of passion and of slander—let the people judge for themselves, rather than through the dictation of party associations—and we have no fear that they will be misled by the opinions of those very men whose trumpet-call to freedom has been the first to rouse them to the consciousness and defence of their rights. We have no fear that they will be deceived, by *ignis fatuus* lights, from the flame of those altars, where the fire of their patriotism has first been lighted! *Pro patria! Fide et Fiduciâ.*

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ART. III.—POPULAR DISCOURSES AND ORATIONS.

1. *The Death and Funeral Ceremonies of John Caldwell Calhoun*, containing the Speeches, Reports and other Documents connected therewith, the Oration of the Hon. R. B. RHETT, before the Legislature, &c. Columbia: A. S. Johnston. 1850.
2. *Discourse*, delivered before the Graduating Class of the College of Charleston, Feb. 23, 1851. By Rev. Professor J. W. MILES. Charleston: John Russell. 1851.
3. *Speech of T. L. Clingman*, on the Future Policy of the Government. Delivered in Committee of the Whole of the House of Representatives, Washington, Feb. 15. 1851.
4. *Inaugural Address*, delivered in the Hall of the House of Representatives, Columbia, before the Teacher's Association of South-Carolina, Dec. 3, 1850. By THOMAS CURTIS, D.D., President. Columbia: A. S. Johnston. 1851.
5. *An Address*, delivered before the South-Carolina Institute, at its second Annual Fair, on the 19th Nov., 1850. By Jos. H. LUMPKIN. Charleston: Walker & James. 1851.
6. *Self-Cultivation*. An Address, delivered before the Society of the Alumni of the College of Charleston, at their Anniversary, Feb. 25, 1851. By WILLIAM D. PORTER. Charleston: E. C. Councell. 1851.

7. *An Address to the People of Barnwell District, on Separate State Secession.* By W. A. OWENS. Charleston: Walker & James. 1851.

WE see no good reason why we should not, at quarterly or semi-annual periods, class, for notice in our pages, under one head and in some general connection, the numerous occasional lectures, orations and addresses, which, during such period, usually find their way to the press, after their first oral publication. Such re-publication may, in some degree, be regarded as *prima facie* evidence in behalf of their merits. Having passed successfully the one ordeal of criticism, it may be naturally assumed that the claims of the discourse are such as should compel the consideration of another and a higher tribunal. This, we say, is the natural presumption, though it is one which assumes quite too liberally in behalf of the first ordeal. The popular audience, as we well know, is by no means scrupulous or severe in its decisions; and an erroneous notion that the society which invites the orator is, *par courtesie*, bound to print his lucubrations, secures a second appearance to the speaker, in frequent instances, when it would by no means secure him a second hearing from the same audience. In consequence of this false opinion of his claims and their duties, the innocent public are but too frequently required to bear an infliction which the knowing ones studiously avoid; and a permanent record is thus made, by the press, of matters and mouthings which prove equally intolerable to gods, men and magazines. Usually, however, in well regulated societies, the orator is one whose claims are pretty well ascertained before he is solicited; and it is rare, indeed, that any community deserving of a better fortune, are caught and held by the ears by any of the stolid class BORE, however frequently the victims of the cleverer class HUMBUG. This being understood of the orator, when people of ordinary experience constitute his audience, the farther presumption is that what he consents to publish, will be found worthy to be read. This being the case, we are tacitly required to review, or notice it, at least; and where the publications are numerous, and belong to a single class of writings, it seems the most natural and proper plan to include them in one general survey, instead of scattering them—"pearls at random strung,"—among

our miscellaneous critical notices. Here, in fact, we say, are the quarterly treasures of popular eloquence among us. Here are the gems which have fallen from our inspired lips, our prophets, statesmen and priestly minds, during the summer solstice. We gather them together in one sacred place, so that you may always be able, at a moment, to hold them in your eyes, and be made happy under their lights and guidance. The plan seems to be particularly proper where the local impulse seems naturally to direct the reader in his search after these special revelations of the favourite place.

But there is another and a better reason for thus distinguishing this class of writings, giving it a special habitation and a name, and not leaving the several performances of our orators to find places, where they can, among a crowd of unknown people. Lectures, orations and addresses, in the South, are required to assert a higher rank than they are apt to do in other regions. They, in fact, constitute a great portion of the literature proper of our section, and we should be doing the greatest possible wrong to the native intellect, were we to pass it by as a thing simply of occasion and without permanent claims to our recognition and regards. In these performances lie the most ample proofs, of our giving, of our intellectual activity. Here must we look for the evidence of our politics and philosophy, our fancy and imagination. This is the only open medium by which the leading minds of the South may approach their people,—and this, in consequence of certain facts in our condition, operating as barriers and embarrassments, which, for the present, are not likely to be quickly overcome.

Justly speaking, there is no such thing as a professional literature in the South. Our literature is mostly in the hands of amateurs,—is indulged in as a recreation, as an aside from other duties,—as an agreeable relief from toils which take any other aspect—and *per se* asserts really no existence. It is tributary to our politics or our amusements,—is brief always in its performances, and spasmodic in its exhibitions. It is rare that you find an individual, addressing himself to it as an occupation—the essential object of his care—the essential necessity of his genius. And this for sufficient reasons.

In countries almost wholly agricultural—in regions especially where the agriculture is of that expansive sort

which we call *staple*—which concentrates all interests in *one*—and excludes much variety and much detail—there can be little or no professional literature. Its vitality depends wholly upon conditions precisely the reverse of this, and of the circumstances which such a pursuit inevitably involves. Literature is necessarily the growth of large, old and densely settled communities; and the absence of such communities has been the true reason why there has been so little American literature of any kind. There have been no great cities in the country, in which the leading minds of the whole country may concentrate, try themselves by a common standard, and settle down, each, upon his own certain level. The illustration of the necessity which exists of a great city for the proper development of a national literature may be found in what we know of almost all countries which may boast of such possessions. Thus we find that there is no English literature out of London, no French literature out of Paris, no Scotch and Irish literature out of Edinburgh and Dublin. The large city seems essential to the growth of a national literature, if not of its mind. In the Southern States of this country we have no great cities, and the stimulus to professional authorship, due to, and derivable from, the attrition of numerous minds in active competition—and still greater numbers able to appreciate, and eager to obtain the element which they finish; is found in very partial degree in the thinly settled regions of the South. The intellect of this region exhibits itself usually through a single medium, that of popular oratory. The first transition from this, to a higher form, is in the printed speech or pamphlet. These are usually written in a style intended to be popular, and designed rather for the hearer than the reader. They are the fruits of hasty requisitions, sudden exigencies of society, embodying tributes to individual worth, appeals to public patriotism, the discussion of passing interests and temporary objects, or sharp assaults upon new enactments of law, and new suggestions of public policy. Essays upon art, science, education or morals in general, may indicate a change in the subject, but scarcely in the manner of its examination. The performance is still designed for popular effect, is narrow in its plan and admits of but little variety in its mode of treatment. The exactions of the popular assembly are still in the mind of the writer. For such



an audience he must not be profound. If he dives, they doze. If he is circuitous in the approach to his points, they fail to follow him. The art which he employs is required to be very simple, and the philosophy exceedingly lucid. As a necessary consequence, the commonplace is the besetting infirmity of one half of the productions of this class, and where it does not prevail wholly over the performance, it is yet required so largely to mingle with the original and the thoughtful, which the orator suggests, that his own mind is disparaged in the judgment of the subsequent critic, who seldom makes allowances for the *printed* speech, and, indeed, should not. The author owes it to the reader, that his speech, if printed, should be purged of its commonplace, and made fit for the higher judgment which he entreats upon it. He is less excusable by far than the professional author. He is not driven by hunger to the condition of the hack. No necessity goads him to publication, and his own vanity must be tutored to yield a less eager ear to the solicitations of friends—or at least, if he will listen, he must learn to value properly the indirect admonition of Job, when he prays that his enemy may be prompted to commit himself to the printer. He must make his book worthy of the press, if he will publish; assured that the indulgent standards which render docile the popular assembly, are not such as he has any right to claim, when he subjects himself to the ordeal of after publication. The very great good nature of a Southern audience, exercises a very detrimental influence upon the literature of its public men. They are too much given to regard the present purpose only in their performances, and to lose sight of all other critics than the neighbours whom they address. The consequence is fatal to their final success. They are usually of short-lived popularity. Their laurels are so easily won, that they persuade a thousand competitors; and it is surprising what a number of popular speakers, all along the dead levels of mediocrity, will spring up, in a single season, to the discomfiture or disquiet of those already in possession of the high places. That one goes up and another down, to the end of the chapter, we charge upon the vulgar caprices of the people. We should be greatly nigher the mark—certainly, quite as nigh—were we to charge it upon the vulgarly superficial training of our public men, who, descending

to their audiences—which a public man should never do—rarely succeeds in keeping permanently above them.

But we have little space for digression. The discourse or oration, essay or argument, thus delivered, thus written, is evidently designed for a merely present purpose. The design is apparent upon its face—and it is thus justly forgotten, after a hearing or perusal. It might have its merits, no less than its uses, and, with more painstaking, would be deserving of better favour. It may be brilliant in declamation, acute in its argument, profound in its occasional suggestions, and, sometimes, may embody fresh and valuable truths which fully deserve to be treasured up for continued study. It is in such characteristics as these that it will demand from us occasional consideration, as properly illustrative of our sectional mind, and as the only representative of its literature. But the very form in which it appears—the ostensibly temporary purpose in which it originates,—the want of habitual practice, in the writer, which it too frequently betrays,—these, and other causes, naturally tend to lessen its value, and to contract its circulation. The absence of literary practice, which we have suggested, is by no means the least embarrassment under which this class of writing labours. The refinements of the habitual writer, are not to be acquired by any of the training peculiar to the simple orator; and it is almost a proverb that he who makes himself famous in the one character, is rarely successful in the other. That the orator so frequently fails, as a writer, is due to deficient practice. It is in the fatal facility of his tongue, that he revolts at the labour of the pen. Yet the value of habitual exercise in composition, even to the orator, is hardly to be exaggerated, since it affords that “correct mind” which to the “full” and “ready mind,” is essential to make success perfect, and the victory complete. It is only by the refinements of the habitual writer, those freedoms of style and manner which enable him to “snatch the grace beyond all reach of art,” that he can rise into real excellence, and assert a classical dignity which will rather grow than diminish in public esteem, with the progress of years. Thought, properly costumed, is at once admitted into society, and takes its place without challenge in those circles into which, in her nakedness, she might produce revoltings only. This is the art which our popular speakers, fresh

from the stump, and reeking of the hustings, are scarcely willing to exercise and acknowledge. Its neglect is one of the true, though unsuspected, causes of their popular overthrow. They aim at a cheap eminence, and this is seldom a lasting one.

The want of *wholeness* and finish in our popular discourses, however, must not make us heedless of the real merits which they occasionally display. If wanting in a propriety and simplicity of style, which is apt to be their great defect, they exhibit passages at times of great force, grace and sweetness; if rarely unique in plan, they yet occasionally impress you by great boldness of suggestion, a vigorous grasp of certain subjects, and an earnest and trenchant power which, in the utterance of an old truth, and in the revelation of a new one, makes the soul to kindle, and fills the memory with most noble meanings which the mind constantly and unconsciously reverts to as to favourite passages of a great poet. There will be, at times, a delightful play of fancy, a visible sport of thought, toying with a favourite idea, and dressing it up in a costume at once appropriate and oriental. Sometimes we behold the imagination passing, with a bound, on bold and graceful wing, to the heights of sublimity; at other moments, the orator will speak to our affections and sympathies in tones that sink into and wind about the heart, soothing and softening its pulses, until all is tenderness and love. These are fruits, found on a luxuriant tree, which needs pruning only, to make it at once productive in high degree, and as precious in the quality of its fruits as productive in quantity. We must not, because of its bad cultivation, neglect and want of training, combined with unnecessary foliage, and overrun with weeds and vines, abandon it to indifference or contempt. We should rather labour at the elevation and improvement of a form of literature, which is the most natural to our present condition. Suppose it is hasty and careless, inaccurate in small things—nay, as a form of literature, in great things also—lacking in finish, and, being of occasional origin, deficient in that higher essential of *design*, which constitutes the great virtue in the highest form of letters. We should be doing equal injustice to our section, and to this, its more conspicuous literary growth, did we not linger over, and assert its real merits and advantages—did we not contemplate it with interest and curiosity as

characteristic of the habits of life and thought, the temperament and the genius of the people—speaking as it does to an impulsive and eager nature, a susceptible and kindling spirit, and a generous enthusiasm which eloquence, in the cause of virtue and patriotism, will always warm to deeds of great daring and self-sacrifice.

With this introduction, we proceed to a brief notice of the pamphlets which have reached us during the last quarter. The reader will remember that we notice those only which reach us, through the attention of publisher or author. If he finds any publication omitted, which he yet deems worthy of consideration, he must understand that we are not in possession of it. He will, however, in all probability find the collection which follows sufficiently ample.

1. The first of these publications to which we entreat his notice, is that which stands at the head of our rubric, the tribute of the State of South-Carolina to the memory of Mr. Calhoun. This pamphlet contains a full report of all the official proceedings as well of Congress and of the State Legislature of South-Carolina, in respect to the demise and funeral honours paid to the great statesman, *par excellence*, of the South, closing with the eulogium of Mr. Rhett, appointed to this duty by the governor of the State. We must notice these very briefly. The speech of Mr. Butler, the colleague of Mr. Calhoun in the Senate, announcing his death, and reviewing his public career, is clear, comprehensive and in good taste. He was followed by Mr. Clay and Mr. Webster, in appropriate and highly characteristic tributes, honourable at once to their magnanimity and talent. Mr. Rusk, one of the Senators of Texas, claimed the privilege to follow, as a native of South-Carolina and as one who had long enjoyed an intimacy with the deceased. Mr. Clemens, Senator of Alabama, succeeded in a brief eulogium. Their speeches are all severally reported in this pamphlet. The Chaplain of the Senate, the Rev. C. M. Butler, D.D., officiated at the funeral services in Washington, in a sermon which is given. A committee of the Senate accompanied the remains of Mr. Calhoun to South-Carolina, a committee from that State having been previously appointed to proceed to Washington and become their escort home. The proceedings in the House of Representatives of the United States, next follow in this report.



The announcement to that body of Mr. Calhoun's demise was made by Mr. Holmes, of South-Carolina, in an impressive and appropriate speech; Mr. Winthrop, of Massachusetts, followed Mr. Holmes, speaking gracefully and well; to him succeeded Mr. Venable, of North-Carolina, whose affectionate attendance on Mr. Calhoun, in his last illness, secures him the grateful remembrance of all our people.—He described the deceased justly through life, and of his last hours gave a full and interesting description. The proper resolutions were taken by both Houses. The Report of the Committee of Twenty-Five, sent from South-Carolina to bring home the sacred remains, next follows, from the pen of its Chairman, Mr. Daniel Ravenel,—a very interesting and well written narrative, distinguished by good sense and good taste. The progress of the melancholy *cortege* through Virginia and North-Carolina, attended in both States by reverential tributes at every step, is copiously reported. The narrative of the Funeral Honours paid to the remains of Mr. Calhoun, on their arrival in Charleston, occupies, very properly, a large place in this pamphlet. To those who witnessed them, the recollection will always be vivid and impressive, and well calculated to speak for the eminent virtues of the deceased, and for the unanimous sentiment, which the ceremonials illustrated, of the popular bereavement. These proceedings include speeches from the Governor, Seabrook, from Senator Mason of Virginia, the Hon. Mr. Venable of North-Carolina, and the Mayor of the City, Hutchinson. Resolutions follow, of the City of Charleston, the Congregations of St. Philips' Church,—in whose grounds the remains of Mr. Calhoun are temporarily deposited; the States of Pennsylvania; New-York, and the New-York Historical Society. The oration of the Hon. R. Barnwell Rhett, before the Legislature of South-Carolina, delivered Nov. 28, 1850, closes the report.

This production, rapidly sketching the career, and describing the character of Mr. Calhoun, is written in the best manner of the orator,—simply, without any ambitious attempts at oratory, and rather in the style of narrative than eulogy. The orator seizes upon all the leading periods and events in the life of Calhoun, and sums up briefly, but comprehensively, their characteristics. His task was a difficult one, as the field had been so well and repeatedly reaped by previous biographers and orators.

Our space will suffer us but a few extracts from this performance, and these we shall make from those portions in which the speaker was most digressive. Here is a brief portrait of William Lowndes.

“William Lowndes was one of the greatest, yet one of the blandest and most amiable of men. No one could approach him without emotions of affection and admiration. In conferring with him, you felt as if communing with a bright and serene spirit, fresh from the crystal fountains of truth, without a spot on its snowy vestments. You were not so much dazzled by the splendour, as attracted by the mild light of his clear and beautiful intelligence, like the light of bright but distant stars. He did not, perhaps he could not, crush, by the overwhelming weight of his logic, the mind of his hearer—but softly subduing it to his purposes, he won it away from itself, and made it willing to be won. His native delicacy taught him that most difficult of all achievements to a very superior mind, not to offend by his superiority. You came to him with ease and confidence, you left him full of thought and gladness. Instead of humbling in his intercourse, he lifted up the feebler minds of others, and made them willing to bow to the gentle majesty of so much goodness and so much power. Mr. Lowndes had no enemies. To wound the feelings of another, even to protect his own, was beyond the gentleness of his noble nature. He had, of course, friends, warm friends, whose admiration of him as a man and as a statesman, was equalled only by their love. Between such a man and Mr. Calhoun, there was an instinctive assimilation. They appreciated and loved each other. When, therefore, they were both nominated for the Presidency, and thus placed in the attitude of rivals, Mr. Calhoun hastened to Mr. Lowndes. He assured him that he had had no agency in his own nomination by Pennsylvania; and expressed the hope, that the acts of their friends would not at all affect the personal relations of friendship and esteem between themselves. Mr. Lowndes warmly reciprocated the desire of Mr. Calhoun, and to his death the feelings of confidence and friendship between these two great men remained unimpaired—a striking instance of the nobleness of their generous nature.”

We could add much to the following description of Mr. Legaré, without disturbing the judgment of the orator—giving it copiousness only;—but this labour must be reserved for future pages. The tribute of Mr. Rhett will be gratefully acknowledged by all those who read the *Southern Review*.

“Hugh S. Legaré was a man of too much heart for politics.

His French temperament, quick to resent, yet easy to forgive; warm, guileless, and confiding, rendered him too unhappy and too disappointed, when tossed on the boisterous and adverse waves of public life. He had none of that cold patience, or buoyant hope, which often makes disaster the occasion of after rejoicing; or defeat the means of awakening new and higher energies. Yet he had a genius capable of mastering every science—an industry which travelled with untiring steps over the whole domain of literature; and a spirit of blazing intensity, which drew to itself and consumed all that was great or truthful or beautiful in the thoughts of other men. How often did his oratory resound in this hall; filling us with admiration at its pure and deep cadences! Vigorous thought, clothed in the drapery of the warmest and most nervous language, and borne on the wings of a lofty and impetuous spirit, characterized his striking powers in debate. Alas! the eagle fell as he reached the mountain top! He died on the very summit, where his glorious scholarship, mighty attainments, and brilliant genius, would have made him a name amongst the great statesmen of the world. Although he deemed himself slighted and wronged by his native State, he turned to her, to the last, with a full and yearning heart.

‘Heu! quanto minus est cum reliquis versare,  
Quam tui meminisse.’”

The passage which eulogises Robert Y. Hayne will not be held inappropriate among the episodes of Mr. Rhett, or in our pages.

“Gen. Hayne was the idol of the people, and repaid their devotion by a fidelity as true as theirs. He loved South-Carolina as the knight of old his bride. He loved popularity, not for the sake of its honours or emoluments, but because the heart of his humanity delighted to beat in unison with the warm pulsations of others. He rejoiced in the public service, as the boy who laughs and bounds and drives the ball before him. His manners were the perfection of frank and winning courtesy. But the spirit of the soldier radiated from every look and tone. In obeying the voice of the State, he brought to her service a determination to protect her from aggression or invasion, which no terrors could daunt. He stood, the proud delight and confidence of all. His inaugural address, on assuming the office of Governor, penetrated the souls of all who heard him, and drew tears of kindred sympathy from some of the sternest of us. He was an orator in the full meaning of oratory, the art of persuasion. Free and fast, the words floated on his silvery voice, while ingenuous and manly candour gave potency to the arguments of

his fine intellect. In the meridian of his powers he left public life; and borne along by the prosperity and the ambitious imagination of the country, entered, with his usual intrepidity, into the great scheme of uniting, by iron bonds, the South and West in commercial intercourse. His name would be written on the Alleghanies, and future generations would bless the wisdom and energy by which this great work was accomplished. But convulsion and ruin swept over the commercial world. The project failed. His heart sunk beneath the calamity. Eager gain carped at his doings; jealous misfortune turned upon him her cold reproachful eye. He died, the noblest victim of those disastrous times."

On the whole, though no great admirer of Andrew Jackson, Mr. Rhett has given us a not unfair portrait of that great man. It lacks fullness, but as a sketch, it may be regarded as a likeness, even at the hands of an enemy.

"Gen. Jackson was a most remarkable man. Born and reared and living, the greater part of his life, in a newly settled country, his character partook of the defects such an existence naturally engenders. His education was very limited. He learned nothing *from books*, of the great thoughts of the great men other ages have produced; but human nature, as he met it in the pathway of life, he thoroughly studied and understood. The feeble enforcement of the laws on our frontiers, necessarily made a man of his bold and reckless temper not very regardful of law. His will was his law, and with his own right arm he enforced it. Thus, from the circumstances of his life, as well as natural disposition, arose that aptitude and skill in contention which made him the most faithful of friends. He identified himself with those to whom he was attached, with a blind devotion which only very generous natures can feel, but which meaner spirits are so apt to take advantage of, and abuse. To conquer and rule men, if not his leading passion, was certainly his greatest attribute. With a powerful, although rude intellect, to support his fierce and iron will, he could not be otherwise than great—great amongst men—great in the field—great as a civil ruler. No man was ever more feared, no man was ever more implicitly obeyed, wherever he moved; confidence in him, and distrust in others, irresistibly spread over the minds of those who came within the charm of his fearful influence. Yet, in his turn, he was easily influenced by those who bowed before his sway, and had won his confidence. Placability was not possible in such a nature. He hated intensely, and forgave only those enemies whom he humbled, or who humbled themselves before his imperious domination."



Our space will suffer us no more. These extracts will suffice to show the spirit, style and manner of Mr. Rhett, and the freedom and force of his oration, which affords a correct general review of the protracted career, the valuable services, and the more striking traits of the great statesman who is his subject.

2. *Miles's Discourse*, before the Graduating Class of the College of Charleston, the next publication on our list, is one that secured the most ample plaudits upon delivery,—plaudits which will not be forfeited by the appearance of the work in print; though he, too—our author—properly conscious, as he is, of what is due to the reader, and what the critic demands, is very apt to send forth his productions without the adequate revision which they quite as much deserve as need. Mr. Miles is one of our special favourites. He unites, in large degree, the metaphysical with the imaginative faculty. It is in this combination, a very rare one, by the way, that we find the secret of originality. With such endowments, the thoughts are winged as well as native. Conclusions are reached, and convictions established, at a bound. Intuition seems to anticipate induction. Truth appears to receive aid from inspiration, which lightens argument of half her labours in the way to faith. The fancy sweetens the philosophy, while the philosophy dignifies the fancy. Ardency of temperament is always kindred with these qualities, prompts their activity, and makes eloquent their speech. Where these attributes exist we forgive a thousand minor faults. There may be rudeness of style—indeed, this is almost necessarily the case with writers or speakers of eager and impulsive character—but we scarcely note the absence of symmetry and mere smoothness in the higher attributes of a keen thought and a vigorous imagination. Nor are these rudenesses at all inconsistent with those frequent felicities of expression, in which the voice, becoming lifted by eloquent suggestions of the mind, attains a freedom and a force, a beauty and a grace, very far superior to the staid refinements of a close and elaborate polish. Mr. Miles, though abounding in these curious felicities of style, is not what the critic would call a *finished* writer. He, perhaps, a little too much disregards, perhaps despises, the minute advantages of a careful propriety, conspicuous in every sentence. We could point out, for example, sundry inaccuracies of phrase, and some

exuberances, (as we deem them,) in this performance, which would have required only a very little pains-taking to amend and render perfect. In listening to the orator, however—catching a certain portion of his generous enthusiasm—we cease to be critics. We are willing to suffer faults when associated with striking merit, and fail to notice his little irregularities or eccentricities in the impression which is made upon us, by his bold and hurrying imagination. His subject, in the present discourse, is the “Proper Aims of Youth.” “Covet earnestly the best gifts,” is the appropriate text which he borrows from I. Corinthians. In the illustration of this admirable text for a moral essay, he discusses the several kinds of ambition which lead or mislead the young beginner, and exhibits the right standards for adoption at the commencement of that journey of life, which, to be pursued rightly, must contemplate the future no less than the present. In this discussion, our author naturally adverts to the career of sundry of the most greatly endowed of human performers. He gives us, in this survey, several glowing portraits of the (so-called) great men of the world. Napoleon, Voltaire, Talleyrand, Byron—all wanting religion and all failing, more or less, of the attainment even of their own purposes—certainly, of the consummation of their own works, according to their endowments—these are among the instances which he happily employs to illustrate his lessons of Christian philosophy. These enable him, with singular felicity, to point the moral which he would inculcate—showing the lamentable deficiency, of the one thing most needful, even for the successful exercise of the greatest gifts of genius. These portraits, though sketched only, are all in oil,—with a bold, free brush, and in colours the most appropriate and impressive. The great lesson of *duty* is accordingly urged as the genuine secret of true fame—fame, in due degree with the talent and the trust conferred. There is much force, with much wholesome truth, in the following passages :

“There is, however, a greater word than fame. Pursue duty with conscientious earnestness, and, even without aiming at renown, it will be the sure result of worthy performance.

“The soul, which has a special work to perform, must pursue its calling by the resistless impulse—the necessities of its own desires and cravings. It must, it will, utter itself; and the more emphatically, from the opposition and barriers through which it is compelled

to make itself a way. It speaks, it acts, because it must ; and fame it leaves to come or not, as the future shall reveal. If its work and calling be great, it has an instinct that renown must be its free reward. The reward, seen glittering in the distance, may cheer and elevate ; but its work, its calling, its mission, is that which absorbs the energies of the earnest soul, and is that for which it labours. It labours not for fame, as an end, because fame must be the necessary consequence of the great work, whose achievement is the true end of its toil, its enthusiasm, and its devotion.

“If the soul feels that it must labour only for fame, that it has powers to achieve it, and that fame is the end, and object, and goal of its toil, that object it may attain ; but it will accomplish no great work, which humanity will revere and cherish, as a glory and benefit to the race. The fame thus attained will be only a homage to the powers of the individual man. But when the individual is identified with the great work, which is to be an eternal glory and benefit to humanity, in that work will he find the satisfaction of his soul and its aspirations ; and immortal fame and renown will be accorded him by his race, whether he has consciously laboured for them or not—a fame and renown which the race will jealously cherish, as a part of its own glory.

But there is another mistake which we may commit. We may confound immortality with the fame which we covet. We may not believe that one's name can live, except in the renown accorded by posterity. We may make, therefore, no account of the quiet, unobtrusive path of daily duty ; and those who are obscurely pursuing that path, and doing nothing to leave a name known to, and admired by the world, we may regard as scarcely worthy the name of living. If we so think, we forget that thousands may live unknown, die forgotten, leave no visible trace of their silent existence, and yet, in faithfully performing the humble duties of daily life, lay up for themselves an immortal record, in the memory of an Eternal Spectator. But we can imagine some vacillating aspirant for fame, uttering such language as this : ‘It is not only fame that I desire ; I am willing that it should come as the consequence of worthy performance. Something I would do for the benefit of my race, which they will not willingly let die. If I could, I would not put forth a work merely for the fame it would win, without some loftier aim. But the cause of my dissatisfaction is, that I feel the possession of energy, of ability, to accomplish something more than the ordinary duties of life ; nay, that very feeling imposes upon me the duty of accomplishing some such thing—and yet I cannot choose, I cannot determine, amidst the multiplicity of objects, to what I should devote my application and toil.’ To such language, we must reply : You deceive yourself. You speak as though you had but to select an object, in order to succeed in your aspirations ; while your dis-

satisfaction and hesitancy imply that there is a secret misgiving of success, and yet an underlying impatience to enjoy that success, and not to trust all to the future. And your very indecision in selecting an object, while you crave something more than the full round of present duties, which are unquestionable, is an evidence that you have no true calling to any such special work, or it would resistlessly determine you, and that you are not heartily and faithfully fulfilling the duties of life to which you are plainly called. Throw yourself manfully into the performance of your present duties, and be content to be nobody to the world, that, by a faithful life, you may be worthily immortal in the approval of God. Life is a grand and awful mystery. It is so, because it is related to eternity. Live, then, as though you really believed this, and if God has indeed a special calling for you, whereby fame and renown are to encircle your name in human annals, leave it, without restlessness and anxiety, to His providence, and, when the hour arrives, the path will open clearly before you, and you will feel the impulse, and possess the power to pursue it, and to achieve your destiny. Remember that the great law of duty is conscience; but the law of duty, for you, is conscience enlightened by the Christian revelation."

This is a long extract, but the thoughtful reader will scarcely find it so. We cannot forbear another quotation. Our orator conducts his audience into the libraries of the learned. He makes a rapid survey of their treasures,—their glories of philosophy, poetry, history, art, science—in short, the whole world of the world's literature. With his hand finally resting upon THE BIBLE, he thus proceeds:

"But, amidst the grand array, the eye of the weary and unsatisfied inquirer turns to one small and ancient volume. It has passed through a more fiery ordeal of criticism than all the volumes, collectively, of India, Greece and Rome, and it holds enthralled the faith and homage of the civilized world. Strange, venerable, awful, terrible book! It is folly to ridicule you; it is madness to reject you! With all your hard sayings, and dark riddles, and dim traditions, and bloody stories, you have triumphed over the literature of Greece, and, what is more, over the noblest intellects and the finest hearts which have regaled humanity. What a triumphant, though silent concession, have you extorted from your enemies, in that they have deemed you sufficiently formidable to elicit almost every thing which learning, assiduity, genius, weariless research, and the most polished intellectual armoury, could furnish, to combat you.\* One

\* "I am indebted to the kind suggestion of a friend, for alluding here to one of the most remarkable tributes to christianity which human genius ever paid. Shelley, in his wonderful and grand poem, 'Prometheus Unbound,' while pre-



book, in barbarous dialects, against the glorious language and unrivalled genius of a library of Grecians! The true Olympian Eagle of Song, the Fiery Master of the lyric torrent, the Enthroned Triad of action and passion, the lute-voiced old Chronicler, the Promethean Thief of Clio's Stylus, the pure-tongued Annalist of the Immortal Retreat, the Thunderbolt of winged eloquence, the mighty genius of that subtle Encyclopædist, the polished Censor and Panegyrist of declining Athens, the genial Essayist and Biographer, and even the sublimely attuned soul, whose thoughts and language roll on, like the everlasting harmony of the spheres—yes, all, poet, orator, historian, philosopher—you must all doff your starry, well-earned crowns, before the awful diadem of that authoritative volume. Old Grecians, your glory is like the glitter of the starry firmament—your majesty like that of 'the old rolling heavens;' but the Bible is like floods of sunshine, and stormy night, and lurid fire, and balmy morn, and life and death, and heaven and hell, in the rapidly shifting scenes of an universal panorama. Masters of the heart and intellect, as you Grecians are, your pages have no such pathos as the story of Joseph—no psalms, like the strains of David—no sublime conceptions of the Omnipotent Jehovah, like the Hebrew prophets—no grandeur, like the empyrean-piercing flights of Pauline eloquence, an eloquence which neither the intricacies of bad Greek nor the peculiar method of rabbinic logic can degrade or obscure—your pages present nothing equal to the magnificent book of Job—nothing at all comparable to the wild sublimity of the Apocalyptic epic—and your loftiest and most brilliant conceptions fade into insignificance, and the dimmest twilight, before the divine majesty of the simple Gospels. What is the sacrifice of a raving Hercules, that he might speedily reach the blessed abodes, through the sharp, self-inflicted agonies, which swallowed up, in their fiery haste, the slow torments of the gnawing vest; what is Agamemnon's compulsory sacrifice of the self-devoted Iphigenia; what is the affecting self-sacrifice of Alcestis for her husband's life; what is the grand suffering of Prometheus, for the temporal benefit of the human race; what all the voluntary sacrifices of Grecian story,

sending, in the great Titan, an embodiment of hostility to revealed religion, and shadowing forth, in that extraordinary production, the ultimate triumph of atheism, has yet evidently modelled Prometheus upon the type of Christ. The genius of the poet, in seeking the most perfect and sublimest character—a character which should be the triumphant rival of even the Deity of revelation—could find it nowhere but in the person of the despised Christ, with a stolen light from whom he gilds the character of his infidel Titan. If it be even supposed, however, that the coincidence is only accidental, whereby the Prometheus so strongly reflects and suggests the Christ, it would prove that the most perfect conception of character can rise to no loftier type than Christ; and yet it is historically certain that, before the production of the Gospels, that model had never been conceived and delineated by human genius.

compared with the overwhelming tenderness, the unspeakable awe and sublimity, of the loving sacrifice of the Son of God, for the everlasting salvation of a sinful world? The genius and learning of centuries have been kindled by and lavished upon the literature of Greece; but it never brought comfort to the penitent spirit—it never softened remorse into repentance, and transformed repentance into the hope of faith—it never poured balm into the broken heart, nor consolation into the bosom of the afflicted and desolate—it never took away the sting of sin, or threw a halo of triumph around the gloom of death—it never extorted from a glorious crowd of genius and learning the confession that ‘this is the Word of God,’ as that same old Bible has mightily done. And, after every concession is made which true science and criticism can extort or demand, the truths of that book will still shine, a golden chain, linking the deepest and holiest hopes of man with the heavenly throne of the eternal God.”

3. *Clingman's speech* on the future policy of the government, is one of those able reviews of the condition of public affairs at this juncture, which should command the serious consideration of every citizen of the South. This gentleman, a representative of the “old North State,” in the House of Representatives, is unquestionably one of the ablest members of Congress from the South. A whig, while the old issues of party were unsettled, he has wisely seen that these old issues are at an end, and that there is no good reason to maintain a party organization which contemplates no principles, and is only preserved with the view to individual or party power. He has opened his eyes, in season, to the geographical questions which alone divide the country at present. He sees the danger to the South, from these questions, and has properly buckled on his armour, for the one great necessity—the South, the whole South, and the South in peril! This is the only patriotism. The speech before us is devoted to this one object. The protective tariff he discusses, under just lights, and decides against it. In respect to manufactures, he gives the following encouraging picture of what is done and doing in the South, more particularly in his own State :

“The competition of foreign fabrics is not the sole cause of the present suffering of Massachusetts. The high price of the raw material, cotton, at this time, is perhaps the main element of her distress. There is another reason, however, which ought not to be overlooked. I mean the growing competition of the Southern

States. This is a cause which is rapidly becoming stronger, and which the legislation of this government cannot materially check. I would direct your attention to North Carolina, because I know more about her, and what she contains. I must first, however, make a passing remark, with reference to coal and iron, lest it should be supposed that I am indifferent to the interests of Pennsylvania, because my own State has not similar advantages. Iron ore is not only generally and abundantly diffused throughout the State, but she has also two large deposits of coal. The fields of this mineral, too, are fortunately deposited on the two rivers most easily rendered navigable of any in the State, and emptying into the ocean within her own limits. The existence of the coal on Deep river has been known for half a century, but, until recently, it was not supposed that it could be transported, with facility, to the markets of the world. The operations, however, of the Cape Fear and Deep river navigation company, have, within the last twelve months, rendered it certain that this coal can easily and cheaply be transported to the ocean. The field is extensive, and cannot be exhausted for centuries. It contains, in abundance, the best varieties of highly bituminous, semi-bituminous and anthracite coal. Capitalists from Massachusetts and New-York, who have recently acquired interests in the mines, assure me, with the utmost confidence, that they will be able to mine this coal, and transport it to tide water, at a cost of less than one dollar per ton. It costs more than three dollars per ton to transport the coals of Maryland and Pennsylvania to the sea. The stream, with the locks already nearly completed, is capable of conveying, in steamboats, several millions of tons annually. We expect, therefore, to be able to supply with the best kinds of coal the cities of the Atlantic coast, and the steamers of the ocean. There are also, in some places, lying immediately above the coal, large deposits of rich iron ore. In the production of iron, either free or slave labour can be obtained, at forty or fifty cents per day. This labour, when employed in raising coal and iron ore, in the vicinity of Pittsburg, in Alleghany county, costs not less than one dollar per day. Provisions are also abundant and cheap. When, therefore, in the case above stated, the labour employed in making a ton of iron, in Pennsylvania, costs \$45, the same would cost, with us, only \$22 50. We might, therefore, when the Pennsylvanians were making nothing, realize a profit of \$22 per ton.

"I do not, however, regard the calculations of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Hampton] as entirely accurate. Still I have no doubt that we should be able to produce iron cheaper than they are doing in his State. The iron, too, when thus made, could be transported to the ocean for less than \$1 per ton. It is obvious, therefore, that our State might put forward a demand for high protective duties, with as much show of justice as Pennsylvania does.

I trust, however, that her people will be satisfied with the existing rates, highly protective as they are. North-Carolina has, also, not less than fifty cotton factories, most of which have been built within the last four or five years. I think she is in advance of any of the Southern States, in this branch of business. Whether I am right or not, in entertaining this opinion, the returns of the late census, when completed, will decide. It is believed, by many, that the South cannot compete successfully with the North in manufacturing, it being supposed that we have not the capital to spare to such investments. Let us look, for a moment, at the elements of manufacturing capital. An important one is water power, and North-Carolina has more than enough of this to move all the machinery now existing in the world. It may be had, too, in most of the localities, at a price merely nominal. Timber, stone, and all building materials, are also equally cheap. North-Carolina, though not a great cotton State, also produces five times as much, probably, as she or any one Southern State is now manufacturing. She can, too, obtain easily an additional supply from South-Carolina, by means of three railroads, connecting her with that State. The cotton now produced by her is cheaper, by one cent in the pound, than the same article at Charleston. It is also cheaper at Charleston, by three-fourths of a cent, than in New-England. Our manufacturing establishments, therefore, can obtain the raw material at nearly two cents in the pound cheaper than the New-England establishments. Provisions are, also, only half as dear with us. Labour is, likewise, one hundred per cent. cheaper. In the upper parts of the State, the labour of either a free man or a slave, including board, clothing, etc., can be obtained for from \$110 to \$120 per annum. It costs at least twice that sum in New-England.

“The difference in the cost of female labour, whether free or slave, is even greater. As we now have a population of nearly one million, we might advance, to a great extent, in manufacturing, before we materially increased the wages of labour. We have, therefore, all the elements of manufacturing capital, much cheaper than the North, except the machinery, and this we should be able to obtain at the same price. There is a sufficient surplus capital among us for its purchase. Two years since, our legislature imposed a tax on money placed at interest, whenever the individual had more than \$1,000 above his own indebtedness. It appeared that there were more than \$15,000,000 so lent. If, as I think it is probably true, that there is as much now outstanding, in smaller sums, there is not less than thirty millions of capital in this condition. Much of this sum might at once be invested in manufacturing. The other Southern States are doubtless in a similar condition. Our Southerners have abundance of money to expend, for purposes of business or plea-



sure. We shall; therefore, I think, at no distant day, work up a large, if not the greater portion, of our cotton into manufactured fabrics. Should this opinion of mine be well-founded, it is obvious that no duties which we could impose would long enable the New-England factories to sustain themselves in competition with us. They would find it their interest to go into such finer fabrics as we would not produce, for some time to come, or into new employments. I have no apprehension that a people so intelligent, energetic and enterprising as they are, will fail to find means of sustaining themselves in comfort and prosperity."

On the subject of the recent territorial usurpations of the North, Mr. Clingman says:

"The North has made a great mistake, in getting up the late anti-slavery agitation. Instead of endeavouring to limit slavery to the territory where it now exists, if they had consulted their interests, they would have consented to its extension, even to the shores of the Pacific. By thus allowing the slaves and their owners to be diffused over a wide extent of country, they would have been kept employed in agriculture, and the competition of their labour would thereby have been escaped, and they would have continued good customers. But by limiting them as to territory, they will be driven, whether they will it or not, into manufacturing for themselves. The conduct of the North, while, in my judgment, a crime to us, was, like Napoleon's invasion of Spain, a blunder for them. What they intended as an injury, like many other seeming evils, may prove, in the end, a benefit. So wise and benevolent is the system ordained by Providence, that it usually depends upon ourselves whether a particular occurrence shall, in its results, be an evil or a blessing. In the language of Burke, 'our antagonist is our helper.' The energy which we have summoned to our aid, to enable us to resist a threatened danger, will give us strength for a forward movement. A great impulse has been given to the Southern mind, within the last twelve months. Much of this is due to the direction, purposely given to the debates of the last session, by some of the speakers. While, therefore, I cannot too strongly denounce the acts of the last session, in relation to the Mexican territory, I do not, nor have I ever pretended, that they would be followed by any great immediate practical injury to us. Undoubtedly, depriving us of all share in the public territory, and limiting slavery to the area it now occupies, is the greatest injury, with reference to that interest, which the government could possibly inflict on us, until it shall have attacked the institution in the States themselves.

"The other measures proposed by the abolitionists are comparatively insignificant in their ultimate practical efforts. I do not pretend that this exclusion could be claimed as a political victory, by

the free-soil or abolition party. That party had staked itself on the passage of a positive act of exclusion, viz : the Wilmot proviso or Jeffersonian ordinance. After a few weeks discussion, it was driven from this ground, being defeated, on a direct vote. It then fell back on what was called the President's plan, to wit : the admission of territories as free States. In this movement, after a long struggle, they were frustrated and foiled, by the dilatory motions which the minority resorted to, and which, it was seen, could and would be indefinitely prolonged. It is true, however, that the measures actually passed, did, in the end, practically give them the exclusion of slavery which they desired. This, however, was owing to the action of Southern men, who, by their votes, consented that this section of the Union should be excluded. What I have a right to complain of is, that after the abolition party stood thus defeated before the country, Southern men should have been willing to give them, practically, all the fruits of the victory. It is said, however, that the South saved its honour. So did the Mexican army at Monterey. But though it capitulated with the honours of war, it surrendered up the city, the object for which the battle was fought. If we had been overpowered and defeated by this party, I could better have borne their seizing the fruits of the victory. By giving up all the Mexican territory to them, in addition to that previously held by the government, and made free by acts of Congress, we have put it in their power to call to their aid, at a future day, twenty or thirty additional free States. If we have found them troublesome now, will they not be more formidable when thus strengthened, should they be roused to another attack? It is this view of the future which has produced the deep dissatisfaction existing in the South. Our people feel that the outposts have been surrendered to our enemies, and that courage and firmness can alone protect them. Even those among us who have defended or apologized for these measures have tacitly acknowledged the peril to which they subject us, by insisting that the North should be held under the most rigid obligation not to renew the attack. Calling themselves, *par excellence*, Union men, and stigmatized by their opponents as submissionists, they have, nevertheless, found it necessary to lay down a strong disunion platform. I say a strong disunion platform, because they have declared their purpose to dissolve the Union, upon issues and contingencies which no one, not even the most ultra, thought of making, a year ago. If the abolition party, encouraged, as it probably will be, by these great acquisitions, shall make another formidable movement against us, it will most probably result in the overthrow of the government, and the disruption of the confederacy. I do not apprehend, however, that they will be able to succeed in abolishing slavery. Two plans are entertained, for effecting this object. The first is, immediately and directly, by legislation, to

attack it in the States. This mode has not now advocates enough to excite much apprehension in the public mind. The other plan, by which they expect to accomplish the same thing, at a day not far distant in a nation's progress, is the following: They say that the slaves of the country, being confined to the States where they are now held, will so increase in numbers, in connection with the multiplication of the white race, that their labour will become unprofitable, not yielding more than enough for their bare subsistence, and that their owners will find it advantageous to abandon them as property, and allow them to go free. They do not stop to calculate how vast will be the misery inflicted, by thus crowding together our population. When the pressure has become so great that the labour of the slaves will no longer support them, what will be the condition of the free labourers, under the same rate of wages? To carry out their fanatical and wicked objects, they are perfectly willing to place the whole Southern country in a condition of indescribable misery."

This is well stated. Mr. Clingman might have been more impressive in his delineation and denunciation of that class of Southern politicians, who have helped the enemies of the South, in stabbing their common mother in her most vital interest. But time will affix the brand upon their cheeks, even if their contemporaries forbear. Of the calculations of the abolitionists, and of our own future, Mr. Clingman speaks the following language:

"A distinguished statesman, whose declarations have great weight with many of our citizens, is represented, in the newspapers, recently to have expressed the opinion, at a meeting, held in this city, that when the number of slaves in the United States shall have become three or four times as great as it now is, that the contingency will happen, and that they will become free, by the voluntary act of their owners. As the slaves have been doubling their numbers in a little more than twenty-five years, that condition of things might be expected to be arrived at in the next fifty years. In that time, the population of the slaveholding States might amount to nearly forty millions, of which nearly one-third would be slaves. Those States embrace, together, an area of nearly 900,000 square miles. A population of forty millions, diffused over them, need not be more dense than that of Kentucky now is. It might go up to more than fifty millions, before it became as dense as that of the State of Maryland. In these States, slave labour is not so unprofitable that its owners are willing voluntarily to give it up, or even to take the high prices which it commands farther South. Yet these States are not supposed to be remarkably adapted to the profitable use of slave

labour ; nor are they, as a whole, above the average fertility of the slaveholding States. Not, only, too, are they able permanently to maintain their present population, but nobody, I think, doubts but what it might be greatly increased, without a material change in their condition or prosperity. Is there any reason to apprehend that the Southern States are incapable, as a whole, of sustaining a population proportionally as great, or even much greater ? It is the opinion of a friend of mine, on the other side of the House, from Mississippi, [Mr. Thompson,] that, in a single bend in the river of the same name, there is a body of land yet untouched, sufficiently extensive and fertile to employ profitably, in the culture of cotton, all the slaves now existing in the State of Virginia. That our population would, in time, become too dense for a comfortable subsistence, I do not question. But the period must be longer than that supposed. Before that time has arrived, possibly the slaves may, in the opinion of some, disappear in another mode.

“ But does any man imagine that we shall not acquire additional territory, in much less than fifty years. Why, Mexico, even now, seems to be on the eve of falling to pieces. I should not be surprised, at any time, to hear that the adventurous gold hunters, now in California, had organized an expedition, and seized upon the Mexican provinces immediately south of them. When Texas is filled up by our emigrants, they cannot be prevented from passing the Rio Grande, and revolutionizing the neighbouring provinces. They are destined to be occupied by our slaveholding population. It will fill up all the country around the gulf, including the peninsula of Yucatan, and perhaps the northern portion of the South-American continent. This state of things will be likely to occur even before our interest requires it. Whether it be desirable or not, there is no power on this continent to prevent it. Mexico is altogether too feeble. This government itself cannot do it. It had as well attempt to curb the waves of the ocean. I say boldly, that if the government makes the effort, it will itself perish in the attempt. As soon as we feel the actual want of additional territory, we shall occupy it, either with or without the aid of this government. Our right to take it will be neither better nor worse than that by which we have driven back the original Indian population. Even now, we are strong enough to take care of ourselves, against any forces that can be brought to bear upon us, and we shall be getting relatively stronger for some time to come. Sir, the returns of the census, for the past year, will present a condition of things not anticipated by many persons. Within the last ten years, some two millions of foreigners have arrived in this country. They have almost all become residents of the Northern States. They, of themselves, were sufficient to have given the North more than twenty additional members of Congress, under the new apportionment. But, in point



of fact, if you except the two members she gets by the admission of California, she will gain nothing, or, at most, but two or three members. Notwithstanding, therefore, this great advantage, as well as others, which the North has had, the South will, nevertheless, very nearly, if not quite, hold her relative strength. This is due to the fact that our people, being mostly agriculturists, enjoy more of the comforts of life, and are increasing in numbers faster, from natural causes. The condition of society at the North is less favourable to this progress, because of the numbers engaged in manufacturing, and as servants to the wealthy, who are without domicils, and who are frequently reduced to pauperism.

"The next decade will show a large increase in our Southern population. We are now nearly ten millions, and there is no body of people, of the same number, upon earth, better able to defend itself against attack. Slavery, instead of being an element of weakness, is one of positive strength. The amount of force which any nation can bring into the field depends not merely on the number of its men, but also on the amount of its production. Few countries, if any, can sustain permanently in the field more than one-sixth of their adult male population. We have a population, intelligent, enterprising, high-spirited, and brave, and ever ready to embark in military expeditions."

Of the *prestige* of Union, without regard to the constitution, of its declining influence, and the inquiring mind that is now addressed to the questions—what is its value? what are its dangers? the speaker gives us the following just and forcible passage :

"One great benefit, Mr. Chairman, has resulted from the late slavery agitation. Heretofore, our people had been accustomed to think of the Union with a sort of religious reverence. They were disposed to idolize the work of their own hands. But all superstitions are degrading and debasing in their effects. I rejoice that our people have been liberated from its influences. The agitation here, and the discussions attendant on it, have produced a great revolution in the sentiments of our population. They had been accustomed to rest, in thought, on the idea of the Union, as the ark of safety; but they have been aroused from the delusion. One of our citizens, Mr. Stevens, while travelling in Central America, experienced there the shock of a violent earthquake. He declared that it had produced a great permanent revolution in his feelings, in one respect. Till then, he said, he had been accustomed, when upon the surface of the earth, to feel secure, and that he rested on a foundation firm and stable; but, ever afterwards, he could only think of the solid globe itself as a frail, tremulous thing, ready to give way

under him at any moment. The shock of an earthquake has passed under the minds of our people, and they no longer rest on the Union as the solid rock of safety. I rejoice that it is so. I wish to see them bold, self-relying, and confident of being able, with the favour of Providence, to guard their liberties and preserve their happiness. It will be long before confidence, that "plant of slow growth," will flourish again. Rather let them realize the great truth, that "eternal vigilance is the price of liberty." They have met, too, with its merited scorn, and trampled under their feet, the doctrine of a slavish subserviency to the government of their own creation. Certain professed national organs and orators have preached devotion to the Union, in any event, and under all circumstances. A baser sentiment never fell from the lips of a mortal man. It is substantially the same with the doctrine of passive obedience and non-resistance, which brought the head of Charles I. to the block. Since then, no Englishman has had the effrontery to avow such opinions. Its only supporters, in this country, formerly were the tories of the revolution. Those who have preached the doctrine, in our day, will only find their fellows among the palace slaves of Asiatic despotism. Their proper place is below every thing that Providence has created, when in its natural state. Even the meanest reptiles struggle upward, against the oppressor. The American people justly regard these individuals as degraded below the rest of animated nature."

We might quote other passages from this very sensible and manly speech, did our limits not deny. We commend it to the Southern citizen. It speaks the secret care, the brooding anxiety, and the growing resolution of thousands, in our country, who have themselves forborne to speak, but who are not the less settled in their convictions, and not the less firm in their resolutions. The South may be robbed and cheated for a season; but there will be a day for retribution, and the degree of penalty will be extreme, in just proportion to the long forbearance of the South. She has been robbed and cheated for many seasons, and too many of her own sons have been found willing—for a consideration—to hold her down, while the robber empties her pockets. But she has grown suspicious, watchful, resentful, of late, and they will, none of them, find it so easy to pass the knife across her throat; which is the present contemplated crime, disguised by whatever artifice. Fortunately, she has too numerous, too intelligent, too brave, and too well-appointed a population, to submit to the last act in this atrocious drama of spoliation. She has still arms, and

men, and spirit, intellect and wealth. She will not be found a victim so easy to subdue, as were the people of the British West India Islands. They design for her this fate, in goodly emulation of the English abolitionists; but they have utterly miscalculated the relative strength of the victims. Once fully awakened to a conviction of the wrong—once assured of the growth and approach of the danger—and she will be seen arousing herself from sleep, like the strong man, not again to sink back into slumber, until she has forever shaken off the deadly thralldom that has enfeebled her energies, and now threatens to destroy her life.

4. *Curtis's Inaugural Address.* The wretched system of popular education which prevails in South-Carolina, and, indeed, throughout most of the Southern States of this Union, is due mostly to the sparseness of the population. This forbids the employment of competent schoolmasters, and, in fact, lessens wonderfully the popular sense of the deficiencies of learning. In an agricultural community, the wants of education are not so quickly felt, as in communities where the density of population renders the means of life more difficult of attainment, and where the constant attrition of mind with mind serves, in some degree, to supply educational deficiencies. Numerous efforts have been made in the South, and in South-Carolina especially, to correct the evils arising from our sparseness of population, and the antagonistic circumstances of our situation; but these have been mostly unavailing, as we have usually failed to address ourselves to the one great difficulty, already indicated, under which we labour. Among the schemes for this object has been that of a convention of teachers, who, sensibly feeling the embarrassments of their charge, have honourably set themselves to work to seek the remedies. We are not in possession of the full results of their assemblage, nor, indeed, do we suppose that much more has been done than to compare notes, and suggest topics for general inquiry. The excellent address before us, however, is in sufficient proof of the ability which may be brought to bear upon the subject, and the capacity of the teachers to suggest the proper means for the general improvement of our school system. Dr. Curtis is a correct thinker, and a man of large experience. He evidently knows the right estimate to be set upon education, and is by no means the person

to deal in vague generalities, or in those wretched commonplaces, which constitute so large a part of the usual talk upon the subject. We must make a few extracts from his discourse, which may be allowed to speak for themselves. The question, "What is education?" he has discussed and defined. The subject of it suggests the inquiry which next follows :

"But we have a human mind to lead out : not that of an angel, unfallen or fallen ; that of an intelligent being, of high order, but not the highest—of great imperfections and faults, but not those of the worst possible character. I speak at once to a point, in the experience of us all : for that which is, by revelation, more fully ascertained to us, I hold to be discernible, in the entire outline, by intelligent observation. Here is a being of noble powers and capacities ; but they are slowly developed, and their *limits* I find a first duty both to remember and to teach. If in anything the science of mind has advanced of late years, it has been in the knowledge and practical acknowledgment of these limits. As the existence of man here, in connection with what we find *he is*, argues that he will exist hereafter, so the very excellence of his mental nature argues the probability of higher excellence, even in this universe of creatures. It is not an angel we have to teach, nor angelic powers to lead or draw out, in any stage of our work as teachers—powers of high distinction, but not thus high.

"On the other hand, we find in him mental and moral discrepancies, imperfections, faults—crime. There is the perpetual conflict between reason and sense, which even heathen moralists lament. Plato's satire upon some perfectionists of his day, will apply to the optimists with regard to young people, whom we occasionally meet with in our own. 'If,' says he, in his *Meno*, 'children were (*φύσει*) by nature good, it were only necessary to shut them up to keep them good.' In other words, why educate them at all ? We have a faulty being to teach and control, just inasmuch as he is committed to us to educate—to *govern*. We may imagine him better, in any or every respect, than he is, in which case we shall not sufficiently control what is bad. We may imagine him worse, until we only contribute to making him so. It is neither the powers of a pure, nor those of a fallen angel, we have to educate ; those of a being prone only to good, nor those of one of unmixed and unmitigated evil character ; or of whom we ought, at any time, morally to despair.

"Then we have, by the very name of our undertaking, to lead, draw out or guide ; not to create, extort or drive forth, either as a whole, or in part, these latent powers of his—not to

'Tear ope the blushing bud to make a flower.'



"And here I take a stand between two extremes. The one ancient, the other a modern mistake, I submit. Looking back through rigid Rome, to semi-barbarous Sparta, we perceive the iron hand of mere authority attempting to accomplish everything in education (so called) *by* anything but educative methods. All is seizure, rough and reckless tearing forth such powers of the young mind as public or domestic leaders chose to appropriate to building up the supposed interests of the State, or the fortunes of a family—a kind of Cæsarean operation, not resorted to as the undesired exception, but as the rule, in every case of the mental birth of a citizen. In nothing was nature consulted, much less waited upon; there was no hope, because no faith, in her developments. The young citizen must be compressed, or tortured, to a given model; shortened to the size of the procrustean bed, or stretched and elongated, until the energies of his mind were broken or dislocated. Relics of this dictation to Nature, substituted for the congenial guidance of nature, have been, to a late date, found in the scholastic polity of Europe—may be found, perhaps, in that of Prussia, at this day. Instruction, and its means, are mistaken for education and its issues. But how many men can instruct, that cannot educate! Instruction is not education. 'You may make a mere *drench*' of the former, as I have read, 'and find as much difficulty in opening a mule's mouth for it, as that of the best horse in your stable.' This is one extreme. Another is, for the pupil to be the master of the teacher and all his plans; or for youth to be so consulted on the entire scheme and details of their education, as that, not only what is necessary in most cases, and indispensable in some, is alike disregarded, but that only which ignorance appreciates as the suitable knowledge, and that which idleness or obstinacy may dictate, as alone desirable, is chosen, and the education (miscalled) is conducted on the *minimum* of instruction, or as little as possible to pass the pupil off as educated. Here is the other extreme. Nothing, as it might and should be, is educed in the one case, because the mind's own vigour and capacity are not consulted—there is no faith in mind, properly so called. Nothing, in the other, because the powers that were born into this world to be led, restrain or refuse all guidance."

The mind must be conducted, or led out, to usefulness—in other words, developed for *good*, and this good contemplates equally the necessities and objects of society, and the nature of the individual mind of the pupil,—for each pupil is an individual, having a special mission. This is a point which Dr. Curtis judiciously discusses, but we are at a loss for space to give what he says on this subject. Our author stands up stoutly for the Latin Grammar. He says :

"The basis of an useful education, bearing on the learned professions, seems happily *common* to them all. All must have a foundation in those principles of grammar which are universal; and these will be found as conveniently, at least, I venture to opine, (with, perhaps, the obsolete prejudices of a grammar-school boy,) in the Latin grammar as anywhere. Hence, may you teach, undoubtedly, the entire substance of the English grammar, while you are teaching the Latin; although the converse is not true: and hence the policy, if sound learning is worth sowing broadcast over a land, of the phrase 'Grammar Schools,' in England, being legally held to mean a school where the Latin grammar *must* be taught. All the professions need the rudiments, at least, of mathematical learning, not only to strengthen the mind, but, while *meum* and *tuum* shall be words whose meaning no man may forget, a liberal foundation in history, and more of natural philosophy than is usually obtained in schools. At the well-conducted academy, then, I hold—that which has any pretensions to prepare youth for college—these common and indispensable foundations of professional learning may be laid. And there would I lay them solidly—those foundation principles of *all* liberal education, that should give a young man, as well as his parents, the *means* of rationally choosing a profession. *The ignoramus has no such means.* A profession may be chosen for us, and by us, far too early. Too lightly chosen it must have been, *wherever* it is lightly abandoned—*where* lawyers would sometimes induce one to suppose that the world was indeed 'without law,' so anxious are they to be found, *not* expounding the past, but clothed with the powers of *new* legislation; *where* neither mercantile nor idle and dandy physicians are rare; and *where* *merely* professional, and wholly incompetent clergymen are found, perhaps, in equal numbers. All these cases argue, I contend, the precocious choice of a profession somewhere—the boy, perhaps, consulted, until he fetters and makes boyish the conduct of the man for half his life; or ignorance, choosing all it will be taught, (a choice not confined to boys,) until it learns nothing. I wholly approve and applaud the liberty of choice, in young men, at the right period. I only contend that it should be a later period than it often is. I would not heed a child crying for the moon, nor trust the chariot of Phœbus to any Phæton."

In respect to the present collegiate system, by which much cramming is made to take the place of wholesome feeding, Dr. Curtis speaks in language of strong condemnation. He approves, measurably, of the improved system adopted in Brown University, as offering "a happy medium between the extremely conservative and the ultra-progressive economy of a college." Here is a scheme

of collegiate instruction, as reported by Dr. Wayland, of which, in great degree, Dr. C. approves :

"Dr. W. suggests, 1. The abandonment of any fixed term of years for the entire collegiate course. Let the time allotted to each particular study be determined by its own nature, and every student be allowed, within given limits, to take a greater or less number, as he may choose. But, 2. Every course of instruction, once commenced, should be continued until completed. 3. Every student seeking a degree, should sustain, as now, an honourable examination, in prescribed studies ; no student, however, being under any obligation to proceed to a degree, unless he choose. 4. Every student should be entitled to a certificate of such progress as he may have made in any course.

"And now he proposes a pretty liberal bill of fare, respecting which I would only say, (especially as to the latter part,) there is still the objection of some Northern tables—*fast feeding*. Latin, Greek, modern languages, and the pure mathematics, occupy, respectively, two years each ; mechanics, optics and astronomy, a course of one year and a half ; chemistry, physiology and geology, one year and a half ; the English language and rhetoric, one year ; moral and intellectual philosophy, one year ; political economy and history, one *term* each. Courses of instruction in the science of teaching, in agriculture, on the application of science, generally, and particularly of chemistry, to the arts, and in the science of law, are also proposed to be given, without a limit of time for them being fixed.

"The primary object has been, we are told, to provide in college, not merely for the learned, but for '*the productive*' professions ; not for a restricted class, or a few classes, but for all. Some courses will be abridged or abolished ; others amplified, or substitutes introduced, in the working of the plan. It is further proposed, to make the professors in each department depend largely, perhaps chiefly, for remuneration, on the fees of their class.

"Too little time, certainly, is here given for some important studies. History, (all history, apparently,) but one term ; moral and intellectual philosophy, one term ! and the whole English language and elocution, (the classic tongue of Christianity and civil liberty,) one year only ! While, of the evidences of our religion, not the less national, I hope, because not established by human laws, no distinct notice whatever is taken."

On the score of discipline, Dr. Curtis has some sensible and thoughtful paragraphs, but we have not room for farther selections. We may state, however, that he still retains some affection for the rod as a venerable instrument of education, which we have no right to contemn,

though he would make sparing use of it. He is for the *juste milieu* principle, and will take "moral suasion," so long as it will serve the purpose, but he is still for keeping a bundle of birch hung up conveniently in the corner, in reserve, if not *in terrorem*. We could quote other portions of this discourse with profit. It discusses many points of great value to the teacher and the pupil. But the one subject, that by which to give our poor citizens schooling of any kind, is the difficulty in our legislation. We may refine upon the qualities and kinds of schooling hereafter. How shall we establish and maintain schools for the poor, in a region which contains a population of only ten white persons to a square mile? This is the one embarrassing problem before us, to the solution of which we are not a step nigher than we were forty years ago, when Free Schools were first established in the State. Strange to say, the subject is not a popular one. This is the sufficient reason why it claims so little the regards of legislators.

5. *Lumpkin's Address before the South-Carolina Institute.* We had the pleasure of listening to this manly and sensible address, when it was delivered at the Charleston Theatre, to a crowded, intelligent and highly appreciative audience. Mr. Lumpkin has the reputation of being one of the most successful extempore speakers in the South. He has acquired this reputation in fields of moral, rather than political performance. Identified with the cause of temperance, he is known, in Georgia, as a local "Father Mathew," and occupies a similar rank, in this goodly work, with his Honour, Judge O'Neill, of this State. We can very well understand how Mr. Lumpkin should be successful as a public speaker. He has equal fluency and grace of speech; is thoughtful, sensible, and, withal, possessed of that frank, open and hearty look and manner, which invariably take hold upon the affections of an audience. The address before us is significant of his best attributes. It was equally suited to the object and the audience. The author showed himself thoroughly familiar with the true policy of the South, and he developed it in a style at once impressive and agreeable. The necessity of multiplying the forms of our enterprise and industry—of diverting some of our capital from the fields of raw production, to those of manufacture—and of making our-



selves independent of a people who, reaping the profits of our agriculture, are yet suicidally bent on the destruction of all its sources—these were topics to make a true Southron at once eloquent, thoughtful and instructive. The oration was a highly comprehensive view of the whole subject, and gave eminent gratification. It will reward the reader, in print, as it did the audience who heard it. The Institute has, thus far, been singularly successful in its choice of orators. Hammond first, and Lumpkin now, will make the labours of a successor exceedingly difficult. We had marked several passages from this address for extract, but our limits will not suffer us to include them here. Fortunately, a large edition has been published, and we commend it to the earnest perusal of all who may lay hands upon it.

6. *Porter on Self-Cultivation.* Good sense, good taste, and a gentle morality, are the characteristics of this discourse. Mr. Porter rightly conceives the objects of life, and as correctly estimates the nature of the education and training by which they are to be attained. He inculcates his opinions unambitiously, as an essayist, rather than an orator—is simple in style, clear in statement, and logical in relation. He makes no attempts at fine writing, and indulges in no rhetorical flourishes in the hope to secure the palm of eloquence. The extract which follows, will afford a correct idea of his manner. It relates to a subject which is of the last importance in the career of the man—namely, that first step which he takes into the arena of performance and responsibility—the step which usually determines all his career, and every prospect of his future life—the choice of a profession :

“The choice of a vocation is an epoch in the life of a young man. However heedless or indolent his previous course may have been, this important step should never be taken without a full estimate of its bearing upon his future destiny. The incurring of new and weighty responsibilities has not unfrequently arrested men in a career of levity, and called out into sudden and vigorous exercise, powers of which they were before unconscious and unsuspected. ‘No more of these fooleries now,’ said Frederick the Great, upon his accession to the throne, to his old favourites, who were luxuriating in the anticipated continuance of their former idle dissipations ; and Charles XII. of Sweden, on a like occasion, although a mere boy in years, is said to have astounded his grey-headed counsellors,

by the sudden and wonderful transformation his character underwent. A young man, when about to assume the manly gown and enter upon the arena of active life, should feel like some worthy prince when called to his inheritance of a crown. 'The world is all before him, where to choose;' and inasmuch as this choice of a pursuit for life, involves duties which do not terminate in himself alone, but extend through all his relations, 'from dust to deity,' it is matter of great concern that it be made wisely and well. A mere preference for one calling over others, is by no means a reliable test of capacity for its successful prosecution. This preference is often suggested by fashion, caprice, association, or other accidents and circumstances of a transitory character. There is, for instance, a very strong proclivity among us to the learned professions, from an idea that they are of superior respectability, and that they open a short and easy way to emolument and honours. Hence the number of mere supernumeraries, of idle, unproductive consumers,—'*fruges consumere nati*,'—who hang upon the skirts of the professions, like camp followers upon the rear of an advancing army. When a good merchant is lost in an unskilful doctor, or an excellent mechanic in an indifferent lawyer, the loss is two-fold—to the community as well as to the individual. How poor must that spirit be, how meagre that ambition, which, instead of putting the thews and sinews of the physical man, at least, to a good account, can content itself with occupying an undistinguished place upon the long and melancholy roll of 'briefless barristers,' or with rejoicing in a diploma which is generally regarded as little better than a license to jeopard human life. No! it is the man that illustrates the calling; not the calling, the man. There is no office or employment so high, that it can give respectability to ignorance or indolence; nor is there any so low, that it can detract from the dignity of intelligent, faithful and virtuous endeavour. Follow the bent of your genius; but that you may not be deceived or misled, first institute an honest and thorough scrutiny into your natural aptitudes, your qualifications of body and mind, for the pursuit proposed. Interrogate nature in good faith, and in this, as in all other matters, she will respond to your questionings, with a fidelity and truth upon which you may safely rely."

7. *Owens's Address to the People of Barnwell District*, is a spirited but very carelessly written pamphlet, which has provoked a good deal of discussion upon a subject of very great interest to South-Carolina, and, in fact, to the whole South. It is not our policy or desire to contribute to this discussion, as we do not wish to see South-Carolina divided upon a question of policy, however important the considerations may be. At all events, it is not advis-

able, just now, that the discussion should be urged. There will be sufficient occasion for it hereafter. Col. Owens, it will be enough to state, is opposed to the separate action of South-Carolina, in regard to her relations with the Federal Government. He is for waiting and urging the co-operation of the other States of the South,—of which co-operation he does not despair. Col. Owens is a member of the Legislature, by which the Convention was called; and here seems to have been his mistake. The call of the Convention seems to have implied nothing less than secession. It implied that there was something to be done, which the Legislature could not do, and the character of that duty must have been known to the Legislature before it could have determined the necessity. If this was not clearly understood, the Legislature acted wildly. Col. Owens voted for the call of the Convention—nay, brought in the bill for it originally. What did he design that the Convention should do? Now, we do not mean to express ourselves at all in respect to the policy of this call, or of that which should govern the Convention hereafter; but it is quite important that the public should know what was the definite idea in the minds of the legislators as to the performances of the Convention. We do not say that they have acted with precipitation. We only require them to show that they have resolved with forethought. Col. Owens is a young man of decided talent. This pamphlet shows it;—but it is equally in proof of a decided indifference to the most ordinary laws of literature, and crowded with errors of taste and grammar. There are portions of the statement, in the narrative, the correctness of which we more than doubt, though the matters are not of such importance as to render denial and controversy necessary. We may return to the subject in future pages.

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## ART. IV.—THE ATHENIAN ORATORS.

*Oratores Attici. Græce et Latine.* Ed. AHRENS, BAITER, et CH. MÜLLER. Parisiis. Editore AMBROSIO FIRMIN DIDOT. 2 vols. 8vo.

WE have no intention of dwelling upon the critical labours of Messrs. Ahrens, Baiter and Müller, nor do we propose to expatiate upon the accuracy of text, the excellence of typography, the beauty of paper, or the convenience of form, which characterize the series of Greek classics comprised in the *Bibliotheca Græca* of Didot. It would be wholly unnecessary to do the latter, for the printer's art and the publisher's taste speak to the eye of every one who may inspect them; and the high reputation of the editors renders it equally needless to do the former, more especially as the dry and tedious discussion of critical niceties, of various readings, of conjectural emendations, and different codices, would be anything but welcome to the large majority of the readers of the Review. We prefer, accordingly, the employment of the volume specified in our text, simply as the data and excuse for a passing notice of THE ATHENIAN ORATORS.

Old Isaac Taylor, who, perhaps, did more for the correction and illustration of the remains of the forensic and parliamentary eloquence of Athens than any other single scholar, with the possible exception of his sturdy predecessor, Jerome Wolf, laments bitterly the utter neglect with which they were treated in his day, and the disgraceful inattention which was manifested towards the few surviving monuments of Attic jurisprudence.\* When we review the comparatively recent labours of Dobree and Dobson, of Immanuel Bekker, of Bremi and Vömel, of Sauppe and Becker, and of our present editors, and behold the results of a renewed and diligent study of Athenian law and Athenian eloquence, in the works of

\* *Ex nostratibus nemo fere, aut hoc, aut superioribus sæculis in Jurisprudentia Attica, atque oratoribus Græcis operam suam locabat; in quibus tamen, si eruditionem spectes, maximo cum fructu locari poterat. \* \* \* Juro eoque ignoebantur, ut, cum ad Lysiam recudendum, accessi, statum sensi, rure pauciores fere ad editionem promovendam excitasse meæ sedulitatis et constantiæ, quam aut tanti nominis celebritatem, aut cum hominis fama et scriptis consuetudinem. Taylori Pref. ad Lysiam.* If our impression is not erroneous, Jerome Wolf makes a similar complaint of his countrymen and contemporaries.



Böeckh, Hermann, Wachsmuth, Mitchell, Thirlwall and Grote, and in the special researches of Meier, Platner, Schömann, etc., we may safely indulge a more favourable estimate of present times, and augur well of the future. We trust, at least, that the native attraction of the subject, and the influence, direct or indirect, of these celebrated scholars, will render our purposed devotion of a few pages to the masters of ancient oratory not unacceptable to our readers. Mr. Carlyle has so recently thundered his philippic against all forms of stump oratory, that there may be some, if only momentary, satisfaction, in witnessing the perfection to which it was brought in Athens, and in estimating the benefits and evils which flowed from that sparkling fountain—for in this, as in so many other cases, it is but too true, the saying of the chosen bard of Epicurus,

“Surgit amari aliquid medio de fonte leporum.”

The names of Æschines and Demosthenes have long continued to be synonymous with eloquence, and are still familiar as household words, in this signification; nor is the fame of Isocrates second to that of any modern orator—yet how frequently has literary canonization and undying celebrity (in ore vulgi) restrained the inclination to disturb the sacred dust of ages, and acquire, by direct study, a personal acquaintance with the justice of the reputation, and the character of the merits, which are thus glorified! Undeviating neglect has been often the reward of undisputed pre-eminence in the republic of letters, as it is, at times, in other republics. Yet there is much to be gained by an intimate familiarity with the remains of Attic eloquence, for it is as true now as it was in the days of Cicero, that the richest bloom and most perfect maturity of oratory must be sought at Athens alone; and we must still be content to draw our loftiest inspiration from the same altars which gave to the lips of Tully their sacred fire. It is not to modern ages that we must look for the exemplars of the art of eloquence. We must not be content with seeking them in Rome, or even in Greece; but we must go to the single city of the Athenians, for the ripest fruits of this, as of nearly all intellectual excellence.\* It is a little singular that, in a coun-

\* Atque, ut omittam Græciam, quæ semper eloquentiæ princeps esse voluit, atque illas omnium doctrinarum inventrices Athenas, in quibus summa dicendi

try like ours, under a free government, enjoying democratic institutions, and surrounded by social and political influences, which should link our thoughts in close and daily associations with the liberal states of antiquity—seeing every day the possession of popular eloquence growing to be the *sine qua non* of popular strength and public authority—that, notwithstanding these natural incentives, the majority of those who aim at being statesmen never dream of seeking aid from the master-spirits of Athens and Rome, or imagine that the rude vigour of their native speech can be heightened, refined, pointed and strengthened by hourly converse with Cicero and Demosthenes. One brilliant exception exhibits both the folly of neglect and the rewards which await the study of ancient eloquence. The late Mr. Legaré drew from those exhaustless fountains the grace, the music, the variety, the power, and the lucid order of his exquisite forensic displays; and, if much was indisputably due to the exuberance of his own mind, the richness of his imagination, the fertility of his invention, and the vast range of his information, he would have been the last to deny that all these were fashioned, ordered, elevated, adorned and directed by the beautifying touch of Athenian art. We have been told by a lawyer of eminence, that, having a desperate case to defend, and being hopeless of success, he ventured upon framing his address to the jury in strict accordance with the rules prescribed by Cicero. His client was acquitted triumphantly; and we have been told by others, present at the scene, that the bench, the bar, the jury, the audience—even the prosecuting attorney and the culprit—were bathed in tears. It might have been, in truth, the spontaneous eloquence of the lawyer, to which the effect was credited by his hearers; but he attributed his success solely to his adherence to the precepts of Cicero. The rules of Cicero, however, are nothing more than the practice of Demosthenes and his illustrious compeers, expressed in terms of art by a brother of the craft; but that practice had been formed, not by *extempore* inspiration, but by diligent study, and the lessons of Isocrates.

vis et inventa est et perfecta. \* \* Cic. de Orat., lib. i., c. iv., § 13. Hoc autem studium non erat commune Græciæ, sed proprium Athenarum. Quis enim aut Argivum oratorem, aut Corinthium, aut Thebanum scit fuisse temporibus illis? etc. Cic. Brut., c. xiii., §§ 49, 50, cf. c. vii., § 26. Velleius Paterculus, i., c. 18.

There can be no doubt that the ancients are to be rivalled, and the highest prizes of eloquence to be won, only by following the example of Cicero and Demosthenes, and diligently studying the master-pieces of our great precursors. The circumstances of our education are analogous to those in which the orators of antiquity were placed, and the similitude is daily becoming more pronounced. We may thus entertain the hope of attaining, at some future day, the glory of like success; but in the meantime we may profitably examine the influences which tended to the perfection of Attic eloquence, and the characteristics of the classic orators of Athens, and thus prepare the way for higher culture by stimulating the zeal of rivalry, and indicating the elements of excellence.

It would be an endless task were we to dilate upon the various influences which ministered in common to all the diverse forms in which Athenian genius displayed itself. The singular fire and vigorous intellect of the Athenians were equally manifested in all the arts of war and peace; their poetry, their history, their philosophy, their social converse, were all alike adorned by the sonorous melody and exquisite perfection of the Greek tongue. The same taste which regulated their conceptions of the beautiful in sentiment and expression, presided over the construction of their glorious temples, and the fashioning of their life-like statues. It was the same genius re-appearing under all the Protean forms of human development, and due to the same concurring causes of production. This variety of excellence re-acted upon the imagination of speaker and hearer, and in its aggregate no less than in its separate effect conspired to perfect the compositions of the orator. With these co-operating causes, however, we have not the time to concern ourselves at present, but must confine ourselves to those special circumstances which more immediately or peculiarly favoured the growth of eloquence at Athens, and determined its complexion.

In a free government, and especially in one where the principle of popular sovereignty and direct popular intervention was as widely and loosely applied as at Athens, public office and power could be acquired and retained only by the favour of the people. In all ages there have been two grand avenues to the heart of the nation: military distinction and rhetorical ability. In the earlier ages of the Athenian democracy, while the memory of Mara-

thon and Salamis and Plataea was fresh and lively—while the soldiers of Marathon\* still survived, and the citizens who elected to places of trust and profit were the same people who had personally contended with the Persians in those gallant fights, the splendour of military renown eclipsed all other claims to popular regard. The Athenians naturally chose as their rulers and officers those who had led them to victory, who had received the highest share of that glory which was the common possession and the common pride of all. Moreover, the danger so recently apprehended, so nobly encountered, was by no means at an end. The enemy had been defeated and repelled, not subdued; and it was a question of state, on which Athenians could not long hesitate, whether Greece should await a fresh invasion of the barbarians, or should seek them on their own shores, and throw back the tides of war on the coasts of Asia. As the conflict was still to be prosecuted, the generals under whom they had been already triumphant, were naturally the choice of the people when new victories and new dangers were contemplated; and, as the separation of civil and military functions was not yet familiar, these became their governors. Yet even before these wars, Pisistratus, and during their continuance, Themistocles, are said to have been aided in their rise to power by their eloquence. It must be remembered, too, that during the period of military ascendancy, the genius of the old aristocratic organization was still strong and vigorous. It was only after the long struggle between Cimon and Pericles that the democracy, in fact as in name, was definitely established at Athens; and it is exactly in the heat of this contest that we note distinctly the rise of Athenian eloquence. Military reputations were thenceforth eclipsed by civil talents and oratorical ability. Pericles, it is true, united both in an eminent degree, but the fame of Pericles as a soldier is almost lost in the blaze of his celebrity as orator and statesman.† There was no decline of military skill, for Conon, Timotheus, Chabrias, and Iphicrates, certainly approved themselves as able generals as Miltiades, Themistocles, Aristides and Cimon had done. If their victo-

\* *Μαραθωνομάχαι*. Aristoph. *Acharn.*, v. 181. *Nubes*. 973, and Spanheim ad loc.

† Pericles, qui quum floreret omni genere virtutis, hac tamen fuit laude clarissimus.—Cic. *Brutus*, c. vii., § 28.



ries were attended with less important results, this must be attributed to the unhappy constitution of the times, which rendered the success of Sparta, Athens, Argos, or Bæotia, equally fatal to the expiring liberties of Greece. But the temper of the Athenian people was changed; the hardships of war were devolved upon the contingents of the allies, or foreign condottieri, the indolence of peace and the excitement of political discussion were reserved for themselves;\* and thus their exclusive admiration was transferred from heroic exploits in the field to brilliant displays in the public assemblies. The march of intellect had stolen upon them, too, and intellectual power, or rather elegant loquacity, became the object of their highest adoration.

Thus but one avenue remained open to influence, place, and opulence. These could be only retained, if inherited, or won, if not possessed at the outset of life, by the advocacy of popular measures, or by rendering those, which might be proposed, popular through the persuasion of eloquence. The remark of Tacitus,† if Tacitus it be, and of Longinus, that liberty is the nurse of eloquence, that oratory languishes and dies if separated from her breast, is not the hollow lament of desponding rhetoricians, but a sound political truth. Despotism cannot co-exist with eloquence, and it has an instinctive horror of that wondrous and more than rival power, by which the feelings of the multitude are kindled and controlled, and their tumultuous passions heightened, harmonized, concentrated, and directed to the attainment of a common and popular end. The fire of oratory requires to be fanned by the breath of freedom, before it can burst forth into a blaze, or glow with living heat;—dissevered from this, its native aliment, it is a mere affectation,—the sickly and impotent flame which flickers over stagnant marshes, or wreathes itself around putrescence. It is the mesmeric sympathy between the heart of the speaker and the hearts of his hearers—the electric interchange of thought and emotion—which give

\* Nec enim in constituentibus rempublicam, nec in bella gerentibus, nec in impeditis ac regum dominatione devinctis, nasci cupiditas dicendi solet. Pacis et comes, otiiq; socia, et jam bene constitutæ civitatis quasi alumna quædam eloquentia.—Cic. Brut., xii., § 45, &c.

† The author of the exquisite Treatise De Causis Corruptæ Eloquentiæ. It is certainly not Quintilian; Spalding has established that. We think it earlier than Tacitus, and by a companion of Octavius Scapula.

to oratory its power;—how can such sympathy or such communion exist amid the dissociating and selfish influences of despotism? It is the lofty aspiration after some great public aim which awakens the divine frenzy of the orator; the quickening infection of minds attuned and tempered like his own, burning with high thoughts, pregnant with big resolves, which furnishes his inspiration, and reacts upon his audience with increased power, because concentrated and intensified by his own impassioned ardour. It is the utterance of a common scorn, a common indignation, a common hope, a common fear, and a common will, which infuses and justifies an elevation of tone and language, which, without this, would be ridiculous and absurd.\* It is the consciousness of the people's ability to put his fiery thoughts into immediate action which lends a solemn earnestness to his efforts, and seriousness to their reception. It is the deep sense of his own responsibility, of his self-dependence, of his great but precarious power, that stimulates his faculties to their utmost tension; and the inspiring rivalry with his opponents, upon the same arena, before the great tribunal of their common countrymen, which nerves all his energies, and fills him with the ennobling joys of his lofty contention.† What room is there for such feelings, or such results, when every thing is decided, and known to be decided, by the capricious nod of a despot, or the secret deliberations of a narrow council? Then the eloquence which blooms only in the sunlight of freedom must be forgotten, and supplanted by the cosmetics of Mæcenas and the tinkling of Gallio.‡

It must be added, too, that just in proportion to the magnitude of the interests at stake does the fire, and consequently the power, of the orator increase. His eloquence is heightened with the occasion for its display. If nothing but the passage or rejection of a trivial measure be the issue, he may speak with grace, ease, perspicuity, and dignity, but hardly with consuming fire. We may then expect the transparent clearness, and the lucid order of Lysias, or the elegant phrase and elaborate modulations of Isocrates, but not the thunders and light-

\* Cic. de Orat., lib. ii., c. iv., § 17.

† Gaudia certaminis—the celebrated expression of Attila.

‡ Calamistros Mæcenasalis aut tinnitus Gallionis.—Dial. de Caussis Corr. Eloquent.

nings of Péricles or Demosthenes. But when the orator's influence and position in the state, his fortunes, his home, or his life, are wafted by his own breath over the stormy tides of popular sentiment;—or when the dignity, the welfare, even the existence of his country, tremble in the balance, and their fate, either for weal or for woe, rests or is supposed to rest, upon his tongue;—when the multitude is all-powerful, and reckless in the exercise of its power;—when great questions are to be settled irretrievably on the impulse of the passions of the hour, and the career of the speaker is suspended on the same thread which sustains his policy—it is then only that we can anticipate a Cicero or Demosthenes.

All these incentives to eloquence existed in the highest intensity at Athens, and grew rapidly in strength from the time when Pericles first ascended the Bema till Demosthenes sought from the poisoned ring the last protection of death in the Island of Calameia—a nobler sacrifice to the liberties of his country than the dead who fell at Marathon.\* From the first appearance of Pericles on the stage of public affairs, the power of the people increased with each succeeding day, and passed, after his death, with sudden vehemence, from the orderly procedure of a well tempered democracy to the furious and fickle anarchy of popular licentiousness. Every day the lofty gift of eloquence became more indispensable for the control and favour of the turbulent populace. The interests of the state were balanced on the whim of the hour, and were decided with unreflecting recklessness, just as the shifting gusts of passion blew. The experience of the past lent no wisdom to the resolves of the people,† and, in consequence, their inconsiderate and wrong-headed decisions became proverbial.‡ A wild and reckless imagination spread the colours of the rose over all the clouds of the future; or the citizens left the contingencies of the future to take care of themselves, from pure apathy and reluctance to undergo the tedium and

\* καλλιον ἀνάθημα τῇ γῇ τῶν ἐν Μαραθῶνι πεπτωκότων, put in the mouth of Antipater. Pseudo-Lucian, Demoth. Encom. ad finem.

† Of this the orators constantly complain. Pseudo-Androcides de Pace cum Lacedæm., § 1, and Sluiter ad loc.

‡ Aristoph. Acharn., 605, 607. Equit., 1050. Eurip. Suppl., 321, 427. Aristoph. Nub., 578. Pax., 674. Isocrat. de Pace, §§ 17, 29, 35. Panath., § 6. Demoth. Olyn., i., § 7, ii., §§ 8, 9. Philipp. i., §§ 2, 6, 9, 15. De Pace, § 1. Phil. iii., §§ 1, 11, &c.

annoyance of calm deliberation. The pleasure of the moment occupied all thoughts; the counsels of the people were hastily determined on mere impulse; and the permanent interests of the state were unheeded in the pleasure which was afforded by a successful speech,\* or the desire which was entertained to gratify the lust, the greed, or the caprice of a favourite speaker. Oratory thus became every thing in the political arena, and the engrossing pursuit of all, either as orators or hearers.† At the same time, the regard for active justice and the tenderness of human life were almost obliterated in the breasts of the Athenians; questions of law, of right, of public policy, were governed by the mere fancy of the moment; and the fortunes and lives of the orators and their clients, no less than the interests of the city, depended less on reflection and the merits of the cause, than on the success or failure of their eloquence. The avarice of the multitude had been inflamed by judicial fees, by the insane love of exercising judicial functions,‡ by long indulgence in reckless habits, and by inveterate idleness, while the jealousy of the rich was manifested with malignant force, and with a fatal disregard of every principle of justice. Thus the greed and selfishness, and indeed the necessities of the multitude, led them to pant after fines and confiscations; and it was merely a matter of hazard or whim, whether these were to be remitted, or accompanied with the exile or death of the accused. Thus, the orator, whether using his own or another's composition, might be truly said to speak with the halter around his neck; for, as his advocacy of another's cause made him, in some measure, a partaker of his virtues or his crimes, and irritated or delighted his audience, according to his genius or his dullness, in all cases every energy was required, and the deepest solicitude and most excited feelings aroused.

It was no easy task to speak before an Athenian audience; it was no light matter to gratify or satisfy their fastidious tastes; nor before such judges was the victory easily obtained over rival orators. The Athenian populace was undoubtedly the most refined, intelligent, quick-

\* Andoc., c. Alcibiadem, § 5.

† Andoc., c. Alcib., § 8.

‡ πολλὰς καταπεπωκὺς δίκας. Aristoph. Avez., 1429, v. Acharn., γ' 353.



witted\* and critical that the world has yet seen. It is only necessary to look over the comedies of Aristophanes, or the antagonistic orations of Æschines and Demosthenes, to be assured of their singular aptitude, in apprehending an idea from a hint, of deducing a long chain of consequences from an allusion or insinuation, and of picking out from the whole range of their literature or history the exact passage or event in point, indicated by the most rapid and delicate suggestion. The cautious preparation and chary display of Pericles, the fifteen years lucubration of Isocrates, the timid avoidance of public life of Antiphon and Isæus, the laborious ordeal and midnight studies of Demosthenes,† attest as strongly as the declaration of Cicero, the precise and religious ear of Attic taste,‡

To those who are accustomed to confine all education to the vicarious learning,§ drilled in by the schoolmaster, or laboriously obtained from the printed wisdom of the living and the dead, it may sound strange to hear the Athenians called a highly educated people. But their instruction was constant, abundant, and vigorous, though drawn from the silent inspiration of the influences by which they were surrounded, and the vivifying interchange of thought and feeling which took place freely between all classes of the community. Their life in the open air, tended to facilitate and extend this intercourse, which was the natural growth of their liberal institutions. The public exposition of the laws and decrees, the inscriptions in the temples, on the public monuments, and the Hermæ along the streets,|| furnished a better primer than the horn book leads to. There could be no lack of oral instruction or of intellectual culture, in a society, where Aristides, Cimon, Pericles, conversed, without restraint, in the market place, the public grounds, and

\* *γνώναι πάντων ὑμεῖς ὀξύτατοι τὰ ῥηθέντα.* Demoth. Olynthiac, iii. (ii.) § 6.

† When Epicles taunted Demosthenes with his cautious preparation, the latter replied: *Αἰσχυνοίμην γὰρ εἰ τηλικούτῳ δόμῳ συμβουλευτῶν αὐτοσχεδιάζοιμι.* Pseudo-Plutarch, Vit. Demosth.

‡ *Atticorum aures teretes et religiosas.* Cic. Orat., c. ix., § 27. Of the Romans, Cicero says, *conciones sæpe exclamare vidi, quum apte verba cecidissent.* Orat., c. l., § 168.

§ This is what Kant calls "subjective historical knowledge." Logic. Introd. § iii. He, like many others before him, points out its worthlessness as a means of true intellectual development, unless sustained and regulated by a higher education.

|| V. Sluiteri Lectiones Androcidæ, cap. ii.

the camp, with all their countrymen; where Socrates catechized the poor as well as the rich at the corners of the thoroughfares, on the wharves of the Piræus, beneath the shade of his favourite sycamore on the banks of the Ilissus, or at the door of his own humble dwelling; where Æschylus, and Sophocles, and Aristophanes, poured forth the treasures of their genius throughout the long day, and public judges estimated the merits of great competitors, and rendered an account of their decision; where every citizen had a seat in the courts and a voice in the assemblies, and heard the statements of his own and foreign ambassadors, and listened to the conflicting reasons of state urged by contending orators; where he knew and understood the history of his country, by having had a direct influence and participation both in the measures of peace and the actions of war; and where every subject of public or private interest was freely discussed by the motley groups which gathered on the Pnyx, at the great festivals, or beneath the colonnades of their magnificent temples. This most pregnant and inspiring of all educations was the life of the Athenian people. In our Southern States, where a like climate, like temperament, and like institutions, generate similar results, we can readily understand and recognize the wonderful efficacy of such intellectual discipline; in the Northern States of the confederacy, and in Europe, where different habits prevail, it will appear singular, if not incomprehensible.\*

If the substance of education was thus fortunately provided for, its graces were still more felicitously cherished. The mythology of Greece, the history of Athens, were instinct with poetry; at all the great games and public celebrations, poets and rhapsodists recited their own and the Homeric poems. Their glorious language, rich, various, and exuberant, did not merely clothe, but it fed the imagination, and lent its changing melody to every sentiment, and to every feeling. The fine and decorative arts lavished their master-pieces around them; and the con-

\* It is recognized, however, by Bulwer in his *Athens*, and by Macaulay in his essay on the *Athenian Orators*, and by others removed by centuries from our times. "Nihil vero ad informationem commodius est quam frequens cum viris doctis conversatio, quæ est disciplina omnium optima, et in sensus magis incurrit, quam tædiosa illa per lectiones et meditationes via." Morkoffii *Polyhistor.*, Ps. i., lib. i., c. xv., § 47, where are cited the concurring testimonies of Tschirnhausius, Alex. Fichetus, Marcellus Maresius, and Campanella.

stant familiarity with the perfect works of sculpture, statuary, painting, and architecture, produced its usual result in heightening their sensibilities, elevating and purifying their tastes, and quickening their minds with all the dreams of ideal loveliness. The choral dances and the variations of all the moods of music in their religious ceremonies and theatrical representations, rendered them keenly alive to elegance or awkwardness of motion, and sharpened their perceptions of the rhythm of language and the melody of intonation. Every thing combined to idealize their conceptions of the beautiful, and to render them acute and exacting critics of all the excellences of oratory, both in its essence and its form.

The arduous nature of the orator's functions was still further increased even by the vices of the people. They were blindly impressed with the sanctity of popular actions rather than of popular rights; they were filled with a lively sense of the just omnipotence of popular sovereignty, and often displayed it rashly and tyrannically from the pure love of its exercise; they hurled their thunderbolts, without thought and without occasion, that they might not cool idly in their hands; they used their power to show they possessed it, and justified its use by its possession, as in the case of the unfortunate Melians.\* They were vitiated by an intellectual Epicurism, which made unpleasant topics, however necessary, repugnant to them, and produced a morbid appetite for the repetition of those doctrines and stereotype phrases, which had become their phylacteries and the magical formulas of all their incantations. In the speeches of the great Athenian orators, we see, as almost necessary constituent parts of the formal oration, the deprecating air with which the people are addressed, the tender and delicate allusions to the familiar perils of popular impetuosity, the anxious entreaty for a patient hearing, the soothing condiments dexterously thrown in to appease irritability, the hurried treatment of unwelcome topics, the quick return to popular common places, and the earnest prayer for justice, not as a matter of right, but as affording the only guarantee of the permanent interests of the multitude. It could have been no light or idle fear which compelled Demos-

\* The doctrine is nakedly asserted by the Athenian ambassadors. Thucyd. lib. v., c. 105, et vide Scholia.

thenes, in the full maturity of his power, to mince his words, veil his meanings, and deprecate resentment at nearly every paragraph of his greatest speeches. The Athenians were quick, passionate,\* petulant, impetuous, and capricious in their treatment of public servants; they were fond of turning their orators into ridicule, and enjoyed the torture inflicted on them by the bitter gibes of their opponents; they had a keen zest in subjecting them to practical jokes, and the zest was only the better relished when, like those of Caligula,† it was accompanied and spiced with cruelty. They prided themselves on their compassionate disposition;‡ but it was displayed only in the rare moments of reflection, and at such times they continued to exhibit to the last all the virtues of the best ages. But in the excitement of the court or the assembly, their fury or their wanton levity was equally fatal. They came to the seat of judgment, or the deliberations of the Pnyx, with the same feelings with which they attended their theatres—their object was to be pleased and to criticize, not to judge of law and justice, or to deliberate on their own and the public welfare. The sanctity of religion and the restraint imposed by the presence of foreigners, produced order, decency and propriety in the theatres, which were too often disregarded in their more important assemblies.§ Can we doubt the danger and difficulty of addressing the Athenian people, when we hear even the dread|| Demosthenes, in the plenitude of his tremendous eloquence, employing such language as this:

“Were ye but spectators of the tragic scene in the Temple of Dionysius, instead of being here in solemn deliberation on the public safety and the common good, not thus would ye hear him with favour, and me with bitter repugnance.”¶

And again:

“When Philip was gathering his hosts against you, inattentive to his movements and heedless of counter-preparation, ye indulged your fatal indolence, and, if such a speech may be hazarded, ye

\* τὸν αὐτοῦ δὲ τρόπον: Aristoph. Pax., 590.

† Suetonius, Vit. Calig., c. xxix.

‡ Demosth. de Fals. Leg., § 35. Plato, Menex. Eur. Suppl., 190. Stanley ad Æsch. Suppl., 198.

§ Andoc., c. Alcibad., § 8, v. Aristoph. Acharn., v. 476.

|| δὲ γὰρ περὶ τὸς, καὶ τοῖς λόγοις δεινὸς Δημοσθένης. Æschines, De Fals. Leg., § 35, and τὸ θηριὸν, § 15. Such is the testimony of his great rival.

¶ Demosth. De Pace, § 2.



threw far from you all thought of action ; but when ye learn that another city is lost or besieged, then ye listen and prepare. Then, when ye would not, was the time for hearing and deliberation ; now, when ye will hear, is the time for action and the employment of the means which ought to have been prepared. With such habitudes, your action, alone of men, is the reverse of that of others. All other men deliberate in advance of action, but you after the season of action has passed.”\*

The fastidiousness, the intelligence, the recklessness, the caprice, the waywardness, the despotism of the people, all contributed to increase the difficulties of the orator's position ; but he himself had his countervailing advantages. Nay, these unfavourable circumstances, as they might be thought, were themselves the strongest stimulants to exertion ; and then the rewards of success offered to the orator were rich and splendid—place, power, wealth, distinction—the admiration of his countrymen, the wonder of surrounding states, the envy of his peers, and the consciousness of self-won, self-sustained greatness.

But beside the difficulties and incitements of the strife and the attractions of the end, there was much to favour the assiduous training and preparation for the lofty but arduous career. Rhetoric has become an art, not yet, indeed, strictly defined within its legitimate sphere, which it never was among the ancients, though more rigidly by Aristotle than any other composer of systems, but in the same sense in which it was understood by Quintilian, embracing within its wide range the whole curriculum of education, and including both the moral discipline and intellectual training which could minister most efficiently to the persuasion of the masses. It was this loose determination of the functions of rhetoric, and the consequent confusion of its legitimate aims, which gave rise to the question, so much agitated among the ancients, whether any but a virtuous man could be an orator. The masters of rhetoric occupied themselves with the formation of the whole intellectual character of the aspirant ; they marked out and communicated the exact information, both in kind and degree, which was deemed most serviceable. The precepts of logic, or the art of reasoning, were inculcated with the same care with which the arts of persuasion

\* Demosth. Philippic, iv., § 8.

and the dexterous employment of language were taught. The logic of the Athenian schools at that time, it is true, was by no means that rigid and symmetrical science which was subsequently constructed by the philosophic genius and acumen of the Stagyræite; it was captious, and principally eristical, to use their own term, but it was so much the better adapted to the purposes of contentious public disputation.\*

Gorgias, the Leontine, the ambassador from a free state, was the first who, shortly after the death of Pericles, in imitation of a recent Sicilian practice, publicly professed to give instruction in the rhetorical art. His example was soon followed by others, and the Sophists brought their perverse ingenuity both to render the instruction more perfect and to sap the morals of both citizens and orators.† The universal detestation in which the name of the Sophists is held, and the ominous signification which it has obtained in all subsequent ages, tend to make us underrate their intellectual powers. Yet there can be little doubt that Prodicus, Protagoras, their compeers and their successors, were among the loftiest intellects of their age. They possessed all the knowledge and science of the times; and they applied to them a singular fertility of invention, a wonderful acuteness of logical perception, a happy readiness of wit, and remarkable dialectical subtlety, which must have rendered their teaching eminently striking. It is enough to indicate the depth and comprehensiveness of their speculations, to mention that Protagoras was the father of a philosophy, whose influence may yet be detected contaminating the metaphysics of the Scotch, French, and German schools. The obloquy which rests upon their names have sprung, not from their intellectual inferiority to Socrates, Plato, or Aristotle, but from the perfect indifference to right and wrong, and the utter confusion of these ideas, which were the natural results of their philosophy. It is not necessary, nor would it be correct, to attribute to them either a native proclivity to vice or a defective moral sense. The long life of Gorgias is a shining refutation of such a charge, which is as little appropriate to the Sophists as to

\* We are aware that the authority of Cicero, in one passage of his works is against us.

† Aristoph. *Nubes*. Plato, *Gorgias*.

Hobbes, Bérkéley, and Hume. The antagonism between the Ionian and Eleatic schools had produced exactly the same effect which we have witnessed in more recent times; the grounds of justice were obliterated, the distinction of truth and falsehood annihilated, and the foundations of right obscured by those conflicting schemes of metaphysics, which had only revealed the fallacies of the opposing systems and the difficulties of each, but were unable to probe the fundamental questions of philosophy to the core. There was no tenable philosophic ground discoverable for the certainty of human knowledge, no logical demonstration of the validity of human reason, and the indifferentism between right and wrong, truth and falsehood, justice and injustice, virtue and vice, was the consequence, not the cause, of the doctrines of the Sophists. It was the ever recurring contest between sensationalism and idealism, between nominalism and realism, eventuating in its necessary result, universal intellectual infidelity. We can see from the Dialogues of Plato the arduous nature of the problems which demanded solution; we can see in his own arguments the insoluble fallacies on both sides, from which even he could not entirely escape. To them they were perfectly irreducible, and they concluded that they sprung from an original and latent identity between the most opposite properties, and consequently, not merely justified, but demanded at the hands of philosophers the recognition of their equal and indifferent truth. Like the Scholastics of the middle ages, whom in many respects they strikingly resembled, the Sophists had started questions which they could not fathom, and, like the moderns, from a similar cause, they sought rest and refuge in universal scepticism, and in the reduction of all alleged truth to the mere plausibilities of semblance. Montaigne and Le Mothe Le Vayer, Hobbes, and perhaps Spinoza, Comte and Strauss, are apt illustrations both of the difficulties and consequences of the sophistical age. Yet we would hardly attribute the scepticism of these illustrious moderns to either vice or any intellectual inferiority to their predecessors, their contemporaries, or their successors.

Such were the teachers, who sometimes indirectly, but for the most part directly, were the guides of the rising oratory of Athens. It will be at once apparent how eminently apt their instruction must have been for the con-

licts of the court and the assembly. The very indifference to truth was both an encouragement and an efficient instrument in preparing the way for rhetorical successes. As all knowledge and truth were reduced to mere appearances, they lost all objective reality; truth and falsehood became nothing more than shifting accidents, and consisted solely in the supposed strength or feebleness of the argument on either side. A plausible and fallacious proposition or inference was thus superior to one which was correct, but obscure. Every thing was thus condensed into what was vaguely understood as rhetoric. Law has been defined by an eminent lawyer of Charleston, "any thing which is strenuously asserted, and plausibly maintained;" but in the system of the Sophists all knowledge and science was embraced under the same formula. The professors of rhetoric or sophistry, consequently undertook, in strict accordance with the fundamental principles of their doctrine, to teach and declaim, like the scholastic doctors, *de omni scibili*. They systematically substituted the appearance for the fact, the logical or rather the rhetorical form for the substance, so that Strepsiades, in the comedy, was not far wrong in fancying that their whole science consisted in making the worse appear the better cause.\* But though truth was conceived to be a mere phantasm, the diligent search for the most plausible appearances became in some measure a patient acquisition of knowledge; and, notwithstanding the inherent confusion of right and wrong in their entire system, much that was valuable was undoubtedly discovered and taught, if we may venture to judge from the dialogues of Plato and the orations of Isocrates.† It was like the insane dreams and speculations of the alchemists and astrologers, which nevertheless ultimately bloomed into chemistry and astronomy. Such science and knowledge as the Sophists possessed or discovered, they transferred, with their logical methods and rhetorical instructions, into the

\* εἶναι παρ' αὐτοῖς φασὶν ἔμφω τῷ λόγῳ  
τον κρείττον ὅστις ἐστί, καὶ τὸν ἥττονα.  
τούτοιον τὸν ἕτερον τοῖν λόγοιν, τὸν ἥττονα,  
νικῶν λεγοντά φασι τ' ἀδικώτερα.—Aristoph. Nub., v. 113.

† We have weighed carefully all the arguments *pro* and *con*, and conceive Aristophanes to have rightly deemed Socrates a Sophist. Such he was in his younger days, such his method was in his maturity. Isocrates himself, though declaiming against the Sophists, was one, though somewhat more tenacious than his brethren of real truth.



minds of their pupils. Thus the orators became mere talking machines of the most exquisite art and the most finished perfection: they became political wind-mills, deriving their grist *aliunde*, but working with a regularity, precision, and admirable contrivance, which would have merited the highest commendation in the celebrated Isle of Ruach.\* The people, who were early infected from the same fountains of sophistry, were moulded and kneaded just into the right habitudes for the best possible reception of oratorical displays.

These remarks must of course be applied *cum grano salis*: there were occasional and illustrious exceptions to which they would be inappropriate. We should never dream of accusing the earnest Demosthenes of indifference to either the truth of his doctrines or the integrity of his policy, but we have exhibited what may be considered the general complexion of this class of orators at Athens.

We have dwelt longer upon the Sophists than we should otherwise have done, from their pre-eminent but almost unnoted importance in the history of oratory, and of Athens itself. The mode and extent of their influence has been rarely appreciated: the repugnance which their name excites has led to vituperation and neglect: seldom to a thorough examination of the real functions and phenomena of their career. Yet we must undoubtedly attribute to them the principal share in the creation of Athenian oratory, and in that rapid depravation of the Athenian character, by the obliteration in the ruder and coarser minds of the practical as well as theoretical opposition of right and wrong, which ministered so materially to the perfection of oratory, rendered it the sole and necessary means of government, and adapted the people so admirably to its reception and appreciation. We must, however, with as little hesitation, regard them as the founders of moral and political science; rather, it is true, in consequence of the problems which they started, than in consequence of the solutions which they proposed: yet the great social problems of the present day are discussed by their antagonists, Plato and Aristotle: and the political and politico-economical conclusions of Isocrates will for the most part stand the criticism of the present day, though

\* Rabelais Pantagruel, liv. iv: c. xliii. "Ilz ne vivent que de vent. Rien ne veuent, rein ne mangent suion vent," &c.

Mr. Macaulay may deem but slightly of the merits of those whom he does not appear to have read.

In attributing so large a share in the perfection of oratory to the instrumentality of the Sophists, we deem it but prudent to advert to the later identification of the terms Sophist and Orator, and to add, as a further confirmation of our views, the reason assigned by Cicero for his own attachment to the sceptical philosophy of the Later Academy. His preference was determined, as he himself informs us, by its close harmony with his own professional pursuits, as instructing him in the art, and aiding him in the practice of arguing on either side of any given question.\*

We proceed to another most influential cause of oratorical excellence. We have already said that rhetoric had become an art, and to this we must add that oratory soon became a profession. This has been already very acutely conjectured by Mr. Macaulay;† but it is not a matter of conjecture: it is one of the plainest and best substantiated facts of Athenian history. The confusion of all the departments of government, and the ultimate subjection of all public procedure to the momentary will of the people, together with the absence of any clear and precise conceptions of either the character or functions of judicial evidence, prevented the growth of a settled systematic jurisprudence at Athens. We heed not the eulogies of Henri Valois, of Wesseling, and Taylor, &c., on the legal science of the Athenians: every page of their history, every speech of their orators, evinces the utter want of regular judicial precedents. Under these circumstances, there was no room for a regular bar, and consequently the Athenians had no professional lawyers. In the early ages of Rome, the secrecy and mystery of an aristocratic religion laid the foundations and guarded the

\* Cic. *Orat.*, c. iv. § 12    *De Orat.*, lib. iii. c. xix. § 69.    *Ad. Herenn.*, lib. ii. c. xi. § 16.

† Essay on the Athenian orators. In a note on the same passage, he also mentions his conjecture that the rapid downfall of the Lacedæmonian power should be referred to the change of the Greek soldiery from a militia force to a standing army. Mr. Macaulay must have read the *Orators* on whom he comments very carelessly, or he must have studied only a few of their speeches (unterrified by the warning of Jerome Wolf,) or he must have left them wholly unread; otherwise, he would not have stated this as a novel inference, but as an authenticated fact, and would have referred boldly to Isocrat. *Archidamus*, § 32, and Demosth. *Philippic*, iii. § 10, and as many more passages as might be necessary.

sanctity of that science, which the omnipotence and caprice of the Democracy prevented from ever taking root at Athens. A few forms of procedure, a few provisions sanctioned, but not rendered inviolate by the names of Draco and Solon, composed nearly the whole *corpus juris* of Attica. In addition to these, there were statutory enactments and popular decrees, in abundance, but the people paid little more respect to these than the people and the courts of Virginia do to the decisions of their Appellate Tribunal. But notwithstanding the rudeness and uncertainty of Athenian jurisprudence, trials of necessity took place, and the genius of the Athenian government, no less than the morbid appetite of the Athenian people for the exercise of their judicial functions,\* multiplied the business of the Courts, while their rapacity and reckless disregard of justice, augmented the perils of both criminal and civil litigation. The necessity for forensic eloquence and skill was thus deeply felt, while there were no constitutional means of supplying the want. There were no lawyers, and each party advocated his own case with the assistance of his friends. The Athenians appear to have entertained the same horror of maintenance and barratry as filled the minds of our remote ancestors, and this practice was at first probably enforced with much strictness. In later times, however, it was much relaxed, or the wants proving too strong for the restraints, means were found of overcoming the constitutional difficulties in the way. Nevertheless, the influence of the ancient rule must have always continued to be very considerable, for a large portion of the rhetorical treatises of the Greeks is occupied with observations on the most effectual modes of rendering to the judges an adequate and satisfactory excuse for intervention in a cause not directly one's own: and we can see by the remains of the orators themselves, how cautiously and sedulously this point had been attended to by them. In the total exclusion of lawyers and the partial exclusion of mere advocates, a singular procedure was resorted to. Professed orators occupied themselves with the preparation of arguments or orations, which were delivered by the principals or assistants in the cause. For this, they demanded and received a handsome remuneration.

\* Aristoph. Aves, 40, 1429, 1435. Nub. 1406. Thucyd. lib. i. c. lxxvii. Xenoph. De. Rep. Ath. c. iii. § 2.

neration of course—and if we may judge from the enormity of the fees for rhetorical tuition, the fees for a written argument were ordinarily such as would prove most acceptable to the leading lawyers of our own time, in Westminster Hall, or the Supreme Court, for more direct and continuous service. In this way, oratory became a regular and lucrative profession, even more than an accomplishment; and Antiphon, Lysias, and Isæus, might be appropriately regarded as the Erskine, Brougham, or Abinger of their respective days. Thus, too, a long preparation for the difficulties and dangers of public life might be made without risk, *in alieno periculo*, until success had bred confidence as well as skill.

The first who set the example of this practice—a practice which, before half a century, we venture to assert will be fully in vogue at Washington,—was Antiphon, the supposed instructor of Thucydides in eloquence.\* It was soon imitated, however, by numberless others, some few of whom obtained greater reputation than himself, by this chamber practice. Such were Lysias and Isæus. Thrasy-machus, of whom no remains survive, and to a very considerable extent, Isocrates, though he was principally a rhetorical teacher, and in part also, as Mr. Macaulay terms him, a pamphleteer. Such, too, was the profession of Demosthenes in his earlier years.†

This professional character of the orators continued to the latest years of the Republic, and affords a partial explanation of that intimate and baneful connection between the principal Captains of the *Condottieri* employed by Athens, and the more illustrious speakers, of which Æschines and Isocrates with much justice complain.‡

It was a necessary consequence of the non-existence of fixed or systematic jurisprudence, that the whole body of the law was, in the manipulation of the orators, plastic as clay in the hands of the potter. Each case was expected to be decided on its own merits, or rather on the merits of its advocacy, and the caprice of the people. The Helias-tic Courts were at once the judges, the jury, and the legislature, to all practical intents. The advocate was trammelled by no rigid rules, he was hemmed in by no

\* This point is fully, rather than satisfactorily, discussed by Sluiter in his *Lectiones Anædode*.

† Æschines, c. Ctesiphon.

‡ Æschines, c. Ctesiphon, § 3. Isocrat. *Æginetic*.



impassable landmarks; he had a clear course for eloquence and ingenuity; and he knew that the decision of the case rested entirely with himself, if he could prove equal to the occasion. Hence, at one time the letter of the law is the subject of commendation, at another its spirit; and frequently both are derided as inappropriate, or are made to bend to the circumstances of the case.

The absence of the printing press or of any means of rapidly disseminating written orations among the people, must have been often experienced by the orators as a real benefit. They had thus a much freer course; they could much more safely and efficiently blend fact and fiction, or substitute the latter for the former; they could more easily change with the gale, and indulge in all manner of tergiversation and deception, passing off forged letters and counterfeit laws, and they could avail themselves of various other forms of trickery, too open to be ventured on when the transfer from the tongue to the paper, from the paper to the whole public is almost instantaneous. They had nothing to apprehend but the unfavourable recollections of the audience. Thus we may understand many of the peculiarities of the Attic orators which would be otherwise unintelligible—their rash statements, and their unblushing license in the treatment of facts, and in the exposition of the history of their country.

When we combine these various favouring influences together, we may reasonably conclude that, if the orator's had many difficulties to surmount, they were not without adequate means of preparation and assistance. We do not pretend to explain either the genius of the individuals, or of the Athenian people, for these are beyond the reach and range of explanations. We have only designed to exhibit the co-incident condition of society and government, under which, and by whose aid, oratory attained its perfection, and without which, in all probability, it would never have attained its exquisite and consummate maturity.

It may be inferred from the tenor of our observations, that we esteem oratory to be in some measure the instrument and the production of national decline. That it was so at Athens, we have neither any doubts ourselves, nor do we see any room for doubt on the part of others. But to convert this special truth into a general axiom, would be pushing our inferences further than we would either

press them ourselves, or consent to their being pressed. We must confess, however, that our minds are not wholly free from the suspicion that the highest and most finished oratory can only flourish as an art, and be of familiar occurrence, among a people who value talk above action, sentimentalism above genuine feeling, and the reckless exercise of unrestrained and irresponsible license above the orderly procedure of temperate, regular, and constitutional government. We do imagine that the most perfect form of eloquence may be rarely separable from national corruption and decline, and that the suggestions of Tacitus and Longinus,\* doubtful as they appeared to their own minds, may nevertheless be true. But there is much which is noble in human speech, and lofty and worthy of all admiration in human sentiment, which may be safely displayed and generated among a free people, even before the approaches of national decline. The brilliant oratory of Pericles at Athens, and of Patrick Henry in our own country, and many other names of the dead and the living, assure us that if the most perfect triumphs of eloquence are reserved to throw a delusive splendour over times of political confusion and national decay, we may, while the State is yet sound and the people uncorrupted, indulge and admire that oratory which is scarcely second to the best.

It is a little singular that our investigations in a field so different, and with objects so entirely dissimilar, should nevertheless have brought us to conclusions strikingly accordant with the positions of Carlyle in his quaint pamphlet on the Stump-Orator. But a close examination into the phenomena of history will, we think, clearly evince that true oratory can exist only under a free government, and scarcely under any but a democracy; that the period of its use is exactly at that stage of democratic development when the power of the people is theoretically if not practically supreme: and that its growth and perfection advance with the progression from temperate democracy to turbulent mob-rule. It will, therefore, be a manifestation of intellectual ability, not so much desirable in itself, as necessary from its constituting the sole surviving check upon the rabid passions of the multitude become dissolute;

\* We are aware that the authority of Cicero is, in some degree, adverse. *De Orat. lib. i. c. viii. § 30.*

and even in its best form dangerous from the uncertainty of the hands—whether those of Demosthenes or Demades—into which so potent an instrument of authority over the people may fall. Certain it is, that the march of intellect must have advanced to that point when intellectual power becomes the great god of popular idolatry, before every higher quality of statesmanship and public virtue can be eclipsed in popular estimation, by the dazzling display of oratorical talent. It is not the least significant phenomenon of the times of the Athenian orators, that their numbers were almost countless,—in this respect presenting a striking analogy to the innumerable herd of authors, which Carlyle notices as characteristic of our own days, when, as Macaulay justly observes, the press has in great measure supplanted the Bema. It is only necessary to look into Rhunkin's Critical History of the Greek Orators, to ascertain the number of those who attained celebrity; and we may safely infer that those of less note equalled, in proportion to the population, the abundance of modern *litterateurs*. We may perhaps venture to conclude from this, and from the experience of the United States, that, however rare may be the oratorical ability of Demosthenes or Cicero, the oratorical talent, in an eminent, though inferior degree, is by no means uncommon, but shoots up, like weeds after a rain, in certain political conditions of society. We have in recent times attained that degree of skill, and that facility and habitual elegance in composition, which two centuries ago would have won the meed of fame. But these things are so pregnant in our days, that they seem to be almost the uniform result of an ordinary education. We may perhaps venture to conjecture that the talent of respectable eloquence was just as generally diffused among the Athenian people during the later ages of the republic, as that of literary composition is among our contemporaries.

A single further observation must be hazarded in this place, but one which is important for the due appreciation of oratory, and especially for the comprehension of the remains of Attic eloquence. It is an entire misapprehension of the nature of eloquence, to suppose that its essence consists in what is ordinarily regarded as fine language, brilliant metaphor, and novel sentiments. The master-pieces of oratory are frequently simple and undorned—elegant and chaste they must be,—but often they

are almost naked in their intense strength. If the common impression were correct, a great orator would be by no means so rare a phœnix upon earth, and the smoothly rounded periods of Prescott, the dropsical style of Headley, and the scrofulous blotches of Emerson or Carlyle, would eclipse the fame of Clay or McDuffie. It is a very different thing from this, or we should certainly place as the ancients would have done, Hyperides, Æschines, and Isocrates, far above Demosthenes, while the rivalry, or even superiority of Demades, would be utterly incomprehensible. Action, said Demosthenes, was the great excellence of the orator—action the first, action the second, action the third of his requisites. It is a very bad translation for a very significant and technical expression. He meant, not merely, nor even principally, the graces of gesticulation, but especially the well-ordered and harmonious expression of the eye and the features, the happy and thrilling undulations of the voice, but above all that art, by whatsoever means attained, whereby the speaker is enabled to give effective utterance to his own feelings,\* to afford an energetic interpretation of his own thoughts,† and to transfuse with instantaneous and magic sympathy his own emotions into the bosoms of his whole auditory. It is a singular commentary on the rude apprehension of the signification of the term action, that it was a violation of the rules of art and decorum among the Athenians, to remove the hand from the concealment of the cloak. The whole art of speaking, says Cicero,‡ consists in the employment of three instruments of persuasion—the proof of our positions, the attraction of our hearers, and the direction of their passions in accordance with the requirements of the case. Elegant diction, perspicuous expression, graceful action, rich imagination, cogent reasoning, are all only the vesture of eloquence, not the substance: efficient in heightening and facilitating the success of the orator, if the true fires of oratory are veiled beneath,§ but otherwise cold, uninteresting, and impotent.|| The single key to

\* *Vim promovet insitam.* Hor. iv. Od. iv. 33.

† *Effert animi motus interprete lingua.* Hor. Ep. ad Pis. iii. cf. Cic. De Orat. i. v. 18.

‡ De Orat. lib. ii. c. xxvii. § 115. *Ita ratio omnis dicendi tribus ad persuadendum rebus est nixa: ut probemus vera esse ea quæ defendimus: ut conciliemus nobis eos, qui audiunt: ut animos eorum ad quemcumque causam postulabit motum vocemus.*

§ Cic. ad Herenn. lib. iii. c. xv. 27.

|| Cic. De Orat. ii. c. iv, § 17.



the whole comprehension and criticism of oratory lies in the single maxim of Quintilian: *Pectus facit ingenium*. The *deivórn*s of Demosthenes, on which ancient critics so carefully enlarge, was far removed from Euphuistic elegancies and unexpected terms of expression. It consisted in the concise energy of utterance, the fire of passion, the sublime and often terrible grandeur of pride, scorn, or indignation, the impetuous and at times turbid flow of language, the vivid illumination of intense feeling, the divine rage and fury of excitement, and the sympathetic thrill with which he made the chords of every heart vibrate. He has no wit, no poetic fancy, little imagination, scarcely any pathos: his most overpowering flights are almost bald in the simplicity and unadorned vigor of their expression, but their condensation and force are perfectly irresistible. These are the qualities which gave him his uncontested pre-eminence among all orators, both ancient and modern; but they are also the cause of his being so rarely appreciated by his readers. The retired scholar can perhaps alone appreciate the full significance and felicitous propriety of his language, but his unfamiliarity with living oratory prevents his appreciating its practical appositeness, its strength, and its influence when delivered. The consequence is, that all translations of the great Athenian are weak and deceptive, and bear about the same relation to their original, that a farthing rush-light does to the sun. Lord Brougham, one of the latest and in some respects the best qualified of his translators, though a forcible debater and effective advocate at Nisi Prius, in Westminster Hall, or at St. Stephens, had no conception of the popular character and true elements of oratory, and was, moreover, equally deficient in acquaintance with the Greek tongue, and in comprehension of the Athenian character and history. The French version of Auger, from the imbecility of the language rather than from the incompetence of the translation, suggests the performance of Handel's Creation on a Jew's-harp, or a hurdy-gurdy. Those who are more familiar with public life, and especially with the spirit of democracies, have rarely that acquaintance with the Greek language which could render the perusal of the orations of Demosthenes either easy or pleasant. Yet, until both scholarship and political experience under a republican government are united, we can hardly expect that the disappointment should cease which nearly all

readers feel in their study of Demosthenes.\* Without this union, Cicero and Isocrates will still continue to be the favourite specimens of ancient eloquence, because better adapted to the shade and seclusion of the closet, and less strongly marked by the dust and sun of political contention. The choice of the mere scholar is guided by the same instinct which has given to the speeches of Burke a brighter and more enduring fame than to those of Fox; though the vast superiority of the latter was unquestioned and uncontested in the actual arena.

After a few other remarks on the characteristics and peculiarities of Athenian oratory, we would fain, if there were time, pass on to the consideration of the orators themselves. The latter cannot be understood or appreciated, unless we have a distinct comprehension of the conditions under which their genius was displayed, and the requirements which were exacted at their hands. Endless charges have been brought against them, and these must be refuted or explained, before we are prepared to form a just estimate of either their respective merits, or of their merits as a class. It has been alleged that the study of their remains is utterly profitless and unavailable for the purposes of modern imitation, inasmuch as their orations present no definite issue—are full of tedious digressions—are rather literary exercises than strictly subordinated to practical aims. They have also been accused of manifesting an entire disregard and misapprehension of the nature of evidence—of being deficient in logical concatenation and correctness of argument—of abounding in irrelevancies, common-places and mythological episodes—of being full of vain-glorious boasts, and a senseless repetition of the legendary and historic glories of Athens, and of being continually defaced with foul-tongued slanders and seasoned principally with the rhetoric of Billingsgate. The complaint is also made, that they convey neither political nor moral instruction, and can scarcely be said to prove anything, while their rigid artistic symmetry scarcely adds to their beauty, and detracts seriously from their strength and ease by the imposition of needless trammels. A long and grave catalogue of offences, assuredly, if they can only be fairly substantiated, but sin-

\* Cic. De Orat., lib. ii. c. xxx. § 131. The remark of Cicero has reference to the orator himself, but it may be appropriately applied to the critic of oratory.

gularly enough omitting one which would have excited more reprehension than any other, if these ancient monuments had only been studied with sufficient care and penetration, to reveal it to such objectors—the punctilious rythmetical composition of the language.

A few words on each head, will, we think, abundantly exhibit the injustice or futility of these accusations. Certain we are, that if any such critics, with a due fear of their own criticisms, and the supposed errors of the Athenian orators, before their eyes, were to attempt to address a fastidious, impatient, turbulent, and tumultuous assembly in any democratic community, in a cause involving the life, the fortunes or the welfare of themselves, their clients or their country; those who might be luckless enough to be thus defended would fare but badly. But we proceed with our exposition, which we shall render without too great solicitude for the exact order of their presentation.

The first charge is singularly vague, not so much indeed in itself, as from the diversity of subjects to which it must be applied. Among the remains of ancient eloquence, we have deliberative, judicial, and panegyric orations—each with their distinct aims and distinctive rules. In many instances the three characters are blended in different proportions. We have mere exercises of the school, in fictitious legal cases, as in Antiphon, or in fictitious eulogies and censures, as in the Helen and Busiris of Isocrates. We have homilies or the counterparts of modern sermons, in the Paræneses of Isocrates to Demonicus and Nideles, though we cannot regard these as genuine productions. It is only in the judicial speeches, and at times in the deliberative, that a definite issue would be appropriate or could be expected; and we certainly find it wherever we have any valid reason for anticipating it—in the oration of Æschines C. Timarchus, in the orations of himself and his greater antagonist, *De Falsa Legatione* and *De Corona*: in the arguments of Isæus about land titles, in the principal speeches of Lysias; in the speech of Antiphon on the murder of Herod; in those of Andocides *De Mysteriis* and *De Reditu*; and in other instances. It is only necessary to look at the ancient scholia, and the summaries prefixed to each oration, to be convinced of the special attention which was paid to this point. It is true that the *στέσις* of the Greeks, the *status* of the Latins,

did not exactly correspond to the *exitus* or issue of the English courts. The Athenians at least had no special pleading, distinct from the order of the oration.\* It was embodied in the arguments at trial, as the whole procedure was before the people acting in their judicial capacity. There was little preparation of the case preliminary to its being argued, and from the mutual ignorance of contending advocates, no less than from the neglect to compel a previous agreement as to the point to be discussed, it often happened that the main issue of one party was treated as of secondary consequence by his antagonist. There was no prohibition either of duplicity in pleading. The Romans were more attentive to special pleading, as appears from Quintilian's careful discussion of the subject, and in a slighter degree from Cicero;† but there is no sufficient evidence that this was with them severed from the arguments of counsel. In the Athenian courts, the judges, who were nothing but an irresponsible jury without a judge, sat by hundreds: the refinements of modern pleading would have been unsuitable to so promiscuous and numerous an assemblage, because they would have been disregarded by them, and consequently in nearly all cases, the issue was a general issue of the most general kind. But it reveals an utter ignorance or misapprehension of the Attic orators, to suppose that they were negligent in regard to making a definite issue. It is not, indeed always distinctly stated, for this would have often interfered with the free play of their ingenious sophistry, and with the effect of their plausible arts; but it is always involved in the whole conduct of their arguments, and alone furnishes the key to their explanation.

The digressions, which appear tedious to a modern reader, are by no means such as would have been necessarily esteemed so by an ancient hearer. A rigid argumentative harangue has but few charms, except for those whose minds are naturally reflective, and have been cultivated to the exercise of uninterrupted attention in the diligent anxiety to detect the truth. It would be neither appropriate nor acceptable to a miscellaneous audience, unused to such fixity of intellectual aim, incapable of becoming accustomed to it, and more solicitous of gratification than instruction. A good joke or a well told

\* v. Antiphon De Chorenta. § 3.

† Cic. De Inn. lib. ii. c. xix. §. 57.



anecdote, will rivet the attention of a crowd, but it would be dispersed by a mathematical demonstration, or a bald logical deduction, as rapidly as the House of Commons by one of Burke's speeches, or the reading of the Riot Act. In all effective oratory, the tension of the hearer's mind must be dexterously relieved by variety, by pauses in the taxation of thought, and by easy deflections from the strict continuity of the argument. Whatever means may be most efficient in producing this result, are legitimate and praiseworthy, whether they be witticisms, anecdotes, sarcasms, apologies, imaginative flights, illustrations, or digressions. These, when happily introduced, are as admirable as they are necessary. It might as justly be said in commendation of an Athenian orator, as of an Athenian dramatist:

Incolumi gravitate jocum tentavit, eo quod  
 Illecebris erat et grata novitate morandus,  
 Spectator functusque sacris, et potus, et exlex.

And what is said of a joke would be equally true of a digression. Yet these digressions are by no means as numerous as might be conjectured. Their direct importance may not always be manifest to us, from our imperfect acquaintance with the domestic history of the times: but we may be assured that the critical, captious, and fastidious temperament of the audience must have rendered any irrelevant digression fatal to the success and reputation of the speaker, while the limited time allowed to the orators in most cases, the prohibition of exordium and peroration in others, must have tended to the utmost condensation which was compatible with the fullest success. We can discover nothing in Lysias, Isæus, Æschines and Demosthenes, to militate against these conclusions.

It can only be the result of unpardonable ignorance or unblushing effrontery that the eloquence of Athens is represented as rather a literary diversion than an earnest and practical endeavour. The funeral oration of Lysias, and that attributed erroneously to Demosthenes, the Panegyric and Panathenaic orations of Isocrates, and in fact nearly every one of his declamations, are of the former cast, as are also the fictions of which we have formerly spoken, but they are so ostensibly and professedly. In the great and serious efforts of Æschines and Demosthenes, on the other hand, in the speeches which Lysias and Isæus wrote

for others, and in the scanty remains of Demades and Dinarchus, their intense practical scope and efficiency are their most striking characteristics. The solitary fragment of Lysurgus approximates both in its digressions and in its long poetical citations, as well as in its general tone, more closely to the pedantic dissertations of Isocrates and the sophisticated rhetoricians; but the commencement of the oration against Socrates is condensed, precise, grave, urgent, and practical. Some misunderstanding may undoubtedly be occasioned by the apparent vagueness of the issue, which we have already explained, but there is no mistaking the direct practical character and strict adherence to the point of such arguments as those of Demosthenes against Androtion, Aristocrates, or Timocrates, or even that exquisite speech against Leptures.

There is but too much reason to suspect that the ordinary opinions relative to the Athenian orators, have been formed from a hurried and partial acquaintance with their works. The celebrity of a few leading orators has attracted to them the exclusive attention which is so rarely bestowed upon Attic oratory—but we might just as reasonably pretend to judge of American eloquence from half a dozen Fourth of July Orations, as of the Greek, by any such compendious process as this.

That there is a singular disregard of the plainest rules of evidence in these celebrated master-pieces is indubitable, but it is often intentional; and it is but just to remark that when the case justifies it, the shrewd apprehension of the bearing and force of particular kinds of evidence, is as remarkably evinced as it ever is in any of our modern courts. We have already called attention to the looseness of civil and criminal procedure at Athens; and to the entire subjection of all questions of right and wrong, of justice and injustice, to the legerdemain of the orators, and the arbitrary caprices of the people; and we have indicated the causes of this lamentable want of fixed principles and settled practice. When such was the state of feeling, of thought, of familiar practice, too rigid an adherence to the correct prescriptions of the doctrine of evidence would have been a senseless and fatal concession to vigilant and uncompromising adversaries. It was less the fault of the orator than attributable to the condition of the times, that he was negligent of the character of his evidence. The orator must adapt himself to his auditory,

he must mould his arguments, and shape his employment of means, in accordance with the peculiar temper of those whom he addresses.\* If the Athenian orator would hope for success among such a people as his Athenian contemporaries, he was compelled to speak, *non tanquam in Republica Platonis, sed tanquam in fœce Romuli*. It was one striking indication of the vast superiority of Demosthenes over all his contemporaries, that he could command success with only slight concessions to the depravity of his times, and the whims of the people, and retrieved every concession with such sublime nobility of virtuous sentiment and patriotic reprehension of accredited vices: yet even he could not escape the necessity, and still less could others, of yielding much to the familiar usages and associations of his countrymen. But we may ask, before abandoning this topic, whether our modern statesmen and advocates uniformly refrain from aiding their cause or their clients by doing occasional violence to the evidence before them? The history of cross-examination would reveal offences of this kind, in comparison with which all the alleged errors of the ancients would appear trivial.

These remarks are, in great measure, applicable to that absence of strict logical coherence and rigid argumentation, which has been made another cause for censure. The rules of evidence are but the application of logic, and what has been just said of this branch may be appropriately said of the parent stem also. But it must be observed further, that when we exact strictness of demonstration from a popular speech, we erroneously expect the proprieties of a philosophic dissertation from that which is of an entirely different character. It is agreed by all writers that persuasion, not proof, is the end of oratory:† proof, when employed, is introduced only as one of the means of persuasion, and usually, when most efficient, the argument is rather implied than formally drawn out. We admit then, freely, the want of apparent connection, the sudden and abrupt transition, and yet we fancy that these supposed negligences may have been very often in reality

\* Semper oratorum eloquentiæ moderatrix fuit auditorum prudentia. Omnes enim qui probari volunt, voluntatem earum qui audiunt intuentur ad eamque, et ad eorum arbitrium et nutum totos se fingunt et accommodant. Cic. Ora. c. viii., § 57. But such objections as we are refuting would never be urged if the testimony of Cicero were received and regarded.

† Aristot. Rhet. i. c. 2.

the perfection of consummate art. It is true we have no better æsthetic reason for expecting the orderly progression of sentiment, the uniform flow of reasoning, or the smooth dependence of paragraph upon paragraph, in an oration, than in a lyric poem, or any other form of passionate expression. What we should anticipate is the most effective arrangement for influencing popular feeling and producing persuasion. Art is always suspicious, as indicating deliberation, previous machination, and caution: and consequently the concealment of art has been always regarded as its highest perfection.\* Hence, notwithstanding their diligent preparation and laborious composition, the Athenian orators always endeavoured to give the air of extempore and spontaneous expression, of candour and simplicity, to their orations; and by no means could this be more happily attained than by the rupture of the strict concentration of the argument, by the appearance of forgetfulness, hesitation, and often of abrupt transition. Frequently this is rendered the means of a more impressive appeal to the passions;† but in all cases a close examination will reveal an association and dependence of ideas even when the disconnection of language is most obvious; and it will manifest to the candid critic an adequate reason for the appearance of forgetfulness and haste. To one who is desirous of acquainting himself with the nature and effective employment of those artifices of intentional negligence of which we have spoken, we commend the study of the oration of Demosthenes against Aristocrates.

The irrelevancies which are made a subject of accusation are in great measure explained and defended by our previous observations. The repetitions, common-places, and mythological episodes, require separate notice, but will not detain us long. In the first place, it must be remembered that these orations were delivered by different persons and at different times; they were not submitted in convenient volumes to continuous examination, but spoken, and, if not forgotten entirely, only vaguely remembered by the majority of the audience, which itself also changed under the influence of various casualties and the lapse of time. We may profitably bear in mind the reply of Isocrates to his client, who returned the defence

\* Cic. ad. Horen. lib. iv. c. vii. § 10.

† Quædam etiam negligentia est diligens. Cic. Orat. c. xxiii. § 79.



prepared for him, which had won his admiration on the first perusal, but appeared less satisfactory on the second. "You fool," said Isocrates, "your judges will hear it only once!" Repetitions might thus be justified, which in a consecutive work would be intolerable; thus what seems to us common-place, might not be so in reality, and at any rate might be deprived of its objectionable and tedious character. Demosthenes borrowed frequently from himself, Dinarchus stole largely and successfully from Demosthenes, the ancients accused Isocrates of filching from Archinus,\* and his plagiarisms from Thucydides, the well head of all the orators, were continuous and unblushing, and are apparent on the slightest examination. But the difference between the transient purposes of spoken eloquence and the permanent aims of written composition, renders appropriate in the one what would be most offensive in the other. But though the number of common-places may be thus reduced, we would by no means propose the same explanation for all. Taylor† and many other commentators, as ignorant of oratory as conversant with Greek, are sadly troubled to explain the frequent reiterations of a sentiment or position, but the alleged blemishes are justified by the precepts of Aristotle‡ and the practice of Fox. The exquisite taste of Fred. Aug. Wolf prevented his being entangled in this mesh of imaginary difficulties.§ But, besides such repetitions, there is a large class of common-places consisting of those stereotype maxims and sententious fallacies which are always so grateful to the ear of the democracy, and which they are always itching to be tickled with, as containing a recognition of their sovereignty, a formula of flattery for their vanity, and a renewed assertion of popular and unchallenged doctrines. We may estimate the propriety and effect of their introduction, by the constant repetition among ourselves of the celebrated, though second-hand, doctrine, of the Declaration of Independence, "that all men are born free and equal," or of the soothing formula that "the will of the majority is the ultimate canon of political right." The mythological episodes and the frequent laudation of the real and fabled glories of Athens, may be similarly justified. They tickled the ears of the peo-

\* Ruhnkeni. *Hist. Crit. Orat. Græc.*† Not. at Demosth. *De Corona*, § 6.‡ *De Rhet.*, lib. iii. c. 12.§ *Præf. ad Or. c. Lepturem.*

ple, and were sops thrown to Cerberus, whom it was very necessary to coax, cajole, flatter, and wheedle, every now and then.\* They fulfilled exactly the same functions in Athenian oratory that the singular jumble of fact, fable, imagination and conjecture, annually repeated without end, does in our own Fourth of July orations. These annual panegyrics may be, both in matter and form, common-place, trivial and fabulous: with some rare exceptions, they are so, but they are infinitely more acceptable to the people, and they are infinitely more efficient in kindling enthusiasm and exciting patriotic emotions than a volume of Botta or Bancroft, or a chapter of Story on the Constitution, or even a dissertation of Benton's could be. The legends of Attic mythology were a part of the history and the glories of the country, and, if not wholly believed, they were welcomed with the same sort of gratification, but with a closer and more immediate interest, with which we listen to the romantic tales of Mediæval times.

The slander, the vituperation, the Billingsgate of the Athenian orators, and especially of Demosthenes, are indubitable and not to be palliated. The peculiar wealth of the Greek language in the rhetoric of blackguardism is almost exhausted, and but for these examples we should hardly be capable of conceiving either its capabilities, or the fertility of human invention in this respect. The only observation that it is necessary for us to make is that the feelings of the ancients were more callous, and their taste in matters of personal intercourse less delicate than our own, and that their perverse ingenuity in the fabrication of coarse insults and in the utterance of shameless calumnies, was probably nurtured by the licentiousness of the Attic Comedy and heightened by the impurity of their bacchanalian orgies. It is but just, however, to the ancients to observe that the discussions in the Senate of the United States during its last session, were characterized by equal coarseness and vulgarity, but by less point, without the excuse of the example of either Comedy or Dionysia.

To say that the Athenian orators are unconstructive and prove nothing, is a mere exhibition of a total misapprehension of the functions of oratory. It reminds us strongly of the complaining criticism of the Special Pleader on Milton's *Paradise Lost*. "For the life of him, he could

\* See the amusing caricature of this habit. Aristoph. *Equites*.

not see what it proved." The Attic orators did not speak for our improvement, information, or amusement ; but to meet the urgencies of the immediate occasion : they did not seek so much to enlighten even their hearers, as to persuade them to adopt a particular decision or a particular line of action in a pressing emergency. They left instruction to be more acceptably conveyed in free colloquial intercourse, and discussion among friends: all they were immediately concerned with was the attainment of a favourable verdict. A professed homily, or an avowed attempt at such instruction, as those who make the objection would look for, would have been repulsive and would have been coughed down,\* or would have brought upon the unlucky orator a storm of hisses, and perhaps of rotten eggs. He could only suggest with due obeisance, and lowly deference to the supreme wisdom of the despotic Demos,† that this course was more advisable than that, and lead them by their passions rather than by their reason to the adoption of his views. If he had strung syllogism upon syllogism, had all M'Cullough at his fingers' ends, and arrayed facts and figures, statistics and congressional reports in support of the doctrine which he was anxious to maintain by irrefragable proof, what would this have benefited him, if the merest sciolist in opposition should by ridicule, wit, cajolery, eloquence, or the excitement of their passions, induce the sovereign multitude to decide that, in spite of proof to the contrary, it was their supreme pleasure that the moon should be decreed to be made of green cheese.‡ An Athenian mob would have done this with as little hesitation as a modern jury can acquit a culprit obviously guilty under the law, in consequence of some moral justification or palliation which the law does not recognize. The Athenian orators, like modern politicians, availed themselves of their Blue Books, their Parliamentary Reports, their Records, and such statistics as they had, but they did so under due subordination to the precepts of their art, as means of persuasion, not as substitutes for it. There is no exact analogy be-

\* v. Demosth., *De Falsa Legatione*, § 9.

† The classical scholar will recollect the celebrated passage in *Æschines c. Timarch.* § 27.

‡ See Carlyle's *Latter Day Pamphlets*. Cicero, speaking of the necessity of attending to the means of persuasion, says, "nam sæpe veritas, nisi hæc servata sint fidem facere non potest." *Cic. ad. Herenn.* i. c. ix. § 15.

tween an Athenian and any modern audience—because there has been but one modern democracy of any duration, and because that is still, thanks to Providence, sound and incorrupt. But if the people of the United States should by the natural progression of democratic tendencies arrive at the same stage of political licentiousness as their Athenian prototype, we shall again witness a strictly analogous procedure, though it may be unaccompanied with an equal display of oratorical ability. It is worthy of note that all the axioms of the progressive democracy of our country—"the extension of the area of freedom:" "to the victors belong the spoils:" "the majority have the right to govern:" "the will of the people is law:" "every man has a right to support:" "property belongs to the people:" with the other propositions of the creed, are literal but undesigned and unwitting translations from the Athenian orators, and the catch-words of the Athenian Pnyx and market-place. There is no *poissarde* in the streets of republican Paris, or demagogue among ourselves, more voluble in the utterance of these articles of the faith than were the sausage-sellers and tanners of Athens. We must not judge the ancients too rigidly by modern practices until the incipient analogy is more complete than it is at present.

If we pretended to estimate the merits and effect of the strict scientific form in which the ancients moulded their orations, or to examine into the merits of their rythmical prose, it would be necessary for us to discuss minutely the views of their technical authors, and their whole technical procedure, which would be too tedious a detention and digression in this place. We have certainly not the time to insert here a review of Aristotle, Quintilian, Dionysius, Halicarnassensis, Aristides, Aristophanes, &c. It must suffice for the present to observe that this strictly regulated art has confessedly produced the ablest orators whom the world has yet seen, and can scarcely have been an impediment or anything but an aid. The tendency of the rigid observance of rules to produce point, condensation, energy, and finish, is illustrated by the whole body of poetry in every language, and particularly by the testimony and example of Pope.

These observations may facilitate the comprehension and appreciation of the Attic orators, but they are necessarily exceedingly brief, and they leave many important



topics entirely untouched. We may add, that, as we previously pointed out the manner in which the corruption of the nation ministered to the perfection of oratory, and was probably increased by its influence, so the orators, as a class, seem to have drunk even more abundantly than the rest of their compatriots, of the same Circean cup. It would be difficult to parade any where a more dissolute, profligate, dishonest, treacherous, rapacious, or vicious set than the large majority of the Athenian orators, seem, from the most abundant and credible testimony, fully and repeatedly endorsed by themselves, to have been. Let us be thankful for, and attentive to, the lesson which is conveyed in the fact that the most virtuous were among the most distinguished. So far as we are aware, neither stain nor suspicion rests upon the names of Lysias, Isæus, Isocrates, and Hyperides; Lycurgus was pure as the refined gold; and though the name of Demosthenes is still clouded by the fumes of political contention, and mixed up with the confused scenes of the last days of Athenian liberty, yet it appears bright and pure, in comparison with his rivals, (Phocion alone excepted,) when the mists raised by party malignity and calumny are wafted from his fame.

It is with reluctance we drop the paper before completing our designs: we are chary of being compelled, like Mr. Macaulay, to content ourselves with writing a preface when we proposed to write an essay:

amphora cœpit  
Institui; currente rota cur circeus exit?

We have no pretty metaphor or allegory to conceal the abruptness of our close:\* but the length to which our remarks have already extended prevent the introduction of a new branch of the inquiry; and we can only atone for our present omissions by the expression of the hope, that another opportunity will enable us to do, what we cannot but suspect Mr. Macaulay prudently left undone, to accompany our present slight sketch of Athenian oratory with an examination of the remains of the orators which have descended to our times.

H.

\* See the close of Mr. Macaulay's graceful and ingenious Essay on the Athenian Orators.

ART. V.—LIEBER, NORDHEIMER, AND DONALDSON, ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE.

1. *Smithsonian Contributions to Knowledge*. A Paper on the Vocal Sounds of Laura Bridgeman, the Blind Deaf Mute at Boston; compared with the elements of Phonetic Language. By FRANCIS LIEBER.
2. *A Critical Grammar of the Hebrew Language*; by ISAAC NORDHEIMER. In two volumes. New-York: 1838-'41. 8vo.\*
3. *The New Cratylus*, or Contributions towards a more accurate knowledge of the Greek Language; by J. W. DONALDSON, D. D., etc. 2d Edition, revised and considerably enlarged. London. 1850.†

THIS paper (which comes to us from its learned and accomplished author as a quarto fasciculus of thirty-one pages,) constitutes the second article of the second volume of the valuable "Contributions" of the Smithsonian Institute. The paper before us is characterised by attentive observation, philosophical analysis, and evidences of extensive erudition. It is also so suggestive of profound reflections, as to make us regret that Dr. Lieber has not formally presented his own theory of language, which we doubt not, however, it is his intention to do in a systematic manner at some early period. His lecture on the origin of the first constituents of civilization, (published in 1845,) in which some of his views respecting language appear to have been embodied, it has never been our good fortune to meet with, and the interesting memoir before us, entitles us to urge him to make no long delay in giving to the learned world his matured philological views in a systematic form. To those who fancy that obscurity, complexity, and involution of thought and expression, hard to be unravelled, are essential characteristics of the philosophical mode of thinking of a German mind, we beg leave to commend this paper of Dr. Lieber, as an example of clear thought clothed in lucid language;

\* We have added this work to our rubric, on account of the use we shall make of it in its general bearing upon Philology, in the course of our notice of Dr. Lieber's paper.

† This work ought to have been noticed before in our pages, and we take the opportunity afforded by the general subject of Language, alluded to in Dr. L.'s paper, to call attention to Dr. Donaldson's profound labours.

and, although it is not demanded by the subject, we can not forbear adding the remark, that the whole paper has left upon us the impression of having emanated from a man of real nobleness, generosity, and purity of heart.

The case of Laura Bridgeman is, of course, perfectly familiar to all of our readers, and the object of Dr. Lieber's paper is, to suggest inquiry into the bearing of her spontaneous vocal sounds upon the great question of the phonetic origin of human language. The origin of utterance, Dr. L. regards as emotional. In the brute it is confined to the expression of emotion; in man it rises to the sign of rational expression. Emotion excites a spontaneous outward expression by sounds and gestures, which are well denominated by Dr. L., *SYMPHENOMENAL*.

"All emotion," says he, "excites the nervous system, or consists in an excitement of the nervous system, which, so long as we remain in the body, is linked to the mind by such mysterious laws. This excitement becomes apparent by a variety of phenomena. All these respective signs which accompany the utterances, and the utterances themselves, are phenomena arising in each case from one and the same cause. I would call them, therefore, symphenomena—a legitimate word, it seems, both in point of etymology and meaning. Our accent, our intonation, our gestures, the shrugging of the shoulders, the opening wide or half shutting of the eyes, the curling of the lip, the pointing involuntarily at objects, the rubbing of the head in cases of perplexity, the accompanying our words by depictive signs, laughing, blushing, smiling, weeping, moaning, with hundreds of other phenomena, are symphenomena of the idea or emotion prevailing at the time within us, and affecting the brain and nervous system. I would call, then, symphasis the manifestation of two or more phenomena conjointly produced by the same cause.

"It will appear at once how important the whole subject of symphony is, when we consider that that which is originally the pure symphenomenon of an emotion, becomes, in the beholder, who cannot know of the emotion by direct communion from mind to mind, a *sign*, indicating or *conveying* the emotion from the original sentient to his fellow-creature. Crying, wringing the hands, and uttering plaintive sounds, are the spontaneous symphenomena of despair. He in whom they appear does not intentionally produce them. He, however, who beholds them, knows them, because they are spontaneous, and because he is endowed with the same nature and organization; and thus they become *signs* of despair. Henceforth rational beings may *intentionally produce* them, when they *desire to convey* the idea of despair. There is no invention in this case; no conventional agreement upon an arbitrary sign; but

there is, nevertheless, a development of a sign by rational beings out of that which they, at first, produced involuntarily as sentient creatures. The latter man has in common with the brute. The animal world is full of symphenomena. The first, however—the transformation of the symphenomena into an intentional sign—belongs to the defining, generalizing, and combining power of reason.”

These views appear to us highly important and strictly philosophical. All the theories respecting the origin of language have oscillated between the queries—was it invented by man, or given to him fully formed by God? Dr. L.’s views indicate plainly enough, that it is not in such speculations we are to seek light upon the subject, but in an analysis of language itself in its relations to the faculties of man. It would be futile to discuss the queries—did man invent reasoning, or was it given to him in systematic form by God? We should, of course, reply, man did not invent the process of reasoning from utterly disjoined and independent elements,—nor did God give him a set of logical rules; but reasoning was the necessary development of faculties implanted in man by God. Its progressive development under the laws of Understanding and Reason, which give internal unity to the material furnished by sensations, conceptions, ideas, &c., is a legitimate object of investigation. The very notion of *inventing* reasoning, presupposes and implies the faculty itself; and few will contend that a formal system of logic was originally taught to man by God himself. So with regard to language, which not only “consists of signs representing ideas,” as Dr. L. correctly affirms, but which also (as indeed is implied in that definition itself—since human ideas are not disjoined, independent, isolated elements—) is the expression of connected thought, it implies an internal and organic unity springing from mental laws involving, by implication, the very structure of language itself. In fact, the statement that man *invented* any thing which is involved in his very constitution, has to us no meaning whatever. We can attach no intelligible notion to the saying that man *invented* walking, or muscular action, or shutting his eyes, or chewing his food; and as little can we attach to the saying that he invented *language*, which implies not mere *words*—(this might have some show of possibility)—but an organic unity of etymological and syntactical structure, springing from essential



laws of the intellect itself. But if any one chooses to suppose that God gave originally to man a formal grammar and vocabulary, we have nothing to say except that it never can be proved,—that it is at variance with the whole analogy of Providence in the development of the faculties, powers, and progress of man,—and that it is exceedingly improbable in view of all the investigations of philology.

That all languages exhibit a fundamental affinity, because language itself is the result of thought—that the idea is the parent of the word,—that a λόγος προφορικός implies and requires an antecedent λόγος ἐνδιά θετος will scarcely be denied by any profound philologist. By the fundamental connection, however, of all languages, is generally understood their original derivation from *one* stem. This is a proposition which philology has not yet established; but what philology has done, and what it is destined still more completely to demonstrate, is this, that language is the result of certain fixed laws of the intellect and organization of man,—that it is potentially and necessarily involved in his physiology,—and hence that the fundamental identity of languages, lies in the identity of the fundamental laws of thought and organism which characterize the nature of the human races. Hence it is that the superficial method of old philology, which sought only after *verbal* analogies, and the comparison and identification of languages by *vocabularies*, has yielded to the method of scientific philology, which investigates the structure, the internal connection, and what we may, perhaps, be allowed to call the psychological characteristics of different tongues. And here we shall, without apology, transfer bodily a considerable portion of the Introduction to the first volume of Nordheimer's Hebrew Grammar, because of the intrinsic value and interest of the observations, which are not likely to meet the eyes of our readers in their original source. Nordheimer's is the most philosophical grammar with which we are acquainted, and we say this without being ignorant of the labors of De Sacy in Arabic, and of Bopp in Sanscrit Grammar respectively; and as we have reason to think that Nordheimer's work is not so extensively known as it deserves to be, we shall make our extract from his pages with no niggard hand. He says:—

"The truth of the proposition is now fully established, that, as the logician in undertaking to discover and explain the laws of thinking, (the internal speech or language of the soul, depending indeed upon words, but not yet incorporated into sounds,) must examine into all the faculties of the human mind, watch with a deeply penetrating look their movements, operations, and progress, and finally display the results of his inquiries in a series of laws so systematically progressive that each one may serve as the foundation of that which succeeds it ; in like manner the philologist, after an accurate investigation and comparison of the various powers of the mind, must discover in the relation of the physical senses to the external world, how the internal man becomes excited to cause the organs of speech to be set in motion, and in what manner these organs are compelled by his feelings to the production of articulate sounds.

"At the very outset of his inquiry, he will not fail to recognize the important truth, that all the nations on which the sun shines in his daily course, from the subdued and patient Chinese to the untamed savage that roams the wilds of America, have the same purpose in putting their organs of speech in motion, namely, to embody in sounds the operations of their minds ; and that those ideas and feelings which one nation wishes to communicate, another will likewise desire to convey. But that which remained undivided and unchanged in the harmony of thought and feeling, and dependent for its form on the subjective character of each individual nation, as soon as it steps out into the external world through the agency of the organs of speech, becomes diversified in a variety as boundless as the modifications which the voice and the movements of the organs themselves admit. Thus the ideas must necessarily break through their previous harmony in order to issue forth embodied in sounds ; and as these come in contact with the rest of the external world, the reaction exerts upon their formation a powerful influence. And hence the development of these sounds,—which are produced by changes in the position or configuration of the organs of speech, as for instance the vowels, or by their actual collision, as the consonants,—although in all times and places essentially the same, exhibits itself under varying aspects, not only in the different languages of separate nations, but also in the often numerous dialects of a single tongue.

"Accordingly the development of consonants and vowels, considered independently of each other as the primary elements of speech, is the second point in the formation of language to which the attention of the philologist must be directed. And this will lead him by an easy transition to the discovery of those general principles on which is founded the combination of vowels and consonants into syllables. Here a much greater variety will disclose itself to him in the methods pursued by different languages, than in the course

of his preceding investigations ; for in proportion as these articulate sounds remove from their internal source, and continue to render themselves independent by advancing further into the material world, the more extensively they become modified by external influences. Yet amid all this diversity of sounds and forms, he must not lose sight of their unity of origin, or shrink from the task of seeking out the clue to its discovery.

“As the philologist thus pursues his investigations, and, prepared by the results of his preceding researches into the primary elements of language, proceeds to examine the further combination of syllables into words, he again enters upon a larger and at the same time an entirely new field. It must now be his object to ascertain, not only how syllables are combined, but also why they are combined as he finds them, and not otherwise ; and not only what ideas such combinations are intended to convey, but also why they convey one idea rather than another. Indeed the philologist can scarcely be said to have fairly entered upon the study of language, till he comes to inquire on what account the word is created, or in other words, wherein consists the connection between these external sounds and the internal impressions and operations of the soul which are their producing cause.

“Since, however, the external sound belongs entirely to the material, and the idea which it represents as exclusively to the immaterial world, the two stand at a distance so remote from each other, that the connection between them has hitherto been a complete *res occulta* ; and such doubtless it will continue, so long as we shall remain ignorant of the nature of the union existing between the body and the soul. For the present, therefore, we must rest content with the ability to trace the connection of those representatives of ideas to their originals, which are rather imitations of material sounds than the immediate production of the operations of the mind, viz. *onomatopées* ; while that which exists between those words and their primary cause, whose origin lies in the activity of the soul, whether excited by sensation or reflection, is likely to remain forever an impenetrable mystery. All that we can hope to accomplish in the vast majority of cases, is to find out the primitive idea or signification of a word for the expression of which the organs through the power of the soul were first set in motion ; and when once the word with its individual meaning has been thus established as an integral part of the language to which it belongs, the formation of derivatives may be shown to take place on principles the determination of which is comparatively easy.

“The improbability, however, of our ever being able to discover the nature of the connection between the objective word and the subjective idea which it represents, is no sufficient argument against its existence. On the contrary, that such a connection does exist, is proved by the fact, that a striking similarity and even iden-

tity of form is often presented by corresponding primitives in languages the most remote from each other; the origin of which resemblance, though not deducible from any circumstances of time or place, may yet be found in the relation borne by language to the human mind, which may give rise to the production of similar sounds or combinations of sounds by different individuals or nations, to denote the same idea. Still we must not expect to find this internal relation displayed in an objective resemblance of all languages to each other: since in the very moment of its birth an idea may be perceived in modes as various as the innumerable degrees in which mental development and culture exist; and even when the original perception is uniformly the same, it is liable to be indefinitely modified through the influence of the external world on becoming incorporated into sounds. And thus we see that at the very outset of the world's creation there exists a reason why those sanguine expectations of the discovery of a genealogical band uniting all languages to a parent stem, which the brilliant results of their acute investigations have raised in the minds of some ardent cultivators of comparative philology, have hitherto been and will continue to be frustrated, so long as it is sought in the external form of the word itself, with the preconceived opinion that a given combination of sounds must of necessity express the same idea in one language as in another. Although at the same time it would be equally erroneous and absurd, to infer from the dissimilarities presented by corresponding words in different languages, that there is no relation whatever between them.

"When once the word has attained its expression, that which before was the exclusive property of the mind acquires a separate existence of its own, and is submitted to the cognizance of the senses by means of the organs of speech; and thus the sound and its animating idea become coëstablished in the mutual relation of body and soul. Accordingly a repetition of the primary impression, by causing the organs of speech to be set in motion in a similar manner, results in the reproduction of the same sound or combination of sounds which it at first originated. These considerations enable us to understand why it is that primitive words, which are the direct expressions of the operations of the soul, not having acquired a complete individuality, but continuing partially to retain their connection with the latter, frequently exhibit an astonishing similarity to each other in languages whose sources are to all appearance totally distinct. Again, as the points of resemblance afforded by an idea are numerous in proportion to the scope of its signification, we frequently find in the comparative study of languages, that although corresponding derivations may present an almost entirely dissimilar appearance, the examination of their roots, which are the more immediate reflections of the impressions of the soul, often proves them to be astonishingly near.



“Primitive words, even after their establishment as the outward signs of ideas, are liable to mutations of various kinds : thus an individual, in endeavoring to render an idea objective by means of the same representative through which it was before communicated to him by another, may involuntarily change some of its elements ; a process whose continued repetition is capable of producing essential alterations in the forms of words. These changes may be effected in two different ways ; either by accidentally commuting nearly related sounds, i. e. those produced by the same or neighboring organs ; or by neglecting one of the elements of a compound articulation, or adding another as an assistant, for the purpose of facilitating utterance. And this we may reasonably conclude to be the origin of the almost infinite variety of dialects of many single languages, and also of the numerous languages which spring from an individual stock.

“Entertaining such views of the origin and progress of language, after a careful examination of the structure of the organs of speech, and of the relations which the products of their activity bear to their movements, and after watching the influences exerted by climate and other external circumstances upon the moral and physical condition of mankind through long periods of time, the inquiring philologist has been enabled to separate the effects of extraneous causes from the primary forms acquired by words as the direct expressions of the ideas conceived by the soul. These are the principles and the mode of investigation which have brought about the wonderful discoveries characterizing the present state of philological science, and which must go on producing others of increasing importance, whose magnitude none can presume to estimate.

“The involuntary mutations in the forms of words, to which differences of organization give rise in the attempts to reproduce the original combinations of sounds, doubtless suggested the notion of voluntary changes for the purpose of denoting ideas differing in a greater or less degree from those already embodied in words, although still bearing to them a direct and obvious relation. In this manner a comparatively few primitives are made to furnish the materials for constructing a multitude of new terms ; the selection of similar expressions as the representatives of similar ideas being a natural result of the constitution of the human mind. Hence a language containing but a moderate number of primitives may be extremely rich in its vocabulary, if the power of derivation exist in full force. Those changes which consist in the commutation, rejection, or addition of a vowel or consonant, may be called *INTERNAL*.

“Again, a modified idea may be represented by the addition of another term to that which denotes it in its simple state ; the two words, although severally retaining their independent significations, being made to serve as the expression of a single idea ; this may be termed *inclination*. These two words, in consequence of the sim-

plicity of their joint signification, may become united into a single compound expression ; in the course of which either one or both may undergo some change from the original form, although adhering to it in the main : this is termed *composition*. The process may even be carried further, until at last one of the terms by parting with some of its principal elements is made to assume the appearance of an initial or final increment, at the same time surrendering its individual meaning, which is no longer distinguishable in that of the compound : this is called *afformation*. The mutations produced by this mode of designating related ideas may be denominated *EXTERNAL*. They are far more decided and important than those of the preceding kind ; for as the word becomes increased, its objectivity is enlarged, and the greater are the changes it admits.

“As a result of this variety in the modes of constructing expressions for ideas similar to those already denoted by words, we find that not only is derivation affected differently in separate words and classes of words in the same language, but also that a marked distinction in this respect exists in different languages—*internal* changes prevailing chiefly or almost exclusively in one, and *external* in another.

“We have two principal data on which to proceed in the attempt to distinguish the primitive word from its derivatives ; these are its *signification* and *form*.

“First. In order to discover the primitive by means of its *signification*, we must seek out that idea lying as a common root at the foundation of all the rest, *from* which they have grown out in various directions, either as its branches or as newly formed independent stems, and to which they all admit of being reduced, however apparently remote from their original. This mode of proceeding is grounded on the fact that the conception of the modification of an idea must always be preceded by that of the simple idea itself, which immediately upon its birth in the mind obtains an external existence in the form of a word. The truth of this proposition is not disproved by the non-existence in a language of words corresponding to certain primitive ideas : for such terms may become obsolete, while their derivatives remain in use, and constitute an indispensable portion of the language ; even as in the physical world a tree is seen to wither and die, after producing shoots whose branches flourish as widely as those of the parent plant. In the course of the laborious investigations here pointed out, and which it lies chiefly within the province of the lexicographer to make, comparative philology is capable of furnishing assistance of the most important kind ; since a radical word which has become extinct in one language is not unfrequently preserved in another of the same stock.

“A plan similar to the above must be pursued in the attempt to deduce the *primitive meaning* of a word from the variety of accep-

tations in which it may be employed ; that is, our researches must be uniformly directed to the discovery of that idea which forms the foundation of all the rest. And this will always be that which lies nearest the soul of man, and is most likely first to affect it ; for the first activity of the organs is exerted to produce a primitive word, and the first causes of such activity are the earliest impressions of the soul.

“Secondly. In endeavouring to ascertain the primitive by its *form*, we must seek out that word which presents the least complexity in its appearance. For as a mutual relation exists between the internal impression and its external representative, and as the first impression is invariably the simplest, the primitive word which corresponds to it must exhibit the greatest degree of simplicity in regard to the elements of which it is composed. To the question, therefore, whether the monosyllabic or the polysyllabic form of words is to be regarded as original, we would reply without hesitation, the former ; for, though we may find ideas which are certainly primitive expressed in a language by words of more or less complex appearance, they must nevertheless be susceptible of reduction to those simple forms which the operation of various influences through an indefinite period of time has caused them gradually to deviate, until at length they have arrived at that state in which they first attract our observation. That essential changes in the forms of primitives do actually occur, is completely proved by a comparison of the prevalent forms of words in the chief great divisions of human speech. Thus the inflexible nature of the monosyllabic Chinese appears to forbid any modification of the primitive type even in derivatives. On the other hand, the interminable dialects of the aborigines of America present the majority of words both primitive and derivative in a luxuriantly polysyllabic form. The Indo-European and Shemitish stocks may be said, as a whole, to constitute a medium between these two extremes, although in this respect they differ to a considerable extent among themselves.

“The changes to which a primitive word is liable, are the modification of its original elements, addition, and rejection. These again are of two kinds, viz. those which a word undergoes in passing from one dialect or language into another, and those employed to indicate a deviation from the primary meaning. The changes of the first kind are not the result of the operations of the mind, but are involuntarily produced by varieties in the conformation of the organs of speech ; as however these varieties are of limited extent, so also are the changes of which they are the cause. The philologist, therefore, in tracing their origin need go no further than the structure of the organs from which they arise ; after examining these with attention, and ascertaining the precise nature and extent of the modifications to which they are liable, he must exhibit the results of his inquiries as the laws on which all such changes depend. But in order to

penetrate the sources of that other class of changes which take place during the progress of derivation, this alone will not suffice; since these are the result of a deliberate operation of the mind, exerted to express, either by means of an internal change in the primitive word itself, or by the addition of another word in an entire or fragmentary form, an extension or modification of the original meaning.

“The discovery of the causes in which changes of the latter description originate, demands a much greater share of intelligence and application. The statement that the change of a certain consonant or vowel, or the addition of a certain word or syllable, is uniformly accompanied by this or that change of meaning, will not be considered satisfactory. It will be required further to show by what means a given change in the form of a word, or accession to its length, is rendered capable of conveying that modification of the original idea by which it is attended. And here, it must be owned, the philologist is frequently left in darkness: since the numerous influences both internal and external which so strongly affect the primitives, exercise the same power and in a still higher degree on their less important additions. Consequently not only may those additions which retain somewhat of their independent signification have departed so far from their original form and meaning, that these can be recovered only through the laborious inquiries and happy suggestions of a vigorous and original thinker; but they may so merge their signification into that of the compound, and become so essentially altered in appearance, as to render every attempt at their elucidation utterly hopeless. The cultivation of this abstruse department of philology has been pursued with the most distinguished success, as far as relates to the Sanscrit and its remains in the principal Indo-European languages, by Professor BOPP. We must observe, however, that there are some prepositions and inflections whose explanation this learned scholar has left unattempted, and that with regard to some others we do not feel fully prepared to acquiesce in the correctness of his conclusions.

“By means of the foregoing reasonings and statements,—in which the word has been treated as an independent existence within its own proper limits, and a history attempted of its gradual development and formation, from the period when it lay hid as an embryo in the productive womb of the mind, until that in which it steps forth into the world as an individual existence, and tells the cause of its creation,—we hope to have clearly demonstrated the erroneousness of the views entertained by those grammarians who, regarding this broad and fertile field for the labours of the critical philologist as a barren and unprofitable waste, have limited their exertions to the cultivation of the word as received in its perfect state from the hand of the lexicographer. For until the principal elements that enter into the composition of language, the laws on which depend the formation of derivatives, and the hidden power



of modification residing in the prefixes and affixes, have been discovered and displayed, the lexicon can be little better than a mere vocabulary, in which indeed the words with their respective meanings as nearly as they can be ascertained without these previous inquiries, are collected and arranged, but where many of the statements must rest upon vague and insufficient testimony, and not unfrequently are altogether without foundation.

"Who, we would ask, is to furnish the lexicographer with the preliminary truths which must serve as the animating principle of his labours, if not the grammarian? and who shall collect, digest, and usefully apply them, if not the lexicographer? The grammarian and lexicographer are not independent of each other, but possess a united control over the entire word; and thus, while it is the duty of the former to trace its formation from its simplest elements to its completed state; the latter must arrange and make himself familiar with these results, preparatory to his own further deductions—in pursuing which the statements and opinions of his fellow-labourer must constantly be consulted, so long as the word remains an isolated portion of the language, neither affecting others nor being itself affected. This independent state, however, it can not long preserve: for as a man by his very birth is constituted a member of a community of beings similar to himself, nay, is created in order that he may become so, and in this capacity variously influences those individuals with whom he comes in contact, and is as variously influenced by them in turn; in like manner a word, which is designed to form an integral part of a complicated system, as soon as it obtains its citizenship in the body politic of language, begins to act and be acted upon through the relations which spring up between itself and the objects of its kind with which it is surrounded. When this takes place, the word falls entirely into the power of the grammarian, who has now not only to note the changes both internal and external which are at once the effects and the exponents of these relations, and to deduce from them the laws of inflection prevailing in a language; but also, and this must be his principal aim, to show by what means these changes are rendered capable of indicating the relations which words are made to bear to one another in the course of rational thinking and speaking.

"We have seen that a word, before becoming affected by a contact with others of its species, is subject to changes produced either involuntarily by varieties in the conformation of the organs of speech, or voluntarily in order to indicate those modifications of the original idea which distinguish derivations from their primitives. It might not unreasonably be supposed that the changes which words undergo in consequence of their mutual action upon one another, would be more various and extensive than those just mentioned; seeing that, in addition to the direct influence which words in connection exert upon the forms of each other, there exists a fruitful

source of change in the many new shades of signification resulting from this connection. But as words before they become related are established in the external world with their respective meanings, these relations, and consequently the changes by which they are denoted, are much less dependent on varieties in the organs of speech, and being originated and controlled almost exclusively by reflecting mind, are in reality far less numerous than those of the class alluded to.

"The principal modes employed to indicate grammatical relations are the following three :

"First. The word, having obtained its proper form with its inherent animating idea, resists the effects of all influences, both internal and external, and remains entirely independent and immutable ; while the accessory ideas or relations are indicated either by a change of position, or by a separate word. This extreme tenacity of the original form is strikingly exhibited in the unbending nature of the Chinese language.

"Secondly. The word readily surrenders itself to every influence that is brought to bear upon it in the different circumstances in which it is placed, and accommodates its elements with the utmost facility to the indication of its relations to others, by which means *internal* changes are produced ; or it preserves its original elements unchanged, and to denote the relations in which it is placed receives *external* additions ; or lastly, it undergoes at the same time both *internal* and *external* changes. This susceptibility to influence from without is manifested in the highest degree in the exceedingly flexible Sanscrit.

"Thirdly. The word refuses to surrender the form it has acquired, but receives into its composition as an additional member the representative of a closely connected idea. This construction obtains chiefly in the Mexican language, the verbs of which are made to include entire nouns.

"It should, however, be remarked, that no one of these modes of indicating grammatical relations is employed perhaps in any language to the entire exclusion of the rest, but that which prevails in one to the greatest extent confers on it its peculiar character. This is the case in regard to the languages above mentioned.

"Since the willingness or aversion of words to be affected by their relations to one another depends on the immutable laws directing the operations of the human mind, the character which is thereby stamped on the language is of the most marked and permanent kind, and therefore the most proper to be consulted by the philologist as his principal guide in attempting the classification of languages according to their affinities. It would lead the pursuer of such inquiries to no satisfactory results, but would rather involve him in uncertainty and error, were he to make isolated words the subject of his researches, and to consider the mere discovery of a greater or

less number of terms common to two or more languages as clearly indicative of a radical connection. In the first place, such terms may have been adopted from one language into the other: again, although now presenting a similar appearance, they may in their origin have been perfectly distinct; for, as the changes to which words are liable frequently cause those which were originally similar or identical to differ by degrees, until at length their connection is scarcely discernible by the most experienced etymologist, so likewise, by operating in a contrary direction, they may produce between words from totally different sources an almost perfect resemblance: or, granting that these terms have not been borrowed, and still are radically the same, their similarity proves nothing more than the common structure of the human mind and the intimate connection existing between the internal impression of the soul and its external representative."

We can entertain no doubt of the correctness of Wm. Von Humboldt's opinion, that the *unity* of language is a *physiological* effect; the *diversities* of various tongues is a *dynamical* one: the former being based in the nature of man, the latter springing from the individualization impressed by the speakers. That human language, then, had a *common* origin which accounts for its affinities of structure, philology must be regarded as having proved; but whatever may be the fact, and however it may be ultimately decided, we must grant, that as yet, philology has only proved that origin to be—not an original stem or language, but the *unity of human nature*, which consists in the radical or formative *laws* which constitute it a *nature*. The several races developing under the influence of those laws which regulate them as partakers of *human* nature, will, consequently, manifest identity; while that identical nature, modified by the laws which individualize and distinguish the races *as races*, will manifest a corresponding diversity. If the peculiar characteristics of the different races are the results of specific laws originally defining the races, and involved in their several constitutions, still the Unity of their Human Nature is admitted; and if those characteristics have otherwise originated from a single, primitive race, yet the diversities of the several races have now become permanent characteristics. So that whatever may be the ultimate, scientific decision upon the problem—and that the scientific and theological interpretations will finally coincide, *which ever* way the decision be made, no one acquainted

with past controversies can doubt,—it will be conceded on all sides, that while all the races of men of one kin by the possession of a common nature, shall be recognized as having a common interest in the redemption of man, no wild schemes of pseudo-philanthropy and politics, should vainly endeavour to violate those appointed boundaries of providence for each race, without a regard to whose peculiarities and capabilities, both philanthropist and statesman must commit formidable mistakes.

In approaching the vast subject of *language*, we first observe the great variety of *languages*, and these we proceed to classify according to the results deduced from investigations into their respective structure and position by comparative philology and ethnology. Then we may proceed to the elemental structure or the phonetic origin of language itself, as a thing involved in the physiology of man.

All languages may be classified in three different manners; according to their *psychological*, *grammatical*, and *ethnical* characteristics. Each of these classifications is useful, as each exhibits some peculiar relation of the tongues which it comprehends, not embraced or distinctly indicated by the others. We cannot here enter upon the philosophy of language, in which the first two modes of classification are based; and we must equally abstain from the ethnological researches which have established the third. We will only state the respective classifications as they have been determined by philologists.

PSYCHOLOGICAL. In all languages, there is a tendency, as they undergo cultivation, to give to the logical or syntactical structure, predominance over the etymological. Hence, they may be distributed into, what Dr. Donaldson calls the primary, secondary and tertiary state. He says:\*

1. "Languages, in a primary or highly etymological state, are those which have few or no syntactical contrivances, but complete and regular inflexions, and a living power of derivation and composition. In such languages, writing has been cultivated at a late period, and circumstances have not favoured the logical development of the language. The most remarkable specimens of languages in a primary state, are the Sanscrit, Slavonian, and old Latin.

2. "Languages in a secondary state, are those, which, without sacrificing to any very considerable extent, their inflexions and

\* New Cratylus, 2d ed. Lond. 1850. p. 74.



power of composition, have still attained to a clear and copious syntax. The most remarkable specimens of this class, are the ancient Greek and the modern high German.

3. "Languages in a tertiary state are those which have all but lost their inflexions and power of composition; which substitute syntactical contrivances for those variations of form, which in the older languages characterize differences of declension and conjugation; and which enjoy all the resources of logic in the construction of their propositions. To this class we must refer all the Semitic languages, the dead no less than the living, together with a considerable number of modern idioms, including the Romance languages and our own."

This classification exhibits the state of a language with regard to its development as an expression of connected thought.

GRAMMATICAL. As to grammatical structure, great philologists, like A. W. Von Schlegel, Bopp, etc., have recognized three great classes of languages :\*

1. "Languages with monosyllabic roots, but incapable of composition, and therefore without grammar or organization : to this class belongs the Chinese, in which we have nothing but naked roots, and the predicates and other relations of the subject are determined simply by the position of the words in the sentence.

2. "Languages with monosyllabic roots which are susceptible of composition, and in which the grammar and organization depend entirely on this. In this class, the leading principle of the formation of words lies in the connection of verbal and pronominal roots, which, in combination, form the body and soul of the language: to this belongs the Sanscrit family, and all other languages not included under 1 and 3, and preserved in such a state that the forms of the words may still be resolved into their simplest elements.

3. "Languages which consist of disyllabic verbal roots, and require three consonants as the vehicles of their fundamental signification : this class contains the Semitic languages only ; its grammatical forms are produced not merely by composition as is the case with the second, but also by means of a simple modification of the roots."

ETHNICAL. Although some difference of opinion may exist with regard to the ethnical affinities and distribution of the various races, it is generally conceded that the Sanscrit is the most important member of the languages

\* New Cratylus, pp. 104-5.

of the Indo-Germanic stock or families. So striking is the resemblance between the old Low German dialects and the Sanscrit, that Bopp remarked, of the Gothic version of the scriptures, that when he read the venerable Ulphilas, he could believe he was reading Sanscrit. The Persepolitan dialect of the age of Darius, exhibited in the arrow-headed inscriptions—so far as they are Persian—is Sanscrit.\* And according to Dr. Donaldson,† it was the migration from the country about the southern extremity of the Caspian sea, which carried the Hindus to India, and the Low Germans to Europe. This last named scholar, speaking of the grammatical classification of languages which we have just given above from his pages, says:‡

“More recently, it has been thought convenient to divide the known languages of man into five different groups or dynasties.

1st. The Indo-Germanic, corresponding to number 2, in the above classification.

2d. The Syro-Arabian, corresponding to number 3, of the same classification.

3d. The Turanian, or Ugro-Tartarian.

4th. The Chinese and Indo-Chinese, corresponding to number 1.

5th. The languages of Central and Southern Africa.

We still prefer a tripartite division, which in effect is capable of further arrangement in two groups of languages: and we think that the following is the simplest nomenclature.

The two groups may be called, A, the *central*, and B, the *sporadic*.

Group A, contains, 1st, the Iranian languages, corresponding to the Indo-Germanic, or Sanscrit family; and 2d, the Aramaic languages, corresponding to the Semitic, or Syro-Arabian family.

Group B, 3d, or *sporadic* family, includes the Turanian, the Chinese, and all those other languages which were scattered over the globe by the first and furthest wanderers from the birth-place of our race. According to this arrangement, the first two families are classed together, as constituting one group of languages closely related in their material elements, and differing only in the state or degree of their grammatical development. The third family stands by itself as comprising all the disintegrated or ungrammatical idioms. . . . At present they must be regarded as belonging to a region of phenomena not yet completely explored by science, and surrounding like a cloud the clearly developed and central mass of Aramaic and Iranian idioms.”

\* The Natural History of the Varieties of Man. By Robt. Gordon Latham, M.D., F.R.S. etc. etc, Lond. 1850, p. 544.

† New Cratylus, p. 121.

‡ New Cratylus, p. 105.

For ourselves, we confess that we do not regard ethnology as sufficiently advanced to enable us yet to adopt any certain ethnological classification of languages, which of course can only be based upon the actual filiation of races.

In analyzing language into its constituent elements, if we regard it as the spontaneous product of the physiology of man, we should expect to find reflected in it the results of psychological analysis. And hence, we have to state, in the language of Dr. Donaldson :\*

“The connection between the results of psychology, or the science of mind, and of the philosophical analysis of inflected language. That such a connection, or rather identity of results, should exist, is necessary, if we are right in maintaining that language springs naturally and spontaneously from the mind of man.

“The results of all that writers on the philosophy of mind have collected, with regard to our thoughts and the constitution of our intellectual powers, may easily be summed up, so far as they accord with our own convictions. Every man has one primary belief; that he exists, and that there is something without him, full of realities, animate and inanimate; he sees, too, an infinity of beings like himself, who live in the same belief. This something without him is known to him from his sensations, which, acting in the first instance, on his bodily organs, produce an impression on his mind which we call a perception. These perceptions survive the presence and the influence of the substance which caused them, they become a part of the mind, and are called conceptions. Now the mind of man is so constituted, that whenever a perception is recollected, or a conception arises, it instantly awakes some other similar conception, or perhaps a whole train of them, connected by the relations of resemblance or contrast. This habit or tendency is called association or suggestion. We can also combine those conceptions at pleasure, so as to form new conceptions existing only in the mind, and this faculty is called imagination. Now all these powers, with the exception of the last, are confessedly enjoyed by the lower animals, and we class them all under the name of Understanding, the faculty of rules, or the faculty of judging according to sense.†

\* New Cratylus, pp. 76, et seq.

† “It will be observed that we use the term ‘understanding,’ in a more limited sense than others, Coleridge for instance, give to the ‘human understanding.’ Coleridge attributes to the understanding many operations which we consider as peculiar to the reason—discourse, abstraction, generalization, etc. (*Aids to Reflection*, p. 215.) We adopt the Kantian distinction, in general, but we are rather disposed to comprehend under the term reason, every faculty which is peculiar to the mind of man, excepting the imagination, which, however, in its

But there is also a higher faculty which we alone possess, which presides over and regulates the understanding, and which we call Reason, or the faculty of principles. By this faculty we compare our conceptions with one another, we estimate their similarity or incongruity, we arrange the objects of our perception in classes, and these classes again under more general subdivisions; we compare these ultimate generalizations with one another, and so arrive analytically at absolute truth; or, in some cases, we seize upon the principles of science synthetically, *à priori*, and at once. It is this faculty which constitutes our humanity; it is to this that speech ministers as an indispensable, but subordinate adjunct.

"The knowledge of his own existence and the simultaneous belief in an external world,—this is the first act of man's consciousness. But this consciousness is in itself subjected to two other primary intuitions: it is subordinated to the intuition of space, for he is *here*, and every thing else is *there*, and these are two positions; it is subordinated to the idea of time, for the very belief in his own existence presumes a continuance.

"This, then, is the sum of psychology. Man is and the world is, there is a *here* and a *there*, a *me* and a *not me*,—the knowledge of this fact is consciousness. He has perception, conception, association, which constitute his Understanding. He compares, generalizes, knows, and discourses; these are the operations of his Reason. And all his thoughts are modified by, and subordinated to, his primary intuitions of space and time.

"Now if language be, as we say it is, the genuine product of the reason, we should expect to find traces of all these conformations of the mind in the structure of our speech. And so it is.

Our analysis of the Greek and cognate languages has taught us that there are two primary elements of speech: the first, an organizing element, which enters into all words, and which we call a pronoun; the second, a material element, which constitutes the basis of all significant terms which are not pronouns. The pronoun expresses in the first instance, the relation of the thinking being to the external world, of the subject to the object, of the *me* to the *not me*, and this is, formally put as an opposition of *here* to *there*. The first general and vague idea of *there* is soon split up into a number of modifications, of which the first is a distinction of objects in the *there* or outward world, according as they are nearer to, or further from, the subject, and subsequently a designation of all the different directions in which they stand with regard to the subject. The

truest and highest form, can exist only in a reasoning and speaking creature. For imagination, when it really deserves the name, is intimately connected and blended with the reason. It is in fact the poetical reason, or the realistic element in the reason. In its lower form it constitutes the fancy, which ministers to the hope and and fear of infants and dumb animals."



pronoun, therefore, in its different forms, is an expression of the first great fact of consciousness,—that we are, and that there is something without us.

“The material element of language includes the names of all the objects which present themselves to us in the outer world, and to our contact with which we owe the experiences that are the staple for our understanding. We find on examination that all names of things are generic terms, that they describe some particular quality or attribute of the object, that strikes us as most remarkable in it and by which we at once see its resemblance to the other objects of the same class. We observe, too, that even in the words which we call proper names, are originally generic terms, designating some qualities, and consecrated to certain particular objects possessing those qualities in a remarkable degree. It is, therefore, clear, that the very act of naming implies classification and abstraction, or reasoning power, and when Adam is said to have named all the animals, this is only another way of expressing the fact, that by his reasoning power, which is identical with the power of speech, he divided them according to the *prima facie* classes of natural history. Of course, this use of general instead of special names, has a great effect on the conciseness and perfection of language as an instrument of thought. But the process does not stop here; not only are individuals described by the general names, but all the relations which bear any resemblance to the attribute from which the body of the name, or the root, as it is called, is derived, are expressed by words into which that root enters; nay, more, very many words expressing contrasted relations, have the same root perhaps slightly modified. This is an exemplification in language, of the principle of association or suggestion, which all physiologists recognize as one of the most important operations of the mind. All writers on suggestion, or the association of ideas, admit, either directly or by implication, that contrast or contrariety, is a species of connection among ideas; indeed, Brown makes it one of the *primary* laws of suggestion. Now, if we recollect that suggestion or association depends upon previous co-existence, or previous proximate succession, we shall not wonder, that, in this natural and necessary process of expressing the greatest number of thoughts or modifications of thought, with the fewest possible words or modifications of words, ideas of contrast, as well as ideas of resemblance, should be expressed by words, into which the same, or a slightly modified root enters; for contrasts and resemblances are relations, and no idea of a relation could be formed unless we had seen the related objects together, or experienced the related feelings in close succession; but in this case, where the perceptions have taken place together, the recollection of one perception awakens a remembrance of the other; consequently, if we have got a word to express one of these related ideas, that word suggests the other idea to our mind; therefore, the

root of that word, or a slight modification of it, would naturally be adopted to express the other idea, whether it be an idea of contrast or an idea of resemblance. And thus we find that a word may bear two contrasted significations, or there may be two or more words, containing the same or slightly modified roots, which denote contrasted or contrary objects or feelings, when the objects or feelings have been seen, felt, or experienced, always or generally, in connection or in immediate succession.

“Every word containing a root, or belonging to the material element of language, also contains by way of prefix, suffix, or both, a pronominal element. This is the counterpart in language of the psychological fact, that every act of consciousness is subordinated to the two conditions of thought, the intuitions of space and time. The old Epicurians maintained that the only real existences in the world were matter and space, and that every thing else was either a property (*conjunctum*) or an accident (*eveniunt*) of these. Time, for instance, was an accident of matter, not perceptible in itself, but to be inferred from the rest or motion of things. With what connection with this materialistic view we know not, but all people, whether philosophers or not, seemed to have made up their minds, till Kant appeared, that space at all events was something external, empirical, and real. Kant, however, deduces his critical philosophy from the position that space and time are *à priori* intuitions, because we cannot form a conception of outward objects without a presupposition of space and time; they necessarily form the basis of all outward phenomena; they are, both of them taken together, pure forms of all perception, and consequently make synthetical positions, *à priori* possible. It is true that the intuitions of Space or Position, and of Time or Continuity, are equally original and equally necessary, but if we analyze them more rigorously, we shall find that the intuition of Time is only a refinement and modification of that of Space. These two primary notions may be otherwise stated as an intuition on the one hand, of position or fixedness of objects with isolations or intervals, which is the intuition of Space, and an intuition on the other hand of continuousness or motion of objects, or of such a closeness and proximity in their positions, that the intervals are not perceived, or not taken into account, and this is the intuition of Time. Now it is clear, even from common language, that this is the whole distinction between space and time; for the words which we use as indications of position, such as ‘before’ and ‘after,’ ‘backwards,’ and ‘forwards,’ are also indicative of time. We shall, however, make our meaning clearer by an example.

“That these primary forms of thought necessary to perception, are the basis of pure mathematics, is distinctly stated by Kant, and it is indeed obvious to every one, who agrees with Plato in considering the exact sciences as derived from perception by the intellectual faculties. The two first invented of the exact sciences were

Arithmetic and Geometry, which are both referable to the intuition of space. The latter was always, in the hands of the old geometers, the science of position ; in the former, all the principles are derived from the notion of intervals, and the primary names of the numbers are, as we shall hereafter see, pronominal words signifying position. For convenience in reckoning, it soon became customary to substitute for these arithmetical words a set of symbols, all of them single letters, and people were not long in inventing concise methods of combining these, according to the principles of the science. But even these abbreviations were not enough, and a sort of short hand was invented in different parts of the world, which Europeans have agreed to designate by the Arabic name *Algebra*.\* This written language, (for it was only a set of symbols, and therefore could not be spoken,) was, in process of time, extended to the expression of geometrical results : but only imperfectly ; because the geometer sometimes encroached upon the domain of the other intuition ; and a science of pure time had not been developed from the sciences of space. In fact, the intuition of time or continuity was much more difficult to deal with ; like the old Heracleitean doctrines, it presupposed a continual flowing or change, and escaped from the grasp of expression. The great difficulty to be overcome was a philosophical one,—the construction of a language to express motion, time, or continuous change. This obstacle was surmounted at nearly the same period, by Leibnitz and Newton, and their discovery of the language of change was one of the greatest importance immediately for physical science, and ultimately, we doubt not, for philosophy in general. No one has been at the pains to point out the natural process of this discovery ; it will, we apprehend, be easy to do so. The most obvious example of continued change, or melting down of intervals, is that of physical continuous motion : so obvious, indeed, that the ancient philosophers included under the name *motion*, (*κίνησις*) all that we include under the term *change*. . . . . In accordance with this, then, the earliest language or science of change, borrowed all its terms and even its name from physical motion : though from the very first it was applied to the investigation of problems in change or continuity in general. The natural division, therefore, of the exact sciences is this. (1.) The science of position or intervals, which includes geometry and arithmetic. (2.) The science of time or continuous change, which comprehends mechanics, dynamics, and the great problem of physical astronomy. When Algebra, or the symbolical language in which the sciences of space were expressed, was applied to the science of time, it was called Fluxions or Differential Calculus ; but it might in fact be called by the name of the older language, of which it is nearly an extension.

\* This word is referred to *djbr* and signifies “ *reductio partium ad totum, seu fractionum ad integritatem.*” (Golius. c. 462 Freytag, I. p. 239 b.)

We are aware that an eminent mathematician, in the sister island, has asserted that Algebra, by which he means all that is included in the unphilosophical use of the word analysis, is the science of pure time,\* and he even goes so far as to say that arithmetic is a part of the same science;† but with deference to him and another distinguished analyst,‡ who defines Algebra as the science of general reasoning by symbolical language, we must insist that Algebra can never be called a science, when separated from its applications, which are so many distinct sciences. If the science of pure time is co-extensive and identical with Algebra, as the former scholar asserts, then must Geometry, which is the science of pure space, become the science of pure time, whenever it is expressed in analysis. Algebra should be defined as the method or art of combining symbols, as a language in which we can carry on the most abstract and general reasonings about sensible objects, considered in their relation to one or other of our original intentions.

"It appears, then, from the progress and extension of Algebra, that the intuition of time, though necessarily co-ordinate with that of space, may be derived from it by adding the idea of motion or change, or by melting down the intervals which constitute position, and that in scientific language, at all events, the expression of time is posterior to that of space. In the common languages, we find two classes of the material words, which we call nouns and verbs. The former are capable of expressing relations of space only: the latter denote actions or express relations of time. Yet we find that both are made out of the same materials; the roots or stuff of language, enter into each set, and they are each of them combined with pronominal elements, which denote the case-relations in the former, and the person-relations in the latter; the cases of the nouns expressing the position of some object with regard to other objects, the persons of the verb the point from which the action begins, or at which it ends. These we shall see stand upon exactly the same footing, and the expression of agency, whether affected by a case,

\* Sir W. Rowan Hamilton, in the introductory remarks to an essay "On Conjugate Functions, and on Algebra as the Science of Pure Time," (*Transactions of the Royal Irish Academy*, vol. xvii. p. 293, fol.) states "that his object is to inquire whether existing Algebra offers no rudiment which may encourage a hope of developing a science of Algebra, properly so called, strict, pure and independent, deduced by valid reasons from its own intuitive principles; and this not less an object of *à priori* contemplation than Geometry, not less distinct in its own essence, from the rules which it may teach or use, and from the signs by which it may express its meaning; and that he has been led to the belief that the intuition of time is such an element." This is not the place to enter upon a formal examination of so profound a subject: but we are sure that any one who will look into Sir W. R. Hamilton's paper, and compare it with the explanation given in the text, must admit that he has confused the method of Algebra with one of its applications.

† *Ubi supra*. p. 308.

‡ Professor Peacock's *Algebra*, § 1.



a preposition, or a person-ending, is still strictly pronominal, or derived from the intuition of space.

“From this examination we see that the principles according to which the words of a perfect, or, what is the same thing, an inflected language, are formed, that is to say, their anatomical structure or internal mechanism, is the counterpart of what we know of the operations of the mind. Here, however, the parallel is at an end, and we must be careful to recollect that the words themselves, when formed into a whole, are nowise representatives of any thing in the mind. They may go on through all possible shades of meaning, and even be used by abstraction without any regard either to their structure or primitive signification, and without in the least affecting the mind with a comprehension of their import: nay, it is, as we have shown, the natural process in language, as it develops itself syntactically, to destroy the fulness and significance of individual words; and it is highly beneficial to science that such should be the case. A very pregnant example of this is furnished by those general abstract terms, of which so much has been said by metaphysicians.

“If we examine the abstract and general names in any language, we shall find that they are only tropical and figurative words, properly referring to sensible objects; and the reason of this is obvious, for the whole end of language is to transfer our inward feelings to the outward world, so that they may become cognizable to others, and objective to ourselves; now, in order to attach a name to a thing, it is necessary that the name and the thing should be presented to the observation a certain number of times together; but it is easier to present a material object to the observation of another, for the purpose of naming it, than to describe to him an impression or a thought; consequently, material objects are first named, and thought or ideas are described by a metaphorical reference to them. Of course, this method of forming our abstract terms, though necessary under the circumstances, is productive of serious inconveniences: by using metaphorical words, we are apt to reason vaguely in consequence of the different significations which the words bear in common language. Hence, for the purposes of science, it would doubtless be desirable to have a set of words which bear no specific meaning. But this is impossible in spoken language, except in the case of merely pronominal words, denoting not things but the position of things: therefore it is only in Arithmetic, Geometry and Music, that we can have a spoken language perfectly general. In symbolical written language, however, it is possible to put down marks or signs, and invent laws for their combination without at all troubling ourselves about their interpretation; and it is to the invention of such a language, and its subsequent extension to subjects beyond the arithmetical calculations to which it was at first applied,

that the great advances in pure mathematics and the sciences depending on them, are to be attributed.

"As abstract general terms are merely the names of sensible objects used tropically, they could not be considered as the representatives of any ideas in the mind, even though it were true that the words of a language, and not the mode of forming them only, might be regarded as the representatives of mental operations. The controversy between the realists and nominalists could not arise at the present day; every one is now aware that words, as the signs of generalization, are the only objects about which general reasoning is conversant. If any question of this root could be agitated at present, it must be one between the nominalism of Occam, or conceptualism as some might be pleased to call it, and the ultra-nominalism of the school of Hobbes, Horne, Tooke and Bentham. Some of these have gone so far as to seek for general truths in the words of a particular language, but no one, now-a-days, would conversely assert the objective existence of general ideas, as something independent of the general terms which we use in reasoning.

"It is true, indeed, that general terms presume generalization; it is true that there is such a thing as general, necessary, absolute truth, and that synthetic judgments *à priori* are possible; it is true that there are genera and species of things, and, in short, representative or abstract knowledge as opposed to perceptive or intuitive knowledge; but it is not true that, because we can abstract and generalize, therefore we have in our mind general abstract ideas, or images of the absolute and unconditioned, still less that our general terms are representatives of such ideas, and least of all that such abstract ideas have an independent existence. As a great philosopher has remarked, in speaking of the metaphorical meaning of general terms, our necessities have obliged us to depart from the natural order of our ideas; we have been obliged to attach ourselves to one furnished by the occasions and accidents to which we are liable, and this order gives us not the origin of our ideas, but the history of our discoveries.\* To adopt the words of the same philosopher, there are two different kinds of ideas,—the real and the nominal. The nominal idea of a thing is but its definition; and thus a simple idea is only real, for it cannot have a definition, that is, a new, simple idea cannot be raised in the mind by means of words. The nominal idea, or essence of a thing, is simply that quality or attribute which we remark in it, as the point of similarity between it and the other individuals which we class with it, and which is therefore the cause of its name. This definition, like all classification or naming, is of course, to a certain extent, arbitrary; for, as Dugald Stuart observes,† it does not necessarily follow that this quality is

\* Leibnitz. *Nouveaux Essais sur l'Etendement Humain*, p. 324.

† Elements, p. 130.

more essential to the existence of anything as an individual, than various other qualities which we are accustomed to regard as accidental. The real definition enables us to see the possibility of the thing defined, and it is this definition alone that can be made the basis of science, for which the nominal definition is not sufficient, unless it can be shown by experiment that the thing defined is possible, in which case the definition becomes real. There is, perhaps, no such thing in the world as a perfect circle, but the definition of the circle enables us to see the possibility of the thing, and therefore the definition is allowed to rank among the first principles of the science of Geometry. The essence of a thing is but the possibility of it, and therefore does not depend upon ourselves; the merely nominal definition is arbitrary, and though there is but one essence, there may be several nominal definitions of the same thing, while the real definition must be justified by the reason, which shows that it is possible, or by experience, which shows that it actually is, and is therefore possible.\*

"The doctrines of the realists in the middle ages seem to have suggested a misconception of the philosophy of Plato, which has prevailed to the present time.† It has been all along supposed that Plato was a realist in the strictest sense of the word, that he believed in the independent existence of universal ideas, that he had a great passion for the marvellous and mysterious, and so forth. We believe nothing of the kind. Plato may have been a bad citizen—in his heart a traitor to his country, and an enemy to her institutions, but he was not a mystical dreamer, or a wild enthusiast; he was the very greatest of all true philosophers, because he was the first; he was a sober, clear-headed thinker, and not the less so because he had the most brilliant fancy—a mind teeming with the most poetical imagery that ever gilded the page of abstract speculation. The business of philosophy is to undress the objects of sense; to take the thought away from the particular, and turn it to the general. In the beginning of real philosophy, this was the great thing to be done. The first philosophers, so called, were materialists and ultra-materialists, and therefore it was Plato's object, as a true philosopher, to establish at least the position that truth and science cannot be found in the individuals, but must be sought after by general reasoning; that we must take general terms, the names of classes and not of individual things, if we would arrive at any valuable conclusions. If he had written as Dugald Stuart might have written, on the same theme in the nineteenth century, after the world had enjoyed, for many hundred years, the lights of philosophy,

\* Leibnitz, (*Ubi supra*, p. 252, fol.)

† It is perhaps right to make an exception to a certain extent in favour of Bishop Berkeley. (See *Siris*, § 338.)

science, literature, and a true, spiritual religion, he would have had no occasion to use allegories about chariots and winged horses, and ideas dwelling in the world of intelligencies, and metempsychosis,\* and so forth. But living as he did, in an idolatrous country, where every association was opposed to abstraction, and the human soul made an image worship of its every thought, where there was no literature except poetry and annals, and these too read by few, he was obliged to set up idols against idols, to make the imagination, which had created all the elements of Greek polytheism, its own iconoclast in favour of a rival worship; and so he spoke of ideas as things real, objective and independent, dwelling with God in the heaven of heavens, and making other things what they are by participation. Nevertheless, no one knew better than he did that this was but philosophy speaking in parables; as will appear from the consideration of a very few facts.

Plato bases his whole system on dialectic or logic, the art of general reasoning. He knew that there could be no general reasoning leading to philosophy, or general principles, without real definitions. Now, the definition necessarily includes two things, generalization and division, or, in the words of modern logicians, it is made either *per genus* or *per differentiam*. The former process is the base of the second; the second is the development of the former. Accordingly, dialectic, and therefore philosophy, depend upon generalization; and Plato's theory of ideas, as it is called, is merely the assertion of the principle, that in order to general reasoning we must generalize and classify, *κατὰ γένος διακρίνειν* and *κατ' εἶδη σκοπεῖν*, which he explains very clearly in the *Phædrus* (294 B): *δεῖ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ξυρίεναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰδὼν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ ξυναιρούμενον*,—and this, we presume, is now generally admitted. It is strange that this should have escaped the notice of so many writers on the history of philosophy; one would have thought that the connexion between him and the Pythagoreans, who made the same use of numbers,—the first abstract terms in language, which he did of his ideas, would have taught them that Plato's object was only to bring forward the principles of science or general truth, to draw the first outlines of a system of logic or general reasoning, by laying down the rules of classification and generalization. His pupil, Aristotle, who has grievously misrepresented his meaning, did but fill up his scheme; and it may be shown from the words of both, that, in talking of genera and species, categories and universals, they meant only general terms, the necessary instruments of reasoning, the main part of the definition real, which is perpetual because it speaks only of the possible.†

\* The allegory in the *Phædrus* is borrowed entirely from the circumstance, that, in the Attic dialect, words referring to the use of wings, are employed to signify the emotions of the mind."

† Leibnitz. *U. S.* p. 354 : *les Essences sont perpetuelles parcequ'il ne s'y agit que du possible.*



We need not search long in Plato's works without finding indubitable proofs of his nominalism, expressed in the most direct terms.\* For instance, in the *Republic* (x. p. 596. A.) he begins an investigation by the generic name (*ὄνομα*) as a representative of the genus (*εἶδος ἰδέα* which are in this passage used as identical words,) and states that this is the usual method. . . . And in the *Laws* (x. p. 895-6,) he gives in plain words the distinction, which we have given above, between the name and the definition, the former being a *prima facie*, the latter a scientific classification, the former a nominal, the latter a real description. . . . Plato, although no philosopher, had convinced himself of the fact which philosophy has made certain to us, that although the structure of language is a counterpart of the organization of the mind, the individual words are only arbitrary signs, and therefore do not contain the truth of things. But the great talkers, by whom he was surrounded, and whose writings constituted the intellectual food of Athens, had arrived at the extremest point of ultra-nominalism, and had asserted that truth was to be found, not only in the fleeting phenomena of the visible world, but even in the individual words of a particular language. Plato is not to be charged with realism, because he opposed this abuse of nominalism, any more than a man is to be considered an infidel who is opposed to the excess of religious zeal. But he has been called so, because, as Aristotle says, those who are in the one extreme of wrong, class in the opposite extreme of wrong all who hold to the golden mean of right.

\* Mr. Dyer, in a paper on *the noun, or name, as an instrument of reasoning*, read before the Philological Society, 14th Jan. 1848, (*Proceedings*, vol. iii. No. 65,) has combatted this view of Plato's philosophy. He maintains that nominalism would have been totally inconsistent with Plato's particular tenets; that he was in fact a realist. But he admits that Plato's "realism did not prevent him from making use of general terms for logical purposes, precisely in the same way as the most thorough nominalist." He tells us too, that "the germ of Plato's philosophy lies in the well known passage of the *Phædrus* (245. D. sqq.) in which the soul is likened to a yoke of winged horses;" and he maintains that "fanciful as this sketch may appear, it in reality contains the leading principles of the Platonic philosophy, such as we find them worked out in a more serious manner in the later dialogues." The question, therefore, between Dr. Dyer and ourselves, lies within a very narrow compass. He admits that Socrates was a nominalist, and that Plato adopted the dialectic method of his master in a thoroughly nominalistic manner. Accordingly, it only remains that we should decide whether his idealism was a fanciful play with words and metaphors, which might be perfectly consistent with the merest nominalism; or whether a clear-headed man, who understood the meaning of a general predication in language, was so besotted in his word-worship, that he was obliged to give an external and objective existence to the significance of every verbal abstraction. In spite of the vagueness of his poetical phraseology, it is sufficiently clear from the passages quoted in the text, that Plato regarded the general term or name as the only result of abstraction.—[Plato's formula for the universal, is *ἐν καὶ πολλὰ* 'the one and the many,' i. e., the subject, of which many predicates may be asserted, and which, therefore, appear as manifold.]"

"The work in which Plato directly opposed the philosophical application of this ultra-nominalism, the *Cratylus*, was, till very lately, altogether misunderstood; we shall therefore give some account of it, and of the modern work which stands in prominent opposition to it, the *Diversions of Purley*, by John Horne Tooke, as well on account of the contrast between them, and our decided opposition to the latter, as because the serious truths for the first time announced in the *Cratylus*, its connexion with the rest of Plato's system, and consequently with that philosophy which is the beginning of human knowledge, have induced us to borrow from it the title of this book."

Our limits oblige us to abstain from quoting Dr. Donaldson's account of the *Cratylus*; after which he thus proceeds :

"The celebrated work of Horne Tooke presents, in many ways, a striking resemblance to the sophistical philosophy, against which the *Cratylus* was written. It was suggested more immediately by some legal quibbles, originating in the author's trial for high treason, just as the sophistical play upon words seems to have been recommended as a part of the juggling rhetoric, with which the Athenian pleaders threw dust into the eyes of the discasts; and as *Cratylus* was a partizan of the materialism of Heracleitus and Protagoras, so Horne Tooke professedly adopts the sensualism of Locke. In his philological method too, he nearly resembles these old etymologers; he endeavours to establish his views by an examination of his mother-tongue, chiefly, if not entirely, unaided by a comparison of other languages. Of his fundamental error, with regard to the parts of speech, we have spoken in another place. His object is to establish nominalism in its lowest and worst form, as an instrument in the hands of materialism; he endeavours to show that, in the English language at least, all words, however abstract or general their present use may be, are ultimately traceable to a meaning derived from sensible impressions, and from this he concludes that these words must still be understood, not in their present metaphorical, but in their primitive, literal sense, and consequently, that as words are the signs of ideas, and all words refer only to sensations, we have no knowledge but through our sensations. But, Sir James Mackintosh somewhere asks, would it be just to conclude that, because all words seem to represent, originally, *visible* objects, there are neither impressions of touch, smell, sound, nor taste in the human mind? This author, however, has no deductions more unwarrantable in logic, or more truly conceived in the spirit of the old sophists, than those in which he attempts, by twisting and materializing the meaning of some of our most abstract terms, to subvert the

principles of our inner subjective morality. For instance, when he says that "*truth* is nothing but what every man *troweth* ; that there is no such thing as eternal, immutable, everlasting *truth*, unless mankind, *such as they are at present*, be also eternal, immutable and everlasting ; that two persons may contradict each other, and yet both speak *truth*, for the *truth* of one person may be opposite to the *truth* of another"—what is this but to re-assert the old dogma of Protagoras, that the individual man is the standard of all truth ? What is it but to leave us to the dreary conclusion, which the follower of the Sophists must needs be contented with, that he has no community either with men or God, but remains, like another Prometheus, bound to the isolated and comfortless rock of his own personal consciousness, with all his social longings and irresistible first convictions preying like a vulture on his soul ?

"The *Diversions of Purley* still maintains its ground, censured by few, and admired by many. To oppose the extravagant nominalism and false philosophy of that work, and others of a similar stamp, and to find the mean between an excess of philosophical speculation, and the superstitious realism which shrinks from all contact with philosophy,—this is the more general object of the following pages. We bring forward against vulgar materialism, a truer and more congenial philosophy ; we oppose to a narrow induction drawn from a mixed, wavering, and still spoken language, the carefully collected results of the labours of three generations of scholars, applied to a language copious, fixed, and comparatively pure, aided by the lights of comparative grammar, of a new era of the history of philosophy ; in a word, we oppose to chimerical conjectures, the results of a science founded on facts. On the other hand, our careful dissection of the whole body of inflected speech, will make it plain that, while words are merely outward symbols, designating certain notions of the mind, those notions do not stand related, in all cases, just as the words or inflections which express them, and that we cannot, by means of mere words, convert into physical truth, all that is logically and physically true. It is time that some attempt should be made to show, that the philosophy of language refuses its ministering aid, both to gross materialism and the superstitious fancy, and that it stands forth as the chief confirmation of those systems, by which human reason contributes to the support of religion and morality. The word is destined to teach ; let it cease to be the instrument of deception."

Having thus, from the origin of language, through its philosophical structure, reached the analysis of its elements as presented in words, we will further commit their distribution to Dr. Donaldson. He says:\*

\* New Cratylus, p. 198, *et seq.*

"The distribution of words into the parts of speech, as they are called, has been a fruitful source of error to those philosophers who have failed to observe that there are two distinct methods, according to which this distribution may be effected, the one syntactical, and the other etymological; of which the former considers words only according to their distinction, as parts of a logical proposition, while the latter analyzes the words themselves, and sets forth the primary elements from which the different kinds of words have sprung. There is a third method based on the former of the two, which we have just mentioned; but as its object is merely to facilitate the acquirement of particular languages, and as it differs with those languages, it has never been thought worthy of discussion in formal treatises. . . . .

"The syntactical division of the parts of speech, may be traced to the first beginnings of dialectic or logic, in other words, to Plato. The formation of a system of logic is, in fact, simply a discovery of the principles of syntax, or of the formation of sentences; for, as far as the reasoning faculty is concerned, logic is nothing but the nomenclature and method of the process which every man carries on in his discourse. Logic is conversant with the truth or falsehood of propositions, and not with single words. . . . . The first step, therefore, in logical analysis, is the division of a sentence or proposition into its fundamental parts. These fundamental parts we call the subject, copula and predicate; in other words, the proposition must contain either a nominative case + verb-substantive + some predicate, or a nominative case + (verb = verb-substantive + some predicate.) Thus, "I run," is equivalent to "I am running." The Greek, however, does not make much use of the copula, the article being considered sufficient to distinguish the subject from the predicate: thus, *ὁ ἵππος λευκός* is fully equivalent to *ὁ ἵππος ἐστὶ λευκός*. In by far the greater number of cases, the Greek word contains both copula and predicate. Accordingly it was natural enough that in analyzing the sentence into its primary elements, Plato would consider these as consisting simply of the noun (*ὄνομα*) and the verb (*ῥῆμα*) . . . . Plato included in the word *ῥῆμα*, all that could be called a predicate, as distinguished from the subject, namely, the verb and the adjective; for he could not have overlooked the obvious fact, that in the Greek language a verb may alone constitute a whole sentence: thus *τρέχει* means he is running."

After continuing his analysis of the syntactical distribution of the sentence, Dr. Donaldson proceeds:

"We have stated thus minutely the origin of the syntactical parts of speech, because it has not been pointed out before, so far as we know, and in order that our readers may more easily detect



the fallacy by which Horne Tooke has, perhaps designedly, built up his whole system of etymology on this syntactical distribution of language. The resolution of the sentence into subjects and predicates, or, what generally comes to the same thing in Greek, into the noun and verb, was undoubtedly of great importance when it was first effected: it was the beginning of a syntactical analysis of language, when etymology, or the doctrine of the matter and form of language, was not and could not be in existence. But to make this arrangement the basis of etymology, and to derive the elements of the word from the elements of the sentence, is a mode of proceeding which can only lead to error and confusion. What then shall we say of a modern philosopher, who not only reproduces this logical division of the parts of speech, applying, however, to the words *ὄνομα* and *ῥῆμα* the limited signification of noun and verb, which they had only as a part of *λέξις* in the method of Aristotle, but has even made this division the basis of a system of etymology, virtually supposing that language was formed according to that system of logic, which only the mighty genius of Plato and the unfailing subtlety of Aristotle succeeded in extracting from the clearest and most syntactical language ever spoken by man? And this is just what Horne Tooke has done. His system of ultra-nominalism rests upon the hypothesis, which his contemporaries incautiously allowed, that the two primary sorts of words, from which all others are derived, were the nouns and the verbs. "In English and in all languages," he says, "there are only *two* sorts of words which are *necessary* for the communication of our thoughts; and they are (1) noun, and (2) verb. In the strict sense of the term, no doubt both the necessary words and the abbreviations, are all of them parts of speech; because they are all useful in language, and each has a different manner of signification. But I think it of great consequence both to knowledge and to language, to keep the words employed for the different purposes of speech as distinct as possible. And therefore I am inclined to allow that rank only to the necessary words: and to include all the others (which are not *necessary* to speech, but merely substitutes of the first root) under the title of *abbreviations*." Proceeding from this assumption, he has not hesitated to derive all the indeclinable words, whether conjunction, prepositions, or adverbs, from nouns or verbs, and thus contrived to disguise the few remains of etymological structures in our language.\* As the best answer to an erroneous system is a plain statement of the antagonistic truths, and as this is the final object of the present work in reference to the English representative of the Heracleitean school, we will simply

\* It is right to mention, that most writers on philology before comparative grammar was brought to its present state of perfection, fell into the same error of taking a logical view of etymology, but we select Horne Tooke as an object of animadversion, because his book is designedly wrong, and actually pernicious.

offer our shield to those who dread the power of the *ἔπεα πτερόεντα* ;\* and will here take our leave of this celebrated piece of sophistry, with the remark, that although it contains some very happy explanations of English words, and some very ingenious argumentations, written in a lively and attractive style, it should never be opened by any one who has not sufficient philological knowledge to guard him from the errors into which he will inevitably lead the ignorant and unwary.

“The logical or syntactical distribution of words was, as we have already stated, made the basis of that division of the parts of speech which has been adopted for practical convenience in learning particular languages, according to which it varies.

“In the case of the Greek language, the usual arrangement is as follows :

1. Noun,    { Substantive.  
              { Adjective.
2. Pronoun, including the Article.
3. Verb, with which is connected
4. Participle.
- These are all capable of inflection.
5. Adverb.
6. Preposition.
7. Conjunction.
8. Interjection.

These are not inflected, and are generally called particles.

The old grammarians adopted this arrangement, with the exception, that they classed the interjection with the adverb, and made the article a distinct part of speech. For the purpose of learning a language, the syntax of which is logical and for the most part well understood, this arrangement is highly convenient, and from its constant adoption, the ear has become so familiar with it, that its nomenclature can hardly be banished even from etymology, with which it has no concern. We, therefore, retain the names of these eight parts of speech, though, to avoid confusion, we render them subordinate to the real etymological division of words, which we have already mentioned, and which we now more formally set forth.

“In the Indo-Germanic languages, all words may be comprised in two general classes ; the PRONOUNS, or those words which indi-

\* There can be little doubt that in taking this title for his book, Horne Tooke merely meant to imply that the wings of Mercury, or our haste in expressing our meaning, occasioned those abbreviations to which he traces all the corruptions of language—consequently, by *ἔπεα πτερόεντα* he understands merely “hurried or hastily uttered words.” It is, however, worth while to remark that here, as elsewhere, he is in error ; for the metaphor in the epithet *πτερόεντα* is borrowed from the *winged arrows*, to which words are so often compared in ancient writers ; and, in spite of the joke, it may be truly said, that he has robbed the phrase of its *point*.

cate *space* or *position*; and the WORDS CONTAINING ROOTS, which express the positional relations of general attributes. The former are words, declinable or indeclinable as the case may be, without any admixture with the other element of language. The latter require the addition of at least one pronominal suffix to make them words. It is for this reason that we term the PRONOUNS or positional words, the *organizing, constituent, or formative* element of inflected language, and the ROOTS the *material* element. By pronominal additions of a perfectly analogous nature, the same root becomes either a NOUN or a VERB, that is, it expresses either a thing, or an acting, or result of acting. The only etymological difference between the noun and the verb, is this—that the pronominal suffixes, which mark the inflections of the noun, are fixed or adverbial, while those which mark the persons of the verb are themselves capable of inflection. When they lose this independent power of inflection, they become intermediate affixes, and the crude verb is then capable of receiving a set of case-inflections, so that it becomes a noun. This sort of noun is called a *participle*. We cannot, therefore, consider the noun and verb as, etymologically, different parts of speech, but, on account of their prominent importance in the syntactical scheme, we have in the following pages classed them under separate heads; which arrangement is further justified by the fact, that in the case of the verb the idea of space has developed itself into the idea of time. That the formative element of language is prior to the material, appears from what we have just mentioned,—that the pronoun is a word without extrinsic addition; but the noun or verb are such only by the addition of pronominal elements. It also appears from psychological considerations. Every thing is conceived as happening in space or time, the idea of space being, however, antecedent to, and the parent of, that of time. The first conception about anything, is that it has a position, that it is somewhere without us, and, as it is our conceptions that we express in words, the first words must be those which indicate position, that is, pronouns. The next conception with regard to the particular object, is of some particular quality with which sensation has invested it, and this quality of course gives it a name according to a root of *prima facie* classification. But still it is *somewhere*, and therefore the pronoun is tacked on to the end of it, in order to constitute it a word: the same would be the case, though in a more obvious manner, when the thing conceived was not a quality but an action.

“That in the Greek language in particular, all words may be resolved into and decided from these elements, will be abundantly shown in the following pages. As we use the word pronoun or pronomial in a sense somewhat wider than that which it generally bears, it will be as well to give comparative tables of the etymological and ordinary arrangements of the parts of speech.

*Etymological.**Syntactical.*

Formative element or pronoun.		{	Preposition.	
		{	Conjunction.	
		{	Numeral.	
Material element combined	{	Noun,	Adjective,	}
with pronoun.			Substantive.	
	{	Verb,	Participle.	}
			Verb.	

"The interjection is either an unmeaning cry, a residuary pronoun, or the vocative case of a noun: the adverbs are generally pronominal words, but some of them are merely cases of nouns. The numerals are adjectives in syntax, though etymologically pronouns."

We see no reason for ever regarding the interjection as "an unmeaning cry;" that it is sometimes a residuary pronoun or the vocative case of a noun, is certain; but it is also sometimes the seed of words, (as Coleridge called it,) and so far belongs to the material element or roots of language.

To pursue now our analysis still further into the *pho-netic* elements of words themselves, we will recur to Dr. Lieber's paper, in order to present his views upon this subject. He says (p. 13):

"We may classify the verbal elements of all phonetic language in the following manner:

"Interjections, that is, primary phonetic symphenomena of the inner state of man. . . .

"As the second class may be mentioned positive imitations, or copies of sound—the onomatopy of grammarians. Man resorts to it at the earliest periods, partly led to it by the inherent imitative principle; partly because sound, wherever it is produced at all, is the most distinctive characteristic, and because the readiest sign for the being that utters it, inasmuch as the ear perceives a sound, and nothing more; while the eye perceives at once an object in all its visual relations, as an image which must be analyzed in order to be described. The eye perceives totalities, the ear single characteristics. It is incomparably easier to designate a sheep or a cataract by imitating the bleating of the one or the rumbling noise of the other, than to describe them by words already existing, or by drawing outlines of these objects.....

"Two other classes of words are at once formed from the two preceding ones. Interjections themselves are used at an early period as words, (as I have heard children say, 'this is fie,' for this is naughty;) but what is more important, interjections soon form the roots of other words. Thus the feeling of wonder seeks vent from



every human breast in the symphenomenal sound of *o*, or one between *o* and *a*, (the latter as in *father*.) The ideas of adiration and wonder again, and more of height, tallness, power, are closely connected in the human intellect; so that we find in original languages, words designating height, elevation, derived from this interjection, as the German *Hoch*, for high, which is nothing but the interjection *o*, wrapt, as it were, in strong aspirates. Every where men cast shame upon others, by an interjection sounding *Aih*; and *αἰδώς* means, in Greek, actions of which we ought to be ashamed; and *Aetchen*, in German, means to call *aih* at a person, or strongly to deride him. Disgust mingled with contempt, is expressed by all men by a symphenomenon, which consists of a sharp exhalation of the sound *f*, which is the combined effect of the lower lip being somewhat protruded, while the upper one is contemptuously drawn up, and the breath is strongly uttered—all, the effects of the prevailing feeling of disgust. This *f* sound leads to the universal interjection of *jie*, *pfui*, *fi*, or *φεῦ*—the vowel, the most liquid element of speech, changing in the different languages, as it would with different individuals, before usage has settled one vowel as the adopted one. This *fi*, or *ji* (in French,) is the root of the word *Fien*, to hate, in low German and ancient Franconian, and of *Fian* in Anglo-Saxon; whence again the noun *Fiend*, in English, is derived, as likewise *Fijend* in low German, *Fiend* in German, *Fient* in Swedish, *Fiant* in ancient Franconian, and *Nejant* in Dutch, for hateful enemy, a malignant being. The Greek *φεῦ* indicates more an interjection of pain; but that which is the utterance of pain becomes that of dislike if exclaimed *at* an object. The two ideas are near akin. We have, therefore, *φεῦζω* to indulge in sounds of woe, or to call *φεῦ*; and is not *φεύγω*, (from that which makes us exclaim *φεῦ*, that is, from that which is painful, disagreeable to us,) derived from the same root? [?] *Ototoi* was the Greek articulated exclamation of grief, and *οὔτίζω* is to moan, to give vent to grief.....

“A member of my own family showed, in early infancy, a peculiar tendency to form new words, partly from sounds which the child caught.....partly from symphenomenal emissions of sounds. Thus when the boy was little above a year old, he had made and established in the nursery, the word *nim*, for every thing fit to eat. I had watched the growth of this word. First he expressed his satisfaction at seeing his meal, when hungry, by the natural humming sound, which all of us are apt to produce when approving or pleased with things of a common character, and which we might express thus, *hm*. Gradually, as his organs of speech became more skilful, and repetition made the sound more familiar and clearer, it changed into the more articulate *um* and *im*. Finally *N* was placed before it, *nim* being much easier to pronounce than *im*, when the mouth has been closed. But soon the growing mind began to generalize, and *nim* came to signify every thing

edible; so the boy would add the words *good* or *bad*, which he had learned in the meantime. He now would say *good nim*, *bad nim*, his nurse adopting the word with him. On one occasion he said, *Fie nim*, for *bad*, *repulsive to eat*. There is no doubt but that a verb *to nim*, for to eat, would have developed itself, had not the ripening mind adopted the vernacular language, which was offered to it ready made. We have, then, here the origin and history of a word which commenced in a symphenomenal sound, and gradually became articulate in sound and general in its meaning as the organs of speech, as well as the mind of the utterer became more perfect. And is not the history of this word a representative of many thousands in every language, now settled and acknowledged as a legitimate tongue?

"We meet with articulated sounds which are yet in a middle state between a pure interjection and a distinct word.....The French, when they desire to imitate the sound of the drum, say *rattoplan*, for which we say, *rub-a-dub*, and the Germans have *brumberum*. They are imitative sounds, articulated, yet in an undefined state, so far as grammatical classification is concerned, while *drum* has become a distinct noun. It may be observed in passing, that this latter instance shows, in a striking manner, how different tribes view or perceive the same phonetic phenomenon (hear the sound of the drum) differently according to the different genius of the nation; yet all may be equally correct in their own way.

"Out of the second class, or purely imitative words, arises another very large one. It consists of those words which, so far as their sound goes, are derived from onomatopies, but have come to something which is only occasionally accompanied by the originally imitated sound, or is not so any longer at all. Such, for instance, is the English word *grumbling*, which originally indicated the physical sound of grumbling, but now frequently means the mental act of petty dissatisfaction. A man may grumble in a clear voice. To the same class belong the French *gronder*, the German *krazen*, (to scratch, and pronounced *krat sen*,) the Greek *χράω*, from which is derived *γράφειν*, to grave, to engrave, and ultimately to write, as if we used *scratching* for writing; and by a further extension of the meaning, for composing, corresponding and other significations, which the expansive word writing has received in the course of time. The German word *schmecken*, (of the same root with the English to smack,) which now means to taste, both as an active and a neuter verb, is here in point. It is derived from the sound which is produced by a person eagerly tasting some substance—an action expressed by the French *claquer*, and the English *smacking*; the latter of which also signifies to savour of something. For, the active and the passive, the cause and the effect, the state of a thing and the action resulting from it, the perceiving and the causing of the perception, are ideas constantly passing over into one another in the

human mind, and produce corresponding results in language. But the German word extends its meaning much further, for *geschmick* is the term for taste, in all its meanings, as if the English *smacking* were used for the sense of taste, and the cultivated æsthetical perception and judgment, or as if the French used *claquement* for their word *gout*, in the fine arts, though the very word *gout* and *gouter*, are derived from the latin word *gustus*, which, with its guttural sound, belongs likewise to the present class. It was, originally, an imitation of the sound produced by the act of swallowing, or the reversed sound of *gulping* (also a word to be mentioned here.) The German *plump*, now meaning clumsy, was suggested by the sound which the fall of a heavy and metallic body produces. The Greek *pneuma*, meaning mind, but originally breath, is derived from the sound of breathing forth. The Chinese word *gong*, means the instrument which produces the sound *gong*. The English *sly*, means cunning, but is derived from the root of the word sliding, which, like the German *schlupfen*, is an imitation of the sound made by nimble bodies moving quickly, on smooth surfaces. To clip, now meaning to cut off the tender ends of bodies, is derived from the noise made by the act of clipping. So is the English word to nip, derived from a sound. In German, *nippen* means to sip; both are, originally, of phonetic imitation.

“The following is one of the most striking and interesting instances of words belonging to this class.

“The Latin *vivere*, and the Greek *βίειν*, are of the same root with the Gothic *quivan*, which, etymologically, is the same with our *weave*, that is, to move to and fro, as the German *weben* actually means to weave, and to move as a living body or entity—a sense which *move* has in the great passage of the Bible: In Him we live, and move, and have our being. The German is, “*In ihn beben und weben wir.*” Of the Gothic *quivan*, was formed our *quick*, which means both living and rapid, for the ideas of life and motion are closely united, so much so, that we cannot imagine unalterable sameness, without the idea of death, or lifelessness; while *quivering* has the meaning of trembling motion. But this original root is probably the same which we find in *live*, the German *leben*; and these words originally mean to utter a loud noise, to cry. They are etymologically the same with the low German, *leuen*, the English to low. Hence the German *leu* and *lowe*, and the Latin *leo*, for lion, that is, the *roarer*. To low, is a clear imitation of the sound, while the idea of tone, or utterance, is as closely connected with that of life as the idea of motion. Indeed, wherever life surrounds us, we see motions and hear sounds—be it utterance or noise caused by motion. It is not maintained that men reflected on this close connection, but a noise, a cry, an utterance naturally suggested the idea of life, and the word or verbal sound indicating the one,

was necessarily taken for the other; as an anxious father, doubting the life of a new born infant, will exultingly exclaim, *It cries!* meaning it lives. The Hebrew *lev*, for heart, because it pulsates, moves, or *lives*, probably descends from the same root. It is not useless to remark here, that in common German parlance, the word *leben* (life) has to this day the meaning of uproar or noise. Many a German schoolmaster says, admonishingly to his pupils: 'Boys, do not make so much *life*,' when he suddenly breaks in among them in the midst of a youthful tumult. We have then, here again a word which is originally an imitation or a sound evoked by sound, but which gradually comes to designate various, very different and vast ideas.....

"Under the fifth class of words may be comprehended those which have never designated a sound, but whose sound, nevertheless, stands in a direct psychological connexion with the object to be designated, or the idea to be expressed—as much so as interjections do. There is, indeed, a close affinity between the two. The words of this class are of a symphenomenal origin, and, for this reason, are easily understood when first uttered; almost as much so as the mere cry of pain or joy is. These peculiar words always form a most enlivening and spirited part of human speech; I mean such as the English *flash*. Every one feels at once that there is an affinity between the sound *flash*, and the impression which sudden, vivid, and passing light produces upon our visual organ. The high sound, we might almost say the *brightness* of the sound *a*, as it is pronounced in this word; the impression which the sound *sh*, at the end of the word, produces in this case, reminding us of *splash*, and *dash*, the quickness expressed by the sound of *f*, associated as it is in our minds, with the words *fleet*, *flicker*, *flight*—all these contribute to make the word *flash*, one which accurately paints with sounds (I cannot otherwise express it) the flashing light. How close the affinity of impressions is, made by sound and light, and, indeed, by many other causes, appears from the fact that the same root has often produced in one language a word designating a phenomenon of sound, and in a cognate language a term for a phenomenon perceived by the eye. We have in English to titter, and in German *Zittern*, both derived from the same root. Every etymologist well knows that T, Z, and S, frequently pass over into one another. But the German word *Zittern*, means to tremble, while the English tittering, means to laugh in an under tone, with a tremulous voice. There is a close affinity between the two phenomena, which is indicated by the fact that the expression just used, of *tremulous* voice, is intelligible and legitimate.\*

\* This is not a confusion of ideas, as little as there was confusion in the mind of the blind man, who was asked how he imagined from all he had heard, red colour, when he answered: "Like a trumpet sound for the eye;" or as



"The Greek *lampas*, the German *bliz*, the Latin *clarus*, seem to me to belong to this class; so the English *whirl*, if it does not belong to those words which originally have actually indicated a sound, as the German *schwirren*, which is of the same root, but means a sound similar to the word itself, seems almost to prove. Most original words, designating phenomena of light, belong to this class. Properly speaking, the origin of these words must be referred to the first class—the primitive interjections.

"There ought to be mentioned in connexion with this class, those curious alliterations which have organized a very distinct meaning, and are, consequently, universally understood, but are derived from no ordinary words; or, if they are so, use is made of the original words for their exclusively phonetic impression upon the ear, rather than for the meaning conveyed by them; or lastly, the alliteration consists of syllables without any separate meaning of their own, added to existing words. Some of these alliterations are purely imitative, as the French *din-don*, *ping-pang*, the German *klip-klap*. Others have a symphenomenal connexion with the idea they express; in English, for instance, fiddle-faddle, rip-rap, slip-slop, hodge-podge, namby-pamby, tit for tat, higgledy-piggledy, and zig-zag. In others as indicated before, a symphenomenal sound is added to a word, as chit-chat, see-saw, tit-bit, clap-trap; the German, *misch-mash*, *schmick-schmack*, *holter-polter*; the French, *pele-mele*. Others, again, seem to remind us of an original word, or do really so, but have relapsed into a symphenomenal state, *painting*, as I said before, with sounds the idea within us, as the English *nilly-willy*, (in which the Latin *nolens volens*, and the English *will*, have curiously relapsed into a primitive symphenomenal state,) *flibberdy-gibberdy*, the American *teeter-tawter*, (the English *tiller-toller*,) *hurly-burly*, and a great many others. The American vulgar noun, *slang-wangher*, for a boisterous and arrogant fellow, talking loudly and rudely in private or public, belongs to this class.

"In the sixth class may be ranged those vulgar words which are

there is confusion in the poet's mind when he boldly transposes words which belong to one sensuous sphere to another; Dante speaks of a *silent sun*—that is, of a sun not shining. In this poetic temerity, lies often Shakspeare's greatest beauty and Milton's highest sublimity. If this transposition were not intelligible, human speech would hardly be possible; and if the mind did not perceive things and evolve thoughts in its oneness, they would not be intelligible. Expressions such as space of time, strong sound, cold or warm colouring, sweet voice, waving music, crying red, a clear tone, a dull sound, high minded, sharp taste, a flat fellow, an itching desire, and a thousand others, would convey no ideas. The whole meaning of the metaphor and the trope must be explained upon the same ground. There is but one sensorium where all sensations centre, no matter which sense may have been the channel of perception, and whence all the urgency to breathe out the word proceeds.....The expression proceeds entire from *one* indivisible mind, and radiates, as it were, into different spheres of perceptible objects of the world without.

formed by the addition of a syllable of symphenomenal character—syllables as have been mentioned in the preceding paragraph, to some existing word. The German has the word *bitten*, (to pray, i. e. of man, not of God, of this he forms the frequentative *betteln*, to beg, that is, repeatedly praying, in a small way, for a small gift. It seem to be obvious that the affix *ln*, has the same symphenomenal affinity to the ideas of diminutiveness and repetition that *flash* has to sudden, bright and passing light. The Italian affix *accio*, or *one*, the one expressing badness to contemptibleness, the other indicating amplification, seem to me of the same root. Whoever has heard an Italian using them with his expressive enunciation, will at once understand their peculiar import. The Greek desiderative syllable, *ετω*, is probably of a symphenomenal nature; so are all diminutives which are not originally independent, but now faded nouns. The intensive *S*, of the Teutonic languages, ought to be mentioned in this place.

“In the seventh class I would comprehend those words, which in the advanced state of the language, express a quality which is the cause of an effect that is accompanied by the sound which has suggested the word—a natural transposition or extension of the meaning. The following may serve as an example :

“*Mum* is the English interjection for silence. How has it arisen ? When we address erroneously a deaf-mute, as a person able to hear and speak, and he desires to make us understand that he cannot speak, he compresses his lips and breathes strongly against the palate (so decidedly does thought or feeling animate the organs of respiration, and so phonetic or sound-seeking is the nature of man.) This produces a humming sound—*um* or *mum*. The same is observed if children play the mute, or if the actor in the vaudeville wishes to impress others that he is mute, or ought to be silent. *Um* is the root of the word dumb; but the German *dumm* now means stupid, that is, the cause of silence; as we, also, say for dull person: ‘He has little to say for himself.’ In ancient German poetry we find the expression, *Die Alten und die Dummen*; literally, the old ones and the stupid, and really meaning the old ones and the young, because the young ones ought to be silent, or have nothing important to say. This agrees with the views of all early nations, who, on the one hand, always connect the idea of old with wisdom and authority, and on the other, that of youth with the want of these qualities. We have changed all this, and have ‘young men’s parties,’ ‘young England,’ ‘young France.’ But such was the view of those who made of the terms for old man, father, etc., the name of their highest offices—as *γερων*\* senator, papa, abbot.

\* The word *γερων* is in Homer an adjective, and an epithet for honour. Γε *ραπος* is formed by the common suffix *πος* from the word *γέρας*, “the privilege or peculiar gift of a person in authority,”—e. g. the first share of the booty, and

"As the eighth class of words, we may mention those which are derived from sounds which stand in an incidental, though natural, connexion with the objects which they designate, and which are not therefore of a strictly symphenomenal nature. The simplest of all vowel sounds is A, (pronounced as in Italian,) or *Ha*; for it is the mere breathing forth from a mouth opened before the breathing began. If the mouth is closed again before the breathing wholly ceases, the sound *Am* is heard; if the breathing begins before the lips are closed, we have the sound *Ma*; if the breathing precedes and succeeds the opening of the mouth, we have *Mam*. What wonder, then, that children articulate, at the earliest period, the sound *Am, Ma*? What wonder that this sound is uttered so soon as mere animal crying gives way to articulation, and that the only want felt by the infant, that of nourishment, urges it, according to the general organization of all human beings, to breathe forth its desire in the sound *Ma*? What wonder if this first articulate sound come to be attached to the being who furnishes the nourishment, or the breast which yields it? Has not even the bleating of the lamb the sound of *ma* or *maih* in it? Whenever this sound of the lamb is imitated, it is done by the prolonged and tremulous sound of *maih*. What wonder, lastly, if the sound *ma* or *am*, once having come to signify the being that gave birth, is surrounded, by her affectionate care, with all the dearest associations of love and holy disregard of self?

"In almost all languages the word for the female breast, the mother or the nurse, is derived from this sound. The Latin *mamma* and *mater*, the Greek *μαμμα*, the modern manna, the Hebrew *Emm*, the Persian and Hindoo *Ma* for breast, the Greek *μητηρ*, our mother, the German *Mutter* and *Amme*, (for nurse,) the Gaelic *mam*, the Swedish *manma*, the Albanian *mam*, the Wallachian *mama*, and innumerable others, are all in point. We meet with it again in the Polynesian languages, as the philological part of Captain Wilkes' Exploring Expedition shows.

"All other words are, probably, formed by composition, contraction, expansion, repeated transformation, and certain changes which

so forth—especially "the hereditary privileges and prerogatives of a king:" in which sense it was equivalent to *ἐπavos*. Hence Thucydides says of the old kings of Greece, (I. 13): *πρότερον δὲ ἦσαν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς γέραςι πατρικαὶ βασιλείαι*: accordingly, *γέρων*-s (*γέρων*) was a person holding such privileges and authority, and *γεροντία* or *γερονσία* was the name given to the ruling Senate at Sparta. The root of the word is *grî*—"to take" or "receive," one of common occurrence in all the languages of the Indo-Germanic family, and probably the same with *hri* (Sanskrit), *capere*: [compare Gothic *hreiban* *greifen*.] We do not believe that it is connected with *γῆρας*, "old age," which seem to be related to the Sanskrit root *jrî* (*jarâ*) "to wear away;" and the use of *γέρων*, *γεραιός*, as an apparent synonym for *γνραιός*, is to be explained from the connexion of the ideas of age and dignity in the Greek mind.—Donaldson. *New Crat.* p. 472. —[Reviewer.]

gradually come to designate a general or peculiar relationship subsisting between certain ideas, or between the forms of words themselves in a purely grammatical point of view, the whole being essentially affected by the peculiar formative spirit with which a tribe shapes its own tribes, whether, for instance, it is analytical, whether monosyllabic, as with the Chinese, or holophrastic, as with the American Indians. While these changes are going on with the formed words, their meaning alters according to the endless association of ideas, real or imagined affinities, the gradual expansion of the mind, the constant generalization and abstraction, or a retrogressive degeneracy, and many other causes, mental and physical. It will have been observed that I have spoken only of the origin of words, and of their phonetic formation. The meaning which they acquire constitutes a different subject, which demands attention to all the laws of psychology, of the gradual progress of civilization, to the laws of intellectual and philological degeneracy, (for this has its laws like all disintegration or corruption,) to the changes of history, and, in short, to all the altering conditions and relations which take place within, under, and around Man, individually and collectively, by tribes and nations, by concentration and tribal separation, by mixture, fusion, and by emigration—in politics, religion, the arts, and every advancement and debasement.

“In all inquiries into the origin of words and languages, we must remember this psychological fact of primary importance, that, in consequence of the force of the assimilation of ideas, the inquirer who sees a thing or institution in a defined and ordered state before him, is apt involuntarily to suppose a correspondingly definite and distinct origin from which it has sprung. Accordingly he seeks for this peculiar sort of origin, and is generally led into grave errors. When attention was first directed to the origin of governments, they existed already in a well defined state, and forthwith an origin corresponding in distinctness was sought for and imagined. People dreamed of governments voted into existence as laws are now made. Agriculture, when first it became a subject of reflection, presented itself as a complicated system, far too wise to be supposed to have been invented by man—and its *invention* was silently assumed. It was, therefore, ascribed to the gods, by the Chinese as well as by the Greeks. Even the *invention* of bread has been sought for in the inspiration of some benign deity. The origin of languages has naturally been exposed to the same error, and more so, perhaps, than any other subject.”

Our limits, which we have already, perhaps, unreasonably extended, absolutely forbid our following Dr. Lieber in his interesting and instructive application of his principles to the analysis of the vocal sounds of Laura Bridge-



man. We have observed, with some curiosity, his employment of the terms "definite idea" in connexion with the dog. Unacquainted as we are with his philosophical system, we can only remark that our own ideas of intellectual philosophy would prevent our use of the word "idea" in connexion with the operations of the understanding of brutes.

It is commonly, and frequently for the reader very profitably, the case, that in an article in a Review, an author is dismissed almost with his bare introduction in the rubric, and is therewith left by the Reviewer to fish for himself as to any mode of catching the reader's consideration or hearing; but as the authors of our rubric are of a character not to be so summarily dismissed, for the sake of the lucubrations of the Reviewer, we have suffered them to speak as largely for themselves as our limits would possibly permit, having endeavoured so to arrange our extracts that they may assume a certain systematic form as indicative of our own views; and we furthermore commend them, with whatever weight our Reviewer's prerogative can command, to the careful attention of our readers, assuring them, that however they may differ [as we ourselves do] from some of the opinions of the distinguished authors whom we have quoted, [Nordheimer's premature death is a serious loss to Philology,—Donaldson is one of the very first scientific philologists living.—our own Dr. Lieber is too well known to require a word from us,] our readers will be amply repaid for any attention they may bestow upon the works cited, by the profound learning, the critical acumen, and the fruitful thought, abundantly manifested in almost every page of the productions which we have now had the privilege of noticing.

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ART. VI.—KAVANAGH'S WOMAN IN FRANCE.

*Woman in France, during the Eighteenth Century*; by JULIA KAVANAGH, author of *Madeline, a Tale of Auvergne*, &c. Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard, 1850.

THE title of this work will insure a large number of readers. The history of *Woman in France*, is one which not only has interest for the philosophical mind, but it has numberless charms even for those who read only to grati-

fy a listless curiosity—and beyond all periods, that comprising the reign of Louis XV. addresses itself with most attraction to every class of readers.

We have no intention of discussing formally the mission of woman. We take it for granted that she is destined to be the companion of man, the mother, nurse, and primary instructress of his children—and her mission is most completely performed when she is man's companion in his higher character, and not the mere minister of his pleasures.

The influence of woman in society is diversified, and, as we think, developed rather by the race of which she forms a constituent, than by the operation of any external cause. In the two great races which formed the Hellenic Confederacy, the Ionians and the Dorians, woman appears to have been held in very different estimation. The Ionians regarded her as an inferior, the minister of the pleasures and conveniences of man, whereas the Dorians ever esteemed her as a companion and equal. In the various migrations which were made by the tribes of the former family, the men went alone, and sought their wives among the females of the country in which they proposed to effect a settlement. The Dorians, on the contrary, migrated with their wives, and their children, and their penates, and in creating new homes, ever sought to enrich them with all the associations connected with that which they had abandoned. The Ionian wife addressed her husband by the submissive title of Master, the Dorian husband saluted his wife by the respectful appellation of Mistress.

The Roman history contains a few romances in which woman plays a conspicuous part. We call them romances, not as questioning their truth, for we are ready to admit the substantial truth of every one of them, but because they belong to that class of stories which are selected to illustrate the romance of history. The women of Roman history are all heroines. Lucretia and Clelia perform each one heroic act, and the history of their lives is finished in one page. Virginia is but a passive victim in the hands of a heroic father. Even the celebrated Cornelia is but a heroine. The best illustration of female influence in Roman history is to be found in the daughter of the Patrician M. F. Ambustius, wife of the Plebian C. Licinius Stolo, the gratification of whose vanity induced the introduction of those celebrated Licinian rogations

which opened to the Plebians the road to all the honours of Rome. It is not in a spirit of irony that we call this the best illustration of female influence. In the brief history of the origin of this great revolution, Livy does not even give the names of the ladies. He says—

“M. Fabius Ambustus had two daughters, married, the elder to Servius Sulpicius, the younger to Caius Licinius Stolo, a Plebian. It happened that while the two sisters were amusing themselves in conversation at the house of Sulpicius, then military tribune, on Sulpicius' return home from the forum, one of his lictors, according to custom, rapped at the door with his rod. The younger, Fabia, who was a stranger to the custom, being frightened at this, was laughed at by her sister, who was surprised at her ignorance of the matter. That laugh, however, left a sting in the other's breast, as the merest trifle will often affect the female mind. The crowd also of attendants, and of people offering their service, made her think her sister happy in her marriage, and repine at her own; according to the generally prevailing foible, for it is certain that scarcely any can bear to be surpassed by those nearest their own level. While she was under great disquietude from this recent mortification, her father happened to see her and asked, ‘Is all well?’ and though she dissembled at first, the cause of her uneasiness, because it was neither very consistent with the affection of a sister, nor very honourable to her husband, he by tender inquiries brought her to confess, that her unhappiness arose from being united to an inferior, from being married into a house which neither dignities nor honours could enter. Ambustus, then, consoling his daughter, bid her keep up her spirits, for that she should shortly see in her own house the same honours which she saw at her sister's.”

From this trifling incident sprung the revolution which doubtless elevated Rome to the supremacy over the world, which possibly lay at the foundation of her subsequent fall. Here was no heroism, but merely female vanity. A man may be goaded by a heroic woman to the perpetration of a noble deed; but he who steadily pursues a great end in order to elevate the social position of his wife and children, gives the best proof that he is a good husband, and a pattern head of a family.

As we advance in the course of Roman history, we find woman appropriated to the uses for which she is employed in some of the corrupt societies of modern times. She is given in marriage to promote family influence. Thus Cæsar and Pompey unite their interests by means

of intermarriages—and in the most palmy days of the Empire, woman appears in history only to perform some act of heroism, generally of crime.

It is to be regretted that Rome never possessed a theatre. The stage presents an exaggerated, but still a true picture of the manners of the age. We know that in the age of Elizabeth the tone of morals in society was good, or Shakspeare could never have invested his characters, his females especially, with such virtuous attributes. We can witness in the latter dramatists the gradual degeneracy of the times, until we get down down to the unbridled licentiousness of the second Charles. And while we protest against the stage being considered a faithful mirror in which nature is reflected, we yet feel that some of its reflections are true, and with the aid of this mirror we can form a tolerably accurate conception of the truth.

Rome had no comic theatre. The plays of Plantus and of Terence are merely Greek comedies, not perhaps merely Greek translations, but adapted to a Latin taste. They possess no originality of invention, they make no attempt to portray the manners of the place or of the times. Like the modern French tragedy, the Roman theatre was an exotic ; it may have been highly esteemed by the Romans, but it has never taken possession of the great heart of humanity.

In the Greek theatre woman is often terrible, and heroic, often respectable. In the Latin theatre she rarely excites a deeper emotion than pity, and even when this is excited it is pity for suffering humanity, not grief for fallen greatness, nor sympathy with unmerited misfortune. We feel that woman as there portrayed can never be an ornament to society, and though we may lament her lot, we can not sympathize with her distress.

When the Roman Empire was in the full maturity of her glory, Tacitus wrote a description of the manners and customs of the Germans, who, then regarded as a collection of rude tribes of barbarians, were destined at no distant period to lay the basis of modern civilization by engrafting their own institutions on the firm foundation of Roman polity. There are many circumstances which led persons to suppose that Tacitus had no authentic materials for the composition of his work, but that it was a covert satire on the vices and corruptions of Roman society. But though the great Roman philosopher may



have desired to convey wholesome lessons to his countrymen through the medium of a race of barbarians, a more intimate acquaintance with the people in question proved that, in the main, Tacitus was correctly informed, and that his essay was a bona fide account of the manners of the Germans. In this people we see many of the characteristics of the Doric race, and first among them is the extraordinary reverence in which woman was esteemed.

It would take time, but would not be difficult, to show how the situation of woman varies, according to the race of which she forms a part;—how with one people she is a servant, with another the companion and friend of man. And this distinction has existed for ages, modified indeed by circumstances, but by none ever altogether changed. It has been so frequently and so dogmatically asserted that Christianity has emancipated woman, wherever it has travelled, that it would appear almost a paradox to doubt the assertion. That Christianity has improved the condition of woman as well as of man, is an undeniable fact, but it may be questioned whether it has materially changed the relations which exist between the sexes. There are certain intuitive notions of propriety which seem to belong to whole races of men—which the spirit of religion may modify, but can never entirely control. In the East polygamy prevails. How far Christianity has corrected this propensity, we know not, but as late as 1838, Mr. and Mrs. Hommaire found General Khersanof, son-in-law of the celebrated Cossack Hettman Platof, living near the Caspian Sea with two wives.

“It is said that the two wives live on the best possible terms with each other. The general seems quite at his ease with respect to them, and goes from the one to the other with the same marks of attention and affection. His first wife, the daughter of Platof, is very old, and might be taken for the mother of the second. We are assured that being greatly distressed at having no children, she had herself advised her husband to make a new choice. The general fixed on a very pretty young peasant working on his own property. In order to diminish the great disparity of rank between them, he married her to one of his officers, who, on coming out of church, received orders to depart instantly on a distant mission, from which he never returned. Some time afterwards the young woman was installed in the general's brilliant mansion, and presented to all his acquaintance as Madame Khersanof.”

In the East woman secludes herself; in the West she associates freely with man. Among the nations which still feel most powerfully the influence of old Roman civilization, woman has no position in society until she becomes a wife; the woman of Teutonic race becomes only one of the higher pillars of society after that change in her condition. The two races which formed the Greek Confederacy, are apt types of the states of modern Europe. The wife of Ionia was a woman of no authority, but an Ionian courtesan, operating on the minds of Pericles and other statesmen of Athens, wielded the destinies of that republic. We believe the history of Sparta is unspotted by any such violation of the moral law, though it bears testimony to the influence of Spartan wives and Spartan mothers. The destinies of France have been controlled by a Marianne de L'Orme, a Maintenon, a Chateauroux, a Pompadour, and by the prostitute Du Barry, but no British minister has ever dared to pay his court to a royal favourite.

We are fully alive to the strength of the objection, that as history is conversant with those actions only which influence the destinies of states and of peoples considered as communities, it would be unreasonable to expect that woman should make her appearance in it, in any other character than that of a heroine. And if we had absolutely nothing but bare histories to guide us, we would confess that it would be unfair to judge of the character and position of woman by the figure which she is there made to exhibit. But we fortunately possess other data which serve to illustrate history. In the palmy days of Augustus, Virgil's hero is celebrated for his piety. He bears on his shoulder his father Anchises, takes his son by his hand, and escapes from the flames of Troy. The saving of his father is his claim to piety. But Æneas had a wife, a truthful, loving wife,—what becomes of her? She is permitted to walk after her husband; in the confusion of the burning city she loses them, and she perishes in the flames. If Æneas is to be received as the ideal of a Roman hero, what are we to judge of ordinary Roman men? If a like calamity should befall men of our race we might indeed undergo a fearful struggle between a wife and a child, but can a man of Teutonic blood hesitate between a wife and a father? How supreme, too, the selfishness of that uninteresting old man, who could accept the piety of his son, and permit her whom his son had

chosen for his companion, his wife, the mother of his children, to be exposed to the danger of destruction. Contemplate the disgusting picture.—The old man on his son's back, urging him to fly—the boy Ascanius clinging to his father's arm, and poor Creüsa toiling behind. We have no sympathy with the tears which Æneas shed at the memory of her fate. They are hypocritical. Had he felt for her the tenderness of a husband, those tears would never have been shed; he would have saved her, or shared her fate.

But our readers may well ask, what has all this to do with woman in France? Much. The influence of woman in that country during the last century was great, and we believe it to have been exercised for evil. Whenever man ceases to exercise a wholesome influence in society, woman usurps his place, and renders bad worse. As a helpmeet for man, woman's influence is powerful for good; but her power is felt, not seen. The child feels it in the reverence which he is taught to bear towards his superiors; the man feels it in the honest devotion with which he clings to the chosen partner of his bosom; the woman herself feels it, in that silent but omnipotent public opinion which compels even those whose characters are not the most elevated, to contribute to the development of that opinion which controls their own conduct.

Now who were the women that gave the tone to society in the early part of the last century? Foremost in the catalogue stands the fascinating Madame de Tencin, sister of the Cardinal. A voluptuous nun, she violated the vows of charity. The son to whom she gave birth, exposed to the tender mercies of an inclement Parisian night, found shelter in the humble lodging of a cobbler, lived to become eminent, and rejected the mother who had rejected him. The base-born d'Alembert refused all overtures on the part of his mother for mutual acknowledgment.

It would be an interesting speculation could we follow the social history of Paris, and ascertain the causes which led to the utter prostration of man's influence and the consequent elevation of woman in that capital. If Richelieu did not commence it, he certainly gave the system organization, and apparent end. Louis XIV. was no bad successor to the illustrious Cardinal. He contributed by every means which his position gave him, to wrest from the noblesse of France that haughty spirit of self depend-

ence which militates so fearfully against arbitrary power. As soon as gentlemen began to look upon their offices at court as sources of distinction,—as soon as they began to regard as favours their places about the king, which they should have been taught to claim as their right, their degradation was completed. No woman can truly love, honour, and obey the man, who hails another as his lord and master. A large class of politicians in this country celebrate Richelieu as the mighty spirit who broke down the aristocracy of France. It is, however, questionable whether an aristocracy is not a desirable element in some stages of society. If the destruction of the aristocracy had been followed by the establishment of a pure democracy, the case would have been very different, as in that event each man would have been placed in a position to contend with every other man, and the collision of independent minds would have perhaps even elevated the moral influence of public opinion. But this was not the case in France. The power wrested from the nobles reverted directly to the king. Louis XIV. did not hesitate to declare that he the king was the state. Men now stood before an absolute master, and nothing stood between the people and all the odious consequences of pure absolutism, but the enlightened spirit of the age. The king was not a Czar, not because he was under legal or constitutional restraint, but because he lived under a different social system.

The commencement of the eighteenth century witnessed the declining years of Louis XIV. The haughty monarch had fallen into the arms of the widow of Scarron, who possessed influence enough over him to induce him to celebrate the marriage ceremony. If Madame de Maintenon's conscience could be quieted by this specious ceremony, the good sense of the people still revolted at it. But it is easy to excuse the sins of the great, and justify their absurdities. We have heard men in our own times defend the mock marriage of Mrs. Fitz Herbert.

To Madame de Maintenon, however, this much may and must be said. If she descended from her moral elevation as the widow of Scarron to become the Morgantic wife of Louis XIV., she was at all events a rigid stickler for the *bien seances* of society. She never showed any disinclination or disregard at any sin which bore the impress of gentility or of nobility, but she had a perfect detestation



of low and vulgar profligacy. The court was never so decent as during her reign. Nay, in some respects, the court was hardly ever so respectable. In his old age Louis lost a great deal of that judgment of men, to the exercise of which he was indebted for his greatness, but he appears never to have lost his discernment in the case of church dignitaries. All of his promotions were excellent. And as religion was now the vogue at court, it may well be considered the palmiest day of ecclesiastical respectability. But even Louis could not change the nature of his courtiers. The garb of devotion was worn as a badge, but men panted for the time when they should be permitted to throw it off.

The death of Louis was followed by the regency of the Duke of Orleans, and then, for the first time in the history of modern civilization, profligacy stalked unmasked in all its horrors from the highest places. The Regent was a man of splendid abilities, but of the most dissolute habits. He had not the effeminacy of Heliogobalus, but we know not of any emperor of Rome who was capable of being compared to him. Vice in him seemed rather the over-boiling of animal life ; for he did not by any means neglect the cultivation of his intellectual powers ; and it is admitted, by even his bitterest enemies, that he laid the foundation of that principle of administration which, if not interrupted by the intrigues of the king's mistresses, would perhaps have relieved the kingdom from the load of debt which had been incurred by the majestic extravagance of the late king.

The Regent's besetting sins were women and wine. Some of his courtiers, who could not drink, had the complaisance to affect a stagger when in his company, in order to keep him in countenance. Women he used barely for his pleasures. None ever exercised any control over him. He treated them with utter contempt. It is a remarkable fact that the talent of Henry IV. seems to have descended through the younger branch of his house. The Regent, the notorious Egalite, and the late King of the French, were all men far above the ordinary standard of intellectual power.

The history of the reign of Louis XV. is inseparably interwoven with that of his mistresses. It was the singular destiny of that miserable monarch to pass directly from the hands of a respectable churchman into those of

abandoned women. The Cardinal Fleury, who had been his tutor, remained his minister for seventeen years. During the regency the young monarch had been affianced to the daughter of the King of Spain, and the Infanta, then not more than three or four years of age, had been sent to Paris to receive the education becoming a queen of France. Before the consummation of the marriage, and during the administration of the Prince Conde, who had succeeded after the death of the Duke of Orleans, the king fell dangerously ill. Consternation seized the court. The Conde family particularly regarded with intolerable anguish the possibility of an event which should cause the crown to pass into the hands of the Orleans family. (Qr. Was this an instinctive warning which was fearfully realized in the mysterious death of the last of the Conde family during the reign of Louis Philippe?) This consideration determined the minister to marry the king forthwith. The tender age of the Infanta forbid him to think any longer of her. She was accordingly sent back to Spain with as little ceremony as one would use in dismissing a chambermaid, and the court looked anxiously about to find a wife for the king.

It is an old fashioned notion that a wife is to please her husband. Kings generally are not allowed to please themselves in the selection of their partners. But it was a new feature in a royal marriage, that the future queen should be one who would please a minister's favourite. This was Madame du Prie, daughter of one Pleneuf, a money dealer in Paris, wife of the Marquis du Prie, and mistress of the Prince of Conde. Her object was to secure for herself a principal post at the court, and in order to effect this, to remove the Cardinal Fleury, who, though not yet elevated to the ministry, had obtained, in her opinion, an undue ascendancy over the young king's mind. Her object was to place a queen on the throne who should be bound to her by the ties of gratitude. It may easily be conceived that when such motives ruled the governing powers, the prospect of domestic happiness for the youthful monarch was anything but flattering.

The first person selected by the prime minister for the future queen was his own sister, Mademoiselle de Vermandois, a young, sensible, and amiable woman, well calculated to adorn the first throne of Europe, and endowed with a character capable, if any one female was capa-

ble of such a noble work, of arresting the progress of profligacy which was ravaging France.

One would suppose it would be difficult to supplant the sister of the first minister. But nothing is impossible to a bad woman. In order to satisfy herself as to the views and opinions of Mademoiselle Vermandois, the Marchioness du Prie called on her incognito at the convent in which she resided, and artfully made herself the subject of conversation. In her ignorance, and in the simplicity of her innocence, the young princess exhibited the horror of a virtuous mind at the connection which existed between her brother and her visitor, and did not hesitate to declare that if the proposal to marry her to the king should succeed, Madame du Prie must be exiled from the court. This was enough. Madame du Prie was in search of a creature, not a mistress; she rose indignantly from her seat, announced her real name, and bade the young princess renounce all hope of ever becoming queen of France.

Voltaire relates the characteristic manner in which Marie Leczinski became queen of France. There lived in Paris a certain Madame Texier, the mistress of an old soldier named Vauchon. She was the widow of a person who had once been a cashier in the service of Madame du Prie's father. She was bed-ridden with a dreadful disorder, which had eaten away a considerable portion of her face. Vauchon had spoken to her of Stanislaus Leczinski, who had been made king of Poland by Charles XII., dethroned by Peter the Great, and who was at that time a refugee in Veissemburg, on the frontiers of Alsace, living on a moderate pension which had been allowed, and irregularly paid, by the French ministry. He had a daughter who had been educated from her cradle in adversity, and whose modesty and virtue, combined with her singular misfortunes, rendered her extremely interesting. Madame Texier requested the honour of a visit from Madame du Prie, and recommended to her this princess, who was actually engaged to be married to a colonel in the French army. The mistress of the minister instantly perceived the decided advantage which was now presented to her. She hastened to Veissemburg, saw the Polish princess, was satisfied with her, and she became queen of France.

The successful intriguante enjoyed but a temporary triumph. The boy-king was not yet depraved enough to be entirely guided by a wicked woman. The habit in

which he had lived, in obedience to Cardinal Fleury, was too strong to be broken ; and as soon as Madame du Prie placed herself directly in opposition to the tutor, her power vanished, the Prince Conde ceased to be minister, his mistress was banished to Normandy, and Fleury quietly assumed the reins of government, which he continued to hold until his death.

Louis XV. was a person who appeared to form habits easily, and to be in a remarkable manner their slave. Thus, without any disposition to virtue in the abstract, he easily submitted to the guidance of Cardinal Fleury ; and it is more than probable that if his wife had possessed an energetic character, he would have been a model husband. But he was born to be governed, and fate had not provided him with a wife capable of performing the functions of government. As it was, however, he long lived in perfect satisfaction with her, and had even strength to resist the temptations of those, who, for their own private ends, endeavoured to provide him with a favourite.

He succumbed at last. Licentiousness in him, the legitimate result of pampered idleness, passed through every conceivable phasis. When he broke through the restraints of habit and of decency, he revelled in every species of iniquity, and in the choice of his mistresses passed successively from the *haute noblesse*, to the bourgeoisie, and almost expired in the arms of the lowest depths of sans-culottism.

His first mistress was Madame de Mailly. This was an affair which gave no scandal. The lady was unambitious and disinterested—she was attached to the man—cared little for the king, and in the hands of an artist, would sit for a picture as lovely and as affecting as that of Madame de la Valliere. The few who were aware of her sin were disappointed. The mistress refused to govern her lover. But her reign was of short duration—she was supplanted, and by—her sister. Mademoiselle de Nesle had not the scruples of her sister; she openly aspired to the king's heart, and gained it. The king was now emerging from the prejudices of decency. One prejudice, however, clung to him during his life—that of etiquette. The king's mistress must be a married woman. A husband must be found for this fascinating usurper of



a sister's rights, (qr?) and M. de Vintimille was found to agree to this nominal and debasing alliance.

Short-lived, however, was this equivocal honour—Madame de Vintimille died, to the inexpressible grief of the king; he sought alleviation in the society of the sister who had been supplanted by her. But strange as it may appear, a new comforter appeared in the shape of a third sister of this noble house. Madame de la Tournelle undertook the task of effacing from the king's heart the memory of her sister. She fully succeeded, and was soon acknowledged as the royal mistress. We shall have occasion to say more of this lady, better known as the Duchess of Chateauroux. In the meantime let Miss Kavanagh relate the fate of Madame de Mailly.

“One of Madame de la Tournelle's first steps was to exact that Madame de Mailly should leave the court—the unhappy sister, who still idolized the king, vainly begged of him not to banish her from his presence; he insisted that the request of Madame de la Tournelle should be complied with; the weeping and unpitied Madame de Mailly accordingly left Versailles for ever. She retired to Paris, and like another Madame de la Valliere, she devoted herself to the service of God. Without entering a convent, she led a life of such sincere penance and mortification, that even the most rigidly virtuous were compelled to admire her. The once beloved mistress of a king—the sharer of those voluptuous banquets when he forgot his most sacred duties, now deprived herself of the common necessities of life in order to relieve the poor. The abodes of want and misery henceforth became her home. She accepted every privation as a feeble atonement for her sins; and when insults followed her, even to the house of prayer, she acknowledged them to be deserved with touching and submissive humility. A man of the people once addressed her, in the church of St. Roch, with a coarse epithet—‘since you know me so well,’ said she, ‘pray for me.’”—p. 90.

If Madame Chateauroux could always have been the king's mistress, Louis would never have sunk so low in the scale of humanity as he ultimately did. We do not wish to be thought the apologist of sin. But it really appears that a vast difference exists between the French moral sense, and that of their English neighbours, and we must form our opinions rather from facts, than from abstract notions of propriety. Agnes Sorel is supposed to have exercised as great an influence over the mind of Charles VII. as did Joan d'Arc. Madame de Maintenon

always sat in the council chamber of Louis XIV. and is said to have revoked the edict of Nantes by her supreme authority, Madame de Pompadour is said to have taken an active interest in the religious quarrels which distracted France during her career, and in the chamber of Madame du Barry was formed the project of the celebrated Parliamentary abortion, known as the Parliament Maupeau. Louis XIV. went to his wars accompanied not only by his queen but by his mistresses. It would not be difficult to multiply examples of similar acts, which to the English mind, would be in the last degree revolting. A royal mistress in England can never do any thing but evil, and though they have done evil enough in France, yet they seem actually capable of doing good.

Such at least was the case with Louis XV. The only period of his life in which he appeared otherwise than as a *roi fainéant*, was that of his connection with Madame Chateauroux. This lady desired not merely to be the mistress of a king—she yearned after the glory of being the favourite of a great king. As the waning spirit of the French monarchy revived under the auspices of Agnes Sorel, so she aimed to kindle a flame of military enthusiasm in the bosom of the indolent Louis. France was then engaged in a war, undertaken to humble the House of Austria. She inspired the king with the ambition of placing himself at the head of his armies, and of winning for himself some of that glorious reputation which had adorned the memory of his ancestors. She succeeded. The king actually appeared with his army. His mistress followed him, and two princesses of the blood, the Duchess of Modena, and the Princess of Conti, unblushingly followed in the train of the royal favourite.

In this campaign, which was very creditable to the king, an incident occurred which made a profound impression, not only on the nation but on the king—an incident long remembered for the mixture of the affecting and the ridiculous, and one destined to be repeated at the conclusion of this monarch's life. At Metz he was seized with a fever, which soon assumed a type so alarming, that it was thought necessary to apprise the queen of his danger. The principal attendants of the king were the Marshal Duc de Richelieu, (the modern Alcibiades,) and Madame Chateauroux. The latter, really alarmed, contributed, perhaps, by the assiduity of her attentions, to

excite and increase the fever. The former assumed the direction of the royal apartment, comforted the king, abused his physicians, and in some measure assumed their functions, by occasionally making some trifling prescriptions, and kept out of the monarch's sight all clergymen and devout courtiers who were besieging the door.

The princes of the blood were indignant at the audacity of a gentleman, who presumed to keep them from the person of their perhaps dying head. The noblemen murmured—the clergy prayed and lamented—the people were seriously apprehensive for their monarch's life, and were scandalized and hurt at his apparent neglect of his soul's salvation. An austere and determined prelate, Fitz James, Bishop of Soissons, sounded the alarm, and prescribed public penitential prayers. The physicians encouraged the fears which were entertained for the king's safety, by declaring his fever to be malignant. The Count de Clermont, (a son, we believe, of the Regent,) who, though a noble and a soldier, was also an ecclesiastic, being Abbé of St. Germain des Pres, succeeded in forcing his way into the royal presence, but could not persuade himself to speak so plainly as to inform the king fully of his danger. This was done by another of the royal princes. Louis was terror stricken. The tenderest care of his mistress, the affected severity of Richelieu, were equally unavailing to efface the impression which had been made upon him—Louis had no practical religion, but he had a coward faith—and as Carlyle quaintly observes, he was not a man to be trifled with in the matter of his viaticum. But religion was decent still, if all other sentiments were extinguished. One may not hope to be pardoned and yet retain the offence. The viaticum and Madame de Chateauroux could not appear together in that chamber; and she was dismissed. The favourite, whose power but lately far exceeded that of the queen, became now the most abject of creatures. Deserted by all, she was indebted to Richelieu and the Marshal de Belle Isle, for the protection even of her life. Under the influence of the Bishop of Soissons, she was not only dismissed from the presence of the king, but deprived of the post of lady of honour to the queen. The people insulted her, and but for the protection which we have mentioned, would have stoned her, who, whatever her sins might be, had certainly inspired the king to make the only exhibition

of manliness which he had ever given. At the post office she was not allowed the common right of hiring a chaise and horse, and the Duc de Richelieu appeared a prodigy of chivalry, because he did that which mere pity would have dictated—he lent her his own carriage, and arranged her journey, that she might be spared the pain of encountering the queen, who was on her way to join her husband.

The queen undoubtedly possessed the sympathies of the people; she hastened from her solitary court to the bedside of her husband; and to the confessions of his infidelities which he made, and his oft repeated cry for pardon, she answered only with tears of forgiveness. The reconciliation was regarded by the people, as a presage of the returning favour of heaven, and the king did soon after begin to recover.

This was the culminating point in his repentance—in his fortunes. Louis was beloved. Kings who are not positively wicked, generally are beloved. The people had prospered during his reign—they observed that he had for sixteen years supported a minister whose only fault was excessive parsimony. The result of this parsimony was that the people were spared the burdens of a splendid administration. His illness also appeared to be the consequence of his labours in the wars. They regarded him as a hero who had gone to the camp in pursuit of glory, and Madame de Chateauroux as his evil genius, who was labouring to turn him from his glorious path. In many of the churches, where prayers were offered for the king's recovery, the voice of the priests was interrupted by their tears, and the people responded to the prayers by sobs. The courier who bore to Paris the report of his convalescence, was received with as much enthusiasm as if he had brought tidings of a most important victory. They kissed his horse—they led him in triumph through the streets; the churches changed their notes of wailing, for the exulting strains of the *Te Deum*; and the streets re-echoed with the joyful shout, "the king is safe." Louis was both affected and astonished at these unexpected proofs of affection. "Ah," said he, (and it is the only speech of Louis which history has thought worthy to be preserved,) "how sweet it is to be beloved! what have I done to deserve all this?" These modest and ingenuous words increased the enthusiasm, and it was then



that he received the surname, which unfortunately he forfeited long before he died, of Louis the Beloved.

Louis was afterwards seen on a bed of sickness—similar scenes were exhibited among his courtiers. A second struggle between the favourite and the viaticum was enacted; but not again was heard the voice of a whole people uttering prayers for his recovery. Louis the Beloved had long outlived his surname.

The repentance which is caused in a remorseful spirit at the near approach of death, seldom survives the terror which induces it. The *role* of a beloved king and respectable father of a family soon became fatiguing. The excitement of glory, now that the syren who had fanned the flame was far away, soon palled, and the monarch relapsed into the horrors of ennui. He longed for the presence of her who had taught him the pleasure of feeling. The restraints of decency were soon overcome, and Richelieu was commissioned to treat with the exiled favourite for her return to his court. In this negotiation, the queen, the princes, the priests, the people, were all insulted. The discarded favourite was never so powerful as when in exile. It was stipulated, that her eyes should not be offended by the sight of those who had counselled, or even witnessed her humiliation. The Duc de Chatillon, governor of the Dauphin and his wife, were dismissed from the court. Their sole offence was a letter from the lady to the Queen of Spain, which had been intercepted. The letter contained a narrative of the scene at Metz, and the writer, in her confidential disclosures, attempted no concealment of that horror which a pious and well bred woman naturally entertains of adulterous commerce. They were accordingly dismissed. The Bishop of Soissons was ordered to confine himself to his diocese, and lost the place of grand almoner to the king. The venerable Balloy, governor of the young Duc de Chartres, the same who had urged that prince to lead the sick monarch to the footstool of the tribunal repentance, was also punished with exile. Other punishments were inflicted, but of these we have said enough. When her vengeance was fully appeased, the favourite returned. Her triumph was of short duration. In a few days she died,—and though we can entertain but one opinion respecting the king's favourite, yet she had this merit, that her disinterestedness and elevation of spirit were tenderly

regretted, by those who witnessed and felt the malignity and rapacity of her successors.

Hitherto, Louis, in his amours, had followed in the footsteps of his illustrious predecessors. His favourites had been selected from those ladies whose high birth gave them a title to be near the person of the queen—true type of the revolution which was destined to overthrow his successor, power began now began to descend. The next favourite was from a class which had no pretensions to a place about the court, and his last from that which makes no pretensions to decency.

Madame de Pampadour, née Jeannett. Poisson, was the daughter of a butcher of Paris, and wife of Le Normand d'Etiolles, a banker of the city. Sensible of the voluptuous character of her beauty, her mother had early conceived the project of making her a favourite of the king, and had educated her to entertain the same ambitious views. Whenever an opportunity offered, she appeared in the king's presence, always so adorned as to be conspicuous and attractive. Lacreteille tells us how at a masked ball, her fate was decided, when in a crowd of courtiers, she took care to let her handkerchief fall near the king's feet. The monarch took up the pledge, and, with inimitable grace, flung it at her. The action was decisive. "The handkerchief is thrown," cried the enraptured courtiers, and Madame d'Etoilles, created Marquise de Pampadour, succeeded to the rights of Madame Chateauroux. The poor husband loved her—he was disconsolate at the treachery of his wife, and he vainly offered to forgive everything, if she would only come back. She refused, in the most peremptory manner, to return to his house—she had placed the example of Madame de Maintenon before her; and she calmly and deliberately watched over the life of the queen, intending herself also to be queen of France.

For nearly twenty years this woman governed France. The force of habit was strong upon the king, and this kept him attached to his mistress long after every spark of passion was extinct. The day of her funeral was a stormy one; and the king saw the hearse as it was bearing her body to the grave. "The marchioness has a bad day for her journey," was the only comment he made on the subject; and for a woman of whose death he could

thus speak, he had violated all the sacred ties which bind humanity together.

The rigid force of etiquette was observed on the occasion of her death—she lived openly in her apartments in the palace of Versailles; but it was against the etiquette of the court that any one not of the blood royal should die there. As soon, therefore, as it appeared that her disease would terminate fatally, she was remorselessly taken up and conveyed to a house in the neighbourhood, in which she could, without violating etiquette, render up her spirit to Him who had given it. Such is Lacrozelles' statement, which, though contradicted by Miss Kavanagh, we deem, in the absence of proof to support the contradiction, the more satisfactory authority.

During the ascendancy of Madame de Pompadour, the gossiping Marmontel flourished in Paris, and his connections opened to him the doors of the lower rooms of the palace. He enjoyed occasionally the privilege of an interview with the favourite; and a perusal of his pages, though they disclose few facts, will better than any graver history, give an idea which prevailed in certain portions of French society, during the middle of the last century.

We say *certain portions*, for we hold that a society universally corrupt cannot sustain itself. We cannot conceive of a nation existing in which woman is generally vile, and man has no respect for the virtue of that sex which bore and nourished him. Official dignitaries may sully the reputation of a time-honoured name, but we cannot believe that the *noblesse* of France, that body which, in the trying times which soon followed, if it did not exhibit that active courage which might have saved the monarchy and themselves, yet proved by passive courage, the elevation of their virtue and the indomitable spirit of their souls, could have participated in that general depravity of morals, which disgraced the court.

Marmontel's memoirs were written for his children. They appear to have been interrupted by the exciting scenes of the revolution. The book is a pleasant piece of egotistical gossiping, and though it is full of the names of titled personages, with whom he associated, it is evident that there was an inner circle of good society which he never saw. It is true he had the *entrée* to Madame Geoffrin's soirees, but he had evidently never seen Ma-

dame du Deffand. He secured the favour of Madame de Pompadour, and speaks of her with the warmth of true regard. In the course of the long reign of this favourite, numerous efforts were made to supplant her. The finest and most attractive women were sent to lavish their charms upon the king, but all without success. Here is a scene extracted from Marmontel.

"In order to supplant Madame de Pompadour, M. d'Argenson and Madame d'Estrade inspired the king with a desire of enjoying the favours of the young and beautiful Madame de Choiseul, wife of the first gentleman to the Dauphin. The intrigue proceeded and was advancing to its denouement—a rendezvous was agreed upon, and the young lady had gone to keep her appointment. In the meantime, d'Argenson and his secretary Dubois, Madame d'Estrade, and Dr. Quesnai, were waiting in the minister's cabinet. After a while, Madame de Choiseul arrived; her disorder announced her triumph—Madame d'Estrade ran to her with open arms, and inquired whether she had succeeded. 'Yes,' she replied, 'it is done; I am beloved; he is happy. She (Pompadour) is to be dismissed, he has given me his promise.'

What a scene! and what an occupation! and the actors enjoyed historical names; and one was a king's minister! But we have dwelt so long on the age of Louis XV. and his mistresses, that we have no time to mention other distinguished women who are noticed in this volume. We shall close this essay with the following extract, which, from the romantic story of the heroine, will, we are sure, be acceptable to all our readers.

"Madame de Ferriol had never been very witty, and she grew ill-tempered and morose with years. The world might have become indifferent, if the attractions she no longer possessed, had not fortunately been supplied by the presence of a young and lovely Circassian slave, named Aïssée whom she had brought up, and who resided beneath her roof. The origin of the connection of Mademoiselle Aïssée and her protectress, was singular and romantic.

"M. de Ferriol had an elder brother, who travelled a great deal in the East, and was sent on various diplomatic missions to Turkey, where he led a life of oriental despotism and licentiousness. He was in the habit of purchasing beautiful female slaves, two of whom he once brought to France,—he kept one for himself, the other he gave to his friend, the Count de Nogent, who was so deeply enamoured of her, that he did not hesitate to make her his wife. M.



de Ferriol's probably died young, for there is no other record of her fate.

"In the year 1698, M. de Ferriol was passing through the slave market at Constantinople, when he was struck with the surpassing loveliness of a young female child exposed for sale. He questioned her owner, and learned that the child had been carried off by the Turks from the palace of a Circassian prince, whom they had massacred with all his people; she was supposed to be his daughter, for her ravishers had found her surrounded by attendants. Moved with compassion at her unhappy fate, and also actuated by a less pure and disinterested motive, the French nobleman purchased the young Haidée or Aïssée—the two names appeared to be identical—for the sum of fifteen hundred livres. On returning to France, he confided the child to his sister-in-law, Madame de Ferriol, and then went back once more to Constantinople, where he resided as ambassador until the year 1711.

"Aïssée, as she still continued to be called, although she had been baptized under the name of Charlotte, was kindly treated by Madame Ferriol, by whom she was brought up on a footing of equality with her two sons. Her beauty was remarkable, even in that age of beautiful women; it blended the passion and fire of the East, with the classical outlines of Grecian loveliness and the animated grace of France. She was about the middle height, of an elegant figure and graceful carriage—her complexion had in youth that dazzling bloom and transparent purity which is still the boast of the fair Circassian race; her eyes, dark soft and lustrous, shone with truly Eastern splendour; her oval and delicate countenance expressed the goodness, candour and firmness of her character.

"Aïssée attracted considerable attention in the circle of Madame de Ferriol—her extreme loveliness was not her only charm. If she was not brilliant and witty, she possessed, however, all the tact and delicacy of a fair nature; she spoke well, but little, for her disposition was retiring—she was in the bloom and freshness of her beauty when M. de Ferriol returned to France. He was on the verge of seventy, his protégée was only seventeen. He endeavoured, nevertheless, to inspire her with a more tender feeling than gratitude; and when he failed entirely, he asserted his right over her in a tone of oriental despotism. He reminded her that she was his; that he had bought her; and he ended by pleading his love and offering her a share in all his possessions. In order to escape this persecution, Aïssée appealed to her adopted brother, D'Argental, whose interference and remonstrances at length convinced her ancient admirer of the uselessness of his suit. M. de Ferriol consented to be reasonable, and to receive from Aïssée—all she could give—the affection and devotedness of a daughter. It was in this character that she remained with him until his death. If M. de Ferriol, notwith-

standing his years, could not remain insensible to the grace and beauty of the young Circassian, others found the task equally difficult. Bolingbroke did not fall in love with her, probably because he knew that love would be unavailing; but in his letters he alludes with evident affection and tenderness, to 'the dear Circassian,' 'the charming Aïssée,' declaring 'that he would sooner have found the secret of pleasing her, than the quadrature of the circle.

The regent, who met Mademoiselle Aïssée at the house of his mistress, Madame de Parabere,—such was the profligacy of the age, that none of the young girls' protectors, objected to her intimacy with this abandoned woman—expressed his admiration in more explicit language. Stung and astonished with her coldness, which only heightened his passion, he endeavoured to seduce her with the most brilliant offers. Aïssée firmly and indignantly refused; and from that time carefully shunned his presence. Madame de Ferriol learned with much vexation the scruples of the young girl, who had certainly not been reared in a very virtuous atmosphere. That she should have refused to become the mistress of her old brother-in-law, was perfectly right and justifiable; but that the same reluctance should extend to the first prince of the blood, and regent of the kingdom, was not to be conceived. She urged her to yield; she combatted her arguments; she called her moral scruples folly, and exhorted her to do as all around her did. Aïssée was young, inexperienced and pliable by nature. The world in which she had spent her youth was so corrupt, that her sense of moral right and wrong was never fully developed. She gradually confessed the truth of Madame de Ferriol's reasoning: but when her unworthy protectress thought herself assured of the wished-for triumph, another obstacle arose—the young girl declined to become the mistress of the regent; no longer on moral grounds, but on the noble plea that she did not and could not love him. Unlike the noble and free born ladies of France, the Circassian slave, bought in the market of Constantinople, inexorably refused to sell herself for gold or power. This time all the reasoning of Madame de Ferriol could not vanquish the resistance of Aïssée. When the persecution she endured at length became intolerable, the young girl threw herself at the feet of her protectress, conjuring her, in the name of heaven, to cease mentioning this hateful subject; and declaring, with unexpected vehemence, that if ever urged again, she would enter a convent. Madame de Ferriol, alarmed at a threat which would have deprived her society of its greatest attraction, sullenly desisted from her project, but never forgave Mademoiselle Aïssée this mortifying disappointment.

"At the house of Madame du Deffand, Aïssée met a knight of Malta, without either rank or wealth, but whose love she knew not how to resist, like that of the licentious Prince Regent. The Che-

valier d'Aydie was young, brave and handsome—a true hero of romance: with a disposition so loyal and noble, that even the skeptical Voltaire called him ‘le chevelér sans peur et sans reproche.’ The young knight no sooner beheld Mademoiselle Aïssée, than he became deeply enamoured—she returned his love; there existed only one obstacle to this deep-rooted and mutual passion. The parents of the Chevalier d'Aydie, who were as poor as they were noble, had early compelled him to enter the military order of the knights of St. John. He had several years before their first meeting, taken the vows which bound him to lead a life of celibacy. It was then in the struggle which conscience maintained against passion, that all the fatal arguments of Madame de Ferriol recurred to the mind of Aïssée. She yielded to their force, and her protectress, satisfied at the humiliation of a virtue which had been a silent reproach to her own misconduct, openly sanctioned between her ward and the Chevalier d'Aydie a connection which was only treated as a matter of course by the society in which they moved. Repentance and shame entered the soul of Aïssée too late. With the connivance of Madame de Villette, who feigned to take her to England, while she left her in a retired quarter of Paris, she gave birth to a daughter, unsuspected. The child was placed in a provincial convent, where she passed under the name of Miss Black, niece of Lord Bolingbroke. But though appearances, which were still of paramount importance in that corrupt world, were thus saved, the sense of shame and degradation never left Mademoiselle Aïssée's mind; naturally too pure and delicate for the errors into which her unhappy education had made her fall.

“The birth of their child only increased the passion of the Chevalier d'Aydie. He had already offered his mistress to procure a dispensation from the Pope, and marry her; but she steadily refused; her unknown origin, the poverty of her lover, and the prejudices of the age, which would have rendered such an alliance degrading to him, made her persist in her refusal even when she became a mother. In the excess of his passion, the Chevalier vainly entreated Aïssée to fly with him to the solitude of some remote land, where they might live in peace and happiness—she firmly declined. At this distance of time, it is difficult to understand and appreciate her scruples; they were probably strengthened by the destiny of the Count de Nogent, who, having imprudently married the beautiful slave, brought, like her, from Constantinople, by M. de Ferriol, had, in consequence, been subjected to the most bitter insults. The dread of entailing a similar fate on her lover made Mademoiselle Aïssée disinterestedly sacrifice her own hopes of felicity to his honour. ‘However much happiness it might be to me to become his wife,’ she mournfully wrote to her friend, Madame Calandrini, ‘I must love the Chevalier for himself. What would the world say, if he married an unknown dependant on the Ferriol

family? I value his honour too highly, and I am too proud to let him commit this folly. Would the Chevalier always think as he does now? He might repent; and then indeed I should die of grief at the thought of having caused his unhappiness—at the thought, more bitter still, of being no longer loved.'

"Madame Calandrini, whom she thus addressed, was a lady of much piety and virtue, residing in Geneva, and who had endeavoured to awaken Aïssée to a sense of her error. She succeeded, for the young girl's heart was naturally pure and good. But the affection she had conceived for the Chevalier was no transient love: the struggle between passion and duty was long and full of bitterness. The ill temper of Madame de Ferriol, to whose house she returned after the death of the old ambassador, added to Aïssée's sorrow. No duty, no obedience, however entire, could please the woman, whom, notwithstanding all her faults, Aïssée considered as the benefactress of her youth. Stolen visits to the convent where her child was brought up, and the affection of the Chevalier, would have consoled her, if she could have indulged in that affection without the sense of sin. Though oppressed with remorse, she strove against her feelings in vain.—\* \* \* \* Time, instead of weakening, had strengthened their affection. Its depth and severity rendered her struggle very bitter—her health sunk under the weight of her sorrow, which was increased by the despair the Chevalier felt when he thought himself on the point of losing her. 'Every one,' she wrote, when she had partly recovered, 'pitied him. Indeed, madame, you would have wept as I did—he had a mortal fear that I should die. Madame de Ferriol asked me one day if I had bewitched him? I answered, the charm which I used, was to love against my own will, and to render his life as happy as I could.'

"It was the bond of an affection so true, so tender, and so constant, which Aïssée had now to sever—she accomplished her task, mournfully, but without weakness. The Chevalier d'Aydie had been well aware of Madame Calandrini's efforts to reclaim his mistress. He never sought to oppose that lady's influence, but in the most touching terms, he besought Aïssée not to deprive him of her love. He renewed his offer of marriage, which she again declined. The dread of alienating him forever made her long delay her resolve; but that fear at length yielded to conscience, and she accordingly announced to the Chevalier, that friendship must henceforth be the only feeling between them. Her sorrow was too evident, and he loved her too well to indulge in useless remonstrances or reproaches; he submitted to her decision, not without grief but resignedly; protesting that her affection, whatever name she might give it, would ever be his only source of happiness, and promising never to seek to influence her against the dictates of her conscience. He religiously kept his word; and though years of mingled sorrow



and remorse had faded the numberless charms which had first enchanted him, his love for his Circassian mistress ever remained fervent and true. In the sincerity of that affection, he made her the whimsical proposal that, when their years were such as to justify such a course, without giving rise to scandal, they should both reside under the same roof, and spend the end of their life together; thus realizing, in their old age, the unavailing dream and longing of their youth. Mademoiselle Aïssée smiled and wept as she heard him, for she knew she would never live to see even that second dream fulfilled.

"She ardently desired to consecrate her penitence, by confessing her sins to a priest; but Madame de Ferriol would not probably have sanctioned such a step, and Aïssée was now too weak to go even to the neighbouring church. A plot to enable her to carry her desire into effect, was accordingly concerted between the Chevalier, Madame du Deffand and Madame de Parabere. The latter lady called on her friend, and took her in her carriage to the house of Madame du Deffand, where a clergyman had been brought by the Chevalier d'Aydie. This solemn reconciliation of her soul to God, gave Aïssée a frame of mind she had never known till then. The weary strife was over, the bitter cup was quaffed, and she felt spiritually strengthened and purified by its wholesome bitterness. Her conscience was at rest; the Chevalier loved her still; she might love him without feeling burthened by the sense of sin or shame. But this happiness—for happiness it would have been—came too late. The strength of life and youth had been spent in the long struggle against passion. Signs she could not mistake, soon told Aïssée that her life was drawing to a close.

"She had suffered too much not to feel resigned; but she scarcely dared to contemplate the Chevalier's grief. As though he could by his gifts have hoped to win back the life of a being so beloved, he was constantly heaping presents on every one around her. But love availed not against death, and each day brought Aïssée nearer to the term of her existence. A few days before her end, she thus addressed Madam Calandrini, for the last time. 'The life I have led has been very wretched. Have I ever had an instant's joy? I could never be with myself. I dreaded to think. Remorse never abandoned me from the time that I opened my eyes to the extent of my errors. Why, then, should I dread the separation of my soul, since I feel convinced that God is all goodness, and that my real happiness shall date from the moment when I leave this miserable body?'

"After a long and painful illness, Mademoiselle Aïssée died, on the 3d of March, 1733. She was buried in the vault which the Ferriol family possessed, in the church of St. Roch. Within the narrow circle where she had shed the charms of her gentle presence,

her death was deeply felt; for if others were admired, she was loved. The sorrow of the Chevalier d'Aydie was bitter and lasting. Though he survived the woman he had loved for many years, he never ceased to cherish her memory. He retired to the country, and devoted himself to the education of his daughter, whose dazzling beauty vividly recalled her mother, such as she was when he beheld her first at Madame du Deffand's, young, beautiful and happy."

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#### AET. VII.—THE DIVERSITY AND ORIGIN OF HUMAN RACES.

It has become an adage that "truth is mighty and must prevail." Is this adage the expression of our faith? Why then do we so shrink from submitting our opinions to the severest scrutiny, to the most rigid rule of reason, to the strictest comparison with facts? Is it not, either that failing to discover truth, we cannot abide the confession of our ignorance, or that, discovering truth, our pride of judgment shrinks from the admission that our previous views have been erroneous?

Upon few subjects have opinions been more hastily and superficially formed, and yet decidedly expressed, than upon this, of the distinction and origin of the races. The science of ethnology is unhappily involved in much obscurity, and there is probably no very extensive, certainly no thorough and satisfactory, ethnological book extant. The writings of Prichard, Lawrence and Wiseman, of Europe, and of Caldwell and Bachman, in this country, afford the fullest information of any we have been enabled to examine. In various periodicals valuable articles have appeared within the last year or two, from Prof. Agassiz and from Dr. Nott—and recently we find Mr. Gliddon has expressed opinions on the subject.

It would be neither difficult nor laborious to frame and present a theory on the subject, but this probably would be neither important nor satisfactory to any. We, therefore, at the cost of much time and labour, have selected from the chief and most authentic sources, such statements, facts and principles, as may most forcibly elucidate and illustrate the subject, physiologically, chronologically and philologically.

The original unity of the human race, seems for ages to have been regarded by most men probably in the civilized world, as an axiom, to question which has only been to meet and be dismissed with the quiet smile of self-satisfied contempt, and to insist upon examining which, has been deemed but little less than an insult to the common sense of mankind. But respect for the mere first impressions received from our fathers, who had never submitted the subject to inquiry, is not now sufficient to deter us from its close investigation. Let us then, in the impartial spirit of philosophers, search for the truth on this profoundly interesting subject, and wheresoever facts fail us by which to discover truth, let us candidly admit our ignorance, and charitably concede, each one to every other, the privilege of indulging and expressing, what to him appears to be the most rational conjecture. The question before us may be this: What is the amount of testimony relating to the origin of the human races?

First. Let us consider the subject in its physiological aspect. A writer in the *Christian Spectator*, a review formerly published in New-England, says: "the human family is generally divided into five varieties of classes." The five are, 1st. The Caucasian or European, which Dr. Prichard prefers to call Iranian. 2d. The Mongolian or Asiatic, which Dr. Prichard terms Turanian. 3d. The Malay. 4th. The American. 5th. The African.

In this classification, Linnæus, Blumenbach, Wiseman, Lawrence, Prichard, Caldwell and others, substantially agree, although some think that the differences between the Mongolian, Malay and American are such as can be accounted for sufficiently to admit of their being regarded as one, viz., the Mongolian or Asiatic. Hence, says Brande, in his *Encyclopædia*, "Cuvier considers that *three* varieties are eminently distinct—the white or Caucasian—the yellow or Mongolian—the black or Ethiopian."

In the definition of the term *species*, the several writers on the subject, almost literally agree. Dr. Pritchard says:

"The meaning attached to the term *species*, in natural history, is very simple and obvious. It includes only one circumstance, viz., an original distinctness and constant transmission of any character. A race of animals or plants marked by any peculiarities of structure, which have always been constant and undeviating, constitutes a species; and two races are considered as specifically different, if they are distinguished from each other by some peculiarities, which one

cannot be supposed to have acquired, or the other to have lost, through *any known operation of physical causes*, for we are hence led to conclude that the tribes thus distinguished, cannot have sprung from the original stock."

Lawrence says substantially the same. The author of the *Vestiges of Creation*, says :

"It is to be remarked that the distinction called *species* is applied by naturalists to any group of organized beings which do not show any variation beyond what *can be proved* to have been the result of *external conditions*."

Dr. Caldwell, a writer of opposite views from those of Dr. Prichard, adopts his definition. The definitions of other writers are almost literally the same with those already given.

As it would require much more space than could be allotted to a single article, to give a detailed specification of the peculiarities of each class, as arranged by the different writers before mentioned, our examination will, in a great measure, be limited to the Caucasian and African, as these are admitted by all to include the extremes. And moreover, the consideration of these two extremes has been rendered the more interesting, from their relative social position. We do not propose to define with exactness, either of these terms, Caucasian or African. All such definitions must be arbitrary. We employ the terms in their general acceptance. We will avoid the consideration of all individual cases, whose peculiarities obviously arise from disease or deformity in one race, or from amalgamation of the two races, for this would be inconclusive, and calculated to mislead.

The first presumption, then, from the prominent external differences of colour, feature and form, which we observe generally, wherever we find the two races together, in Africa, Asia, Europe or America, obviously, as probably all admit, favours the supposition of a diversity of original progenitors. In an hundred individuals of the Caucasian variety collected from every quarter of the globe, no two may correspond precisely in stature, or in the exact shade of complexion, or in the hue of the hair, and the eyes may vary from deep hazel to deep blue : or, on the other hand, an hundred Africans may be collected from every quarter of the globe, and from every variety of condition in which they can be found, with every diversity of



stature, and every discoverable shade of complexion from jet black to light brown—and yet the prominent, common and uniform characteristics of the two classes, are so distinct and obvious that the most superficial observer, ignorant of even the terms and classifications of science, will almost instinctively and correctly place each individual in his respective class. He would no more think of classing any one of the latter with the Caucasian, or any one of the former with the African, than he would of classing the sheep with the goat, or the spaniel with the bear, or the cat with the lion. The negro will never be confounded with the Caucasian, nor the Caucasian with the negro.

The skins of the Caucasian and African, some, judging hastily, seem to think marking the only essential difference. Much as has been, and is to be said on this point, we now pass it wholly by as comparatively unimportant. Of the hair on negroes, Dr. Lawrence says :

“It is black and crisp, so as generally to be called woolly. This is either formed into small and short masses, or it may admit of being combed to the length of three or four inches, still forming a kind of woolly fleece.”

Blumenbach gives the same description. Dr. Caldwell says :

“The difference here cannot be adequately made known in words. To be fully understood it must be seen. The hair of the two races must be examined with a microscope. In fact the two productions are as different from each other in their general appearance, we might say much more so, than many plants are, which botanists refer to different species.”

But let us examine briefly, a few of the still more important differences. Blumenbach says—“The upper front teeth of the African are obliquely placed ;” or, as Caldwell says, “pointed obliquely outward.” Lawrence and others state the same. The detail of differences, however, in the head and brain, concerning which all the writers before mentioned and others, almost entirely agree, we purposely pass by, lest it might seem to imply the design of arguing an essential difference in their mental capacities. This is an entirely distinct question, which we do not now propose to consider. For we believe that the origi-

nal unity or diversity of the human family, as far as it can be determined at all, may be determined exclusive of any considerations of their mutual capacity, by the physical structure alone, even omitting any special consideration of the structure of the head. Dr. Caldwell says—"The difference between the osseous and muscular systems of the two races, is much more plain and striking, because the parts are large and can be more easily examined." Yet these, by far the more important differences, but few appear to have examined, though as far as they have been, there is a remarkable agreement. Caldwell further observes that "the differences between the upper extremities of the African and the Caucasian, are particularly striking. In the former, the clavicle is rather shorter and more crooked than in the latter, while in proportion to his height, the arm is longer. An African, five feet eight or nine inches in height, has an arm considerably longer in proportion to the humerus, than the Caucasian."

This remarkable difference has not escaped the observation of Lawrence, who mentions the same thing. Besides, Dr. Lawrence in his lectures quotes Dr. Smith, who says on this remarkable difference of the two races: "I measured the arms of about *fifty negroes*, men, women, and children, *born in different climates*, and found the lower arm longer than in Europeans, in proportion to the upper arm, and to the height of the body. On the other hand, I have measured the arms of a *great number of European skeletons*, and have found that the os humeri, or upper arm, exceeds in length the ulna, which is the longer bone of the forearm, by two or three inches; in none by less than three and one-eighth inches."

As to the opposite extremities, Dr. Caldwell says: "In the two races, the lower extremities are in their relative proportions, the reverse of the upper. In their entire measurement, they are shorter in the African than in the Caucasian—while the thigh, which corresponds to the humerus, is larger in proportion to the leg, which is the part which corresponds to the forearm. The superior length of the African thigh in proportion to the leg, is a point which has received from naturalists but little attention. Yet it is of peculiar interest in the present inquiry. The differences in the articulation of the bones of the thigh and leg, in the two races, which is somewhat striking, can be learned only by inspection. It may be

observed, however, that it is such as to produce, in the African, a perceptible flexure of the limb at the knee, in a forward direction. His lower extremity, therefore, is not so straight as that of the Caucasian. The difference in the bones of the leg is great and peculiarly characteristic."

Respecting the last difference, Dr. Wiseman, (now Cardinal Wiseman,) one of the most predetermined advocates of original unity, quotes Aristotle as asking "why the Ethiopians have crooked legs and distorted feet?" To which Aristotle himself is represented as answering, that "this arises probably from the same cause with that which gives them woolly hair, that is, the heat of the climate."

But without continuing a detail of the differences, we need only say that Dr. Caldwell proceeds to exhibit differences of the same kind in a greater or less degree, throughout the whole system—hands, feet, toes, fingers, the formation of the bones and arrangement of the trunk, the stomach, and even the blood. In his own words, the differences extend "to the head and face, the arms, hands, especially the fingers and nails, the flatness of the sides of the chest, the bones of the pelvis, and the muscles that cover them—the lateral flatness and thinness of the thigh, its depth in the opposite direction, its length compared with that of the leg—the forward bend of the knee—the general form of the foot and its connection with the leg, and the length and taper together with the form and position of their toes. In the upper and lower extremities, then, the differences between the two races of men are numerous and great. But it is particularly to those parts of the system that the geologist directs his attention when looking for marks to settle his classification. Animals very much alike in other parts, are referred to different species and even genera, on account of striking dissimilarities in these. The domestic dog, the wolf and the hyena, are acknowledged to belong to different species. Yet let a skeleton of each be prepared, and it will be much more difficult to distinguish one from the other, than to distinguish an African from a Caucasian skeleton." The discovery of these and other differences, which various reasons compel us to pass by without enumeration, has been the work of thirty years close study and observation, by a learned and able professor in medical science, and con-

firmed by nearly twenty years of subsequent observation, and moreover, these statements have never been contradicted. The writer before referred to, in the *Christian Spectator*, who is professedly reviewing Dr. Caldwell, does not question the statements as we have given them, in a single particular, while Prichard, Lawrence, Blumenbach, Smith, Wiseman and others, whenever they allude to the same particulars at all, strikingly accord, as we have seen in a number of instances, with Caldwell's statements. And wheresoever the races come frequently in contact, every man accustomed to observe, will unhesitatingly confirm these statements, as far as they are discoverable by external examination.

Here, properly, may arise the important question—Have such peculiarities of the races been acquired by one and lost by another, “through any known operation of physical causes?”

Dr. Lawrence, speaking of the fact of differences between the existing races, suggests that “these phenomena are capable of solution in either of these ways. We may suppose that different kinds of men were originally created; that the forms and properties of which the contrast now strikes us so forcibly, were impressed at first on the respective races: and consequently that the latter as we now see them, must be referred to *different original families*. Or, we may suppose that one kind of human beings only was formed in the first instance, and account for the diversity that is now observable, by the agency of the various physical or moral causes to which they have been subsequently exposed.” We might have added a third supposition, which seems to have been entirely overlooked—viz. that one kind of human beings may have been originally formed, and at some subsequent period, an instantaneous and complete change may have been produced, by the same power which formed the original progenitors. The second of these suppositions seems to be beset with numerous difficulties, as all admit who undertake an examination of the subject, and the probability of the last, which we have ourselves suggested, does not appear to be strong. Climate is supposed by most persons to be the chief if not the only cause of difference in colour. But the strongest advocates of the original unity of races, here admit the greatness of the obstacle they have to surmount. Even Dr. Wiseman,



speaking of the two extremes, the black and white races, observes that, "the red or tawny man, *cannot be considered an intermediate step*, and we must look for examples of *direct transition from one extreme to the other*—and this assuredly is the *hardest knot we have to untie in the present inquiry*." He then says that he will pass by "the great discussions held by many authors as to the *original colour* of the human race." Many consider the original colour to have been red. But, with Blumenbach, Wiseman inclines to the opinion that it was white, and that "every departure from this hue bears the mark of an excess or a morbid affection." A writer in the *Edinburgh Review* for October, 1848, on "Prichard's Researches," &c., considers the Mongolian, the original. A writer in the *Westminster Review* for October, 1849, on "Malthus' population theory," &c, in one paragraph remarks: "It is not necessary here to go into the inquiry of whether there were originally several pairs of human beings, or whether the whole family of mankind have descended from a single pair—supposed by some to have been *black*—and that time and climate and other circumstances have occasioned the differences which exist. Differences there are in either case—differences of colour, stature, features, conformation of skull, weight of brain, length of heel, shape of the nail, &c.—and to these when strongly marked, we give the name of characteristics of race." Prof. Bachman, D. D., of South-Carolina, in his "Unity of the Human Race, examined on the principles of science"—(he is an advocate for the original unity of race) says that, "The difficulties in tracing to their original sources the many hidden phenomena that have produced the varieties in the human species, and in the races of domesticated animals, it must be admitted are equally great, with those who deny the unity, as with those who advocate it. Both parties are obliged to acknowledge, that, although they may form many reasonable conjectures, still, in consequence of our imperfect knowledge of the laws of nature, *we are not, as yet, warranted in speaking with certainty* on this intricate subject." A few pages after he says: "We believe we are warranted in saying that the type of the original man has now disappeared from the earth, and no longer exists in any form of head, or in any lineament of countenance, in any of the varieties of men." And a few pages farther on, he remarks: "*We must not be led astray by the idea that*

*the negro* with thick lips and crisped hair, *sprung from the white race*. We have no evidence that a white race, such as is now presented in the fair forms of Europe and America, then existed." And just as little evidence has Dr. Bachman, that the white race sprang from the black race, or that any one race sprang from another.

Notwithstanding the dogmatical manner in which Dr. Wiseman advocates the theory of original unity, he himself, after alluding to some peculiarities of colour, states the greatness of the difficulty in these terms: "Thus far, you see, I have *only thrown doubts* on the process imagined to explain the black colour of the negro—for though I think it depends upon climate, *certainly no theory has yet been discovered to account for its origin*. That climate, in reference to its progressive degrees of heat, has an influence on the tint of the skin, is so far true, that we see a certain ratio exist between the two. Generally speaking, the white races are nearer the pole, and the darkest are more under the influence of tropical heat. But this endeavour to establish a chain of gradations in colour, has to encounter two serious difficulties.

"First. In all these degrees, the tint is too evidently the result of an outward action upon the skin, the effects whereof can be moderated or suspended by precautions against heat. Secondly. Directly opposed to this theory of considering different degrees of darkness a series of transitions from the white to the black, is the startling fact, that the same race preserves its hue without sensible variation, *under the most distant latitudes*." Such are the insurmountable obstacles which Dr. Wiseman himself finds in the way of his own theory. Blumenbach, referring to climate, says: "The ancient Germans, the modern Gipsies, and the Jews, afford examples of peculiar and distinctive casts of countenance being presented in every climate. These well known facts are quite sufficient to overturn the hypothesis *which refers the differences of features to climate*—and a short examination of the races in any part of the world, will soon supply numerous additional ones. Indeed, *I do not know a single well established fact or sound argument in its favour*." Dr. Lawrence, though favouring the original unity of race, states the difficulty as to climate, thus: "That the constitution of the atmosphere varies in respect to light and heat, moisture and electricity, and that these variations, with those of

elevation, soil, wind, vegetable productions, will operate decidedly on individuals, I do not mean to deny. While, however, we have precise information on the kind and degree of influence attributable to such causes, we have abundance of *proof that they are entirely inadequate to account for the differences between the races of men.*" Again, he says: "The same native or congenital constitution prevails over the whole of Europe, the western part of Asia, and the north of Africa. That climate cannot cause similarity of character in nations spread over *fifty degrees of latitude*, and that food, dress, state of civilization, peculiar customs, or other moral causes, are equally inefficacious in accounting for the phenomenon, when we consider how various in all these points the nations are in whom it occurs—will be allowed by every unprejudiced observer."

Besides, we may ourselves add, if climate effect changes so great, as many suppose, why is it that the negroes among ourselves in the United States, *who are unmixed*, whether in the North or South, whether bond or free, more intelligent or less, have neither in form, feature, nor darkness of complexion, undergone the slightest perceptible change? Why, indeed, has not the white undergone change, for the aboriginal, as far as we know anything of him, was not white or Caucasian. We have seen, says Dr. Caldwell, "many American born Africans of the seventh and eighth (and he might now add ninth or tenth) generations, whose depth and glossiness of colour would render them remarkable in the country of their ancestors. In house servants, who are well clothed, cleanly and healthy, and who receive a sufficient supply of nourishing food, both the skin and hair seem usually darker than in those who labour nearly naked in the field. So far is it from being true as some contend, that the African is indebted to the tropical sun for his complexion. Besides, those parts of their bodies which are most carefully covered and protected from the sun appear to be of the deepest black." These are remarkable facts, well known to all who are accustomed to observe the peculiarities of the African race among us. These facts, moreover, are of no small weight when regarded as belonging to *the race*, with which we are familiar, aside from all instances of individual change in complexion, in one race or another. Bartlett, in his "Progress of Ethnology," speaking of the American Indians, mentions similar facts. Bishop He-

ber's writings also contain similar statements concerning the Hindoos.

This brings us more directly to the chronological aspect of the subject. *How long* have these different races existed as we now find them? Or on the supposition of original unity of race—when did the process of change begin, and within what period of time was it completed?

As to the antiquity of the existing distinctions of race, we find this clear concession from Dr. Wiseman. He says: "The more marked divisions of the human race are so striking to the eye, that it was impossible for them to escape the notice of the ancients." Again he remarks: "*The negro features were fixed* as early as the days of Herodotus or Homer, or even much earlier, as appears from Egyptian monuments." Dr. Prichard on this point, says: "The nations which have inhabited Europe for the last 2500 years, consist of three great races, distinguished from each other by their bodily formation, character and language. With slight exceptions, the different countries of Europe are now occupied by the same nations that have occupied them *since the date of our earliest authentic accounts.*"

Dr. Lawrence, on this point speaks thus: "If we should carry ourselves back in imagination, to a supposed period when mankind consisted of one race only, and endeavour to show how the numerous varieties which now occupy the different parts of the earth, have arisen out of the common stock, we cannot arrive at so satisfactory a decision: and we experience further embarrassments, from the fact that the races have been *as distinctly marked and completely separated from the earliest periods to which historical evidence ascends, as they are now.*" Thus all writers on this subject agree that they can go back to no period when this supposed conversion of one race into another could have commenced—nor can they detect it in any stage of its supposed progress—nor determine when it could have been completed. While at the same time, all agree, that the races have been as distinctly marked and as completely separated, from the earliest period to which historical evidence ascends, as they now are. This might seem to be sufficient to terminate all further inquiry, leaving every one from the facts and considerations already presented, to deduce what may appear to him to be the most reasonable conjecture. But there is a mode



of reasoning on this subject, by those who consider it essential to determine the question in favour of original unity of race, from analogy, which demands some consideration. It is argued by Dr. Prichard, Dr. Wiseman, and others, that because certain changes have sometimes occurred in the bodily appearance of individuals and sometimes of families, and are sometimes transmitted for several generations, and because certain changes have occurred in certain animals, sometimes from known and sometimes from unknown causes, therefore the existing divisions of the human family are all, probably, only derivations from one parent family. That is, the analogical argument, at most, obviates any natural impossibility that such changes should occur. But with regard to the first class of changes here alluded to, we have already seen the positive evidence of these men themselves, that whatever change *may* have occurred in individuals or in families, in whatever climate or condition, and how long soever these changes may have been transmitted—still, these have been such as to be readily accounted for by amalgamation, disease, or other known causes. And at all events, within no period known to human history, has any new race been formed, nor any one converted into another, nor has the slightest perceptible progress been made towards such formation or conversion. Besides, in all the cases referred to, the individual would at once be classed under one of the acknowledged existing divisions of the human family. For, when or wheresoever the different *races* of men were first created, they all form one *human* family, children of the same Infinite Father, the Creator. With reference to the stability of the conditions of natural existence, we find Dr. Prichard speaking thus: “Nothing seems to hold more true generally, than that all acquired conditions of body, whether produced by art or accident, end with the life of the individual in whom they are produced. Many nations mould their bodies into unnatural forms. The Indians flatten their heads—the Chinese women reduce their feet to one-third of their natural dimensions—savages elongate their ears—many races mutilate themselves. We frequently mutilate our domestic animals, and our own species are often obliged by disease, to submit to the loss of limbs. That no deformity or mutilation of this kind, is hereditary, is so plainly proved by every thing around us, that we must feel some sur-

prise at the contrary opinion having gained any advocates. After the operation of circumcision has prevailed for three or four thousand years, the Jews are still born the same as four thousand years ago. Docked horses and cropped dogs, do not propagate these mutilations. But for this salutary law, what a frightful spectacle would every race of animals exhibit! The mischances of all preceding times would overwhelm us with their united weight—and the catalogue would be continually increasing, until the universe, instead of displaying a spectacle of beauty and pleasure, would be filled with maimed, imperfect, and monstrous shapes.”

Alluding to the influence of climate, customs, &c., Dr. Lawrence says: “It is obvious that the external influences just considered, even though we should allow them a much greater influence on individuals than experience warrants us in admitting, would be still entirely inadequate to account for those signal diversities which constitute differences of race in animals.” Rev. Dr. Smyth, in his recent work on “The Unity of the Human Race,” speaks thus of *analogical* reasoning: “The force of an analogy seems to be altogether misapprehended. An analogy, that is, a similarity in the relations of certain objects, cannot *prove* anything concerning the real nature, origin, or cause of those objects, since it does not follow, that because there is a resemblance, however striking, in some points, there must be a corresponding similarity in every other particular. All it can do, is to *obviate objections* against the evidence produced for any doctrine.” This remark he makes in reply to the analogy argued between the formation and distribution of the animal races, and the formation and distribution of the human races. But these remarks of Dr. Smyth apply with full force to the arguments of himself and others, who support the doctrine of original unity from analogy, based on the changes which may take place in the lower animals, from climate, food, &c. For, admitting all the changes that have been alleged, to have actually occurred in the lower animals, still the argument is defective. The analogy ceases, just where it should be strongest, proceeding as it does on the supposition—which to have any force must be first *proved* as a fact—that physical causes have the same power to change *now* that they had to change the *inferior animals*. But what is the fact? In addition to the statements al-

ready adduced, Dr. Lawrence again says: "We see the same nation pass into all the climates of the earth, reside whole winters near the pole, plant colonies near the equator—pursue their commerce and establish their factories in Africa, Asia, and America. They can live equally under a burning sky, and on an ice-bound soil, and inhabit regions *where the hardest animals cannot exist.*" Speaking of some instances of change in animals, referred to by Dr. Prichard, Dr. Caldwell forcibly and justly inquires: "If hogs are rendered 'monstrous' and oxen 'long-legged' by being conveyed to the Cape of Good Hope—why is not the same true of Dutchmen and other Europeans who have so long resided in the same places? Why are they not rendered long-legged, or in some other way monstrous, as well as hogs and oxen? The reply is obvious: because the inferior animals are easily changed by food and climate, and men are not. The influence of a tropical sun and atmosphere, imbrowns the complexion of Europeans and affects their health, but produces in them no change indicating the slightest tendency to the formation of a new race. And, if by residence in a hot climate the covering of a sheep changes from *wool into hair*, why should not the covering *on a man's head* be changed from *hair into wool*?"

Still further, he might have inquired,—what effect soever climate and food may have in changing the wool of any other animal into hair, why cannot a *single instance* be shown, of any climate attended by any other circumstances, changing the covering *on a man's head*, either from hair into wool, or from wool into hair.

Referring to the alleged deteriorating influences of uncivilized life, Dr. Lawrence thus sarcastically speaks: "What false notions mankind must hitherto have entertained on this subject! We can no longer believe travellers who tell us that the finest forms and the greatest activity are to be seen in savage tribes: and as little can we trust the evidence of our senses, concerning the frequency of deformity and disease in civilized society, since there are so many reasons why the former should be deformed, black, and ugly, and the latter well proportioned and handsome. Unluckily, however, this theory does not correspond with a few plain facts. Most of the modern European nations existed in a more or less complete state of barbarism, within times of which we have the most authentic records: some of these were seen and described

by philosophers: yet the permanence of their characters is so remarkable, after a *greater progressive civilization* than has happened in any other instance, that those descriptions are applicable with the greatest exactness, to the same races of the present day. Instead, therefore, of accounting for the dark colour, peculiar features, and stature of the Greenlander, Laplander, and Samoiede, from their smoke, their dirt, their food, or the coldness of their climate, we can have no hesitation in ascribing them to the same cause that makes the Briton and German, of this day, resemble the portraits of their ancestors, drawn by Cæsar and Tacitus, viz. their descent from a race marked by the same characters as distinguish themselves. These tribes owe their origin to the Mongols; and retain in the north, those marks of their descent which we find as strongly expressed in the Chinese, under the widely different latitude of the south. At the same time, the parent tribes live in the middle of Asia, equally removed from the former and the latter."

A brief reference here to the ancient Egyptians may not be entirely foreign, but may have considerable bearing on the subject before us.

Dr. Lawrence says: "Much uncertainty has prevailed, respecting the ancient Egyptians, and some have maintained the opinion, (Blumenbach, Volney, and others,) that they were negroes. The question is certainly interesting, particularly if it should appear that the opinion is well grounded. That a race devoted within the period embraced by authentic history, to slavery, or to an independent existence not much better, and possessing under the most favourable circumstances, only the rudiments of the common arts, and the most imperfect social institutions, should have accomplished in the remotest antiquity, undertakings which astonish even now by their grandeur, and prove so great a progress of civilization and social life, in arts and sciences, that they should subsequently have lost all traces of this surprising progress, and never have exhibited the smallest approximation in any other instance, to such a pre-eminence, would be a fact extremely difficult to explain. With our present experience of the capacities of the negroes, and our knowledge of the state in which the whole race has remained for twenty centuries, can we deem it possible that they should have achieved such prodigies?" He then proceeds



to show that the situation of Egypt favours the supposition of a mixed population, which may have flowed in at different times from different quarters of Africa, Asia and Europe. Dr. Wiseman refers to these considerations of Lawrence, and coincides with them. He then expresses his own opinion thus: "It is not easy to reconcile the conflicting results thus obtained from writers and from monuments, and it is no wonder that learned men should have differed widely on this subject. I should think the best solution is, that Egypt was the country where the Greeks most easily saw the inhabitant of interior Africa, many of whom doubtless flocked thither and were settled there, or served in the army as tributaries and provincials, as they have done in later times—and thus they came to be confounded by writers, with the country where alone they knew them, and were considered a part of the indigenous population." Indeed if the ancient Egyptians were negroes, and performed what we know the ancient Egyptians must have performed intellectually and scientifically, then the present state of the African race throughout the world would seem actually to demonstrate as a truth, what many now suppose, viz. that the race is naturally and essentially inferior, intellectually and morally, as well as physically; that even the present attempts to confer on the race the benefits of civilization, by the colonization of American negroes, will prove abortive, and that the now existing republic of Liberia will begin to decline as soon as the influence and directing genius of the Caucasian shall be withdrawn from it, and the race rapidly relapse into the darkness of its original barbarism.

But we return to the general subject. The reflection probably will still arise in some minds that these same causes already referred to, operating through long and successive ages, may have produced all the existing differences in the races. It has been already shown, however, according to the statements of Prichard, Lawrence and Wiseman themselves, that the existing divisions of the human family have been the same from the remotest period known to authentic history. Beyond this, then, we must enter the region of conjecture, where every intelligent mind is equally at liberty. According to these writers themselves, we have authentic history for four thousand years; and as far back as our knowledge extends, every circumstance appears to warrant us in be-

believing, that the varieties and influences of seasons, climates, food, and every other thing in external nature, as well as human nature itself, were always the same, substantially, as now. If, then, *natural causes* within the last four thousand years, *could not* produce such a formation or conversion of races, how probable or how reasonable is it, that the same natural causes, within the previous two thousand years, (or even four thousand, which is two thousand more than the common chronological existence of the world,) could have produced such a formation or conversion? To suppose the existence of any combination of natural causes so *entirely different* from those of which we have ever had any knowledge, and that such combination of causes existed just a sufficient period of time to produce such wonderful results, and *then ceased*, is neither more nor less than to suppose a *miracle*. It is simply obviating all difficulties by the supposition, which, in the beginning of our inquiry, we presented as possible, viz. that one kind of human beings may have been originally formed, and at some subsequent period an instantaneous and radical change *may* have been produced by the same power which formed their original progenitors. But certainly a far more probable miracle than this, is, that different progenitors were originally formed, each pair best adapted, as we find all animals are, to the quarter of the globe in which they were placed by their Creator: and whether at one and the same time or at different times; whether we suppose some of these different creations to have occurred subsequent to the deluge, or two thousand years, or even five thousand years before, need make no difference as to the result. In this connection we will offer another extract from Dr. Wiseman. He says: "The inhabitants of the Indian Peninsula differ from us in colour and shape so materially, as to be classified in another race. Klaproth, to account for this circumstance, imagines that the Indo-Germanic nations were saved from the deluge, on two chains of mountains, the Himalaya and the Caucasus. From the former, according to him, descended the Indians to the South, and the Goths to the North, from the other came the Medes, Persians, and the Pelasgians. He then supposes the dark complexion of the Hindoos to have been produced by intermixture with a dusky race

who were there before them, having been saved from the same scourge upon the mountains of Malabar. But all this, (continues Dr. Wiseman,) is pure conjecture, without the slightest foundation in history or in local tradition, and has been devised simply to escape from the difficulty which is more easily met by allowing that a nation may change its characteristics so as to pass into a different family from what its language proves was its original stock." But in reply to this mode of reasoning, by Dr. Wiseman, we might readily say to him, that to suppose a whole race, so essentially distinct as the negro is from the Caucasian, to have descended from the same source with the Caucasian, or rather from the Caucasian itself, in view of the facts and considerations already presented, as to time, place, and condition, is altogether as conjectural, has just as slight a foundation either in history or local tradition, and is devised simply to escape from the difficulty which is more easily, naturally and reasonably met, either on the supposition of Klaproth, or on the supposition of different original progenitors of the human family. Why go beyond this fair and reasonable supposition, to seek for a cause of the distinction of the races, when this sufficiently accounts for it, and neither sacrifices reason nor conflicts with facts, but rather consists with all facts hitherto discovered?

We may now glance at the philological aspect of the subject. As was hinted in the last quotation, Dr. Wiseman draws what he deems a strong argument from the affinity of languages. He says: "Even those who deny the common origin of the race, allow that similarity and identity, or similarity and strong grammatical affinity of language between nations however distant, cannot be the result of chance, but proves some real connection of origin or early relationship."

Here Dr. Wiseman takes too much for granted, for equally valid authorities differ with him, both as to facts and conclusions.

The American Encyclopædia speaks thus: "The Chinese and the languages of India, are known to have existed at least four thousand years, the one monosyllabic and atactic, the other or others polysyllabic and syntactic. It does not appear that in all that period of time, they have approached nearer to each other, and in their gene-

ral structure and character they remain now, as they were as far back as we can trace them. Why have not the Chinese and the Sanscrit, or its cognate languages, in the course of four thousand years approximated in the least to each other? How comes it that the polysynthetic forms of the American languages extend from one end of this continent to the other, and that one general grammatical system pervades them all, and appears to have been, from the beginning of time, peculiar to the races of American red men? The strong tendencies of languages *to preserve their organic structure*, can alone account in a satisfactory manner for these phenomena. If such a tendency be admitted, and we do not see that it can reasonably be denied, it must have existed in the primitive language as well as in those that are supposed to have been derived from it. But when we see that these have preserved their grammatical characters unchanged, for more than four thousand years, we cannot believe, that in the two thousand years preceding, according to the generally received chronology, language should have suffered so many changes in its organic structure, as to form new languages so essentially and entirely different from each other in that respect, to say nothing of the difference which exists in the etymology of words."

The writer before referred to, in the *Edinburgh Review*, says substantially the same thing. Rev. Dr. Horace Bushnell, in his dissertation on language, in his recent work on theology, speaks thus: "When our modern ethnologists undertake as they say in behalf of the scriptures, to establish the unity of the human race, by tracing all human languages to some common source, through a comparison of terms or names found in them all, they would seem to controvert the authority of scripture by their argument, quite as effectually as they sustain it. No fair construction can be given to the history of the dispersion as recorded by Moses, without understanding him to affirm the virtual destruction of the one language by a miracle." Again he says: "It cannot be pretended by those who are most sanguine in the hope of some time reducing all existing languages to a common origin or parentage, that the investigations hitherto made have yielded any definite token of success; except within certain acknowledged limits of affinity. The fact that there



are living languages between which *no real affinity* can be discovered, still exists in all its integrity, and therefore we must admit the existence of *racés originally distinct*, or else we must refer *these languages* to the scripture solution of a miracle." Thus Wiseman and Bushnell, both holding the doctrine of original unity of race, differ as to the argument from language. But should we even concede to Dr. Wiseman all the alleged affinity of language among men, still his conclusion would not necessarily follow. It might indeed tend, as he says, to "prove some real connection of origin" in the races: for if the *same Deity* be the *same Creator, the Father* of all, then whensoever or wheresoever he created them, there is unquestionably "a real connection and relationship." As far as they have existed, or have been traced, the affinities between the original languages of these different races need not *necessarily* be the result of change, nor does it *prove* any real connexion of *human origin* in the races, but may be sufficiently accounted for, and indeed would seem to be necessary from the very nature of things. Whensoever or wheresoever (it may have been contemporaneously with, or a thousand years before Adam,) the progenitors of the African, or of any other race, first found themselves on the face of the earth, the heavens above, and the earth beneath, and objects around them, were generally the same—their rational faculties, and consequently wants, were in a great degree the same. The same causes, then, under the same circumstances, would naturally produce the same effects; that is, the same way and manner of expressing wants as well as of gratifying them. Hence it should rather seem most surprising, should there appear no affinity in their languages. We should almost expect that there would be no essential difference, though the races might be on different hemispheres, and each totally unconscious of the existence of the other. On the supposition of different creations of human beings, it is very easy to suppose all, and even much more than the similarity that does exist in human languages.

Thus we perceive that *no argument or fact* can be adduced, to prove any thing as regards the original unity of the human family.

We will now give the summing up of the inquiries of

several of the writers, who have written most largely on the subject, as advocates of the theory of original unity of race. The American Encyclopædia says: "Whether the Africans are descended from a *negro Adam*, or from a descendant of Noah, conducted thither from Asia, the first of them receiving their black complexion from the heat of the sun, is a problem which can never be solved."

Near the beginning of this inquiry, Dr. Lawrence asks: "How is man affected by the external influences of climate, food, way of life? Are these or any others operating on beings originally alike, sufficient to account for all the diversities hitherto observed—or must we suppose that different kinds of men were created originally, each one for its own situation! If we adopt the supposition of a single species, what country did it first inhabit? And what was the appearance of the original man? Was he a Patagonian, or an Esquimaux, a negro or a Georgian? Such are the inquiries which claim our attention, in a zoological survey of the human species. To suppose that it is in my power to furnish satisfactory replies, would be a degree of presumption which it is hardly necessary for me to disclaim." Again, near the close of his inquiries, he says: "Yet, if it be allowed that all men are of the same species, it does not follow that they descended from the same family. We have no data for determining this point: it could only be settled by a knowledge of the facts, which have long ago been involved in the impenetrable darkness of antiquity." The writer in the Edinburgh Review makes substantially the same remarks. In his closing remarks on the sum of the evidence which he has presented in favour of the theory of original unity of race, the author of the "*Vestiges of Creation*," says: "After all, it may be regarded as still an open question, whether mankind is of one or more than one origin. The first human generation may have consisted of *many pairs*, though situated at one place, and they may have been considerably different from each other in external characters. And we are equally bound to admit, though this does not seem to have occurred to any other speculator—that barring any objection of a philological nature, there may have been at least one other line or source of origination, shall we say in Africa, which resulted in the production of a being identical in species, though variously marked." And finally, even Dr. Wiseman, near the

close of his inquiries, in his more impartial mood, concedes thus: "But we too indulge here *in conjecture*. I am willing to own it. You may show that there is *no impossibility* of one family having sprung up from another. Yet we must own that the methods whereby nature has proceeded, are yet a mystery—so that the *philosopher* must be content with *conjecture*. Nor can such conjectures be regarded as rash and unwarrantable, so long as the fact which they are intended to account for, is certain and incontestible." So that even so predetermined an advocate of original unity of race must, as a philosopher, on his own admission, be "content with conjecture," and willing to admit that he has not made out his case so conclusively, as to refuse the conjecture of *different* original progenitors, as rash and unwarrantable, so long as the fact which *it* is intended to account for, is certain and incontestible. And the latter conjecture will appear to some, certainly, as more consistent with reason, revelation, and the universal experience of mankind, than the former.

We have now seen, that the differences between the five—or, if we accept the hypothesis of Cuvier—three grand divisions of the human family, are so great and numerous, that *equal differences* in the inferior animals and vegetables, unquestionably constitute different species.

We have now seen, by *the admission of every writer*, whom we have found to express an opinion on the subject, that the same marked distinctions between the races has existed from the remotest period of which we have any authentic history, or full four thousand years.

We have seen by *the admission of every writer*, whom we have found to express an opinion on the subject, that within the whole period known to human history, *no known operation of physical causes* has been found sufficient to form a new race, or convert one race into another, nor to make the slightest perceptible progress towards such a formation or conversion. And we have seen, from the conflicting statements and opinions of writers, and from other considerations, that no definite argument in support of the original unity of the human family, can be drawn from any *real or supposed* affinity of languages.

Aside from the power of early education, the strength and tenacity of early impressions, it seems among the

most difficult of all things yet considered, to account for the fact, that men adhere so tenaciously to a theory of the origin of the human races, which has so many and serious difficulties to encounter, and by which there appears to be nothing possible to be gained. While the supposition that a diversity of original creations by the Supreme Father appears to obviate every difficulty, remove all obscurity, and harmonize perfectly with all the known operations of the gracious author of nature, in adapting all living beings to the admirable and perfect, though to us, wonderful and incomprehensible laws by which he governs the universe.

*Nashville, Tenn.*

C. M. T.

#### ART. VIII.—POPULAR EDUCATION.

*Thirty-Second Annual Report of the Controllers of the Public Schools of the City and County of Philadelphia, comprising the First School District of Pennsylvania, for the year ending June 30, 1850. pp. 243.*

THE subject of education is always one of high interest, as connected with the intellectual, social, and moral progress of a people. We shall, therefore, offer no apology for the extended notice which we take of the pamphlet at the head of this article, in which we are furnished with a full and detailed account of the provisions made by the City and County of Philadelphia for the education of its youthful population. These, indeed, are most ample, and reflect great credit on the enlightened liberality of those through whose instrumentality they are enjoyed.

The Report is published in conformity with the laws of the Commonwealth, and from it we learn that there were in the district which it embraces, (a single County of the State it will be observed,) on the 30th June, 1850, 256 schools, 727 teachers, 81 male and 646 female, 45,383 scholars, 23,706 male and 21,677 female, the cost of whose support for the year above was \$332,433 21. The num-



ber and designation of these Schools are, High School 1, Normal School 1, Grammar Schools 53, Primary Schools 130, Secondary Schools 29, Unclassified 40, all of which are under the supervision of 23 Controllers and 210 Directors, distributed through the eleven Districts which comprise the City and County of Philadelphia.

It will be observed that a very large proportion of the teachers are females, being to the males fully as 8 to 1. These are employed in all the Schools, except the High School, sometimes with a male principal, as in the Boys' Grammar Schools, but mostly having the entire charge of the School under their own control. The secret of this is explained by the Normal School, which was established for the express purpose of improving the system pursued in the public schools by the previous training of those who are to be their future teachers. Here they are thoroughly educated in all the subjects they will be required to teach; trained in the most improved methods of imparting instruction; have opportunities afforded them for practice in teaching and governing; and are thus prepared to enter at once upon their duties as qualified instructors, and not as mere novices, to experiment upon those who may be so unhappy as to be first committed to their charge. To this school, which has now been in operation three years, females only are admitted, and only such as design to follow the business of teaching. All who apply for entrance must be at least fifteen years of age, and give proof of their capacity by undergoing a strict written examination. If this is satisfactory, they are admitted as probationers, and continue in the school two years appropriately engaged, when they undergo another *written* examination, and, if found qualified, receive from the Board of Controllers a certificate to the effect that they are "deemed competent to impart instruction in the branches taught in the Public Grammar Schools, and to discharge properly the duties of a teacher." The advantages of such a system of training and providing teachers for their public schools, in sustaining and elevating their character, are too obvious to need remark; besides that it opens a path of usefulness well suited to the genius of the female mind, and better adapted to the tastes and comfort of woman, than the ill-paid drudgery of working with the needle for a support. The needle, except in the way of household duties, should be her pleasure, not her task.

Another provision of these Controllers which this Report brings to view, exhibits in them a wise forethought and a philanthropic spirit—we mean the establishment of public night-schools for those whose situations or employments do not permit them to attend upon instruction during the day. There is in every city a large class of this description, who, cut off by the circumstances just mentioned, from all opportunities of education during the day, grow up in almost total ignorance, and their families being generally as ignorant as themselves, they have no opportunity for intellectual cultivation at home, and usually find it a dull place after the avocations of the day. Hence they are led to seek enjoyments suited to their tastes abroad, and either spend their evenings in places of questionable amusement, or in rambling about the streets, where, if not viciously inclined at first, they are in danger of meeting companions, and tempted to form associations, and join in pursuits not only ruinous to their own morals, but highly detrimental to the public interests. Indeed, than the night street-school we can conceive of no worse for a growing lad. Its teachers are usually the most proficient in every thing bad, whilst its scholars, however inferior in the outset, usually display an emulation which soon enables them to reach an unhappy equality with their instructors. It is in these schools that all our young vagabonds and criminals are educated. Here they are trained for those nightly brawls, engine-fights, and other disgraceful scenes with which our large cities, and Philadelphia not among the least, are from time to time afflicted. A night-school within doors, and under proper instructors, however, is a very different thing, and calculated to be as beneficial as the other is injurious. It exerts at once a positive and a negative influence—it saves from evil and it imparts good. We say, therefore, that it exhibited a wise forethought and a philanthropic spirit on the part of these gentlemen, when they took measures to operate on this part of their community and meet their wants, by resolving “to open night-schools in each of the sections for male adults from the age of sixteen upwards.” They opened the schools, and the result of their experiment was that they soon had more applicants for admission than they could accommodate. It can hardly be doubted that similar schools might be advantageously opened in any of our cities, large or small; and though

we are happily free from this rowdy class of citizens, probably on account of our peculiar institution, yet we should be glad to see one or more of the kind opened in our own.

But it is to the High School, as the perfection of their educational system, that the bulk and most interesting part of the Report relate. This completes the work which is commenced in the Primary and continued in the Grammar Schools. And though this institution bears the name of *School*, it is in fact a *College*, being provided with the usual faculty in languages, ancient and modern, (French and Spanish,) mathematics, belles-lettres, physical, moral, and political science, and conferring degrees upon its graduates and alumni; it does not, however, as far as we can ascertain, ever bestow these distinctions upon any but those educated within its own walls, as is usually done by other colleges. When the High School was first established, all its students were required to pursue a classical course, but at its re-organization, in 1840, its Controllers very wisely modified the studies so as "to meet the varying wants of individuals," and it is now left optional with parents and guardians to select for their sons or wards one of the three following courses:

1. The principal course, which excludes the Latin and Greek, but embraces all the other studies of the school. This course extends through four years, and is recommended to parents who design their sons for pursuits connected with trade, commerce, and the mechanic arts.

2. The classical course, which excludes the French and Spanish, but includes all the other studies attended to in the school. This course, likewise, extends through four years, and is recommended to such as design to become teachers, or to follow professions in which a knowledge of the ancient languages is deemed desirable.

3. The English course, extending through two years, which excludes both the ancient and modern languages, but embraces, with other studies, natural and political philosophy, chemistry, and drawing. This course is recommended to those who cannot continue in the High School long enough to take a full course.

The principal course has generally had the greatest number pursuing it, but it is worthy of remark that, during the last three terms, the numbers pursuing this course have gradually declined from 58 to 53 and 52 per cent., whilst

those pursuing the classical course have as gradually advanced from 29 to 31 and 33 per cent. The English course has never been a favourite one, the number pursuing it at no period having ever been higher than 16 per cent.

Between the High School, by its very organization, and the Public Schools, a most intimate connection exists—they form parts of one system. None are admitted to the former who have not been first members of the latter. Nor are the privileges of the High School bestowed upon all the pupils of the Public Schools indiscriminately. They are held out as rewards to those who have most distinguished themselves by their successful scholarship and good behaviour, and it is only the best even of these, the *optimi optimorum*, who are finally admitted to the honours of matriculation. The High School has neither time nor money to throw away upon the dunce, the idler, or the vicious: the honour must be first merited, and then won, before it can be enjoyed.

Examinations for admission take place every six months, in order to fill up any vacancies that may have occurred in the interval. Some weeks previous, official notice is sent to the different Grammar Schools announcing the time when the examinations will be held, and inviting such as are qualified to become candidates to present themselves before the examiners. When these make their appearance, neither their names nor that of the schools from which they come, are enquired or known, until the examination is over. Each candidate has a number given him, and is known only as No. 1 or No. 2, &c., till his fate is decided, and thus all room for partiality or favouritism, either as respects the individual or the school from which he comes, is excluded, and the candidate succeeds or fails by his merit or want of merit alone. The examinations are not oral but written, the candidates being allowed only slates, pencils, pen, and paper, and thus, without books or consultation, are required, from their own previous acquisitions and stores of knowledge, to write out answers to a series of printed questions in all the different departments of study which are necessary for admission. The answers thus written are examined by the various professors, and a number affixed to them to denote the degree of excellence which they exhibit. When the examination of all the candidates is finished,



the numbers on the exercises are added up, and those who reach a fixed average receive certificates of admission, those who fall below it are rejected. This mode of examination applies a pretty severe test, and whilst it secures for the High School a body of well and nearly equally trained students, it exercises a most happy influence on both the teachers and pupils of the various Grammar Schools, stimulating their exertions at once to secure the honour of success, and prevent the mortification of failure. How it works is evidenced by the fact that at the examination in February, 1850, out of 250, 95 were admitted and 110 rejected; whilst in July of the same year, out of 127, 85 were admitted and 42 rejected.

On this whole scheme of education, from the Primary School to the Central High School, the citizens of Philadelphia and its County may well congratulate themselves. It is in many respects an admirable one, and not the least so that it throws its portals freely open, without money and without price, to those who would not otherwise be able to incur the expense of a liberal education. Every boy in Philadelphia of good character, leisure, ability, and industry, has provided for him, free of cost, the means of a first rate education. And who knows how many an humble, but talented lad, who but for this provision, might be condemned to pass his life in obscurity, a mere hewer of wood and drawer of water to those of inferior abilities, may yet, through its means, be drawn forth and develop powers and exhibit performances which will at once honour and adorn and dignify his state? Who can tell how much talent and genius have been buried and lost for want of such encouragement?

“*Paulum sepultæ distat inertię  
Celata virtus.*”

There is no reason whatever that our merchants' clerks, our mechanics, our farmers, and our youth in general, whatever occupations in life they may design to follow, should not, if time and circumstances permit, be liberally educated. There is no danger that they will, in consequence of it, become worse citizens, or more unskilful in their employments. If it has no other effect, it will at least tend to elevate them in their own self-respect, and by opening to them new and refined sources of pleasure, save them from those of a different character, to which

the uncultivated intellect too often finds it necessary to resort ; besides, that it will better qualify them to discharge the duties of any higher station to which, from the popular nature of our institutions, they may be, and are not unfrequently, called to fill. From the time of Franklin down to the present, men of this order have exerted no unimportant influence upon the progress and improvement of our country in government and science, and in the works of useful and ornamental art.

There is a notion generally prevalent, that a liberal education, if it does not generate habits wholly idle, tends to create a distaste for employments, other than those of a literary nature. That this may in some degree be true, we will not undertake to disprove. Still, we do not believe that well educated men are disposed to be more idle than those who are not, and if any are so, the fault is to be attributed not to their education, but to their moral constitution. Nor do we think there is any reasonable ground to fear, for many years to come at least, that the mechanic and other arts will be checked and retrograde for want of those to carry them forward because of the progress of education. We believe there will yet be found many a Burritt, who will blow the bellows with one hand whilst he holds the Latin grammar in the other ; and many a Wild (not Jonathan, but the learned tailor,) who will stitch all day, and sit up half the night to read Greek, Hebrew, and Arabic. He, who under the impulses of that undefinable thing called genius, is bent on being a scholar, a sculptor, a painter, or a poet, will be a scholar, a sculptor, a painter, or a poet, though you should fix him down to a cobbler's bench, or send him out to mind sheep ; whilst he whose promptings lead him in another direction, will be turned from it with equal difficulty.

*"Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret."*

In ordinary cases, where genius is not concerned, the occupations of the father will greatly influence those of the son, and where, from the superior education of the latter, a tendency to deviate from them is produced, it is usually the honourable and commendable one of acting in a higher and more extended sphere.

The practical working of the scheme of education we have been considering in Philadelphia, sustains the conclusions at which we have arrived. The Report furnishes us with a register of the occupations followed by the

parents of those who have been educated at the High School, and of the pursuits followed by the pupils themselves after they have left the institution. Among the former we find (not to enumerate them all) bakers and blacksmiths, carpenters and clergymen, farmers and fishermen, gardeners and gentlemen, lawyers and labourers, plasterers and physicians, tailors and teachers, stone cutters and store keepers, watchmakers and watchmen; and among the latter, as we expected, bakers and blacksmiths, clerks and clergymen, dentists and dyers, farmers and merchants, lawyers and doctors, printers and teachers, &c., &c., but singularly enough, no "gentlemen" nor "watchmen." And what has been the result of this high mental training of the sons of bakers, and blacksmiths, and carpenters, &c.? What elevating or refining tendency has it had upon them in their after pursuits in life? Has it not proved a useless expenditure of time and money, and would not their intellectual advancement been quite as great had they been instructed in only those three cardinal branches of all popular school education, reading, writing, and arithmetic? Let the Report answer:

"There are certainly not less than thirteen hundred of these young men now engaged in active life in the city of Philadelphia, at ages varying from fifteen to twenty-seven years. All these young men are bound together by a tie of affection for the Public Schools, and particularly for the High School, the strength of which is even more than proportionate to the benefit they have received. A large part of them, all who were in the school as long as two years, are united in a general society, known as the 'Alumni Association,' numbering now between five and six hundred. Besides this, there are smaller associations, meeting weekly as literary or debating societies, for the purpose of following up the intellectual culture which they commenced at school. The oldest of these, the 'Otis Institute,' was formed April 3, 1841, and numbers over one hundred members. The 'Bache Institute' was formed in October, 1848, and also contains more than one hundred members. The 'Hart Institute' was formed in July, 1850, and contains about sixty members. These societies differ from the ordinary literary societies in colleges, inasmuch as they do not consist of the undergraduates, but are made up entirely of those who have left school. They discuss literary and scientific subjects, prepare essays and lectures, appoint committees to report on questions of science and art submitted by the members, and receive communications on these subjects from such of their members as have removed to other parts of the country."

Such results are at once highly satisfactory and encouraging; and we notice them with more pleasure because Pennsylvania has for a long time been among the States in which the progress of popular education has been most slow. From a memorial presented to her Legislature, in 1830, we learn that there were not more than one hundred and fifty thousand children in all the schools, public and private, throughout the State, though its population at that period was nearly a million and a half. In 1834, the Controllers of public schools in the city and county of Philadelphia, reported the number of pupils within that limit at 6,767. Four years later the Central High School was established, by which a new impulse was given to the whole educational machinery, and a new spirit infused, throughout all its departments, in those who were to direct and control its movements; and as the result, we now find the number of pupils increased seven fold what it was sixteen years ago, and are presented with an educational system not only admirable in its details, but which has proved most effective in its operations. The good work thus commenced in its metropolitan county we hope will spread to other parts of the State, and every succeeding year bring forth more abundant and richer fruits to cheer, encourage, and reward those who have been most active in promoting and sustaining it.

Had we the proper documents at hand, we should like—though it would be far from a labour of love—to show how much our own State is behind even some of our younger sister States in the attention she has paid to, and the provision she has made for the education of her people, if not in theory, at least in fact. We have, it is true, our State College and our Military Academy, both noble institutions, and well worthy the liberal care bestowed upon them by our legislature; but the one or two hundred students annually educated in these—the sons of wealth and intelligence for the most part—would perhaps be equally well educated did these institutions not exist. But with the great mass of our population the case is different. These are not only cut off by circumstances from all the advantages which these seminaries of learning hold out, but, what is most to be deplored, seem, for the most part, neither to know the value of education, nor to feel the want of it. This is true more particularly of our rural districts, but even in other places, where from the charac-



ter of society we should expect to find a different sentiment prevailing, there is a surprising apathy and indifference on the subject, and our youth are too generally hurried into business at an age when they would be better employed with their teachers and their books. It is to the former portion of our State, however, that our present remarks are directed. Our people there need greatly to be roused and stimulated on the subject of education. They must not only be provided with good common schools, but they must be made to see the benefit that would accrue to their children from attendance on them. If we are asked, How this is to be done? we reply, by proceeding in the same way as we do when we wish to rouse and stimulate them on any other subject. We must send some one among them, qualified not only by intelligence and education, but by a love for the work, to go from district to district, visit the public schools, enquire into the character and qualifications of the teachers, inspect the mode in which the schools are conducted, and examine the progress of the scholars, hold meetings with the people, and talk to them plainly, and earnestly, and affectionately, and by showing an interest in the subject himself, create an interest in it in the parents likewise, and use every means to persuade and convince them of the importance of a good common school education to the future welfare and respectability of their children. Nor should this effort be a spasmodic one; it should be continued from year to year till a change is created on the subject in the popular mind. When we have created two or three generations of educated men and women, we may then safely commit the work for the future to them; we shall have created a necessity which will not fail to take measures for a proper supply. It is but seldom that parents who have had a little education do not wish their children to have more; whilst the better educated know too well its advantages to be willing to let their children go without it, if it be within the compass of their means to obtain it for them. As the case now stands, it is acknowledged on all hands not only that the provision made by our State for this object is entirely inadequate, but that our system of popular education itself is most wretched. The forty or fifty thousand dollars annually expended by the legislature on our free-schools, except in our city and larger towns, are regarded as almost thrown away. Our people

are intelligent, yet remain ignorant—too large a portion of them cannot read, and a larger cannot write. Every effort hitherto made to put things in a better train has failed, and but for some slight encouragements in the signs of the times, all hope of future amendment would be lost in despair. The State College in the centre, the City College in the south, and in the north the Wofford College, whose corner-stone was laid on the last anniversary of our independence, are favourably situated to exert a beneficial influence and work a happy change. These, together with the many excellent private schools, both male and female, which dot our State, it is yet to be hoped may prove as so many centres from which a literary atmosphere shall emanate and spread until their continually widening circles shall meet and embrace within their limits every son and daughter of the State.

ART. IX.—GLEANINGS FROM NEGLECTED POETRY.

1. *Hesiodi Carmina: Apollonii Argonautica: Musæi Carm: de Her: et Leand: Coluthi Raptus Helen: Quinti Pos-thomer: Tryphiiodori Excid: Il: Tzetæ Antehom, etc: Gr. et Lat. etc.* Ed. F. S. LEHRS. Asi, Pisandri, Panyasidis, Chærii, Antimachi, Fragment, etc. F. DUBNER. par DIDOT. 1840, roy. 8vo.
2. *The Thesauri of Gronovius and Grævius, with the supplements, etc.* 62 vols. fol.
3. *Corpus Scriptor: Hist.* BYZANT, NIEBUHR, et al. BONN. 42 vols. 8vo.
4. *The Thesaurus of Bernard Pez.* Bound in 6 vols. fol.

THE little Library which the works indicated in our rubric constitute, is there set down not to be reviewed, (enormous task verily would that be!) but merely to inform the reader of the territories into which we have made a foray for the materials of the entertainment, such as it is, which we are about to serve up.

It has seemed to us one of the most beautiful and touching traits in the noble character of Charles Lamb, that he sympathized with every thing which was neglected, and

filled a huge volume with extracts, copied from authors whom the world treated with indifference and careless forgetfulness. Without straying into the very obscurest nooks of Literature, whence many gems may be brought forth, there is much in sundry of its less known and little celebrated paths, which merits juster and more attentive consideration than it has received, being overshadowed by the great light of the Master of Letters. Your fifth and fourth rate writers would have been better appreciated, if there had not been a superior third and second class; and these again would have shone brilliantly, had they not been eclipsed by the splendours of first rate geniuses. It is not because those inferior classes are obscure and unknown that they deserve to be drawn forth from back shelves; or that it argues any learning, research, or discrimination to bring them forward. They are very well known, but they are comparatively neglected, in the world of letters, and therefore, it is with a kindly feeling that we view them; they did what they could according to their gifts.

Now, while all the world does honour to HOMER, how few, comparatively, think it worth while to look into the other remains of the old epic poetry of Greece. True, there is none of it which can rival or even approach the perennial flow of the old Smyrniote's mighty fountain of song. But Sir William Jones, in his beautiful, graceful, and learned Commentaries on Asiatic Poetry, has pointed out with a true poet's eye, very noble things in Apollonius Rhodius, who might never have written, it is true, had not Homer sung before, but who, had Homer's songs been lost, would have now held a place in the first rank of older epic bards. We cannot mention Homer, without saying a passing word about one of his translators, who, as the translator of Homer, is seldom heard of and little known. He is famous enough as a philosopher, but perhaps it is not everybody who has had the curiosity to examine Thomas Hobbe's quaint, rough, unpoetical version of the grand old Ionian. As the work of his old age, it is certainly remarkable; and with all of its faults, it is spirited, nervous, and sometimes exceedingly happy. For example, in the first book of the Iliad, he thus renders the recognition of Pallas by Achilles, in the quarrel between that chieftain and Agamemnon:

“ But Juno——

Sent Pallas down, who coming stood behind  
Achilles, and laid hold upon his hair,  
Whereat Achilles wondering in his mind,  
Turn'd back, *and by the terror of her eyes,*  
*Knew her.*”

Again, in the scene between Hector and Andromache, in the sixth book, he renders :

“ Now Hector met her, with their little boy  
That in the nurse's arms was carried,  
*And like a star upon her bosom lay*  
*His beautiful and shining golden head.*”

And in the Odyssey, in book twenty-first, where Ulysses strings his bow, he has :

“ Then with his left hand *he the string essay'd,*  
*It sounded like the singing of a swallow.*”

And in the begininng of the next book, he says :

“ Ulysses then himself delivereth  
Of his foul rags, *and leaped up to the sill,*  
*With bow in hand and arrows tipt with death.*”

We think that these are instances of felicitous translation, but we fear that we could not produce so many of a similar kind, as benevolence might induce us to wish that we could do, for the sake of the persevering old sage of Malmesbury.

If we look into the oldest epic remains of Greece, we shall not find much, after Homer and Hesiod, to the time of Alexander ; only a few fragments—*membra disjecta*—indeed, gathered out of various authors who have happened to quote here and there a straggling passage. We do not even know the title or titles of the poems of ASIUS the Samian, who probably flourished about 700 years before Christ ; and scarce twenty lines of his poetry have been preserved. Of these, however, the following fragment found in Athenæus, book xii. chap. 6, (or p. 525, E. F.) touching the luxury of the Samians, does not give an unfavourable impression of his verse, and, moreover, illustrates ancient habits :



“Thus, when they’d combed their curling locks, they went  
 To Juno’s fane, with beauteous garments cloth’d,  
 And with their snowy vestments swept the plain  
 Of the broad earth ; while by the breeze were waved  
 Their gold-bound locks, o’er which, like cicadæ,  
 The golden hair-brooch sat ; and round their arms,  
 Like buckler’d warrior, bracelets curious-wrought—”

As for PISANDER of Rhodes, who belongs to about 648 B. C., not four lines of his *Heraclea* have been saved. According to the Ravenna Scholia on the Clouds of Aristophanes, (l. 1047,) Pisander says that the warm baths at the famous straits of Thermopylæ were produced by Minerva for the solace of Hercules when wearied by his labours.\* The luxury, too, is mentioned in the *Odyssey*. The Turks are far ahead of us in civilization, in this respect ; and when we contrast (for comparison is out of the question) one of our pitiful, little, baby, coffin-like, bathing tubs, with an oriental bath—(which is essentially the same as the old classical *balnea*)—we may well perspire at the mortifying reflection, of how much warmer a tribute of praise the barbarous Moslem bath deserves, than our own civilized, niggardly, tureen-like, tin dish of a contrivance. As to the bath with which the Ravenna Scholia represents Pisander as saying that Minerva furnished Hercules, we will venture to say that it it was one worthy of the goddess giver, and of the great hero who floundered in it, and that although it *was* at Thermopylæ, yet that the large-limbed Hercules was not at all straightened therein. We shall pass by without a word the *Heroica Theogamia* of the Psuedo-Pisander.

Between fifty and sixty lines have been preserved of PANYASIS, the Halicarnassian, who flourished in the fifth century before Christ, and who was received by the Alexandrian critics into the epic canon. Of his *Ionica* not a fragment has been found, out of its seven thousand verses, and of the nine thousand verses, in fourteen books, of his *Heraclea*, only the few alluded to survive. These indicate that he was a jolly temperance bard, who appreciated wine and deprecated tipsiness.—[Stobæ Flor. xviii, 22.]

\* We compel ourselves to abstain from a long digression on baths, suggested by Pisander, to which we are tempted for the purpose of quoting some curious Latin poetry by Alcadinus and Eustasius, on the Baths of Puteoli!

"Equal, he bold in feast, and he in war  
 Who sways grief-bearing battles, where the few  
 Courageous wait impetuous Mars ;—accord  
 I equal renown to both. \* \* \*  
 He seems to me to have no vital spring,  
 To live no life of a stout-hearted man,  
 Who holds from wine desire, and stupid drinks  
 Some other draught. To mortals wine's a succour  
 Equal with fire, noble, driving off  
 Ills, like an antidote, of every song  
 Companion ; it partakes a lovely part  
 Of graceful bloom, of choral-dance, of beauty,  
 Of long'd-for love. Hence, with a joyous mind,  
 Ought you to drink at feast, nor gorg'd with food  
 Like vulture sit oblivious of enjoyment."

He also gives a caveat.—[Athenæ ii. p. 36. D.]

"If when one drinks, turning away he goes  
 From the sweet feast tow'rds home, no ill he meets ;  
 But if he drives beyond the third part's measure,  
 Drinking intemp'rately, then Insolence  
 And Bane and Evils company with men."

Of the four recorded poets who bore the name of CHÆRILUS, (one of them being worthless,) we have only to notice the Samian author of the epic entitled *Persica*, born perhaps, about 470 B. C., received by the Alexandrians into the epic canon, and afterwards expelled from that category, and Antimachus substituted in his place, on account, it is said, of an assertion of Heraclides Ponticus, that Plato preferred Antimachus to Chærilus. He is quoted by Aristotle, who points out the inferiority of his similes to those of Homer. Chærilus seems to have felt the exhaustion of epic subjects in his time—and indeed, Homer, so far from standing chronologically at the head of the epic development, was certainly the mature bloom, the fullest flower, of a long antecedent budding and blossoming of the *Epica Vis*. Thus our Samian appears as a *laudator temporis acti*, in the following lines, grubbed by Victorinus *ex Græcis Commentariis*, and edited by Gaisford and others: [Gaisf. in edit. *Rhetorices*, p. 448.]

"Ah! happy in that time he skilled in song,  
 The Muses' servant, when the meadow yet  
 Was all unshorn ; but everything is now

Distributed, and each art hath its bounds,  
 And like the hindmost in the race we're left,  
 Nor can one wistful-looking yet find place  
 To drive in new-yok'd mode his chariot."

Yes, when the meadow of poesy was still fresh and luxuriant in its uncultured richness, ample was the scope for the harvest of the poet; but now, gardened out in epic and dramatic, and lyric fields, well defined and bounded, no easy task is it to drive freely where your muse listeth, or to find a new path for her exercise; and, besides, the very subject of the Samian bard had been already sung before him by the loftiest genius. His great rival Æschylus, had already been crowned for the *Persæ*. However, it is something that his poem on the Athenians' victory over Xerxes, was decreed to be recited in public (at the Panathenian festival,) together with the poems of Homer. Josephus in his work against Apion, (I) quotes Chærilus as mentioning the Hebrews among the forces of Xerxes; the description is not flattering, however, which the historian (as Eusebius also in the *Præparatio Evangelica*, ix. 9.) supposes to be intended for the Hebrew forces.

"Them a race follow'd wondrous to behold,  
 Uttering Phœnician speech, inhabiting  
 The mounts of Solyma and the broad marsh,  
 Squalid their locks round-tonsur'd, and above  
 They wore the horse-head skin harden'd in smoke."

Stobæus, [Flor. xxvii, 1.] quotes a line of Chærilus against all swearing.

"Nor just nor unjust oath there needs to be."

And from the following lines quoted by Athenæus, [xi. p. 464, D.]

"I hold my wealth in hand, a broken potsherd  
 Wreck'd fragment of the feasters, such as oft  
 The winds of Bacchus cast upon the shores  
 Of insolent strife,"

it would seem that the poet was sometimes in, or rather out of, his cups.

The few fragments of ANTIMACHUS excepted, we must come to a later age for epic remains, and we find whole

poems preserved of authors who merit the attention of the curious.

In the thirteenth century, a poem was discovered upon the Loves of Hero and Leander, which was first published by Musurus with a Latin version, but without any conjecture as to its date. It is supposed, however, to be certainly not earlier than the fifth century of the christian era, if indeed it be so old. The style is quite different from the old Greek epics, and presents pretty specimens of what are termed *concelli*, in which the Italian, Spanish, and certain older English poets, delighted to display their ingenuity. There have been a variety of translations of Hero and Leander, (now attributed to MUSÆUS, the Greek grammarian,) among which it is only necessary to mention those of Marlowe, Stapleton, and Stirling, in English; Stollberg and Passow, in German; and Bernardo Tasso and Bettoni, in Italian. There is a French translation, also, by Marot.

This little epic, if so may be called a poem of some three hundred and forty lines, opens with an invocation to the muse to sing the lamp which lit the night-swimmer to his love. And we here say, let no evil-minded critic institute any comparisons with a certain flagitious apostrophe to a lamp, to be found in Aristophanes; to which, indeed, we ought not to have made any allusion. And therefore, we will neither quote the comedian, nor translate the opening of Musæus' poem. He says, that Jove should have placed the lamp among the constellations, which is no very brilliant idea, at least for novelty; and that the sea-echoing strait of old Abydos is still weeping the fate and love of Leander, which is no very wonderful idea, at least for profundity. He says, too, that upon occasion of religious festivals, the youths congregated not so much to offer sacrifices to the gods, as on account of the attraction of the pretty girls; which is a piece of history not so surprising, at least to the church-going young bucks of modern times. On such an occasion was it, that Leander met and courted Hero. The poet lavishes his prettiest conceits upon his portrait of this new Venus.

“She through the temple of the goddess went,  
The virgin Hero, from her graceful face  
Forth-flashing splendour, like the fair-cheek'd moon  
Up-rising; and with roseate colour glow'd



The circle-tips of either snowy cheek,  
 Like, from their buds, bi-coloured roses blowing ;  
 In Hero's limbs, you would have said, appear'd  
 A meadow full of roses, she made blush  
 The color of each limb, and roses glow'd  
 About the ankles of the going maid  
 In snowy chiton clad ; and from her limbs  
 Flow'd many graces,—false the ancients said  
 Three were the graces, for each laughing eye  
 Of Hero with a hundred graces bloom'd."

Very flowry poet, and very rosy, blooming, young lady ! We like the cheeks and the eyes very well ; we think the conceits pretty enough, though nothing new ; but we demur to the meadow of roses. It does not give the conception of a uniformly transfused tint, but rather of a mottled appearance. However, there is another very pretty little notion of a conceit put into the mouths of the youth as, talking one to another, they admiringly comment upon this new belle ; we are afraid that we are not poet enough to compress the original line into a corresponding English one, so we had better give the Greek, *παπταίνων ἰμβύησα, κέρον δ' οὐκ εἶρον ὀπωπής*. For which the uninitiated may read :

"I've wearied looking,  
 Yet no satiety of gaze have found."

The courtship is pretty well told,—torch of love increased by the beams of eyes—beauty of a fair woman keener weapon to men than the winged arrow,—the eye is its path to the deepest wound in the inmost heart,—astonishment, heart-tremour, modesty,—love-giving boldness,—dumb talk of eyes and nods,—hand-seizing,—sighing,—hand-drawing away,—gentle rebuke, which betokens, in fact, encouragement,—it is a way with young ladies, says the poet, and Leander knew it,—so next, a kiss,—only on the neck, however,—impassioned pleading,—down cast eyes,—splendid, vigorous, sustained blushing,—tender reply,—face-hiding,—and finally, positive engagement. That appears to have been the way the thing was done in Musæus' time. Leander became a self-rowing, self-navigating, self-ship, and Hero's lamp was its pole star ! A modern poet couldn't beat that conceit ; and an ancient one could scarcely be freer than our gentleman of the fifth century, when he gets about his two hundred and sixtieth line.

By the way, he says—

“Hero, light-bearer on the lofty-tower,  
What quarter blew the wind with evil blasts,  
Oft the lamp shielded with her garment.”

That is no conceit, but a very natural, obvious, and appropriate proceeding, and, therefore, well and pleasingly introduced by the poet. The well known catastrophe is simply told, and upon the whole, we think it a beautiful little poem, in smoothly flowing verse, and many of the compound epithets are felicitous. But we can't say as much for the dull poem on “The Rape of Helen,” by COLUTHUS, a poet of the sixth century. and so we shall say nothing at all about him.

Putting aside the ORPHIC REMAINS, which are forgeries of a late period, and have little claim to the attention of hunters after fine poetry; and omitting the *Argonautics* of APOLLONIUS RHODIUS, (because Sir William Jones has done them justice, and they can be found in English,) which have good claim to the notice of judges of poetry; we have still a stock of late epic in the *Posthomericæ* of QUINTUS SMYRNÆUS,—fourteen mortal books, in the *Fall of Troy*, by TRYPHIODORUS; and in the *Antehomerica*, *Homericæ*, and *Posthomericæ*, of TZETZES. In this mass of hexameter versification, the curious will find passages which are tolerably good, nearly excellent, and somewhat interesting, amidst much that is dull, heavy, and, as poetry, worthless.

*Apropos*, of obscure poets; we have a volume which we rather think would be a curiosity to our literati. It is a translation (that is, it professes to be,) of a poet not obscure touching being known, but who might as well be so touching any advantage to poetry in his being known. The said poet is Young, author of the tasteless and affected Night Thoughts: the said (alleged) translation is nothing less than a version from a French version of Young, into—guess a dozen years and you'll never come near it. The Night Thoughts done into *French* would be a curiosity of itself, but *that French* done into—we would insert an exclamation or invocation to sundry shades, but it passes all our ejaculatory powers, so we must just simply put it down,—done into *Armeno-Turkish*, is a rare, a singular, a very curious curiosity. “*Young the Philosopher's Thoughts, or Young's Night Thoughts*,” from the English

into the French, from the French into the Armeno-Turkish, by Hohannes Eremyan, printed and bound in handsome style, with very good copper-plate engravings, at Venice, (at the Armenian Monastery of St. Lazarus,) in the year A. D. 1836, and in the 12mo. form, with gilt back, gilt edges, and a ribbon to mark with.

Let us see how Dr. Young looks at this stage of his transmogrifications. First, look on this picture,—

“Tir’d Nature’s sweet restorer, balmy Sleep!  
He, like the world his ready visit pays  
Where Fortune smiles; the wretched he forsakes:  
Swift on his downy pinion flies from woe,  
And lights on lids unsullied with a tear.”

And then on this: The French translator having done Young’s English, Hohannes does the French, (no doubt a just retribution,) in the following style:—

“Ah! sweet sleep, ah! To tired nature rest you give . . . ah! what do I, that it escapes! O, indeed, himself, like those given to the world, from the grieved escapes. From the place that has become prosperous he remains not back. From the voice of Ah and Vah he escapes,—like a bird he flies indeed;—going to light, eyes that have been unmoistened with tears he seeks.”

We have not polished up our translation as we ought, perhaps, to have done, having rendered as verbally and literally as possible, for the sake of displaying to philologists the nature of the idiom. And for the sake of the curious who may wish to transcribe the specimen on a fly leaf of their Young, we will add Hohannes’ original of the above passage, in Anglo-Turkish, (that is, the Turkish in English characters, as the Armeno-Turkish is the Turkish [such as an Armenian would write, however,] in Armenian characters,) since it would not be practicable for our printer to supply the oriental type. It reads thus:—

“Ah! tatlū ouikoo, ah! yôrghoon tabiatè hayat vèrirsin . . . ah! nè èlèyim ki katchayôr: O da kendiyi doonyayè vèrmishlèr gibi, dèrdli ôlandan katchayôr. ikbalin ôldooghoo yèrdèn gèri kalmaz. Ah oo vah sèsisden katchar, koosh gibi outchar da, varûp kònmagha, yash ûla ûslanmamûsh gïozlèr arar.”

This oriental digression, by some freak of association, (perhaps because Commodore Porter used to call the Armenians long-eared, thereby signifying that they were donkeys, [which, by the way, they are not,] and Hohannes

being an Armenian, and his version Armeno-Turkish, recalled this remark of the former minister to Turkey, and donkeys reminded us of *asinus*, and *asinus* called up the *Festum Asinorum*—we mean the extravagant one that once used to be celebrated on the fourteenth of January, in certain parts of France, (the departments of Oise and Somme,) which makes us put a stop to these parentheses, and resume, by saying that the said digression puts it into our head to quote a certain hymn.\*

The rubrics for the said Feast [i. e. Festival] of Asses, have this strange direction.† At the end of the Mass, the priest turning to the people, instead of saying *Ite missa est*, shall thrice neigh: and the people instead of *Deo gratias*, shall thrice respond, *Hinham, Hinham, Hinham*. And during the solemnities of service, the following hymn was sung. It is a literary curiosity, to say nothing of its comparative antiquity, which is worth drawing forth from its obscurity.

“ Orientis partibus,  
Adventavit Asinus,  
Pulcher et fortissimus,  
Sarcinis aptissimus.  
Hez, Sire Asnes, car chantez,  
Belle bouche rechinez,  
Vous aurez du foin assez  
Et de l'avoine à planter.  
Lentus erat pedibus,  
Nisi foret baculus,  
Et eum in clunibus  
Pungeret aculeus.  
Hez, Sire Asnes, &c.  
Hic in collibus Sichem,  
Jam nutritus sub Ruben,  
Transiit per Jordanem,  
Saliit in Bethlehem.  
Hez, Sire Asnes, &c.  
Subjugalis filius  
Asinus egregius  
Asinorum dominus.  
Hez, Sire Asnes, &c.

\* We take occasion here to apologize to our readers for not making all of our quotations in the original; but as it is not convenient to adorn our pages with a great quantity of Greek type, we have taken the liberty of translating as literally as the case would admit, our quotations from that tongue; but as it is not difficult to print quotations from languages which use the Roman type, we leave such intact.

† Du Cange. Gloss. Lat. in verb *Festum*.



Saltu vincit hinnulos,  
 Damas et capreolos,  
 Super dromedarios  
 Velox Madianeos.  
 Hez, Sire Asnes, &c.  
 Aurum de Arabia,  
 Thus et myrrham de Saba,  
 Tulit in Ecclesia  
 Virtus Asinaria.  
 Hez, Sire Asnes, &c.  
 Dum trahit vehicula  
 Multa cum sarcinula,  
 Illius mandibula  
 Dura terit pabula.  
 Hez, Sire Asnes, &c.,  
 Cum aristis hordeum ;  
 Comedit et carduum ;  
 Triticum a palea  
 Segregat in area.  
 Hez, Sire Asnes, &c.  
 Amen, dicas, Asine, (here a genuflection.)  
 Jam satur de gramine :  
 Amen, amen itera  
 Aspernare vetera.  
 Hez va ! hez va ! hez va, hez !  
 Bialx Sire Asnes car allez ;  
 Belle bouche car chantez."

By the way, it is a curious coincidence that the phrase of such great christian antiquity, which gave rise to the appellation of "the Mass," should be of greater pagan antiquity, since the christian "*ite missa est*," is identical with the phrase with which the pagan priest, upon the completion of the sacred rites, turned to the people and dismissed them,—*λαδεις ὑψεις*.\*

That asinine performance, however, appears by no means so out of the way as it might do, when we recollect the extravagances, grossness, and impiety of many of the old monkish "Mysteries." Our readers may remember a specimen of one of them, entitled *Ludus Coventriæ, sive Ludus Corporis Christi*, given in Andrew's continuation of Henry's History of England. But the *LUDUS PASCHALIS, De Adventu et Interitu Antichristi*,† belong ng to the 12th century, is worthy of notice for a certain bizarre pomp

\* Valp. Class. Apuleius. Lib. XI. p. 782. Note k.

† In Pezii Thesaur.

and magnificence in its scenes, as well as for the curious insight it gives into sundry views of the people of the time, and the quaint sort of logic with which the speeches of the interlocutors are tinged.

It opens with a grand scene of the temple of the Lord, and seven regal thrones disposed around. The impersonation of the Gentiles, (*Gentilitas*,) and the king of Babylon enter chanting the following course of reasoning in favour of Polytheism.

“Deorum immortalitas est omnibus colenda,  
Eorum et pluralitas ubique metuenda.  
Stulti sunt et verè fatui qui Deum unum dicunt,  
Quia antiquitatis ritui perpetuæ contradicunt.  
Si enim unum credimus, qui præsit universis,  
Subjectum hunc concedimus contrariè diversis.  
Cùm hinc bonum pacis foveat clementi pietate,  
Hinc belli tumultus moveat sæva crudelitate.  
Sic multa sunt officia diversaque Deorum,  
Quæ nobis sunt indicia discriminis eorum.  
Qui igitur tam multifariis unum dicunt præesse,  
Illorum contrariis est affici necesse.  
Ne ergo unum subijci contrariis dicamus.  
Et his Divinam affici naturam concedamus,  
Ratione hac decernimus Deos discriminare,  
Officia quorum cernimus ab invicem distare.”

They then ascend their throne, and Synagogue with a chorus of Jews enters, singing the following argument for their disbelief in Christianity.—

“Nostra salus in te Domine :  
Nulla vitæ spes in homine :  
Error est in Christi nomine  
Spem salutis æstimari.  
Mirum, si morti succubuit,  
Qui vitam aliis tribuit  
Qui se salvare non potuit,  
Ab hoc quis potest salvari ?  
Non homines, qui est Emanuel,  
Deum adorabis Israël.  
Jesum sicut Deos Ismaël  
Te jubeo detestari.”

The Synagogue ascends her throne, and there enters a grand procession of Church, gorgeously apparelled, at-

tended by Mercy and Justice, the Apostles, the Clergy, the Emperor of the Romans, and his soldiery. The chorus in response to Church, employs a very brief logic,—

“Hæc est fides, ex qua vita,  
In qua mortis lex sopita.  
Quisquis est qui credit aliter,  
Hunc damnamus æternaliter.”

These, too, ascend their throne, Church, Emperor, Apostles, Clergy, sharing the same seat of royalty; and then other kings with their soldiers successively advance, until all the thrones are occupied except one,—it is the seventh.

The emperor now sends his ambassadors to the various kings to demand submission and tribute, alleging history in proof of his claims. The messengers first go to the king of the Franks, who repels their historical assertions by counter allegation, and absolutely refuses to submit. Thereupon the emperor proclaims a threat about the fall of proud hearts, and proceeds with his forces against the refractory king, who hastens to oppose him; a battle ensues, the king of the Franks is conquered, captured, does homage to the emperor, asks for mercy, gives up every thing, and receiving permission from the victor to reign as his vassal, returns to his throne, singing the praises of the august Cæsar.

The ambassadors are next sent on a like mission to the king of the Greeks, who courteously accedes to their demands, goes up himself to the emperor to do homage, and is dismissed with honour to his throne, which he ascends, reiterating the praises of Cæsar as they had been sung by the king of the Franks. Precisely the same scene is enacted with the king of Jerusalem, and the whole Church being now subjected to the Roman dominion, the king of Babylon rises amidst his satellites, and proclaims his intention of obliterating the Christian superstition from the earth, beginning with the place where it first appeared. Accordingly he proceeds to besiege Jerusalem, the king of which sends for aid to the emperor; and while he is collecting his forces, an angel suddenly appears, encouraging Jerusalem, and promising deliverance on the morrow. The chorus (of Jerusalemites) repeat the words of the angel, and meantime (we presume it is to be supposed at once to have become to-morrow,) the emperor with his forces proceeds against the king of Babylon, who

routed in battle, flees away. The emperor enters the temple of the Lord, piously offers up his crown and sceptre, which he leaves upon the altar, and then returns to his dominions, while Church, who had accompanied him to Jerusalem, remains in the temple. During the re-chanting of their respective arguments by Church, Gentilehood, and Synagogue, hypocrites make their appearance going round to win the favour of the laity, and at last assembling before the king of Jerusalem, who receives them benignantly. Hereupon enters Antichrist, "*sub alis indutus lorica,*" with Hypocrisy on his right and Heresy on his left. After a chant between the trio, they come before the king of Jerusalem, and Hypocrisy whispers to the hypocrites that Antichrist has arrived, whereupon the hypocrites (in historically significant words) sing—

"Sacra Religio jam diu titubavit,  
Matrem Ecclesiam vanitas occupavit,  
Ut quid perditio per viros phaleratos?  
Deus non diligit sæculares prælatos," &c.

And like meaning is there in the words of Antichrist—

"Quem sub Ecclesiæ gremio concepistis  
Longis conatibus, me tandem genuistis."

The hypocrites throwing off their upper garments appear armed, dethrone the king of Jerusalem, and crown Antichrist. They place his throne in the temple of the Lord, conduct him to it, and drive out Church with blows and abuse, who thereupon betakes herself to the Apostolic throne.

Then Antichrist sends his ambassadors to the various kings, demanding their submission, which they make, and receive his mark upon their foreheads. But the king of the Teutones, refuses to acknowledge Antichrist, who summons his tributary kings to his assistance, and joins battle with the king of the Teutones, in which the latter is victorious. But now the hypocrites bring a lame man to Antichrist, who heals him with a word, whereat the faith of the Teutonic king begins to be shaken. Antichrist then heals a leper, at which the king's faith is still more shattered; and at last the Arch-deceiver appears to raise to life a pretended dead man, who had fallen in battle, whereupon the king acknowledges Antichrist as his lord and master, and receives his mark. Antichrist commits



to him the charge of an expedition against the Gentiles, who wish to cleave to Polytheism, and not to acknowledge Antichrist as the only god. The expedition is successful, and the conquered Gentile king receives the mark. The hypocrites next persuade Synagogue to acknowledge Antichrist as the Messiah, and then the Prophets enter, proclaiming the true faith, appealing to Scripture, and declaring themselves to be Enoch and Elias. They remove the veil from Synagogue, who thereupon is converted and renounces Antichrist. The hypocrites inform him of the defection; the Prophets and Synagogue are brought before him,—they denounce him,—he claims divinity,—Synagogue confesses her faith, and with the Prophets suffers death. While they were undergoing martyrdom, Church sings a canticle—“*fasciculus myrrhæ dilectus meus mihi.*” Then Antichrist summons all the kings to adore his divinity as god of gods. They obey,—they assemble before his throne,—they adore him as supreme deity,—he proclaims the reign of universal peace,—when the thunders of Omnipotence burst above his head, overwhelm him in destruction, and scatter his adherents. Church sings “*ecce homo, qui non posuit Deum adiutorem suum! Ego autem sicut oliva fructifera in Domo Dei.*” And the piece winds up with the return of all to the faith, whom Church receives, chanting “*laudem dicite Deo nostro.*”

Such is the nature of association that this dramatic subject, with its impious Antichrist, reminds us of a tragedy written perhaps about a century after that of *Ludus Paschalis*, by a celebrated poet, upon a diabolical character. We allude to the *Tragædia Eccerinis* of ALBERTINO MUSSATO.\* Mussato was born at Padua in 1261, and the tragedy in question was written probably soon after 1300. His reputation as a poet was in his day of the highest character, and he was publicly crowned with laurel by the Bishop and University of Padua, with solemn ceremony, after the production of this tragedy. Thomasini, giving an account of the transaction in his “*Gymnasium Patavinum*,” quaintly says—“*in conspectu nempe totius Gymnasii, ac universæ Civitatis, à Pagano Turiano, Episcopo Patavino, et ab Alberto, Saxoniae Duce, tunc Patavi Gymnasii Moderatore sen Rectore, utroque Doctorum*

\* In Grævius' Thesaur.

Collegio præsentē, insignem ex Lauro coronam solemnī apparatū accepit, et summa cum laude Poëta creatus est, eiq̃ue cognomen auctum, ut deinceps ex *Musso* Poëta *Musatus* diceretur, quasi *Musis* charus, et subinde ejus posterī ex eo cognomento aliquamdiu Poëtæ, sen *Musati* dicti sunt."

Of the tragedy itself, our readers may recollect the remark of Hallam (in his *Middle Ages*,) that it "deserves some attention, as the first attempt to revive the regular tragedy. It was written soon after 1300. The language by no means wants animation, notwithstanding an unskillful conduct of the fable. The *Eccerinus* is printed in the tenth volume of Muratori's collection." It is also in the 2nd part of the 6th tome of Grævius' *Thesaur. Antiq. Ital.*, continued by Peter Burmann. Its subject is the fiendish tyrant Eccelin [*Eccerinus*,] da Roma, whose cruelties, says Hallam, "excited universal horror in an age when inhumanity towards enemies was as common as fear and revenge could make it." The language and metres will not endure the searching criticism of a classical eye, but a poet must be allowed a very undefined range of license. The first scene of this tragedy is the most curious of all, and the poet very satisfactorily and monstrously accounts therein for the Satanic disposition of the tyrant, by referring it literally to its legitimate paternity. The mother herself makes the horrible disclosure to Eccerinus and his brother Albericus, in language not meet for gentle eye. She thus describes, however, the coming of her infernal lover :

"Quam prima noctis hora communis quies  
Omni tenent ab opere abstractum genus  
Et ecce ab imo terra mugitum dedit,  
Crepusset ut centrum, ut foret apertum Chaos ;  
Altumque versa resonuit Cælum vice.  
Faciem aëris sulphureus invasit vapor  
Nubemque fecit, Tunc subito fulgur domum  
Lustravit ingens fulminis ad instar tono  
Sequente, oletum sparsa per thalamum tulit  
Fumosa nubes."

And what description of gallant did all this portend ?  
Behold him,—

"Hirsuta aduncis cornibus cervix riget,  
Setis coronant hispidis illum jubæ,

Sanguinea binis cribus manat lues ;  
 Ignemque nares flatibus crebris vomunt.  
 Favilla patulus auribus surgens salit  
 Ab ore spirans. Os quoque eructat levem  
 Flammam, perennis lambit et barbam focus."

Eccerinus receives the information of his paternity with savage exultation, rushes into the depths of the palace, and rolls gnashing upon the ground, renouncing Christ, and calling upon his infernal father to possess him, and to send all the devils as ministers to his meditated crimes. The events are related throughout the drama by a messenger, and run through the course of several years. Eccerinus and his brother utter some fierce and devilish speeches, the chorus sing pious strains, and the messenger narrates the deaths of the tyrants—of the former from a wound in battle—of the latter and his wife and children, with circumstances of horrible cruelty, from the hands of his successful enemies. There is another tragedy of Muscato on Achilles; we think, however, that his eclogues are, upon the whole, the most polished specimens of his poetry. But what a contrast to Eccerinus was a certain Sardinian Duke Eusebius, sung in a curious poem entitled "*De Conflictu Duorum Ducum et Animarum Mirabili Revelatione*,"\* by REINER, a monk of the 12th century, who says that the said Duke was so good, so redolent of good deeds, that

"Denique ut illius evangelicæ mulieris  
 Nardus aromatica miros aspersit odores ;  
 Hujus sic etiam studium memorabile justî  
 Spiramenta bonæ quoquo versus dedit auræ,  
 Donec et arcanos superum penetrando recessus  
 Ipsos emeruit summæ olfactus Deitatis.  
 Et quanti fuerit, quàm suavis odora, placensque,  
 Clarius est luce ; quia non modò profuit illi,  
 Quin etiam multis tulit emolumenta salutis."

For, the virtues and good deeds of the Duke liberated from the clutches of Satan an army of souls, which came to his assistance when he was threatened with subjugation by a powerful enemy. The appearance of the spiritual auxiliaries is thus described :

"Jamque propinquabat paulatim exercitus ille  
 Cujus erat mira species, habitudo stupenda.  
 Cedere floriferi censeret lilia campi,

\* In Pez.

Dum nive plus arma, nive plus vexilla niterent,  
 Vernarent et equi candore quibus residebant.  
 Phura quid attexam? tellus quasi fluctuat omnis  
 Qualibet incedant vibrati luce nitoris,  
 Atque jubar solis florentibus innatat armis."

But we must break off from these digressions, which might lead us indefinitely into the dim recesses of monkish poetry, if we followed the suggestions which this Reiner crowds upon us, and we will revert to the Greeks in order to take a glimpse into the Byzantine period.

PAUL SILENTIARIUS, of the 6th century, may justly claim some attention, for the minute and accurate account which he has given of the great Cathedral of the Eastern Capital, in his two poems—"Description of the Temple of Saint Sophia," and "Description of the Ambo." They appear to have been recited or read on the occasion of the second dedication of that temple (A. D. 562.) after the fallen dome was restored. Agathias testifies to the accuracy of the description, as does the learned Du Cange, the first modern editor of the former poem, who likewise thought the versification fine. There is some other poetry extant attributed to Paul, but his chief poem is the elaborate "Description of Saint Sophia." It opens with 134 iambic verses, the rest of the poem being in hexameters. The recitation of this production commenced in the palace, and was continued at the residence of the Patriarch, whom the poet compliments in the following singular style; we are to understand him now reciting in the presence of that dignitary—to whom alluding, he says:

"May he too be propitious! But let none  
 This hearing, rail; as thus some one might say—  
 O! my good fellow, but in sooth you trifle  
 Superlatively; him you ask to be  
 Propitious to your words—who of all good  
 The habitation is, and cloth'd with all  
 Humanity! Thou art as one who pray'd  
 Intensely, that the sun might rise by day,  
 And light be bright, and words indeed be words!"

This would be indeed a most unfair specimen of a somewhat remarkable poem, (we do not pretend that our unskillful versions do justice to the passages we attempt to render—we ask indulgence for the sake of honest endeavour to be reasonably literal towards our author's text, and



to afford amusement to our readers without presenting them with pages of not the purest classical Greek,) but allowance must be made for the fashion of Byzantine compliments, and we will proceed to give a larger extract from the "Description" of the renowned cathedral. We can not better select a passage, than the following curious and highly ingenious description of the temple as lighted up by night:

"All will you see with splendour cloth'd, all bringing  
Amazement to the eye; but no discourse  
Sufficeth to proclaim the eventide  
Illumination; thou wouldst surely say  
Some Phaëton nocturnal lighted up  
The temple's majesty. For of my sov'reigns  
The prudent forethought, had long brazen chains,  
With wreathèd convolutions opposite,  
Flexile extended from the swelling disc  
Of jutting stone, on every capital,  
Of its high crowning dome. The chains long way  
Down hanging sought the ground, yet e'er 'twas reach'd,  
Upward along their lofty course were drawn,  
And their united chorus perfected.  
Then from the chain he hung, like airy crown,  
The silver discs around the circling bound  
Of the mid fane suspended; and there orb'd  
They swung, and silent kept their lofty way  
Above the passers' heads. Them had a man  
Of skill with iron bor'd, that they should well  
Receive the bases of the cups prepar'd  
From fire-wroughten glass, and thus o'er men  
Should hang the vases of nocturnal fire.  
Nor only from these discs the night-loving beam  
Glitter'd; but in the circle would you see  
Neighbouring the disc, the perforated form  
Of a great cross, with many borèd back,  
Lightly sustaining many a beaming vase.  
Thus stood the circling chorus of bright lights;  
You would have said that, near, you there beheld  
The shining constellations of the Bear  
Or bearded Serpent, or Celestial Crown.  
Thus through the temple roll'd the vesper flame  
Flashing effulgence; and you'd see within  
In lesser circle the beam-bearing rim  
Of the second crown; and mid-fixed in the centre  
Another disc high swinging in the air  
Glitter'd; 'twas thus the darkness was dispers'd.

But near the corridor, on pillars set,  
Lamps separate, in order, here and there,  
Held each its single flame ; and thus they went  
Through the whole depth of that vast fane ; they hung  
A silver disc, like balance, on each pillar,  
Wherein the cups of shining oil sat.  
Nor went one even order for them all,  
But many up and down, might you perceive,  
Like billowy sea in splendor oscillating ;  
And from the many-linkèd chain they shone  
In order'd ranks upon their airy way :  
Thus shine the bipoint lights of Hyades  
Mark'd on the forehead of the bisect\* Bull.

But also silver ships might one behold,  
Bearing for merchandise a freight of light,  
And for the sea, pensile in lucid air  
They have their course, nor fear the south-wind rough,  
Nor the late setting Boötes. And you see  
Upon the pavement delicate wroughten beams  
Trans current through the fork'd supporting iron,  
By whose hung temple-lights proceed the band  
Of priests by rubricated canons bound.  
And other lights stand where the graceful columns  
Their bases set, and others still on high  
O'er the walls' tops their lengthen'd way pursue.  
Nor was the frame of the deep-bosom'd dome  
Left rayless, but about the jutting stone,  
To each well polished boss, lamps separate  
On brazen pins a man of skill had hung.  
As one his queenly maiden decking, wreaths  
About her neck the graceful necklace flashing  
With fiery splendor from the gold-set gem ;  
So had my sov'reign hung to every boss  
The circling lights, which made companionship  
To the fane's circuit round. On silver columns  
For taper-bearers runs a narrow way  
O'er head, refulgent with the glitt'ring clusters,  
And one might liken them to trees, to pines  
In mountain nourish'd, or to graceful cypress,  
For so they graceful end : and circles run  
Gradually widening, till the rim you reach  
Which, last, around the bottom runs, and thence  
Blooms the fire-scattering flow'r ; but for root,  
The silver vases may you see affix'd

\* An allusion to the two groups of stars comprised in the constellation.

To these fire-foliag'd trees ; and in the midst  
 Of this fair grove, form of immortal Cross  
 Shines with the beam to-mortals-giving-light,  
 Studded with clusters glittering of nails.  
 And infinite other lights of vari'd form  
 The fane enclos'd, some pendant in the air  
 From many-wreathèd chains, some at the porches  
 Glowing, some in the midst, and some tow'ards east  
 And west, and some the flashing fire pour'd  
 In loftiest recesses, till bright night  
 Smiling like day, herself like day appear'd  
 With rosy ankles."

There is a certain Latin poet of this same century who should be here mentioned. Are any persons besides classical scholars acquainted with CORRIPUS ? And of those, too, who read Virgil and Horace as easily as they would quaff good wine, and with as much relish, (we never knew a regular tetotalter who was a real scholar or truly imbued with the genial flavour of literature,) how many have ever looked into, not to say perused, the *Johannis*, or the *De Laudibus Justini Minoris* ? In Smith's Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography, there is a good account of Corripus and his productions, and in Corpus Hist. Byzant. (the Bonn edition) is a good edition of his works. The extravagant style of his Panegyric on Justin [who reigned A. D. 565-578] causes it to offer no attractions to poetic taste, although it is valuable to the historian and antiquary ; but his poem on the war carried on by a proconsul or *magister militiæ* named Johannes, against the Moors and Vandals in Africa, is far superior to any Latin poetry which we could reasonably have looked for in that age. It is, perhaps, principally remarkable for the purity of its language, showing an intimate acquaintance with the diction of the great Roman bards of old, and frequently presenting passages to which the name of *poetry* cannot be denied. For instance, the sailing of the fleet, as it sets out upon the expedition :—[Joh. l. i. 159.]

"Inde petens classem nautas hortatur ovantes  
 Magnanimus ductor. Deducent litore puppes ;  
 Prima percussis verruntur marmora tensis ;  
 Solvunt vela citi, magnis clamoribus urgent,  
 Horrisonoque graves laxant stridore rudentes  
 Expanduntque sinus ; placidis jam carbasa flabris

Auræ impulsa movent; abscondunt alta carinæ,  
 Et latet angustum centum sub puppibus æquor.  
 Prospera maturis crebrescent flamina Coris,\*  
 Impelluntque rates; æratis æquora proris  
 Proscindunt celerēs; sulcantur marmora rostris;  
 Spumea sub longis immurmurat unda carinis."

Again: [v. 208.]

Labitur Ægæum classis secura per æquor;  
 Haud secus Adriacis undis ventisque secundis  
 Ocius alta secat: Siculas mox contigit oras.  
 Deserit aura rates, ventisque silentibus omne  
 Immoto fluctu jacuit mare; lenior unda  
 Litora nulla quatit. Siluit tunc Scylla biformis,  
 Latratus siluere canum; non ora luporum  
 Compulit unda ciens ululantia reddere saxa,  
 Quanquam hic alternæ coëant confinia terræ  
 Angustoque freto litus turbetur utrumque.  
 Immotus fluctus nunquam placata charybdis  
 Continuit, liquidas revomens nec sorbuit undas.  
 Lintea laxa cadunt, nullo tumentia flatut  
 Arboribus junxere suis. Tunc solve funes  
 Præcipiens sociis "portus intrate quietos"  
 Ductor ait. Jussi celeres super omnia nautæ  
 Armamenta volant; currens hic vela resolvit,  
 Colligit ille sinus; socios hortatur ovantes  
 Dulcibus ille sonis, et cantu mulcet acuto.  
 Dant animos clamore viri; vox ipsa labores  
 Adjuvat et vires nautis et gaudia præstat.  
 Caucana Sicani juxta jacet arva Pachyni,  
 Litora curva tenens, cujus tunc ancora portus  
 Romanæ classis morsu perstrinxit obunco;  
 Et jam stelliferas maris asperat Hesperus undas,  
 Inducens terris tetram caligine noctem."

The account of ham-stringing a camel is curious. [L. IV., 1065.]

"Sic fatus, et ipse  
 Castra petens primus magnum ferit ense camelum,  
 Qua pedibus vis juncta feri latet insita nervis;  
 Tunc per utrumque femur vulnus transivit acerbum,  
 Et geminas secuit conciso robore coxas.  
 Retro ruit revolutus humi stridore camelus

\* And Caurus—the north-west wind. *Virg. Georg. v. 356. Cæs. l. 5, B. Gall. c. 7.*



Horribili, geminos-que impressit pondere Mauros,  
 Ossaque contrivit quassis male mista medullis,  
 Qui ducis horrifico celsam terrore sub alvum  
 Considerant sese."

The following descriptions of the furor of the pagan *vates*, when consulting the gods, are lively and vigorous.  
 [L. III. 84.]

"Tristes et Apollinis aras  
 Inde petens, Phœbi tripodas laurusque requirit.  
 Funditur horrendis sanguis mæstissimus aris ;  
 Omnigenumque pecus mactat vittata sacerdos,  
 Fata movens. Raptis primum quæsit in extis,  
 Inspiciens (series patuit longissima) fibras ;  
 Duraque perpetuis imposuit viscera flammis.  
 Inde ferox rapitur, subito correpta furore,  
 Terribilis ; mersosque simul per viscera cultros  
 Imprimit ipsa sibi ; multus de corpore sanguis  
 Influit, et crebro geminat cum vulnere ferrum.  
 Erigit alta comas ; tunc flammea lumina torquet  
 Subsiliens, saltusque rotat flexusque malignos  
 Corporis apta sui : rubor igneus inficit ora  
 Numinis icta Noto : ludunt cervixque comæque,  
 Inque humeros utrosque cadunt : præcordia raucis  
 Flatibus alta sonant ; miscentur murmura vocis  
 Tunc dubiæ, plenumque agitant suspiria pectus.  
 Non aliter primos surgens Vulcanus ad ignes  
 Follibus obductis tumidos concurrere ventos  
 Arte movet, flammas-que ciens Eurosque sonantes  
 Spirat, inexhaustas renovans fornace procellas.  
 Tunc male facta canens dictis respondit iniquis."

Again. [L. V. 147.]

"Marmaridum fines, habitat qua corniger Ammon,  
 Inde petit, durique Jovis responsa poposcit.  
 Semper amat miseras deceptor fallere mentes  
 Juppiter hic, quem, vane, rogas ; in sanguine gaudet  
 Horridus, et cunctas quærit disperdere gentes.  
 Asper in adversa percussus fronte bipenni  
 Taurus ut occubuit, manibus tristissima vates  
 Tympana rauca rapit, saltusque altaria circum  
 Cum strepitu lymphata rotat ; salit ardua cervix,  
 Igne micant oculi, consurgunt fronte capilli,  
 Ac facies testata deum fervore rubescit.  
 Nunc maculat palore genas, nunc lumina torquet,  
 Nunc caput, alta fremens, sævos dum colligit ignes.

Ut vero toto percepit pectore numen,  
 Suspicit excelsam nocturno tempore lunam  
 Lumine sanguineo, scrutatur fata recensens,  
 Ardet, anhelat, hiat, pallet, rubet, æstuat, alget,  
 Fatidicum dum quærit iter. Vox improba tandem  
 Prodidit ore fero fatorum arcana sub auras."

The following comparison [L. IV. 576] is worth quoting, in connection with which Du Cange's *Gloss. Lat.* may be consulted *in verb. organum*.

"Sic disponunter et arte  
 Organa plectra lyrae, digitis pulsanda magistri :  
 Quam movet ille, sonat contactu fistula venti :  
 Non chordæ, non aera gemunt, in sponte regentis  
 Carmina percussis resonent expressa cicutis.  
 Non aliter jussu ductoris cuncta movetur  
 Discretis acies concurrens ordine signis."

Our readers will be glad to see the following spirited description, which we quote on account of the peculiar circumstance which it narrates.—[L. V. 753.]

"Est locus in mediis longe præruptus arenis  
 Fluminis in morem, pelagi quem margine fluctus  
 Alluit, atque undis agros concludit amaris,  
 Egrediens ; quibus alga locis limusque relabens  
 Atque altum tremulo nutrit\* sub gurgite cœnum.  
 Huc ubi pervenit, nigras equus horruit algas  
 Et pavidus post terga redit ; tunc naribus afflans  
 Erexit geminas (signum formidinis) aures,  
 Datque latus, fumatque ferox, oculosque retorquet  
 Prospiciens, nec dirum audet tentare periculum.  
 Finierat spatium vitæque viæ que repugnans  
 Dux, heu, magnanimus. Sequitur clamoribus hostis  
 Densus agens turbans-que virum. Tunc calce frequenti  
 Pulsat equum geminans et magnos concutit armos.  
 Extulit impulsus sonipes, cursuque negatam  
 Tentat adire viam, absorptusque voragine mersit  
 Ipse cadens, dominumque super gluttivit hiatu  
 Terra nefanda fero, rapuitque ex hoste receptum  
 Suscipiens fortuna virum, ne staret inermis  
 Aut humilis precibus-que rogans ; tribuitque sepulcrum,  
 Ne nudum in Libycis jacuisset corpus arenis."

We cannot forbear reverting to an earlier part of the poem to quote another striking description of a very different character.—[L. II. 417.]

\* The editor suggests a various reading, (but does not give one of this line from MSS.) *putret* ?

" Humida nox cælo fulgentia sidera reddit  
 Palantes-que polo stellas : nam Cynthia cornu  
 Jam vacuo, obscuræ nec præbens lumina terræ,  
 Æquore mersa fuit ; mensis tenuaverat ignes.  
 Sed non castra ducum noctis sensere tenebras :  
 Lumina densa focis per campos clara relucent,  
 Perque altas montes splendet contermina tellus  
 Ignibus, et densæ radiant in nubila silvæ.  
 Quis cælum a terris illa discernere posset  
 Nocte, ferens quæ stella nitens, quæ flamma fuisset ?  
 Ommia lumen erat ; flammis hinc terra coruscat,  
 Inde polus stellis. Quotiens scintilla cucurrit  
 Igne volans, sidus labens in nocte putata est.  
 Quisquis ab aversis videt tentoria campis  
 Istius, intremuit, crescentia sidera credens  
 Insolite esse polis. Erravit navita campis  
 Æquoreis, nullisque modis cognoscere signa  
 Tunc valuit, cursus-que reflexa puppe negavit."

One more extract, and then we commend the poem  
 to those of our readers who have not perused it.—[L.  
 VII. 510.]

" At Romana manus jussu ducis, horrida turbans  
 Agmina, per cunctos fertur, cornuque reflexo  
 Stridula raucisonis compellit spicula nervis,  
 Condensos veluti fundunt causa nubila nimbos  
 Grandinis et latos dstringunt culta per agros :  
 Sternitur alta seges, viridis nec pampinus uvas  
 Vindicat ipse suas, arbor nec densior ulla  
 Defendit teneros foliorum tegmine ramos.  
 Horrida tum nervis volitans pulsatur arundo,  
 Vulnera certa ferens ; nullum sine sanguine telum  
 Corruit, aut campo volucres cecidere sagittæ.  
 Nunc fortis sonipes, densus nunc sternitur hostis :  
 Omne rubet tepidum Massylo sanguine ferrum.  
 Succedit pilata manus, cunctosque per agros  
 Corpora felici sternebant cæde tribuni.  
 Militis arma calent ; nullum est sine sanguine Mauro  
 Romani ferrum populi : Dolor excitat iras.  
 Quis tot acerba ducum dederant quæ funera campis,  
 Quis varias mortes aut dictis explicet hostes  
 Prostratos captosque ferens, quosque ipse magister  
 Dejecit virtute viros ? Sine nomine plebes  
 Marmaridæ periere simul : sed carmine paucos  
 E multis signabo meo, quos fama priores  
 Attulit id cautas volitans ex hastibus aures.

Armipotens, hostes cernens obstare, Johannes  
 Irruit in densas acies, turmasque rebelles  
 Letifero mucrone secat, ceu messor acuta  
 Falce metit segetes, maturo tempore sollers ;  
 Et modo cum teneris culmos compressat aristis  
 Læva manus, nunc dextra secat, nunc fune tenaci  
 Colligat innumeros gaudens per rura maniplos.  
 Syrticus Altilimas ductoris vulnere victus  
 Corruit, exsecto fusus per gramina collo.  
 Tunc Alacanza ruit magnum pinnatus in hostem  
 Missile vibrato, conturbans calce frequenti  
 Celsum cornipedem ; sed nil conterritus ille  
 Amputat ense caput : truncum videre cadentem  
 Lumina fessa suum ; morientis lingua loquelam  
 Rumpere non potuit, sonuit tamen. Inde furem  
 Dejecit Espotredan, Tamatoniumque Jugurtham  
 Congressus virtute premit, Tursumque trucidat.  
 Audilimanis equum retro ferit ; horrida nervos  
 Ossaque dura pedum secuerunt vulnere ferri ;  
 Volvitur in tergum sonipes, nec corpore toto,  
 Nam celso nondum terræ submiserat annos ;  
 Fortis adhuc rectaque ferus cervice laborat,  
 Surgere pertentans dominum deturbat arenæ.  
 Vulnere congemmans victor per membra Johannes  
 Venit in obnixum stricto mucrone verendus,  
 En tumidum ! frontemque quatit : tunc aspera ferrum  
 Sanguine confuso commiscuit ossa cerebro."

With Corripus as an epic poet may be compared the famous JOSEPH ISCANUS, (who wrote a poem on the Trojan War founded upon the narrative of Dares Phrygius, and) who is regarded as the prince of poets of his age, that is to say of the twelfth century. He died about A. D. 1224. Our limits do not allow us to give quotations from him, but he is spoken of in Warton's History of English Poetry, and Henry's History of England, (vol. 6, p. 237, 3d edition,) and his poem will be found in the Valpy Classics, in the volume comprising Dictys Cretensis and Dares Phrygius. We will just give the concluding lines of his poem, as a motto or epigraph for any author who pleases so to use them.—[*De Bello Trojano*, L. VI. 959.]

"Hactenus Iliacæ questus, lamenta, ruinæ,  
 Confusa explicui veteris compendia veri.  
 Vive liber, liberque vige ; sed si qua nocebunt,  
 Disce libens livore nihil sublimius esse :



Cum tibi mordaces obliquent læva cachinnos  
 Murmura, cum cupiant linguis lacerare profanis,  
 Sis utinam invidia dignus, quæ summa lacessit,  
 Quam pascit præsens, extremaque terminat ætas."

While speaking of poets who have treated of war, we might as well proceed here to notice a Greek poet of the seventh century, GEORGE PISIDA (the PISIDIAN), who flourished in the time of the Emperor Heraclius. He seems to have accompanied this Emperor in his first Persian expedition, and he has left a poem upon the subject. From his various works we shall select, as a fair specimen of his poetry, a passage from his *Bellum Avaricum*, in which he describes the attack upon Constantinople by the Avars, and their repulse, (A. D. 626,) while the Emperor was absent, and a Persian army was encamped at Chalcedon opposite to the capital. *En passant*, we can not resist quoting how Constantinople is said to have appeared to Charlemagne, in a curious Anglo-Norman poem, on the travels of that monarch, written in the twelfth century, and edited by Francisque Michel, (Lond. 1836,) with a glossary, and a learned and interesting introduction.

"Chevalchet li emperère od sa cumpanie grant  
 E passent monteles a les puis d'Abilant,  
 La roche del Guitume e les plaines avant,  
 Virent Constantinoble une citez vaillant,  
 Les cloches e les egles e punz le lusanz ;  
 Destre part la citet de une truve grant  
 Trovent vergers plantez de pins e de lorers beaus.  
 La rose i est florie, li alburs e li glazaus.  
 Vint mile chevalers i trovèrent séant,  
 E sunt vestut de pailles e de heremins blans,  
 E de granz peus de martre jokes as pez trainanz,  
 As eschès e as tables se vunt esbaneant  
 E portent lur falcuns e lur osturs asquanz ;  
 E treis mile puceles à or freis relusant,  
 Vestues sunt de pailles e ount les cors avenanz."

Such is our unhappy subjection to the power of association, that the mention of Chess\* in that last quotation, leads us off to quote a pleasant ode on the subject, entitled *Duelhum Scacchorum*, written by JULIUS ASCANIUS TUCIUS (or TUCCIO), a native of Cremona, and quoted in a

\* Compare also Du Cange's article on the subject in *Gloss. Lat. in verb. Scacci*.

treatise in *Gronovius' Thesaurus*, from the *Amphitheatrum Sapientiæ Socraticæ Jocosæ*, of CASPAR DORNAVIUS, published at Hanover, 1619, fol. DANIEL GEORGE MORHOF, in his *Polyhistor*, (L. I. c. 21, § 45,) says of Dornavius—"Philosophus et Medicus, diligens fuit in nugis, sed eruditus. . . . Collegit ille ridicula rerum encomia, tam è veteribus quam è recentioribus auctoribus, Græca, Latina, Germanica. . . . Multa illic habentur, quæ ad honestam animi relaxationem faciunt, et cum voluptate legi possunt. Scilicet juvant etiam mimi in eruditorum theatro : mallem tamen omisisset quædam scurrilia Germanica." So much for Dornavius, from whom our authorities got the following ode of Tuccio.

"Tecum militibus gestio buxeis  
 Jam conferre manum, Prætor amabilis,  
     Quanquam Regibus Indicis  
     Contendas melius, seu  
 Tu ducas pedites, sive Equites trahas :  
 Sint omnes nivei, sintque licet nigri,  
     Prosternam tabulis tamen  
     Instructas acies, vel  
 Confundam cuneos agminaque omnia :  
 Quis tandem validis turribus obviam  
     Accedet sine sanguine,  
     Quin saltem capiatur ?  
 Rex lætus veniet prælia in ardua  
 Et tuto intrepidam tramite conjugem  
     Ducet non metuens minas,  
     Ipsos forte nec ictus.  
 Sic freti domini milite non pigro  
 Armorum subeunt magna pericula.  
     Imbellesque cadunt viri,  
     Et dant fortibus arma.  
 Si Regina suis septa cohortibus  
 In densas acies ipsa superbiens  
     Hostes per medios viam  
     Prorumpens faciet, tum  
 Quid dices ? minimum signifer albicans  
 Conversis pedibus subsidium feret :  
     Cernes namque meos duces  
     Punctim tela movere :  
 Non tantum in Phygios Æacides ferus  
 Patravit rutilans arma micantia  
     Cladem, quando mei dedit  
     Districto Hectora ferro.

Quantam per niveas gens mea copias  
Ingenti strepitu conficiet, nigra  
Dum matrona potens suo  
Irrumpat peditatu,  
Ergo, quando mihi congregier voles,  
Jam cautus pedites expedies tuos  
Impelles celeres equos,  
Turritas quoque moles.  
Bis fusci pedites quatuor impetu  
Binis signiferis atque Elephantibus  
Binis indomitis Equis,  
Nec non cum duce fusco,  
Invadent alacres castra tua et viros  
Telluremque tegent militibus tuis,  
Et Regina decus feret  
Nobis sæpe triumphans.  
Tum, cernite, tuus Rex stupidus fuga  
Conversa veniam forte meo Duci  
Deflexis genibus petet,  
Se victum quoque dicet.  
Quid ? rides ne ? putas hæc fore somnia ?  
Plus centum proceres, crede mihi, graves  
Nobis exsuvias suas  
Victi deseruere.  
Hispanus venias miles et Æthiops  
Ipsi terribiles vel cuneos ferent  
Immitis Darii, abs Jove  
Artem qui didicerunt.  
Vis promptum manibus forte vicarium  
Aut tecum validum ducere Judicem ?  
Quid tum ? nostra manus premet  
Certe albentia castra.  
Nam fossi pedites vulneribus fugam  
Quærent, si poterunt : jussus eques meus  
Hos mucrone petet, vel hos  
Hasta denique cedit.  
Haud credas, oculis ni videas tuis,  
Cunctis quam valeat gens mea præliis,  
Dum palmam referunt domum,  
Nec non multa tropæa.  
Nam campi in medio sæpe capit ducem  
Album noster Eques ponit et exitum,  
Magnis litibus hostium  
Tendens ad nova bella.  
Thraso ne videar, qui sibi gloriam  
Adscribit nimiam, jam veniunt cito  
Ad certamen atrox tui,  
Nam res verba sequetur."

So leaving Tuccio's bloodless mockery of war on the board, we will, without another digression, come at once to the stern reality, as presented in the trimeter iambics of George the Pisidian :

“ When the barbarians for the battle's strife  
 With strenuous opposition were attent,  
 From counsel mad a conflagration rose,  
 Whence all the space before the wall was lit;  
 And rolling volumes of dense smoke, which made  
 New gloom, the flame was buri'd in the cloud.  
 But to the Persians on the further shore  
 In battle rang'd, the darkling smoke was herald  
 That now the fight against us should have scope.  
 For there was pact\* 'twixt the barbarian hosts  
 On either side, that none should e'er the other  
 Take weapons, but that first he should subdue  
 With fire the blameless stones. It thus befel:  
 Tumultuous joining battle on every side,  
 The barb'rous foes had as protecting shields  
 The posts they 'd seized—the Divine Judge's Temple,  
 And the Inviolat Virgin Leader's Fane—  
 And deem'd auxiliaries in their need whom thus  
 They'd impiously outrag'd. But a crowd  
 Of Sthlavi with Boulgarians mix'd, the foe  
 Embark'd in boats, (these had he hollow'd out  
 Each from a single trunk,) and thus the fight  
 By sea he mingl'd with the strife on land.  
 But now to me strife and confusion rise,  
 Such perturbation in my argument  
 Inheres, and as to battle marshals forth  
 My words. What first, what last, shall I pursue?  
 There 'neath the stroke of rock hurl'd pond'rous, fell  
 One thus his death stroke and his sepulchre  
 Meeting at once; another in the act  
 Of converse with his fellow soldier, struck  
 By hidden archer, e'en before his word

\* Our version is upon the authority of Quercius' note *in loc*, who says that the word in the text (*ἔπος*) means *pact*. There could not have been *emulation* between the barbarians on both sides, as to *who* should first subdue, &c., since one part of them was over at Chalcedon, and so “the blameless stones” of the defences of the capital were not accessible to such attempt from them: otherwise, this would be the most natural interpretation. If *ἔπος* however be taken in its stricter sense of *desire*, then we may alter the passage above as follows:

For on both sides 'midst the barbarian hosts  
 There was desire, not who should e'er the other  
 Take weapons, but that first he should subdue, &c.



Hath breath'd his life out. While a chieftain there  
 Ord'ring the ranks to needed service, stands  
 Safe as he deems amidst the circling shields,  
 Stroke unexpected from the swift-hurl'd stone  
 Cleaves and beats back the bucklers, and him fear  
 Then seizes; while the rest like locusts strewn  
 Fall miserably. Thus Divine Justice  
 The bows, the shooters, the hurl'd stones themselves,  
 Directed, that no missile fell in vain,  
 But straightly reach'd its scope for various fate  
 Of each one smitten. Such the events of fortune  
 The land endur'd; the naval conflict still  
 Had equal trial of the strife to find.  
 To me more wondrous this, how the barbarians  
 Seeing such wide expanse of sea, appear'd  
 By its breadth straighten'd and there close shut in  
 Where was the Virgin Leader's Fane; for there  
 Joining their boats as in a seine net, wide  
 They spread the fleet, and all combining rush'd  
 With shout upon our vessels; thence the fight  
 While evident was secret, for I think  
 The Virgin Mother only could have bent  
 The bows, the shields extended, and unseen  
 In the close conflict mingl'd, blunted swords,  
 Boats overturn'd and sunk, and given the depth  
 To all as habitation: naught is strange  
 If wars the Virgin, by whom to the soul's  
 Essential Majesty even reach'd the sword,  
 Driv'n on, I know not how, and keenly through  
 It pass'd, that nature wounding hitherto  
 Invulnerable.\* So these hollow'd boats  
 By stern necessity their harbour found  
 In the deep surge; and mingling and confusion  
 And fear oppress'd the barb'rous hosts contending  
 In the sea-fight. There falling from his boat  
 One tries his swimmer's skill and in the æt

\* The Latin translator must either have had a different text before him (though no various readings are here given by the editor,) or his misapprehension of this passage belongs to the curiosities of literature. The original, from, "by whom to the soul's, etc,"—is as follows:

δι ἧς παρῆλθεν εἰς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς σέβας  
 οὐκ οἶδα πῶς πεμφθεῖσα ῥομφαία πάλιν.  
 ὅμως παρῆλθεν ἢ διῆλθεν ὀξέως  
 τρώσασα τὴν ἄτρωτον οὐδαμόν φῦσιν.

For which the translator has—"per quam advenit animo religio. Certe nescio, quinam immissa est toties framea; ac certe evasit pervasitque celeriter, gentem vulnerans non vulneratam antea."

Is captur'd ; here another in the wave  
 Feigning himself a corpse hopes to escape ;  
 Another unobserved as to a tower  
 Climbs on the keel, and miserably strives  
 Long with his fate ; and so at length them all  
 E'en as one ship the surging water whelms.  
 There the barbarian inf'nitely inflam'd  
 But now, and breathing from his fiery words  
 A beacon-torch, is suddenly consum'd  
 And meetly is but ashes as against  
 The blameless wood-work having kindl'd up  
 The flame. And rapid after messenger  
 Flies messenger forth bearing to the foe  
 Misfortunes thick as reaper's gather'd sheaves,  
 From land to sea, from sea again to land,  
 A tempest of calamities. The foe  
 Thus suffered a new storm, for e'en on land  
 His mind was toss'd tumultuous and confus'd  
 Like stormy waves, as so the billows roll'd  
 Their adverse battle to one flood of woes.  
 Vaster than forest seem'd the earth to bear  
 The wilderness of fallen foes unburied ;  
 Troubl'd and strewn with corpses was the sea  
 Empurpl'd with the blood of foreigners.  
 The Red-sea was it rightly nam'd, well dy'd  
 With dye barbarian, and seeing, too,  
 A second Pharoah and new Moses thee,\*  
 So should it thus have imag'd the appearance  
 Of that Red-sea. These foes, too, have the waves  
 As funeral urn,—a wat'ry sepulchre  
 And monument Egyptian. Nor was less  
 This new than that old vengeance."

It may throw some light upon the taste of the age to mention that this poet was in his day preferred to Euripides.

But our narrowing limits warn us to refrain from pursuing a subject which might be indefinitely expanded. One more Byzantine poet, however, must we refer to, who is sufficiently obscure to warrant us in saying what little can be said about him. He is *EPHRAËM OF CONSTANTINOPLE*, who flourished in the 14th century. In *Smith's Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography*—where the reader will find some half dozen lines of one column on the sub-

\* The Virgin.

ject—(vol. 2d, p. 38. col. 1st. No. 5. London edit.) it is stated that Ephræm's Chronicle has never been published; and yet the Dictionary was published in 1849, and the Chronicle in 1840, in the Bonn edition of the Byzantine Historians. This chronicle is in iambic verses, and extends from Caius—(the first part of the MS. which commenced from Julius Cæsar, being lost,) down to the restoration of Constantinople to the Greeks, after the termination of the Latin Dynasty. Not only had this poet been so long unedited, but his works were so rare, that Angelo Mai says they were not known to exist except in a single manuscript in the Vatican Library. The same scholar says that Raphaël Volaterra, in the 15th century, is the first, according to his knowledge, who has made note of Ephræm. From him, Vossius (John Gerard) mentions the chronicler in his "*De Historicis Græcis*;" and Allatius often quotes the poem without giving any account of the poet. From Allatius it seems that Vossius, Du Cange, Cave, Fabricius, Le Quien, Brucker and others, obtained some knowledge of the poet's writings. Mai thinks it probable that the manuscript used by Allatius was the identical Vatican codex (1003) which must have lost its first leaf subsequently. He also supposes that Ephræm was the legitimate son of John XII., Patriarch of Constantinople, and born consequently before the prelate was elevated to that celebratary dignity. Pachymeres, in his notice of the said Patriarch, mentions an Ephræm as his son; and the poet, who concludes his chronicle with the year A. D. 1313, in his list of Patriarchs, also mentions that John XII. (who retained the Patriarchate until A. D. 1304,) had a son, but his name is not given. The poet's chronological authorities appear to have been Zonarus—for the period reaching down to the death of Alexius Comnenus I.; Nicetas Choniates—to the Emperor Baldwin I. and George Acropolita—for the remaining period. The life of Ephræm is not known; Allatius calls him sometimes Byzantine chronographer, and sometimes monk. We believe that he is not alluded to by Schœl in his *History of Greek Literature*. Mai mentions some various readings between Allatius' quotations of Ephræm and the Vatican codex; but they are not sufficiently important to induce the belief that Allatius employed another manuscript.

Such a mere doggerel chronicle is this production, that

we cannot think it worth while giving specimens from its ten thousand three hundred and ninety-two iambic lines. It contains such petty anecdotes as a monk would be likely to retail, and with theological rancour, bestows bad names upon the heterodox, whom it sometimes misrepresents. This, however, is a characteristic of polemics and theological schools generally, and not a peculiarity of any orthodox or heretical partisan in particular. Ephræm represents Julian the Emperor as a bitter persecutor, the maker of a host of martyrs; and Nestorius, (who no doubt was no better than his violent, unchristian opposers, but certainly was, in dogma, neither Arian nor Socinian,) he represents as a man-worshipper in regarding Christ as only a man. But, alas! we know how even the scholars after the revival of literature, when they ought to have been softened by its generous influence, pounded and bespattered each other, even when not bitten by the charity-hating furor of theological venom: and so we may make due allowance for the ungentle epithets of a Byzantine monk. Some specimens (which in the possibility of a lady Latinist looking into our pages, we forbear to quote) of what Mr. Shepherd calls "learned Billingsgate," can be seen in the sort of compliments bandied between Filelfo and Puggio Bracciolini, in the 15th century, as cited by Mr. Shepherd in his life of that last named Italian scholar. [2d edition, Liverpool, 1837, pp. 246, 248, 249.]

Hateful as the Latin barbarians—heretics not acknowledging the Only Holy Orthodox Church of the East, and robbers who had seized upon the sacred Capital,—were, of course, to a Byzantine, yet in justice to Ephræm it must be said that he gives a noble and unexceptionable character to Baldwin of Flanders, first Latin Emperor of Constantinople. But hear how sweetly a modern poet damns in mellifluous strains his hostile religionists. We allude to a curious and fine ode on *Ætna* by PIETRO CARRERA, a Sicilian priest, a native of Militello, born A. D. 1571, and a scholar remarkably well versed in the antiquities of his island. The spirited ode, or, as he entitles it, *Idillio on Ætna, or Mongibello*, (which, notwithstanding certain ingenious etymologies, is nothing more than a union of *mons* and *gebhel*, the Saracens having called it *gebhel* or *gibello*, that is to say, mountain, and the Sicilians having added *mon* from *mons* or *monte*: numerous names in England are formed in a similar manner, by the union of



words signifying the same thing in the different dialects of the people who successively occupied the island,—thus *wick*, *ham* and *town* are synonymous, as are *wan*, *beck* and *water*, belonging to different ages of the language, yet compounded as the earlier parts of the word successively lost their signification, so that we find *Wickham*, *Hamptonwick*, *Wansbeckwater* :—but to return, Carrera's *Idillio on Mongibello*) commences in the following manner :

“ I piu superbi e orgogliosi spirti  
De la infernal mangione  
Disposti di sottrarsi  
Dal' imperio di Pluto,  
In secrete adunanzi, e reo consiglio  
Mossi tutti in bisbiglio  
Borbottavan così con tai parole.  
Noi, che un tempo del ciel l'eccelsa sede  
Occupar procurammo, hora avviliti  
Neghittosi, impauriti  
Soffrirem di Plutone il ciglio altiero ?  
Soffrirem de la Moglie  
L'imperioso aspetto ?  
Di rapita Fanciulla  
Divenuti (ò viltà) ministri e schiavi ?  
Nò, nò, scotasi homai  
Dale nostre cervici il grave giogo.  
Ben può ciascun di noi dar legge altrui,  
E governar Inferno.

Dicevano in confuso, e'l fier Bahale  
Con sembiante cruccio  
Spintosi disse all'hor. Fidi compagni  
Seguite me ; per l'alta impresa è d'huopo  
Prender pria Mongibello  
Scala del ciel' ov' aspirar debbiamo,  
E del Tartareo regno ampia fortezza,  
Fatta stanza, e bottega  
(Ahi commune disnore)  
D'un zoppo Fabro, e d'anneriti servi  
Sì sfacciati, e protervi,  
Che l'un per Dio s'addita,  
E gli altri quasi al par de' Semidei.

Ciò detto al'armi, al'armi  
Gridaron tutti ; e chi si vide carco  
D vivo solfo, altri s'armò di pece,  
Chì di brutto bitume,  
E molti ancor di liquidi metalli,

E non pochi sù'l dorso  
 Conduceano curvati e legna, e sassi.  
 Sdegnosi, e furibondi  
 Con frettolosi passi  
 Entran nel mal guardato aperto soglio  
 Raccolti in folta squadra  
 Per via ritorta, e adra  
 Sen vanno al'officina di Vulcano.  
     Fabricava in quel punto il Dio di Lemno  
 Grandi folgori à Giove.  
 A cui Bahal de'ribellanti mostri  
 Fatto duce e campione,  
 Fuggi, gli disse, fuggi,  
 Fuggi vil pecorone ;  
 Vatten ratto di quà, se farlo puoi  
 Con la sciancata gamba.  
 A sì potente e improvviso assalte  
 Ismarissi Vulcano,  
 E gli cadde di mano  
 Il folgore, e'l martello ; isgomentati  
 Rimasero i serventi ;  
 Resta l'opra imperfetta.

We have already exceeded our limits : we can only quote the passage to which we had reference upon introducing this poet :

“Plutone intanto al'impensato avviso  
 Fieremente turbossi.  
 Comandò, Charonte  
 Con la tromba d'Averno  
 Tutti gli habitator del cupo Inferno  
 Convocasse à raccolta.  
 Al'horribil rimbombo  
 Nel Palazza real l'Anime felle  
 Si presentano à Pluto,  
 I Neroni, i Massenzi, i Massimini,  
*I bestial Calvinì,*  
*E gli sporchi Lutheri,* e di lor guida  
 Se tre Sorelle ultrici, e gli altri Spirti  
 Vi concorrono à squadre.”

However, Baron Swedenborg saw Luther and Calvin in a sort of limbus of those who have not spoken or learned the truth ; and we have no doubt that there is not a

religious leader or champion, who has not been hoped and believed to be in a similar condition, by other religionists not of his sect. How many folks will be astonished at finding themselves together in Heaven! "From all uncharitableness, Good Lord deliver us!"

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NOTE TO ARTICLE V., ENTITLED "LEIBER, NORDHEIMER AND DONALDSON, ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE."

As we have intimated that we differ in some points from the scholars whose views we have presented, we feel it to be particularly incumbent upon us to state explicitly that we differ entirely from Dr. Donaldson's assertion representing W. von Humboldt as stating most positively the original unity of languages in *one* original language:—for this is what Dr. Donaldson means:—On the contrary, the views of Humboldt, while recognizing the original unity of language, as a product of *one* Human Nature, by no means disagree with any original diversity of races and nations which may ever be proved to have existed.

## ART. X.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *The Conquest of Florida*, by HERNANDO DE SOTO. By THEODORE IRVING, M. A. New-York: George P. Putnam. 1851.

THIS is a new and revised edition of a work published some twelve or fifteen years ago. It is from the pen of a nephew of Washington Irving, and is marked by the simplicity, if not the sweetness of his uncle's style, by his unaffectedness and propriety, if not his pleasant thoughtfulness and gentle moral fancies. The work is a misnomer. So far from Hernando de Soto conquering Florida, we may, with more propriety, assert that the Floridians conquered him! They may have been defeated in many battles; but they still fought on; and the victory of De Soto was like that of Pyrrhus:—It left him undone. He perished finally of exhaustion and chagrin,—his burial place being the bed of the Mississippi. The outlines of his career are very generally known. The details may be read in this agreeable volume. The present is a great improvement upon the former edition, and is accompanied by a map illustrating the supposed and sinuous march of De Soto through portions of our Southern country.

2. *Nathalie*; a Tale. By JULIA KAVANAGH. Author of *Woman in France*. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. 1851.

THE reader of the delightful volume, by Miss Kavanagh, entitled "*The Women of France*," which will be found examined at length in preceding pages, will not be disappointed by her "*Nathalie*." It is a novel, true;—and, for such a work, the "*Women of France*" affords us no guarantee, except in so much as regards the good sense and correct judgment of the writer, and her just appreciation of character. "*Nathalie*" is not a story of much invention. The incidents are not startling, nor are they frequent. The details are purely domestic; but these, depending upon the development of character, are lively, impressive and highly interesting. Miss Kavanagh, with equal truth to art and nature, has rightly conceived that character in fiction must be salient—must be imperfect—must not, in fact, be wholly ideal. The result is that we are naturally interested in the career of persons, who, with qualities to command attention, are identified with humanity by a full share of all its faults and deformities. Her *dramatis personæ* are all persons of many foibles, and strong and selfish passions. Her "*Nathalie*," is a true woman, and full of charming defects. She is commended to us by the sympathy which we equally feel for her foibles and her pride, as well as her grace, spirit, and sensibility. The



hero is one of similar excesses ; has pride and temper as well as taste and strength ; and does wrong with the confidence of a strong will, and under the grateful conviction that he does right, and is a model. So, of all the personages of this volume, with, perhaps, the single exception of one true, meek, modest christian, who serves as a foil to the heroine. This proportion of one to a score may be assumed as a very liberal allowance in a review of the character of humanity at large. The interest of the book depends upon the conflict of character only ; and not of what we may call action. The struggle is that of mind, manner, thought, and not of *physique*. It is a struggle of the highest interest,—keen, masculine, earnest—of mixed repose and excitement,—and is sustained, throughout, successfully—the characters playing their parts, each, according to the first conception of the author ; and the whole story being wrought out to a conclusion quite satisfactory to the laws of fiction, no less than of morals. There are faults in the book, and we are not satisfied that there is not a halting, if not a failure, in some of the closing scenes. But there are few stories so well managed, so sensibly and spiritedly, and with such agreeable and impressive issues.

3. *The Irish Confederates, and the Rebellion of 1798.* By HENRY M. FIELD. New-York : Harper & Brother. 1851.

IN spite of a loose and careless style, and the employment of much commonplace declamation, the author of this compilation has given us a readable and interesting narrative of a series of events in modern history, the details of which are little known to the American reader, however intimate we may be with the substantial facts. The fate of Ireland, and the cruel relation in which she stands with England, is well understood by the world, without a written history. Her exiled people are living histories, that chronicle her strifes and sufferings, as exiles, on every shore in Christendom. Verily, they revenge her cause upon her oppressors, even in exile ; for, on the continent of America, as in the old world, they have always been found striving in bloody argument with the hated Sassenagh. This narrative of Mr. Field, will show the sort of struggle which has been going on at home, for the last hundred years ;—which still goes on ; and to which there shall be a bloody sequel, no doubt, in the progress of future generations. Our author gives us a hurried glance at early Irish history, from the first passage at arms between that people and the English. His more important labour,—that which illustrates the more recent struggles between the races,—begins with 1782. The Irish revolution of this period is supposed to have been influenced by the successful issue of the American rebellion. From this time, Mr. Field's history advances regularly ; and, though a sketch merely, it is sufficiently close, and full of detail, for the popular comprehension. From this period, the career of the

Irish people, is, simply, a series of biographies of her leading men. Events belong to the individual patriotism and genius of those by whom they were precipitated. The better portions of the book, accordingly, are yielded to such names as Grattan, Curran, Tóine, Lord Edward Fitzgerald, the Emmets, McNeven, Sampson, and others. Several of these, as is well known, emigrated to this country, after the defeat of their objects in Ireland, and became distinguished citizens. These biographies are ample, and very readable, without being remarkable for any new developments, any freshness of suggestion, or beauty of style. A specimen of our author's manner may be had, in the following extract from his sketch of Fitzgerald, who served against us in the American Revolution :

"A more romantic character, and a life more full of adventure, can hardly be found even in the history of this romantic people, than that of Lord Edward Fitzgerald. He was descended from the most ancient British family in the island, and the most distinguished in Irish history. His ancestor, Maurice Fitzgerald, landed with the first English invasion in 1170. Yet though of English descent, this family had always espoused the cause of the oppressed natives of the soil, so much that they had been known as *Hibernis ipsis Hiberniores*. The father of Lord Edward was the Duke of Leinster ; his mother a daughter of the Duke of Richmond, so that he was on this side descended from Charles II. This son was born in 1763. At the age of seventeen he went out to Charleston, as a lieutenant in the American war. He soon became the idol of the army. His high rank and polished manners gave him access to any society, while his warm Irish heart made him a universal favourite. Those associated with him declared that they never knew so loveable a person. His open manner, his gayety, his bravery, and at the same time, his modesty, attached every body about him.

"He shortly distinguished himself in an action at Monk's Corner, and was appointed on Lord Rawdon's staff. He accompanied him in his rapid and successful march for the relief of Ninety-Six, always in the van of the army, by which his person was greatly exposed. At the battle of Eutaw Springs he received a severe wound in the thigh, and when the armies drew off, he was lying on the field insensible. When he awoke, the sound of battle was gone. The first living sight which met his eyes was a poor negro bending over him. This faithful creature raised the wounded officer on his back, and carried him off to his hut, and there nursed him until he was well enough to be removed to Charleston. This negro's name was Tony, whom Fitzgerald, in gratitude for his kindness, took to Charleston as his servant, and afterwards to Ireland. And thenceforth in all his wanderings, the 'faithful Tony' was never absent from his side.

"It has been questioned by those who have followed the subsequent career of Lord Edward, whether he did not imbibe some of his liberal principles during the American war. His biographer thinks not. Yet it would seem that a person of his ardent mind could hardly avoid being struck with the chivalrous daring of the rebel foe. The war in South-Carolina was, in some respects, more full of instances of romantic daring than in any other part of the country. After the American armies had been driven from the field, numerous corps of partisan cavalry were formed, which scoured the country, surprising detached parties, cutting off supplies, and making up for the defect of numbers by the celerity of their movements. They rode abroad chiefly by night, and during the day kept close under cover of the thick wood, or on an island in a morass. From these retreats they sallied out of a dark night, and after riding thirty or forty miles, came in like a thunderbolt on the enemy's camp.

"The Irish dragoons, who were employed in the partisan warfare in South-Carolina, began to conceive an admiration for the brave sons of the forest, who, without uniforms or military equipments, were yet more daring riders and more desperate fighters than themselves. The King's troops could not sit down in their camp to take a breakfast, but Marion's men came like so many wild Indians, dashing out of the wood, each horse foaming with speed, and each rider rising out of his saddle, and his blade flashing on high. At midnight they heard the rushing of their steeds, like goblin horsemen, and saw the quick flashes of their guns light up the greenwood round. The Irish troops felt enthusiasm for such a chivalrous foe. These were exhibitions of courage in which Fitzgerald delighted. There were too many points of resemblance between the condition of America and of Ireland—both oppressed by the same power—not to suggest themselves to their reflection—and many a time in this fraternal war, did their thoughts turn sadly to their own country. Discipline and the fierce passions of war made them fight bravely in the hour of battle. But even when victorious they wandered over the field of the slain, they could not but wish that they were fighting in a better cause.

"Fitzgerald saw something of these rebel chiefs. Colonel Washington, our best cavalry officer, was wounded and taken prisoner at Eutaw Springs. Lord Edward, though not recovered himself, volunteered to take charge of him to Charleston. As the two wounded officers rode side by side, Fitzgerald's Irish enthusiasm could hardly help feeling admiration for his prisoner, who had received his scars fighting for his country. On his death-bed, he alluded to his career in America. A military man called to see him in prison, who had known him in Charleston, and alluded to that period of their lives. 'Ah!' said the dying hero, 'I was then wounded in a very different cause;—that was in fighting against liberty—this in fighting for it.'"

We suspect there is some mistake, or some deficiency in these details. If Lord Edward was wounded and insensible at Eutaw, till the two armies had withdrawn from the field, and was nursed in a negro hut for any time after, it was scarcely possible for him to take charge of Col. Washington as a prisoner, on the same field of battle. The latter was wounded and taken by the command of Major Majoribanks, in the attempt, with cavalry alone, to force the position of the latter, in a thickly covered wood. Majoribanks, with the whole army of the British, *retreated the very day after the battle, to Charleston, and so precipitately as to leave seventy of their wounded* to the mercy of the Americans, who still held their ground in the neighborhood. If the negro, Tony, had the sole charge of Fitzgerald, and the Americans, alone, held possession of the ground, how could Fitzgerald obtain possession of Washington? The story is full of contradictions. At page 26, our author seems to us to do some injustice to the poet Spenser, in insisting that he recommended the policy by which the British Government laid waste the country of the Irish, and drove them to famine and desperation. Spenser might well think harshly of the Irish, since they burnt his dwelling over his head, and destroyed his favourite child in it;—but the passage which Mr. Fields quotes from the poet's "View of Ireland," is simply given as matter of fact, and does not appear to us to be designed as *counsel*, or recommendation. Such is the case, says Spenser,—“I see not how it can well be otherwise from the condition of the people, their peculiarities, and those of the country.” Yet he speaks of the wretchedness and the ruin, as calculated to “make the most stoney heart to rue the same.” His language is that of sorrow and mournfulness, when he thus painfully describes it, and not of hate or exultation.

4. *Characteristics of Literature, illustrated by the Genius of Distinguished Writers.* By HENRY TUCKERMAN. Second Series. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1851.

In previous pages of this Review, we have examined at some length the previous writings of Mr. Tuckerman, the volume, in particular, devoted to the *Characteristics of Literature*, of which this is a continuation. In that examination, we gave due credit to our author's claims; and, justly we believe, accorded our acknowledgments to his own characteristics. We spoke of his general merits as an Essayist; of his grace and facility as a writer; of the delicacy of his discrimination; of the sedate propriety and acuteness of his judgment, in general; and of the wide range of view which was exhibited by his writings. The volume before us will fully sustain his reputation, and confirm our opinions. It is marked by all the qualities for which we gave him credit. His topics now, as before, are of considerable range, interesting as biographies, and instructive and pleasing, as affording a correct analysis of the traits and peculi-



arities of certain well known writers of the Christian world. Manzoni, the Italian novelist, known to us chiefly by *I Promessi Sposi*, (The Betrothed,) Steele, the British Essayist, a frank manly writer; Humboldt, the great traveller and Naturalist; Madame de Sevigné, the French Letter Writer; Horne Tooke, the Politician and Philologist; John Wilson, *alias* Christopher North, the Magazinish and Poet; Talfourd, the Dramatist, author of "Ion,"—whom we take to be but little of a Dramatist, and whom we by no means consider a poet;—a writer greatly overrated;—and whom, by the way, Mr. Tuckerman treats precisely as if he entertained our opinions, (though he does not express them,) since it is the delicacy, the refinement and polish of Talfourd, that he commends, not his poetry, or his dramatic art;—Beckford, whom he designates as a traveller; whom he should rather describe as an intellectual voluptuary, and whom he really treats as such;—Hazlitt, the Critic,—rather more essayist than critic,—a delightful essayist, indeed, but, from his love of point and paradox, scarcely to be relied on; Edward Everett, the orator, of whom an ample review, in our last issue, makes an issue not dissimilar to that of our author;—and Godwin, as the Reformer, who was rather the dreaming Philosopher, and whose reforms have had no actual influence on the affairs of society. Here is the ample catalogue of topics discussed in the volume before us. Now, these names of authors, according to the plan of Mr. Tuckerman, are not permitted to suggest their writings to him as a Reviewer. He does not discuss their performances as a Critic. He simply adopts them as representing so many departments in letters, which departments he unfolds and describes as an Essayist. We note that, in his preface, he enters his *caveat*, in respect to the assumption made by us in our previous notice, that he had chosen these particular writers as the chief expositors of the several classes of letters which he designs to discuss. "The choice of writers," he says, "has been quite accidental, and subordinate to the principal aim—that of grouping around them something like a history and analysis of the species of writing in which they excelled." This statement obviates any objection which might be urged against the inadequacy of our author's criticism. In fact, in the volume before us, he attempts very little criticism, in the usual and limited sense of the word. The work is almost wholly essayical. But it is not the less to be commended for this reason. Its generalizations will hold true of other subjects, in the same categories, and are founded usually on just studies of the laws of art and literature. Yet, we are inclined to believe, that a little more *direct* criticism would greatly help the popularity of these writings, and we commend the point to the future consideration of our author. The field is one which he can profitably pursue. A good essay upon the general heads of the subject, for which the particular writer fur-

nishes the text, coupled with an ample analysis of the latter, would not render the plan of the work less unique, and would greatly increase its animation and interest.

5. *Nile Notes of a Howadji.* New-York : Harper & Bros. 1851.

"HOWADJI," is the Egyptian for traveller and shopkeeper—for shopkeeper, or merchant, properly,—but as, in Egyptian experience, all travellers are merchants, so the name is applied to both. Our Howadji, or traveller, is ambitious, however, of a somewhat higher position in the world of letters. He is not content to write the language either of shopkeeper or traveller. He has been beguiled from his propriety by the fascinations and success of "Eothen;"—a well known volume of Eastern travel, which greatly pleased the reading world a few years ago. The aim of the author of Eothen, was to show the world in which he wandered through a picturesque medium. He brought in to his aid the agencies of poetry. He employed fancy as an auxiliary to description, and his philosophy was agreeably mixed up with his narrative. Our Howadji has had the same notion in his mind. But he has mistaken himself. He is not the author of "Eothen;" though, in his way, a very clever person also. He has fancy. He possesses, in addition, some considerable resources of art. But he lacks, somewhat, the *philosophy*. He can swim,—nay even fly a little; but he cannot *dive*; and so he brings up from the depths no such pearls as Eothen could display. With a just notion of the picturesque, as seen through the medium of fancy,—(which implies pleasant humours and happy comparisons)—he does not well comprehend the picturesque, which depends upon the imagination, and which requires rare thought and a searching philosophy. *His* picturesque is in words and phrases. In these he is sometimes very happy, but he is as frequently monotonous. We get tired of vague phrases, however melodious,—and vague landscapes which show us only the palm trees drooping in a world of sunshine. There is quite too much of this in our author's volume. He gives us too few details. His ambition to avoid the literal, is too intense, too unvarying. We require, in a traveller, something more. If he will clothe his landscape in the picturesque, he must make it sufficiently distinct at least. We do not object to his musings, or his commentary, but he must let us see, more clearly, the forms that provoke his meditations. Besides, the meditations themselves must be proportionably original with the fanciful drapery in which he wraps them. Fine words and pretty fancies do not reconcile us to the commonplace. This is our author's deficiency. He is a *word-painter*, not a *scene-painter*. There is a want of *body* in his views. He is clever, nevertheless, and, read at intervals, his book is pleasant enough. But you must

not sit down to it. Take a chapter, now and then, when you are in a dreamy state, just after dinner; and let the volume keep you through the year; but beware how you make a meal of it. Here is one of his best chapters as a specimen:

"The sun is the secret of the East. There seems to be no light elsewhere. Italy simply preludes the Orient. Sorrento is near the secret. Sicily is like its hand stretched forth over the sea. Their sunsets and dreamy days are delicious. You may well read Hafiz in the odorous orange darkness of Sorrento, and believe that the lustrous leaves languidly moving over you, are palms yielding to the wooing of Arabian winds. The song of the Syrens, heard by you at evening, from these rocks, as you linger along the shore, is the same that Ulysses heard, seductive sweet, the same that Hadrian must have leaned to hear, as he swept, silken-sailed, eastward, as if he had not more than possible Eastern conquest in his young Antinous!

"But the secret sweetness of that song is to you what it was to Ulysses. Son of the East, it sang to him his native language, and he longed to remain. Son of the West, tarry not thou for that sweet singing; but push bravely on and land where the song is realized.

"The East is a voluptuous reverie of nature. Its Egyptian days are perfect. You breathe the sunlight. You feel it warm in your lungs and heart. The whole system absorbs sunshine, and all your views of life become warmly and richly voluptuous. Your day-dreams rise, splendid with sun-sparkling aerial architecture. Stories are told, songs are sung in your mind, and the scenery of each, and the persons, are such as is Damascus, seen at morning from the Salaheeyah, or Sala-ed-Deen, heroic and graceful, in the rosy light of chivalric tradition.

"The Egyptian sun does not glare, it shines. The light has a creamy quality, soft and mellow, as distinguished from the intense whiteness of our American light. The forms of our landscape stand sharp and severe in the atmosphere, like frost-work. But the Eastern outlines are smoothed and softened. The sun is the Mediator, and blends beautifully the separate beauties of the landscape. It melts the sterner stuff of your nature. The intellect is thawed and mellowed. Emotions take the place of thought. Sense rises into the sphere of soul. It becomes so exquisite and refined, that the old landmarks in the moral world begin to totter and dance. They remain nowhere, they have no permanent place. Delight and satisfaction, which are not sensual, but sensuous, become the law of your being; conscience, lulled all the way from Sicily in the soft rocking lap of the Mediterranean, falls quite asleep at Cairo, and you take your chance with the other flowers. The thoughts that try to come, masque no more as austere and sad-browed men, but

pass as large-eyed, dusky maidens, now, with fair folding arms that fascinate you to their embrace. Even old thoughts throng to you in this glowing guise. The Howadji feels once more, how the Nile flows behind history, and he glides gently into the rear of all modern developments, and stands in the pure presence of primitive feeling—perceives the naturalness of the world's first worship, and is an antique Arabian, a devotee of the sun, 'as he sails, as he sails.'

"For sun-worship is an instinct of the earliest races. The sun and stars are the first great friends of man. By the one he directs his movements, by the light of the other, he gathers the fruit its warmth has ripened. Gratitude is natural to the youth, and he adores where he loves—and of the God of the last and wisest faith, the sun is still the symbol.

"This sun shines again in the brilliance of the colours the Easterns love. The sculptures upon the old tombs and temples are of the most positive colours—red, blue, yellow, green and black, were the colours of the old Egyptians—and still the instinct is the same in their costume. The poetic Howadji would fancy they had studied the beauty of rainbows against dark clouds. For golden and gay are the turbans wreathed around their dusky brows, and figures—the very people of poetry—of which Titian and Paul divinely dreamed, but could never paint, sit forever in crimson turbans—yellow, blue and white robes with red slippers crossed under them, languidly breathing smoke over Abana and Parphar, rivers of Damascus. And the buildings in which they sit, the walls of baths and cafés and mosques, are painted in the same gorgeous taste, with broad bars of red, and blue, and white. Over all this brilliance streams the intense sunshine, and completes what itself suggested. So warm, so glowing, and rich, is the universal light and atmosphere, that any thing less than this in architecture would be unnatural. Strange and imperfect as it is, you feel the heart of nature throbbing all through Eastern art. Art there follows the plainest hints of nature in costume and architecture now, as in the antique architecture. The fault of oriental art springs from the very excess, which is the universal law of Eastern life. It is the apparent attempt to say more than is sayable. In the infinite and exquisite elaborations of Arabian architecture, there is the evident effort to realize all the subtle and strange whims of a luxuriantly inspired imagination; and hence results an art that lacks large features and character, like the work of a man who loves the details of his dreams.

"The child's faith that the East lies nearer the rising sun is absurd until you are there. Then you feel that it was his first born and inherits the elder share of his love and influence. Wherever your eye falls it sees the sun and the sun's suggestion. Egypt



lies hard against the heart. But the sun is like other fathers, and his eldest is spoiled.

"As you sweep sun-tranced up the river, the strongest, most distinct desire of being an artist, is born of silence and the sun. So saturated are you with light and colour, that they would seem to flow unaided from the brush. But not so readily, importunate reader, from the pen. Words are worsted by the East. *Chiaro 'scuro* will not give it. A man must be very cunning to persuade his pen to reveal those secrets. But, an artist, I would tarry and worship a while in the temples of Italy, then hurry across the sea into the presence of the power there adored. There I should find that Claude was truly a consecrated priest. For this silence and sun breathe beauty along his canvass. His pictures are more than Italian, more than the real sunset from the Pincio, for they are ideal Italy which bends over the Nile and fulfils the South. The cluster of boats with gay streamers at Luxor, and the turbaned groups under the temple columns on the shore, do justify those sunset dreams of Claude Lorraine, that stately architecture upon the sea.

"I was lost in a sun-dream one afternoon, wondering if, Saturn-like, the sun would not one day utterly consume his child, when I heard the Commander exclaim, 'El Karnak!' much as Columbus might have heard 'land' from his mast-head.

"'There,' said the Commander; and I could scarcely believe such a confirmation of my dreams of palm architecture, as my eye followed the pointing of his finger to a dim, distant point.

"'Those?' said I.

"'Those,' said he.

"I looked again with the glass, and beheld, solitary and stately upon the distant shore, a company of most undoubted trees! The Pacha was smiling at my side, and declaring that he saw some very fine palms. The Commander looked again, confessed his mistake, and in extenuation, I remarked that he was not golden-sleeved. And after all what was Alâ-ed-deen, if Mr. Lane will spell it so, without his lamp?

"A few moments after, a small boat drew up to us and an Emerald Howadji stepped on board. He had left Thebes at two o'clock, which sounded strangely to me when he said it, for I fancied Thebes already to have done with time, and become the property of eternity. He coffeed and smoked, and would leave a duck for dinner, gave us all the last news from Thebes, then shook hands and went over the side of the Ibis, and out of our knowledge forever.

"*Bon voyage*, Emerald Howadji, and as he pulled readily away with the flowing stream toward his descending Dahabieh, he fired at a heron that was streaming whitely over him across the stream, a parting salute possibly, and the dead heron streamed whitely after him upon the river."

## 6. RECENT POETICAL PUBLICATIONS.

1. *Shakspeare's Poems*. Phillips, Sampson & Co. Boston. 1851.
2. *Poems by Henry Theodore Tuckerman*. Boston. Ticknor, Reed & Fields. 1851.
3. *Christ in Hades: a Poem*. By WILLIAM W. LORD. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. 1851.
4. *Life: a Poem*. By D. PARISH BARHYDT. New-York: William Holdredge. 1851.

1. *Shakspeare's Poems*.—The first instalment of a new edition of Shakspeare's poetry, to be issued serially, in connection with the very beautiful edition of his plays, put forth by the same publishers. Two other large parts, like the one before us, will complete the collection, than which, certainly, nothing more admirable, in the way of printing, has ever been issued from the American press. We are not sure, indeed, if this be not the very first American edition of the Poems of Shakspeare—but we are very sure it is the only American edition that merits to be spoken of. Of course it does not need that we should comment on the works of Shakspeare,—even his meanest,—which these are *not*. His Poems have never yet been properly examined; there is abundant room for remark upon them, and their analysis, from new points of view, will probably make the reader acquainted with beauties in them which few conceive them to possess. They are certainly very curious evidences of a manner very different from that employed in his Plays;—and naturally so; but in evidence also of powers, and characteristics of his genius, which the dramas rarely exhibit. They are largely valuable on another account,—as affording the only collection of his writings in which we have any certain glimpses of the *personal* Shakspeare,—the individual man—as he felt and knew himself. They are more essential than *all* his dramas to any just idea of the moral nature, and the temperament, of their author.

2. *Tuckerman's Poems*.—We have hitherto known Mr. Tuckerman only as an Essayist, and have been pleased, more than once, to bear testimony to his merits in this department of literature. In the volume before us, he appears in an entirely new character, and one in which we certainly had not anticipated his appearance—that of the Poet. We had, it is true, occasionally seen a sonnet from his hands, in one or other of the Magazines; but that he had enjoyed such frequent communion with the Muse, as to make the record extend to a volume, was more than we had suspected. Yet here we have it; and quite a respectable volume of verse it is. His poetry, as might be conjectured, is gentle, musical, and contemplative, like his prose. In fact, in verse, as in prose, Mr. Tucker-

man is still an Essayist. Hardly any of the poems before us, but might be turned into a prose essay, gliding on in a quiet current of graceful fancies and unobstructed, natural and pleasing thought, such as his prose writings usually show. But Mr. Tuckerman is less musical as a poet than as a prose writer. We could shock him occasionally by requiring him to read his own verse with due regard to the proper quantities. We could show him, frequently, where he has set his foot down neither firmly nor gracefully. But we forbear. Enough that we give a specimen from this volume—not the best,—but a fair sample of the collection :

“THE NIGHT-BLOOMING CEREUS.

How coyly thou the golden hours dost number !  
 Not all their splendor can thy love beguile ;  
 Vainly the morning zephyrs fan thy slumber,  
 And noon's rich glory woos thee for a smile.

For thou dost blossom when cool shadows hover,  
 And dews are falling through the dusky air ;  
 When with new fervour dreams the happy lover,  
 And winds grow solemn with the voice of prayer.

While all around thee earth's bright things are sleeping,  
 Gay lilies fade and droops the crimson rose,  
 Fresh is the vigil thou alone art keeping,  
 And sweet the charms thy virgin leaves disclose.

Thus, in the soul, is deep love ever hidden,  
 Thus noble minds will fondly shun the throng,  
 And, at their chosen time, stand forth unbidden,  
 With peerless valour or undying song.

Thus the true heart its mystic leaves concealing,  
 Folds them serenely from the world's broad glare,  
 Its treasured bliss and inmost grief revealing  
 To the calm starlight and the dewy air.

Blest is thy lesson, vestal of the flowers,—  
 Not in the sunshine is our whole delight ;  
 Some joys bloom only in life's pensive hours,  
 And pour their fragrance on the breeze of night.”

3. *Lord's Christ in Hades*.—When, a few years ago, Mr. Lord published a verse of metrical miscellanies, we took occasion to reproach him, that, with very decided endowments for poetry,—a genuine and considerable talent for verse, a quickening fancy, much enthusiasm, which was indicative of the imaginative faculty, as well as the blood—ease and freedom in expression—and much industry, he should still be content to follow, servilely imitative of other wri-

ters, particularly Coleridge. We are not sure that Mr. Lord was at all aware of our censure; but we believe that the greater number of the American critical journals expressed themselves to the same effect. The result has not been to cure the evil in our author. We are sorry to say, now, that Mr. Lord's present volume is by no means an improvement upon the past. There, his models, Coleridge, Wordsworth, &c., were comparatively easy ones, in matters of style: and offered no impediments to the natural utterance of our author's fancies. But, with that peevish ambition which makes one

“O'erleap the selle,  
And fall on t'other side,”

he has abandoned his first and safer models, to follow one of the most difficult in any language,—one whose “divine paces” were of such strength and majesty, that he, alone, could safely make sport, and glorious dances, even in his self-imposed shackles. Mr. Lord has fallen into the fatallest error in his present performance. Here he frets and flounders along, striving wretchedly in mockery of the grand, swelling, but involved harmonies of Milton,—making laborious verse, after a very heavy, halting and awkward fashion, giving no freedom to his own muse, and making the most impotent mimeries of that of the great master. This is vastly unfortunate for our author. Mr. Lord has real endowments of his own, if he would only use them honestly, and with becoming discretion. Better that he should forget the great masters, than sink his own individuality forever, in the futile attempt to follow in their footsteps. This is not only a weakness, and a mistake, but a vanity. Let Mr. Lord look modestly into his own heart and mind, and see what they would have, and see of what they are capable. The attempt at Miltonic verse, bastardizes his own genius, and will ultimately ruin its peculiar powers. Of the poem before us we have hardly the patience to speak, it appears to us such a grievous perversion of one's faculties. The subject is scarcely a proper one; and our author's treatment of it, makes it at once awkward and unintelligible. His Invocation will afford a sufficient sample of the style and manner of his poem, and has probably been quite as much laboured as anything in the volume. We confess to finding the whole performance painfully obscure, and positively unreadable.

“Thou of the darkness and the fire, and fame  
Avenged by misery and the Orphic doom,  
Bard of the tyrant-lay! whom dreadless wrongs,  
Impatient, and pale thirst for justice drove,  
A visionary exile, from the earth,  
To seek it in its iron reign—O stern!  
And not accepting sympathy, accept



A not presumptuous offering, that joins  
That region with a greater name : And thou,  
Of my own native language, O dread bard !  
Who, amid heaven's unshadowed light, by thee  
Supremely sung, abidest—shouldst thou know  
Who on the earth with thoughts of thee erects  
And purifies his mind, and, but by thee,  
Awed by no fame, boldened by thee, and awed—  
Not with thy breadth of wing, yet with the power  
To breathe the region air—attempts the height  
Where never Scio's singing eagle towered,  
Nor that high-soaring Theban moulted plume,  
Hear thou my song ! hear, or be deaf, who may."

4. *Barhydt's Poem on Life*.—The first publication of Mr. Barhydt was one of Political Economy. He was an advocate for Free Trade, and was thus, in consequence of his doctrines, especially commended to our favour. We accorded him our acknowledgments in a complimentary article. The transition from Political Economy to Poetry is one not easy to be made. It seems to involve a something paradoxical. It is seldom, indeed, that the poetical faculty assimilates gracefully or genially with studies which are ordinarily assumed to be so dry and uninviting. Not that we would argue any natural antipathy between them. The truly great poet is probably equal to any human performances, since poetry is undoubtedly the most profound of all human philosophies. But the combination is a very rare one ; and we frankly confess that we do not find any argument in this *brochure* of Mr. Barhydt, at all calculated to reconcile us to the faith in their frequent combination. The poem of Mr. Barhydt labours under the objections urged against that of Mr. Lord. He has a bad subject, a difficult model, and his meanings are enveloped in obscurity and mist. Let us, *in limine*, admit that he has fancy and imagination—that his tastes are pure, and his sympathies genial and active. We cheerfully accord him these endowments. But, it will need something more than the production before us, to move us to encourage him in efforts of this nature. His design, itself, is singularly unfavourable, and unfriendly to success. "Life," absorbs too many subjects to be discussed properly in any single scheme. The subject is interminable. It is beyond any imagination ; and requires such an artist as the world has never yet seen, to commend it to any class of readers, if examined through a poetical medium. A single phase, or aspect, at a time ; Life's duration ; or its limits ;—its griefs or joys ;—its denials or opportunities ;—its despondency or exultation ;—each of these, and a thousand others, taken separately,—are sufficiently comprehensive for the plan of any one performance. To attempt to grasp *the whole*, at once, is only to lose oneself in vague and purposeless gene-

ralizations,—and to forego all hope of individualizing and fixing the object firmly in the mind ; which is one of the chief sources of success in poetical composition. This is the great defect in the attempt of Mr. Barhydt, who is also but imperfectly practised in the art of rhythm. The following passage will afford a fair idea of his whole performance :

“ Oh ! Beauty is a life,  
 A spirit dwelling all abroad, within,  
 Without ; a fair familiar that may fly,  
 May fetch and carry, penetrate the heart  
 And centre of the central orb of all  
 To mine the richest gems whose lustre glows  
 Dazzling to sense and gladdening heart of love ;  
 May skim the surface of remotest life,  
 And gild the blackest with effulgence all  
 Divine : sheer through all space on tireless wings,  
 It flies and gives a quality, where else  
 'Twere void : familiar faithful ! that may tell  
 In tongue its own whate'er this soul most craves,  
 Most needs to know, its home is everywhere.  
 Yet at my call it shall obedient  
 Forever minister to me—ay, here  
 And there eternally !”

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7. *Mayo's Romance Dust from the Historic Placer.* Putnam.

A series of spirited sketches from history, by a writer who, in “ Kaloolah,” and “ The Berber,” has distinguished himself by the beauty and imagination of his writings.

8. *Calhoun's Works.*—The first volume, beautifully prepared and printed, of the writings of Mr. Calhoun, edited by Richard K. Cralle, of Virginia, is now before us, and may be procured from all the bookstores in the State. We take for granted that every citizen who honours the memory of the great statesman, and appreciates justly the value of every thing that fell from his pen, will hasten to add this volume to his library. For ourselves, we must take time to examine, thoroughly, the profound treatises which it contains. Such a work is not to be dismissed hurriedly, or reviewed with too much eagerness. However desirous of adding our testimony to that of the public, in duly recording our opinions in its behalf, we owe too much to the writer, and to the subject matter which has exercised his mind, to speak without the most becoming deliberation.

9. *The Claims of Science*.—This is the title of a discourse, delivered by Wm. C. Richards, A. M., at the last Annual Commencement of Erskine College in this State. Our more youthful contemporary has long been known to us as a dexterous writer, devoted to literature and science, and honourably distinguishing himself in the cause by his equal industry and talent. He has here given us a graceful eulogy upon his favourite pursuits, and has shown us, through a picturesque medium, how exceeding lovely is science, how full of attraction to its votaries, how full of importance to mankind.

10. *Tah-Gah-Jute*, or Logan, and Captain Michael Cresap : a Discourse by BRANTZ MAYER; delivered in Baltimore, before the Maryland Historical Society, on its Sixth Anniversary, 9th May, 1851. Baltimore : John Murphy & Co. 1851.

It is well understood that the famous specimen of Indian eloquence, contained in the speech of the Shawanee Chief, Logan, as reported by Mr. Jefferson, was greatly indebted to the good taste, and the skilful furbishing of the American statesman, for its present fame, and for its success with the public. That Logan had afforded the raw material, which Jefferson polished to perfection, is perhaps unquestionable. The pamphlet before us sufficiently establishes the fact. But the credit is due to Mr. Jefferson of preserving in this speech all the essential characteristics of Indian eloquence, boldness, stern simplicity, and compressed passion, while subjecting them to the classical file, so as to commend it to the tastes of the most refined people, in possession of all the best models of art. But the impression made by the speech, as a specimen of striking passion and the most touching pathos, had the farther effect of making the public careless of the question of fact which it involved; and the assertion of Logan that his whole household had been destroyed by Colonel or Captain Michael Cresap, has been received without a doubt, and occupies a place in our history almost without denial. The farther assumption is, that Logan was a chief of the noblest and purest character, generous, humane, brave, and the consistent friend of the whites until the wanton massacre of his wife and children drove him to take up the weapons of war. There have been some obscure publications, which we have not seen, which joined issue with these assumptions, and furnished the true history of Logan,—relieving the memory of Cresap from the charges of brutality, and fixing the crime, if crime there were, upon very different persons. The pamphlet before us has the same object. It shows that Cresap was a most worthy man, as humane as brave and intelligent; one of the pioneers of the wilderness, and conspicuous among them for good qualities; a favourite and *employée* of Washington, and no ways accountable for the murders of which Logan complained:—that Logan was a capricious savage, a sot, and, when drunk,

as much a tiger as any of his people ;—that he had neither wife nor child shot in the canoe where his family was said to have been massacred ; but that his only kinsman who fell was a brother, and that he was actually anticipated when out with a war party against the whites. Even with this affair, Cresap had nothing to do. He was not with the whites by whom the act was committed. Mr. Mayer has argued the case with great fullness, has arrayed all the evidence before the reader, and establishes triumphantly the innocence of the worthy pioneer, whose memory has so long remained dishonoured under the false and unmeaning imputations of a drunken and lying Indian, whose wild eloquence was fortunate in having an editor in so accomplished a writer, and we may add, artist, as Thomas Jefferson. The essay before us contains some very valuable matters in regard to the early transactions on our Western frontier. It is a contribution to our history highly honourable to its author, and to the excellent society through whose means it is put before the public.

11. *Arvine's Cyclopædia of Anecdotes.* Gould & Lincoln.

WE have here the first part of a collection of anecdotes in relation to Literature and the Fine Arts,—men of letters, science, &c. A well conceived and well arranged Cyclopædia, the selection of the materials of which show equal reading, good taste, and research. The work will be comprised in eight parts, issued semi-monthly, at 25 cents each. It is well printed, and on fine paper.

12. *Illuminated Bible.* Hogan & Thompson.

THIS Bible is in a new and very beautiful style of art, well printed, with numerous plates, in oil, rich in colouring, and designed with skill. It is to be completed in about 50 parts, Apocrypha included ; issued semi-monthly ; to contain in all more than 200 chromatic engravings, each part having three at least, and each number at 25 cents. We are in the receipt of the first *eight* parts, with the exception of the *first* and *second*. Where are they ?

13. *Bush's Illustrations of the Holy Scriptures.* Lippincott, Grambo & Co.

A new edition of a very useful and valuable body of notes upon, and illustrations of, the Sacred Volume, embodying all that is of importance in the writings of Hermar, Burder, Paxton, Roberts, Keith, and others, including the observations of all the most celebrated oriental travellers.

14. *The Pictorial Field Book of the Revolution*, to be completed in about twenty parts, has reached its *sixteenth*, maintains its character, and continues to be supplied numerously with portrait illustrations, from the life, from nature, and from historical and other sources.









